Effect of modification of the purpose of use for distributed farmland;

After a farmland distribution disposition is made pursuant to this Act, it can not be permitted to change the purpose of use of the farmland, and such approval disposition shall be deemed to be null and void in its nature.

Article 6 subparag. 4 of the Farmland Reform Act

Supreme Court Decision 60Da336 Decided August 30, 1962

Plaintiff

Defendant

Seoul High Court Decision 66Na1273 delivered on February 24, 1967, Seoul High Court Decision 66Na1273 delivered on February 24, 1967

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

(1) We examine the Defendant’s agent, Kim Jong-soo’s grounds of appeal.

The court below recognized the following facts. In other words, the land at issue in this case is originally distributed as distributed farmland under the Farmland Reform Act and continued to be repaid, and the plaintiff transferred this land to the non-party on or around November 1953 under the condition that the redemption of this land was completed. The non-party also transferred this land to the defendant on January 29, 1954 under the condition that the redemption was completed, and there was a real delivery of the above distributed farmland each time the above sale was made between the plaintiff, the non-party, and the defendants at the time of the above sale. In addition, the sale of distributed farmland between the above three parties is limited to farmland purchase and sale and the site formation. The defendant's transfer registration passed through the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the defendant as of December 30, 1962 without the consent of the plaintiff, who had been previously owned by the defendant, and the defendant did not have an intent to use the plaintiff's seal in the process that the plaintiff expressed his intention to commit an attack to the defendant, and thus, it cannot be found that the plaintiff did not use the above evidence.

(2) Next, we examine the Defendant’s agent’s grounds of appeal.

(A) As to the first ground for appeal, it cannot be viewed that the Defendant asserted that there is no legal defect in the fact-finding court, and that this argument refers to the argument that the Plaintiff’s claim for illegal consideration as stated in Article 2 of the Civil Act or the purport of submitting a defense as to illegal consideration as stated in Article 746 of the Civil Act. Therefore, even though the lower court did not determine on this point, it cannot be said that there is a above law in the judgment of the lower court, even though the lower court did not determine on this point, it cannot be said that there is the above law in the judgment

(B) On the second ground of Article 2, since a farmland distribution disposition under the Farmland Reform Act was made only once, it cannot be permitted to approve the change of the purpose of use of the farmland, and such a permit disposition is a case of a party member (see Supreme Court Decision 62Da336, Aug. 30, 1962). If the plaintiff was distributed one farmland in this case, even if there was a permit to change the purpose of use of the farmland in this case, this disposition is null and void, and it cannot be adopted to discuss the theory on the premise that the change of purpose of use of the farmland was null and void (after the plaintiff was appointed as a director) and later, the change of purpose of use of the farmland in this case was cancelled. Accordingly, as long as the plaintiff was legally distributed the farmland in this case, it can be argued that the plaintiff's right can be asserted as a person who has changed the purpose of use of the farmland in this case as a result of revocation of the change of purpose of use of the farmland in this case.

(C) As to the third, fourth, and fifth points, this paper argues that the defendant did not follow the procedure for ownership transfer registration as of December 30, 1963 with respect to the land of this case by a forged document, and that there was no actual delivery of this case between the plaintiff, the non-party, and the defendant, and that the sale and purchase of the farmland of this case was against the rules of evidence established by the court below as to this point. However, with regard to this point, it has already been explained in the above paragraph (1) above, it shall not be re-written. Further, only with the document No. 6, it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff transferred ownership to the defendant again on December 24, 1963 with respect to the land of this case. This is because, as seen above, the plaintiff's expression of intent to the defendant has not been made to the defendant, and there is no violation of the legal principles as to the sale and purchase of the land of this case by the court below, and the appeal shall be dismissed as it is without merit.

The judge of the Supreme Court is Hong Dong-dong (Presiding Judge) and Dong-dong (Presiding Justice)