The starting point of the period prescribed in Article 174 of the Civil Act, where the debtor who has been notified to perform the obligation requested the postponement of the performance to the creditor for the reason that it is necessary to examine the existence of the obligation.

In particular, in light of the purport of the extinctive prescription system, it is reasonable to interpret the starting point or the expiration point of the extinctive prescription system for the original right holder. As such, in a case where an obligor, for whom the peremptory notice as a cause of interrupting prescription under Article 174 of the Civil Act, has been given, requests a delay in performance to the obligee on the ground that it is necessary to examine whether the obligor is obligated to perform the obligation, etc., the validity of the extinctive prescription system shall continue until the obligee receives the reply. Therefore, it shall be interpreted that the period of six months as prescribed in the same Article is calculated from the time when the obligee receives a reply from the obligor.

Article 174 of the Civil Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Han, Attorneys Park Jae-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

[Judgment of the court below]

Korea

Seoul Civil District Court Decision 93Na35994 delivered on April 6, 1994

The part of the judgment below on the conjunctive claim is reversed and that part of the case is remanded to the Panel Division of Seoul District Court.

The appeal against the plaintiff's primary claim is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

The court below held that the military unit that used the land in this case for the plaintiff's primary claim was removed from the military unit on March 17, 1971, and that even after the defendant purchased the land in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for the Adjustment of Requisitioned Property, it cannot be deemed that the defect in the above purchase decision cannot be deemed null and void because it is significant and obvious, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements and validity of the purchase decision, such as the theory of lawsuit, or the lack of reasoning. There is no reason to discuss.

2. On the second ground for appeal

A. Summary of the reasoning of the judgment below

On March 12, 1982, the court below rejected the plaintiff's conjunctive claim for the execution of the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of repurchase. (1) Since the defendant did not use the Gun to purchase the land subject to requisition pursuant to the above special measures, the plaintiff purchased the right of repurchase on the same land around May 17, 1972. However, the plaintiff's delivery of a petition containing his/her intention of repurchase on March 12, 1982 before the expiration of the 10-year limitation period is recognized to have acquired the right of claim for the registration of ownership transfer on the ground of the above 9-year limitation period. (2) The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff's claim for the registration of ownership transfer was rejected on July 20, 1992, which was 196.

B. Judgment on the grounds of appeal

It is justifiable that the court below did not regard the reply and reply of the Minister of National Defense as an approval or conditional approval, which is a ground for the interruption of prescription.

However, in particular, in light of the purpose of the extinctive prescription system, it is reasonable to interpret the starting point or the expiration point of the extinctive prescription system for the original right holder. Therefore, in a case where an obligor, for whom a peremptory notice as a cause of interrupting prescription under Article 174 of the Civil Act, has been given, requests a postponement of performance to the obligee on the ground that it is necessary to examine whether the obligor is obligated to perform the obligation, etc., the validity of the extinctive prescription system shall continue until the obligee reaches the reply. Therefore, it shall be interpreted that the period of six months under the same Article is calculated from the time when the obligee receives a reply from the obligor (see Supreme Court Decision 74Da178 delivered on July 8, 1975).

As duly determined by the court below, the submission of a written petition to the effect that the plaintiff requests the return of the land of this case to the Minister of National Defense constitutes a peremptory notice which serves as the ground for suspending extinctive prescription, and if the Minister of National Defense recognizes that the reply and re-constition have been made as seen above, the defendant shall be deemed to have sought suspension of performance until he/she notifies the investigation, deliberation, and decision on the plaintiff's above petition for the investigation of the existence of the plaintiff's right to claim. In such cases, the period of six months under Article 174 of the Civil Act

Nevertheless, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the starting point of the "six months" under Article 174 of the Civil Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and thus, there is a reason to point out this issue.

3. Without further proceeding to decide on the remainder of the grounds of appeal, the part concerning the plaintiff's conjunctive claim is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The appeal against the plaintiff's primary claim is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing plaintiff. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)