If a worker suffers from an accident while participating in a group other than the company that is not a duty under the labor contract, the requirements for recognizing such accident as an occupational accident and the method of determining whether there is a proximate causal relationship between the work and the accident in the event that the worker's negligence is concurrent with

Where a worker suffers from an accident while participating in a group, other than a company, which is not a duty under a labor contract, due to occupational accidents, the overall process of events or meetings must be in the state of being controlled or managed by the employer in light of the circumstances such as the organizer, purpose, contents, number of participants and forcedness, methods of operation, burden of expenses, etc. of the group, and the worker must be in the state of not deviating from the normal course of such group.

Furthermore, insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter “Industrial Accident Insurance Act”) are in the nature of workers’ livelihood security, as well as not only requires the employer’s negligence, but also does not deny the liability of workers on the ground of the worker’s negligence, or limit the scope of liability, unless otherwise specifically provided for in the Act. Therefore, in a case where a proximate causal relation between the business and the accident is denied on the ground that the accident is concurrent with the worker’s negligence, unless the accident was caused by the worker’s intentional self-harm, criminal act, or the cause thereof.

Article 5(1) and Article 37(2) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

Supreme Court Decision 97Nu7271 Decided August 29, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 2932), Supreme Court Decision 2007Du6717 Decided November 15, 2007, Supreme Court Decision 2010Du4216 Decided August 19, 201

[Judgment of the court below]

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

Seoul High Court Decision 2015Nu49421 decided December 18, 2015

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Where a worker suffers from an accident while participating in a group, other than a company, which is not a duty under a labor contract, due to occupational accident, the overall process of an event or a group must be in the state of being controlled or managed by the employer in light of the circumstances such as the organizer, purpose, contents, number of participants and forcedness, methods of operation, cost burden, etc. of the group, and the worker must not deviate from the normal course of the group (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Nu7271, Aug. 29, 1997; 2007Du6717, Nov. 15, 2007).

Furthermore, in principle, insurance benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter “Industrial Accident Insurance Act”) are of the nature of workers’ livelihood security, as well as the employer’s negligence, and as well as the scope of liability should not be denied or limited on the ground of workers’ negligence, barring any special provision in the Act. Thus, inasmuch as the pertinent accident is not a worker’s intentional self-injury or criminal act as provided by Article 37(2) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, or where it is caused by such act, it should be careful when denying proximate causal relation between the business and the accident on the ground that the worker’s negligence is concurrent (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Du4216, Aug. 19, 2010).

2. The court below cited the judgment of the court of first instance. ① On March 29, 2013, it is difficult for the plaintiff, a general director of the company of this case, to take advantage of the following facts: (a) on March 29, 2013, the plaintiff et al., together with Nonparty 1, who is an employee of the business partner company of the company of this case; (b) on the basis of Nonparty 2, Nonparty 2 calculated the cost of the doorbook; and (c) on the basis of Nonparty 1, the plaintiff et al., and Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2 moved from door door to singing after completing business consultation; (d) the plaintiff was unable to take advantage of entertainment in the line of duty because the plaintiff et al., was waiting with Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2 as an employee of the business partner company of this case; and (e) on the part of the witness Nonparty 1, the witness appears to have received a little distance from the door of this case to the extent that he was able to have received an ordinary surgery or an accident.

3. However, the lower court’s determination is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

According to the evidence duly admitted by the court below, the following facts are revealed: ① The plaintiff is a general director of the company of this case and his main business is the order of service, customer management and contact; ② the fact that the non-party 2 is the chief of the business partner company which contracted the business management plan decision and implementation plan-related services to the company of this case; ③ the plaintiff and the non-party 1 transferred non-party 2 to the door, door, singing, and singing, for business consultation around 18:45 on March 29, 2013; ④ the plaintiff transferred the non-party 2 to the door, door, singing, singing, and singing, for business consultation; ④ the above door, the degree of 2 disease, beer, 600cc, beer, and 900cc of beer; ⑤ the fact that the plaintiff had been under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it had been under the influence of construction at the end of singing singing, and ⑤ the following fact that the plaintiff dealt with the cost of singing and singing in the company of this case.

Examining these circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the instant ceremony was in the state of being controlled or managed by the employer, since the Plaintiff, as a general director of the instant company, was for the purpose of making a contact with the customer or having a person in charge of business as a general director of the instant company, as well as the extension of business performance. In addition, since the instant ceremony was all the employees of the customer, and did not change the participants until the meeting ceremony is completed, and the instant meeting and singing costs were subsequently handled by the company at the meeting, then the overall process from the singing room to the meeting was carried out as business expenses. Furthermore, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff was in the state of being controlled or managed by the employer as well as the instant meeting ceremony. Furthermore, since the Plaintiff was a person in charge of the customer, who was under the influence of alcohol immediately after the meeting was held in singing, the Plaintiff could not be deemed to have escaped from the normal route of the meeting.

Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the instant accident did not constitute an occupational accident on the grounds as above. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on occupational accidents under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)