[1] A person who is entitled to assert the application of the provisions of expression agency under the Civil Act with respect to the article of the act of endorsement of a bill (i.e., the endorsement in question) and the requirements for a third party purchaser of a bill to exercise the right to the bill against the person to be counterfeited

[2] Where Gap forged the endorsement under Eul's name and then delivered it to Byung under Eul's name, Byung cannot be directly liable for the expression agency of Eul's name as to Eul's name because it is merely a third party, not a direct other party of endorsement under Eul's name,

[1] As to Article 1 of the Civil Act, the provision on representation of a bill is applied or applied mutatis mutandis. In this case, the person who can assert the application of the provision is limited to the other party to the act of a bill. The other party to the act of endorsement of a promissory note refers only to the person against whom the endorsement in question is made, and the person who acquires a bill again from the person against whom the endorsement in question is made falls under the third party, not the other party to the act of endorsement in question, and the third party purchaser of a bill can exercise his right to the bill against the person against whom the bill is counterfeited.

[2] Where Gap forged the endorsement under Eul's name and then delivered it to Byung under Eul's name, the direct opposite party to the endorsement under Eul's name is Gap, and Byung is a person who acquired the endorsement again from Gap, and as to Eul's endorsement, it constitutes a third acquisitor, and Byung cannot be held liable as an expression agent for Eul's direct endorsement

[1] Article 126 of the Civil Code, Article 7 of the Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes Act / [2] Article 126 of the Civil Code, Article 7 of the Bills of Exchange

[1] Supreme Court Decision 91Da3994 delivered on June 11, 1991 (Gong1991, 1906), Supreme Court Decision 93Da21521 delivered on May 27, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1814), Supreme Court Decision 96Da21751 delivered on November 28, 1997 (Gong198Sang, 34) (Gong1999, 19666)

Dong-A Mutual Savings and Finance Company (Attorney Kim Jong-soo, Counsel for defendant-appellee)

United Nations aluminium Co., Ltd.

Daegu District Court Decision 98Na2233 delivered on February 3, 1999

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the main claim

A. The court below examined the process and decision of the evidence that each endorsement under the name of the defendant under the name of the non-party 1, who is the representative director of the co-defendant of the court of first instance, was forged by the non-party 1, as stated in the separate sheet of promissory note (hereinafter referred to as the "bill No. 1 or No. 4 of this case" in the separate sheet of the court below as stated in the judgment below, in light of the records, and therefore, it is reasonable, and there is no error of law of misconception of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal. The ground of appeal is without merit, since it is merely a defect of the judgment of the court below on the premise that the determination of the evidence and the fact were

B. As to Article 2 of the Act on Representation of Bill, the provision of the Civil Act shall be applied or applied mutatis mutandis. In this case, the person who can assert the application of the provision shall be limited to the other party to the act of a bill. The other party to the act of endorsement of a Promissory note shall refer only to the person to whom the endorsement in question is made, and the person who acquires the Promissory Notes again from the person to whom the endorsement in question is made falls under the third party, not the other party to the act of endorsement in question. In a case where the third party to the act of endorsement of the Promissory Notes is recognized as a direct representation of the other party to the act of the Promissory Notes, the third party can only use the same as the other party to the act of endorsement in question and may exercise his rights against the other party (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Meu2310, Sept. 9, 198; 91Da3994, May 27, 1994; 98Da27470, Jan. 29, 299).

According to the facts duly established by the court below, the non-party 1, the representative director of the co-defendant company of the first instance court, has forged the defendant's endorsement in the column of endorser of each of the Promissory Notes in this case, and has delivered it to the plaintiff again in the name of the co-defendant company of the first instance court. If the facts are the same, the direct counterpart of the endorsement in the name of the defendant is the co-defendant company of the first instance court, which is the part of the co-defendant company of the first instance court, and the plaintiff, who has acquired it again from the co-defendant company of the first instance court and acquired it, constitutes a third acquisitor with respect to the endorsement in the name of the defendant. Thus, the plaintiff cannot be held liable for the expression of the defendant's name directly against the defendant, and it can only be invoked in the case where the co-defendant company of the first instance court, which is the direct counter-party, is recognized as an expression agent to the co-defendant company of the first instance court.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion as an expression agent on the ground that there is no assertion or proof as to whether a co-defendant of the court of first instance, who is an unauthorized representative, has the basic right to represent the defendant, and that there is no justifiable ground to believe that the co-defendant of the court of first instance, in the course of engaging in an endorsement in the name of the defendant beyond his/her authority, there is no reasonable ground to believe that the right to represent exists. The judgment of the court below is based on the premise that the plaintiff is the direct counterpart of the endorsement in the name of the defendant, so it is not reasonable in its reasoning, but it is just in its conclusion to reject the plaintiff's assertion as an expression agent.

C. We examine the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records. The court below acknowledged that the plaintiff's employees at the time of discount of the bill Nos. 2 and 3 bill of this case did not verify whether each of the endorsement in the name of the defendant was authentic or not, and the above endorsement was not known to the plaintiff's employees at the time of discount of the bill Nos. 2 and 3 bill, and the court below determined that the defendant's ratification was not possible for the joint defendant company's act of endorsement in the name of the defendant. The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to ratification of the bill of this case as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the conjunctive claim

A. In light of the records, the court below's rejection of the plaintiff's claim claiming damages against the defendant, who is the employer, on the premise that the defendant's employees stand liable for tort against the bill No. 1 and bill No. 4 of this case. There is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts due to violation of the rules of evidence or misunderstanding of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the defendant's act of using the non-party 1's improper act, and found that the non-party 1's act of using the non-party 2's real name and the non-party 3's official seal affixed to the non-party 2's employees at the time of this case's improper act of using the non-party 1's new bill at the time of this case's improper act of using the non-party 2's false seal affixed to the non-party 3's employees, and made an endorsement again in the name of the co-indicted 1's company on December 5, 195, and received discount from the plaintiff on December 26, 195. The plaintiff's act of using the non-party 2's false seal affixed to the non-party 3's employees at the time of this case's improper act of using the defendant's improper seal discount to obtain the defendant's original official seal affixed to the non-party 1's employees, and then made an alteration of each of this case's bill.

According to the records, if the company of the first instance finds that the above employee's seal imprint was affixed to the above employee's above employee's seal imprint (No. 3-2 of the above employee's seal imprint) at the time of submission of the above employee's name, and the seal imprint (No. 3-1 of the above employee's seal imprint) is attached to the company's seal imprint which was reported to the registry, and thus, it is difficult to view that the above employee's seal imprint was altered by prior method and contents of the employee's seal imprint's own seal imprint (2) as the above employee's seal imprint's seal imprint's own seal imprint's own seal imprint's own seal impression, and it is difficult to view that the plaintiff's above employee's seal imprint's above employee's above employee's seal impression was affixed to the above employee's above employee's seal imprint's own seal imprint's own signature affixed to the defendant's above employee's above employee's 1-6-1 of the above employee's seal imprint's own seal imprint's.

3. Therefore, the appeal shall be dismissed and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Cho-Un (Presiding Justice)