[1] Requirements for establishing a joint principal offender

[2] The case holding that the participation in the act of forging a passport alone cannot be deemed as a participation in the act of forging a passport

[1] In order to constitute a joint principal offender, the subjective requirement is the intent and objective requirement of joint processing, and the fact of execution of a crime through functional control based on the joint doctor is required. As a subjective requirement, the intent of joint processing is not sufficient only to recognize another person's crime but not to restrain it, and it should be one of the subjective requirements to move one's own intent by using another person's act.

[2] The case holding that a person involved in the act of forging a passport alone cannot be deemed as having participated in the act of smuggling with the intention of co-processing, on the ground that the act of forging a passport, which is entirely separate from the act of forging a passport, does not necessarily require a forged passport, but can not be used only by the act of forging a passport

[1] Article 30 of the Criminal Code / [2] Article 3 of the Stowging Control Act, Article 30 of the Criminal Code

[1] Supreme Court Decision 97Do1940 delivered on September 30, 1991 (Gong1997Ha, 3364), Supreme Court Decision 95Do2461 delivered on January 26, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 846), Supreme Court Decision 96Do2427 delivered on January 24, 1997 (Gong197Sang, 708), Supreme Court Decision 97Do1940 delivered on September 30, 1997 (Gong197Ha, 3364) (Gong198Ha, 2044)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Seoul District Court Decision 98No102, 3423 delivered on May 28, 1998

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

In order to constitute a joint principal offender, the subjective requirement is the intention of joint processing and objective requirements, which require the fact of execution of a crime through functional control based on the intention of joint process. As a subjective requirement, the intention of joint process is not sufficient only to recognize another person’s criminal act but not to restrain it, and it should be one of the subjective requirements to move one’s own intent by using another’s criminal act (see Supreme Court Decision 97Do3297, Jun. 26, 1998, etc.).

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below held that "the defendant conspireds with non-indicted 1 and non-indicted 2 and 3, who are the non-indicted 1, who is the technician of the passport, to forge his passport, and forged his passport through the above non-indicted 1, who is staying in Japan, and delivered it to the Dong through the non-indicted 1, thereby violating Article 3 (1) of the Stows Control Act." As to the facts charged that "the act of smuggling regulated in Article 3 (1) of the Stows Control Act does not necessarily mean that the act of forging the passport is completely separate from the act of forging the passport, and it does not necessarily mean that the defendant's participation in forging the passport can not be deemed that he participated in the act of forging the passport with the intention of co-processing, and that the defendant's act of forging the passport cannot be seen as having committed an act of forging the passport by itself, or because the defendant's act of forging it cannot be seen as having committed an act of forging the above subjective act of buying the passport by itself.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)