Criteria for permission to be complied with when the criteria for permission have been changed after application for permission.

In principle, an administrative disposition shall be dealt with at the time of the disposition and shall not comply with the standards at the time of the application, and even if there is a change in the standards for permission after the application for permission, it shall not be deemed unlawful in accordance with the new standards for permission unless the new standards for permission are changed because the competent administrative agency delayed the disposition and delayed the disposition.

Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act

Supreme Court Decision 84Nu655 Decided February 26, 1985 Decided 84Nu77 delivered on May 22, 1984

[Judgment of the court below]

Head of Gu of the Busan Metropolitan City;

Busan High Court Decision 88Gu568 delivered on November 18, 1988

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to No. 1:

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the head of Busan Dong-si decided that the application was returned to the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff's application for permission for the instant liquefied petroleum gas sales business was not in conformity with the criteria for permission, and that it could easily be easily known that this constitutes the criteria for separation distance between retail stores, and thus, it could not be deemed that the reasons were not stated in the disposition. In light of the records of the case, the judgment of the court below is justified, and therefore, it is not justified

With respect to the second ground:

According to the statement in Eul evidence No. 3, where there is no dispute in the establishment, the head of Dong-gu, after reviewing the permission application of this case submitted by the plaintiff in accordance with the related laws and the Busan Si's notification, the head of Dong-gu, which failed to meet the permission standards, shall not be deemed to return the application for permission because it fails to meet the permission standards set in supplement of the permission standards, such as theory, although it meets the different permission standards, and it shall not be deemed to return the application for permission because it fails to meet the above permission standards (as seen above, "the plaintiff indicates the permission standards for the distance" as to the plaintiff) as a result of examination in accordance with all the above permission standards. Thus, the defendant's assertion as a ground for return of the distance standard in this case cannot be deemed to add or modify the original disposition which is different from the basic facts and facts of the disposition, and it is also justifiable in the judgment of the court below to this purport, which does not conflict with the precedents of party members in the lawsuit (see Supreme Court Decision 85Nu694 delivered on July 21, 1987).

There is no reason to criticize the judgment of the court below on the basis of the facts not alleged by the court below or not admitted by the court below.

With respect to the third point:

According to Article 3 (2) of the Safety Control and Business Regulation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), a person who intends to operate a liquefied petroleum gas sales business shall obtain permission from the head of Si/Gun/Gu (Seoul Special Metropolitan City and Metropolitan Cities), but Article 3 (4) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that the permission standards and scope shall be determined by the Presidential Decree. Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act provides that where the permission standards are established and the permission-granting authority deems it necessary for public interest and safety and smooth supply and demand of liquefied petroleum gas, the permission-granting authority may separately set necessary standards in addition to the above permission standards. Therefore, even though Article 348 of the notification of the Busan City does not stipulate itself, if the head of Dongdong-gu or the defendant, who is the permission-granting authority, accepted it and applied it as a permission-granting authority, the decision of the court below is just, and this part of the judgment of the court below does not violate the rules of evidence,

In addition, it cannot be said that the rejection disposition of this case was illegal because it was implemented immediately from the time when it was amended without any transitional provision to strengthen the permission standards, and in this case, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff took the same expenses as the theory of lawsuit in order to obtain permission according to the previous standards. The public notice of Busan City is not only a statute but also an established rule that sets the standards for administrative affairs disposal, and there is no promulgation procedure such as publication in the official gazette.

Therefore, there is no reason to criticize the judgment of the court below from the opposite position.

With respect to the fourth point:

In principle, the administrative disposition, like this case, should be dealt with according to the laws and the permission standards at the time of the disposition, and it should not be dealt with at the time of the application, and the same applies to the case where the permission standards have been changed between the administrative agencies which received the application for permission and the permission standards have been changed without any reason. However, in the case of this case, since the permission standards are changed within the permission processing period (seven days), the non-permission disposition in this case cannot be deemed unlawful in accordance with the new permission standards (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 84Nu77, May 22, 1984; 84Nu655, May 22, 1984). Accordingly, in this case, even if the head of the Dong-gu rejected the permission permission by even though he did not limit the processing period, the result of this case is not affected.

In addition, even if the building owner had permission to handle the handling of the novels, it cannot be said that the defendant permitted the instant liquefied petroleum gas sales business in advance to do so, and even if the permission was made with the permission theory, it cannot be said that the permission was null and void.

Therefore, there is no reason for the argument of the lawsuit that criticizes the judgment of the court below from the opposite position.

With respect to the fifth point:

In light of the records, it does not seem that the court below did not accept the plaintiff's application for resumption of oral argument and did not accept the request for the dispatch of written argument. Therefore, the issue is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)