[1] Requirements for establishing a joint principal offender / In a case where a person who participated in the commission of a crime does not constitute a crime in his/her own act by using another accomplice according to his/her joint will, whether he/she is liable for the joint principal offender (negative in principle)

[2] Whether a person can be punished as a co-principal of an offense of false accusation in a case where he/she conspireds with a third party and participates in an act of false accusation (negative)

[1] A co-principal under Article 30 of the Criminal Act is liable for the entire crime in cases where the elements of a crime are realized through co-principal’s cooperation and sharing of charges among accomplices according to the intent to jointly commit the crime. In order to establish such a co-principal, the subjective elements are the intent and objective requirements of co-principal, which require the fact of implementation of a crime through functional control by a co-principal by a co-principal. In such a case, the intent of co-principal should be integrated for the purpose of committing a specific crime with a co-principal’s intent, and the intention of co-principal should be transferred to one another by using another’s act. Therefore, even if a person involved in the commission of a crime is one of the co-principal’s own intent, unless there are special circumstances, he/she is a co-principal’s liability for a co-principal, barring special circumstances.

[2] The crime of false accusation under Article 156 of the Criminal Act refers to a crime of reporting false facts for the purpose of having another person receive criminal punishment or disciplinary disposition. The act of reporting false facts for the purpose of having one person receive criminal punishment or disciplinary disposition, i.e., reporting one’s own act does not constitute an element of a crime of false accusation, and thus does not constitute an element of a crime of false accusation. Therefore, even if a person conspired with a third party to act without one’s own accusation and participated in an act without one’s own accusation, it is merely an attempt to realize an act which does not constitute an element of a crime of false accusation and thus, it cannot be punished as a co-principal

[1] Article 30 of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 30 and 156 of the Criminal Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 95Do2461 delivered on January 26, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 846) Supreme Court Decision 2000Do576 delivered on April 7, 200 (Gong2000Sang, 1214) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2008Do4852 Delivered on October 23, 2008 (Gong2008Ha, 1647)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Cheongju District Court Decision 2013No517 decided September 26, 2013

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The summary of the facts charged in the primary charge of the instant case is as follows. In collusion with Nonindicted 1 and Nonindicted 2, the Defendant decided to file a false accusation against the Defendant by forging a private document, etc., the Defendant, Nonindicted 1, and Nonindicted 2 decided to challenge the Defendant in the manner of preparing for an answer to the anticipated question of the investigative agency, and Nonindicted 1 made and submitted a false accusation that the Defendant punished the Defendant according to his public offering, thereby making the Defendant not guilty.

In regard to this, the lower court determined that, on the grounds that the self-government of one’s own self-government does not constitute a non-government crime, the person who committed his/her own self-government could not be punished as a co-principal of a non-government crime with a third party.

2. A co-principal under Article 30 of the Criminal Act is liable for the entire crime in cases where the elements of a crime are realized through co-principal’s cooperation and sharing of charges among accomplices according to the intent to jointly commit the crime. In order to constitute a co-principal, a subjective element is the intent to jointly process and objective requirements, and the fact that the crime is committed through functional control by a co-principal. In such a case, the intent to jointly process is one for the purpose of committing a specific crime with the intention to jointly commit the crime, and the intention to jointly process is to move to the commission of one’s own intent by using another’s act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Do2461, Jan. 26, 1996; 200Do576, Apr. 7, 200). Therefore, even if a person involved in the commission of a crime, if that person’s act does not constitute a crime by using another co-offender, barring any special circumstance, the co-principal cannot be held liable for a co-principal.

The crime of false accusation under Article 156 of the Criminal Act refers to a crime of reporting false facts for the purpose of having another person receive criminal or disciplinary punishment. The act of reporting false facts for the purpose of having one person receive criminal or disciplinary punishment, i.e., having himself/herself receive criminal or disciplinary punishment, does not constitute a crime of false accusation, and thus does not constitute a crime of false accusation (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do4852, Oct. 23, 2008). Therefore, even if a person conspired with a third party to act without his/her own accusation and participated in the act of false accusation, this is merely a crime of false accusation, which does not constitute an element of a crime of false accusation, and thus, he/she cannot be punished as a co-principal of a crime of false accusation.

3. The lower court’s determination is justifiable in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine. In so determining, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the elements of a crime of false accusation or a joint principal.

The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)