Loss of farming rights under Article 25 (1) of the Farmland Reform Act

Even if a person refuses, interferes with, or violates the enforcement of this Act as referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it is limited to the case where the court declares that the right to cultivate is lost for that reason as a kind of punishment.

Article 25 (1) of the Farmland Reform Act

Supreme Court Decision 4288Noh87 Decided March 8, 1956

Plaintiff

Defendant (Attorney Han Han-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 66Na55 delivered on August 12, 1966

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the Defendant’s agent’s ground of appeal.

(1) On the first ground for appeal

In full view of relevant evidence, the lower court recognized the fact that the Defendant, on or after the end of April 1965, had 10 young people and had them deprived of possession of farmland at issue in the instant case due to violence.

According to the records, there is no evidence evidence illegality in the above process of fact-finding. Thus, the defendant should be viewed as impeding the plaintiff's right to cultivate the farmland as the main part of this case, and it is reasonable for the court below to accept the plaintiff's claim on this premise as to the holding of possession by possessory right and the preservation of possession.

The issue is that the ownership of the farmland of this case is restored to the defendant and requires the plaintiff to deliver it to the plaintiff with the knowledge that it is restored to the defendant. However, even if the ownership of the farmland of this case is about to possess it, it would be better to view that the farmland of this case currently occupied by the plaintiff is not voluntarily delivered to him, and that it would interfere with the plaintiff's right of cultivation (right of possession) against the plaintiff's will.

In addition, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on possession and preservation of possession. In so doing, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on possession and preservation of possession.

(2) On the second ground for appeal:

Even though the statement No. 1, No. 2, No. 4, and No. 7 is combined, the ownership of the original farmland which was naturally purchased by the State at the time of the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act cannot be deemed to be the waiver of ownership thereafter by the State. Even if there is a fact that the Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor returned the money that was compensated for once to the defendant who was a prop, and received again from the defendant due to any circumstance, it cannot be deemed that the original farmland, which was a non-self-owned farmland, was not distributed at the time of the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act, is returned to the self-owned farmland.

This paper is a theory that is not based on the legal basis of the state's forced purchase of farmland.

In addition, there is no violation of evidence supporting the original decision that the plaintiff continued to be satisfy at the time of the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act. There is no misunderstanding of the legal principles referred to as the arguments.

(3) On the third ground for appeal:

As can be seen, even if the Plaintiff’s failure to repay farmland without filing an application for distribution or re-distribution, and even if the Plaintiff’s failure to repay the farmland constitutes a person who has rejected, avoided, or violated the farmland reform law as referred to in Article 25(1) of the Farmland Reform Act, it is limited to a case where the court declares that the Plaintiff’s loss of the right to cultivate is a kind of punishment for the Plaintiff (Supreme Court Decision 4288Hun-Ga87 delivered on March 8, 1956), and in the absence of such a fact, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have lost the right to cultivate the farmland as a matter of course in this case.

The argument can not be employed because it is a theory without the basis of the appellant. The judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles under Article 25 of the Farmland Reform Act, and there is no other error in domestic documentary evidence, which can not affect the judgment of the court below.

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party.

This decision is consistent with the opinions of the involved judges.

The judges of the Supreme Court, the two judges (Presiding Judge) of the two judges of the Supreme Court and the vice versa.