Whether an application filed by the State Compensation Council for damage constitutes grounds for interruption of statute of limitations

The Plaintiff’s claim for damages as the principal claim to the State Compensation Council constitutes a peremptory notice to the Defendant to discharge the obligation to the Defendant, and the Defendant applied for postponement of performance until the above claim is decided. In this case, if the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit within six months from the time the above Compensation Council was decided on within six months since the period of six months under Article 174 of the Civil Act does not proceed until the above decision is made by the Compensation Council, it is reasonable to view that the progress of extinctive prescription has been suspended.

Articles 766 and 174 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 74Da178 delivered on July 8, 1975 (Supreme Court Decision 1090Da1090 delivered on June 23, 199, Supreme Court Decision 23Du179 delivered on June 23, 200, Civil Code Article 174(2)268 delivered on July 268, 200, Court

Plaintiff

Busan City

Busan District Court (76 Gohap1675)

The original judgment shall be modified as follows:

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of KRW 1,491,392 with an annual interest rate of 5% from November 15, 1976 to the full payment.

The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant in the first and second instances.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 2,479,00 won with 5% interest per annum from November 15, 1976 to the date of full payment.

The judgment that the lawsuit costs shall be borne by the defendant and the declaration of provisional execution

The original judgment shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

(1) According to Gap evidence Nos. 1-2, Gap evidence Nos. 2, Eul evidence Nos. 4-1-5, Eul evidence Nos. 2-2, Eul evidence Nos. 1-2, and Eul evidence Nos. 2-1 and the purport of the party member's on-site inspection and pleading, the plaintiff's land Nos. 1-2 and 1-2 of the same City Nos. 39 of the same City No. 38 of the same City No. 39 of the same city No. 39 of the same city No. 1 (hereinafter "the forest of this case") are owned by the plaintiff, and the defendant's land no. 1,55,000 square meters in the Dong-dong and hot spring No. 100 of the same city No. 1965 of Apr. 21, 1965 are constructed to build a park site no. 1,55,000 square meters in a park and build a park no.

Therefore, the plaintiff did not provide the forest land of this case free of charge to the defendant Si, and if the defendant market conducted a project without any lawful follow-up measure in accordance with the above construction schedule notice, and thereby became subject to restrictions on the exercise of private rights by incorporating it into the site of urban park, the defendant market shall be deemed to have executed the park project in an unlawful manner within the extent of the scope of the project. Thus, unless there are special circumstances, the plaintiff lost possession from the end of December 1972 where the defendant market was prohibited from entering the steel network, thereby making it impossible for the plaintiff to use or profit from the above forest land. Thus, the defendant market shall be held liable for damages caused by the plaintiff's failure to use or profit from the above illegal possession.

(2) (A) The defendant alleged that the possession of the forest land of this case at the time of the defendant is a lawful possession by the Park Act, and that the private person's land is to be used as a site for an urban park pursuant to Article 7 of the Park Act. However, there is no material to deem that the defendant's land occupies the forest land by following the above procedure, and the above assertion is groundless.

(B) Even if the possession of the land at the time of the Defendant is illegal possession, the Defendant asserts that there is no damage to the Plaintiff since the land owner is permitted to use the land for the purpose of the park, but the Plaintiff can use the land within the extent consistent with the purpose of the park with the permission of the Si of the Defendant, with the permission of the Si of the Si of the Defendant, and it cannot be said that there is no damage to the Plaintiff

(C) The Defendant asserts that the extinctive prescription period of 1973 has expired since the Plaintiff’s claim for damages occurred due to tort. As such, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff was aware of damages and tort committed by the perpetrator on another’s land, barring special circumstances, and that extinctive prescription should run from that time. Meanwhile, the Plaintiff’s claim for damages to the State Compensation Council pursuant to the State Compensation Act constitutes a demand for the performance of the obligation to compensate for damages against the Defendant, and that the period of 6 months pursuant to Article 174 of the Civil Act has expired until the said decision of the Compensation Council was rendered, and that if the Defendant filed a lawsuit within 6 months from the above decision of the Compensation Council, it would be reasonable to view that the extinctive prescription has run within 17 months from that of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages and tort committed by the perpetrator, barring special circumstances, the extinctive prescription period of 17 months from that of the above decision of 97 months from that of the Plaintiff’s claim for damages until the said decision of compensation Council was rendered.

(3) Therefore, the defendant Si is liable to compensate the plaintiff at least for the damages of the rent for the forest of this case. It is found that the party member's appraiser's annual rent for the forest of this case was 140 won in 1973, 160 won in 1974, 240 won in 1975, 270 won in 1976, and 270 won in 1976, and 6 of evidence No. 4-6 in 1975 did not believe, so it is obvious that the amount equivalent to the rent for the forest of this case 2,010 won in 2,000 from March 2, 1973 to October 31, 1976 2,010 x 235,142 won in x 】 1970 won in x 205 x 305 / 1601 in 197, 2194).

(4) Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay at the rate of 1,491,392 won (235,142+321,600 +482,400 +452,250) and the rate of 5% per annum under the Civil Act from November 15, 1976 to the date of full payment as sought by the plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff's claim for this case is justified within the above recognized limit, and the remainder of the claim shall be dismissed as it is without merit. The original judgment changes part of the conclusion, and it is so decided as per Disposition by applying Articles 96, 89, and 92 of the Civil Procedure Act with respect to the burden of litigation costs.

Judges Park Jae-sik (Presiding Judge) Kim Hun-Un