2021Do6374 A. Violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (Rape, etc.)

Name of the crime: Violation of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse

【Guidance, etc. Magazine】

(b) Violation of the Child Welfare Act (voluntary coercion, intermediary, or sexual harassment against a child);

Sexual harassment, etc.)

2021 Jeondo65 (Joint Attachment Orders)

A

Defendant and the respondent for attachment order and the prosecutor

Attorney Full-time (National Assembly)

Law Firm (LLC) LLC

Attorney Park Jong-hoon, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Daegu High Court Decision 2020No528, 2020No55 decided May 13, 2021

July 29, 2021

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the prosecutor's grounds of appeal

A. Defendant case

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court upheld the first instance judgment that acquitted the Defendant on the ground that there was no proof of a crime regarding the violation (Rape, etc.) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse (hereinafter referred to as the “Juvenile Protection Act”), which is the primary charge of the instant facts charged. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the “Assault” under Article 7(1)

B. As to the claim for attachment order

If a prosecutor files an appeal against a prosecuted case, the appeal is deemed to have been filed regarding the case claiming an attachment order. However, there is no indication in the petition of appeal as to the grounds of appeal nor any statement in the grounds of appeal as to the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the ground of appeal by the defendant and the respondent for attachment order

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court upheld the first instance judgment convicting of the instant facts charged (excluding the part not guilty). Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the “defluence” under Article 7(5) of the Juvenile Sex Protection Act

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Dong-gu

Justices Kim Jae-hyung

Justices Ansan-chul et al.

Justices Noh Jeong-hee