[1] The case holding that it is not necessary to undergo disciplinary procedures under the collective agreement at the time of dismissal, in case where the personnel regulations have grounds for dismissal separately from the grounds for disciplinary action and the dismissal is not stipulated as one of disciplinary action

[2] Whether the number of days during the period of work of a shift system repeated by two weeks a day off a day of service shall be a holiday even if he/she is absent from work on the preceding day (negative)

[1] The case affirming the judgment below holding that the personnel regulations provide that an employee may be dismissed ex officio if there is a ground for dismissal separate from the grounds for disciplinary action, and that the disciplinary action is divided into removal, dismissal, suspension from office, reduction of salary, and reprimand, and that the collective agreement does not stipulate dismissal as one of the disciplinary action, and that the disciplinary action cannot be deemed to include ex officio dismissal under the collective agreement, and that ex officio dismissal under the personnel regulations does not require the procedures for disciplinary action under the collective agreement in the case of ex officio dismissal.

[2] During the period of work of the 3rd class system implemented by dividing a shift worker into four groups, the number of days during the period of work of the 1st class system that repeats one day a day every two weeks during the period of work of the 3rd class system is only recognized as a case where the normal work is performed on the day preceding the previous day, and it cannot be deemed as a recognized holiday regardless of whether the previous work is normal.

[1] Article 27 of the Labor Standards Act / [2] Articles 27, 45, and 47-2 of the Labor Standards Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Da42082 delivered on March 24, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1722), Supreme Court Decision 94Da35350 delivered on June 30, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2547), Supreme Court Decision 95Da1767 delivered on July 14, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2801) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 88Da4277 delivered on May 9, 198 (Gong1989, 888)

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Firm citizen General Law Office, Attorney Kim Do-ro, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission

Seoul Metropolitan Government subway Corporation (Attorney Han-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 95Gu3383 delivered on October 19, 1995

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

Article 35 of the Personnel Regulations (No. 1) of the Defendant Intervenor’s Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the “ Intervenor”) provides that an employee may be dismissed ex officio if any ground for dismissal provided for in each subparagraph of Article 35 exists, separate from the grounds for disciplinary action provided for in Article 45. Article 46 of the Personnel Regulations provides that an employee may be dismissed ex officio. While the collective agreement of this case concluded in 1993 does not provide for dismissal procedures as a disciplinary action, the collective agreement of this case does not provide for dismissal procedures and only provides for disciplinary action. Thus, ex officio dismissal is the same as that of disciplinary action in that it terminates labor relations by the employer’s unilateral declaration of intent. In the collective agreement of this case, the procedure for dismissal of the previous collective agreement was strengthened, and the agreement of this case adopted by the International Labor Organization (LO) provides that an employee shall be given an opportunity to defend himself/herself in the course of completing the act or employment of his/her employee, and thus, it does not constitute an unlawful act of ex officio dismissal as prescribed in the collective agreement.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

In the case of an intervenor corporation, Article 13-2 (3) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor Corporation (Evidence B) provides that "If a participant is absent due to the nature of his/her work to be operated by subway due to his/her continuous work, the number of days during which he/she is absent shall be deemed the number of days during which he/she is absent." In light of the fact that Article 13-2 (3) of the Rules of Employment of the Intervenor Corporation (Evidence B) provides that "If a participant is absent due to his/her continuous work, who is a full-time worker or a full-time worker, he/she shall be deemed to be the number of days during which he/she is absent," the number of days during his/her full-time work and the number of days during his/her full-time work period during his/her full-time work period during his/her full-time work period during his/her full-time work period during his/her full-time work period during his/her previous two weeks." There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles on absence.

3. As to the third ground for appeal

According to the records, absence from absence from absence from absence is not due to illness or other inevitable reasons, and it was caused by illegal strike regardless of the intervenor's continued delivery, and due to such illegal strike, the plaintiffs did not normally operate the subway in Seoul during that period, and caused a big inconvenience to citizens using it. Furthermore, even during the illegal strike, the participant recommended the participant to take measures against workers who participated in the illegal strike in order to promote the normal operation of the subway in Seoul for two times, and continued to engage in illegal strike without complying with the order to return to work for a certain period of time, while considering the fact that the participant continued to engage in the illegal strike without complying with the order to return to work, even though he did not present the attitude of entirely opposing the plaintiffs, the dismissal disposition in this case against the plaintiffs is justified, and it cannot be viewed that there is no reason to believe that the dismissal disposition in this case is unfair because the intervenor did not take a minor disciplinary action against the person who has not returned to the last time without complying with the order.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeong Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)