[Judgment of the court below]

Korea Labor Welfare Corporation

April 9, 2015

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

On April 24, 2013, the Defendant revoked the disposition of non-approval for medical care granted to the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. From April 1, 2005, the Plaintiff became a general director for the business of Nonparty 3 (hereinafter “instant company”). On March 29, 2013, with respect to the business of Nonparty 1’s employees Nonparty 4 Company (hereinafter “Transaction”) as a customer, Nonparty 2, who was an employee of the Asset Management Team of Nonparty 1 (hereinafter “Transaction”), took a meeting in order of Nonparty 1’s regular director, and took a meeting in the order of singing, singing, singing, and singing at around 00:20 on the following day while waiting for a substitute driver at 0:30,000 and waiting for a substitute driver (hereinafter “instant accident”). Since then, Nonparty 2 was diagnosed as the head of the instant case (hereinafter “the instant case”).

B. On April 11, 2013, the Plaintiff applied for the approval of the medical care on the ground that the instant injury to the Defendant constituted an occupational accident. However, on April 24, 2013, the Defendant rendered a disposition of non-approval of the Plaintiff’s application (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that the Plaintiff’s application was based on the following grounds: (a) deeming the data submitted by the business owner and the materials submitted by the business owner to be the second drinking place; (b) however, the circumstances after the third drinking place and the singing room were judged to have reached the private domain of the employee; (c) the instant accident was determined to have reached the private domain of the employee; and (d) the said accident does not constitute an accident during the performance of his/her duties.

C. The Plaintiff filed a request for review and reexamination on the instant disposition, but the said request was dismissed, respectively.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1, 5, 9 through 15 (including virtual numbers) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Customer contact work was one of the Plaintiff’s major business affairs, and the entertainment between the first and third lanes was for the instant company’s business consultation and contact. Considering that the instant accident did not deviate from the ordinary business trip route for the instant business affairs, the instant accident is an occupational accident. The instant accident is deemed to have occurred under the influence of alcohol. If the relevance of the first and second drinking jobs is recognized, the instant accident must be recognized as an occupational accident. Accordingly, the instant disposition by the Defendant on a different premise is unlawful.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) A worker is comprehensively liable for an employer when he/she leaves his/her place of business. Thus, barring any special circumstance, he/she can be deemed to be under the control of the employer with respect to the overall process of a business trip, barring special circumstances. Thus, he/she can generally recognize the performance of his/her duties (see Supreme Court Decision 84Nu403, Dec. 24, 1985, etc.). In such case, if he/she is able to take a time in light of the contents of the business trip order, the nature of the business trip order, the type of means of transportation provided for the business trip, and other relevant business practices, he/she can be deemed as part of the business trip even if he/she goes home immediately without going through the business trip after completing the business trip, but in such case, the business trip cannot be deemed as having reached the private area beyond the scope of the control and management of the business owner, which serves as the basis for recognition of the business performance (see Supreme Court Decision 201Du484, Apr. 14, 2001).

As to the instant case, comprehensively considering the statement Nos. 1, 2, 5, 9 through 12, and 14, and the purport of the entire argument in this court as to the representative director of the non-party 3 corporation, the instant company entered into a contract with the customer company around August 31, 2012 under which the urban management planning decision and implementation plan are awarded, and the Plaintiff, after entering into the instant service contract, provided meals with four to five minor contents in order to consult with the director of non-party 2, who is an employee of the customer company, on the business direction, etc. The instant contract was suspended at one month prior to the instant accident, and it was difficult for the instant company and the customer company to consult on the business feasibility. On March 29, 2013, it is difficult for the Plaintiff and the non-party 1, who was an employee of the said company, to use the Plaintiff’s entertainment service to sing the Plaintiff and the non-party 2, who had been singing out to sing the Plaintiff and the non-party 1.

Even if the Plaintiff’s act of providing entertainment in a singing room is deemed to fall under a business trip as the Plaintiff performed his/her duties outside the place of business, the instant company did not provide the Plaintiff’s means of transportation for returning home or provide a separate instruction on returning home after consultation with the business partner, and the Plaintiff was waiting for a substitute driver for getting on and off Nonparty 2’s vehicle after the amusement at a singing room. Thus, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiff’s business was terminated by the time of the instant accident. Accordingly, it is difficult to see the instant accident that occurred thereafter as an accident during the singing room, and it is reasonable to see that the instant accident occurred while leaving the place of business.

Meanwhile, "occupational accidents" under Article 4 subparagraph 1 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act refers to occupational accidents caused by an employee's performance of duties or other ordinary activities incidental thereto under the control and management of the employer under an employment contract with the employer. Although an accident occurred during the departure and retirement of the employee is closely related to the business of providing labor, it cannot be said that the employee has reserved the choice of the method and route, so it cannot be said that the accident during the departure and retirement is under the control and management of the employer. Thus, it can be deemed that the worker's departure and retirement process is under the control and management of the employer, such as the worker's use of the means of transportation provided by the employer or the employer's use of the means of transportation equivalent thereto (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Du9025, Dec. 24, 199; 9Du9025, Dec. 24, 199).

2) In a case where a worker suffers from an accident while participating in an event or a meeting other than a company, which is not defined as one which is not ordinarily obligated to engage in an employment contract, if the overall process of the event or meeting was under the control or management of the employer, or if the participation in the event or meeting is deemed to be a refund or extension of the performance of duties (see Supreme Court Decision 97Da39087, Jan. 20, 198, etc.). Furthermore, if a disaster, such as an injury, disease, physical disability or death, etc., which has occurred as a major cause, was caused by an excessive trouble in the course of such event or meeting, it constitutes an occupational accident, barring special circumstances, such as where the excessive act was done by his own own independent and voluntary association or by an abnormal route unrelated to a mental or physical disorder, regardless of the age or restraint of the employer, such an accident constitutes an occupational accident as prescribed by the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 200Du8988, Feb. 208, 2008).

However, according to the statement in Gap evidence No. 10, the non-party 1 stated in the witness's answer that "the plaintiff 1 has come to know why he was unsatisfy due to the lack of witness in the situation beyond the plaintiff. The plaintiff seems to drink to the extent similar to the usual book at the time of the accident in this case, a certain distance was limited to the degree, and a bridge is deemed to be weak because there was a satisfy operation." In light of the above statement contents, etc., it is difficult to view that the plaintiff suffered an obstacle to normal operation or judgment ability due to excessive noise, and there is no other evidence to recognize this differently. Thus, it is difficult to see that the plaintiff suffered an accident in this case due to the main cause.

3) Therefore, the instant disposition based on the premise that the instant accident does not constitute an occupational accident is lawful.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Lee Jae-young