[1] Whether a special approval under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act can be granted to a heir who had known of the commencement of inheritance before May 27, 1998 and of the excess of the inheritance obligation (negative)

[2] In a case where an heir is a minor, whether “whether he/she was unaware of the excess of the inheritance obligation within the period under Article 1019(1) of the Civil Act without gross negligence” and “the day on which he/she became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation” under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act or Article 1019(3) and (4) of the Addenda to the Civil Act concerning the retroactive application thereof should be determined based on the legal representative’s awareness (affirmative)

[3] In a case where Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act does not apply to the special recognition of the legal representative of a minor heir, or the limitation period has already expired, whether a successor can newly approve the special recognition of the legal representative based on his/her own awareness after reaching the age of majority (negative)

[1] Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act applies to the heir who became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation after May 27, 1998, and the heir who became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation after May 27, 1998, pursuant to Article 1019(3) and (4) of the Addenda to the Civil Act (amended by Act No. 7765, Dec. 29, 2005; hereinafter the same) (i) from May 27, 1998 to May 27, 1998, and (ii) from May 27, 1998, the heir was not aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation without gross negligence, so it is possible for such heir to grant a special approval within the period prescribed by the foregoing Addenda. However, as prescribed by the foregoing Addenda, the heir had already been aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation before the commencement of inheritance and the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998.

[2] In full view of the legal relations pertaining to inheritance as early as possible, and the legal representative system established to protect minors and the content and purport of Article 1020 of the Civil Act, when an heir is a minor, the period under Article 1019(1) and (3) of the Civil Act shall be based on the legal representative’s awareness when determining when the heir becomes a minor, as prescribed by Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act or Article 1019(3) and (4) of the Addenda to the Civil Act on the Retroactive Application (amended by Act No. 7765 of Dec. 29, 2005; hereinafter the same).

Therefore, if the legal representative of a minor heir knew of the commencement of inheritance and the excess of the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, the heir is not subject to Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act pursuant to the provisions of the Addenda of the Civil Act, so such heir cannot obtain special approval.

In addition, even if Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act applies to an heir after May 27, 1998 on the date his/her legal representative becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, if the limitation period for special approval expires for three months on the basis of the date his/her legal representative becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation as above, the legal relationship of the existing simple approval becomes final and conclusive for the heir.

[3] [Majority Opinion] Based on the legal representative of a minor heir’s perception, the legal relation of simple acceptance is established if the special fixed approval provision is not applicable first or if the period for exclusion of special fixed approval is deemed to have already lapsed when examining the above based on the determination whether the minor heir’s legal representative was unaware of the excess of the obligation without gross negligence, and the date when he/she became aware of the objection. Therefore, even if a heir becomes adult after the commencement of inheritance and the excess of the obligation of inheritance have become effective, the special recognition cannot be newly granted on the ground that the special fixed approval provision is applied based on his/her own awareness and the exclusion period should be calculated separately.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-soo, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, and Justice Kim Jong-hee] Where his legal representative fails to grant a special approval on behalf of an inheritor for three months after he knows that the inheritance exceeds the inheritance obligation, the inheritor can obtain a special approval within three months from the date on which he becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation.

This is reasonable in terms of the principle of constitutional interpretation, the legislative background of the special approval system, the legal representative system for the protection of minors, the principle of self-responsibility of inheritors, etc. as a result of the interpretation of the legal provision. Furthermore, it is reasonable in terms of the balance of interests with the inheritance obligee and the legal stability.

[1] Article 1019(1) and (3) of the Civil Act, Article 1019(3) and (4) of the Addenda ( January 14, 2002) / [2] Articles 1019(1) and (3), 1020, and 1026 subparag. 2 of the Civil Act, Article 1026(3) and (4) of the Addenda ( January 14, 2002) / [3] Articles 114, 1019(1) and (3), 1020, and 1026 subparag. 2 of the Civil Act, Article 1026 subparag. 3 and (4) of the Addenda ( January 14, 202) of the Civil Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 2012Da440 Decided March 15, 2012 (Supreme Court Decision 2012Da15268 Decided April 23, 2015)

Plaintiff

Defendant

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2018Na48467 Decided May 2, 2019

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Facts and issues

A. The reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court reveal the following.

1) Nonparty 1 was liable for the amount of 12,100,000 won to the Defendant before his birth. Nonparty 1 died on February 18, 1993, and Nonparty 2, his spouse, Nonparty 3, and Plaintiff (the date of birth omitted, and the date of birth at that time) jointly succeeded to the property.

2) The Defendant filed a lawsuit against Nonparty 1’s co-inheritors, including the Plaintiff, to win the claim for promissory notes on December 20, 1993, and the judgment became final and conclusive around that time. Nonparty 2, the legal representative of the Plaintiff, was represented by the Plaintiff who was a minor at the time of the said lawsuit.

3) Around November 2003, the Defendant filed a new suit against Nonparty 1’s co-inheritors, including the Plaintiff, for the extension of prescription period, and the decision of performance recommendation became final and conclusive on December 17, 2003. The legal representative of the Plaintiff was served on behalf of the Plaintiff, who was a minor (the age of 17 years), at the time of the extension of prescription.

4) On November 2013, the Defendant filed a lawsuit against Nonparty 1’s co-inheritors, including the Plaintiff, for the extension of the period of extinctive prescription. The said lawsuit was initiated by service by public notice, and on February 12, 2014, a judgment was rendered in favor of the Defendant and became final and conclusive around that time (hereinafter “instant judgment”).

5) On August 31, 2017, the Defendant received the Plaintiff’s claim attachment and collection order against the Plaintiff’s bank deposit claim as the executive title. Accordingly, on September 25, 2017, the Plaintiff received a judgment to accept the report on the qualified acceptance of inheritance on the inheritance on September 25, 2017 (to the Incheon Family Court Branch Branch Decision 2017Ra925). The list of inherited property attached thereto stated that there was no active property, and the attached property was stated as “debt and other non-performance obligations against the Defendant.” After the judgment on the qualified acceptance was rendered, the Plaintiff filed a lawsuit of objection against the instant judgment immediately after the judgment on the qualified acceptance was rendered.

B. The lower court determined that, on September 2017, when the Plaintiff was unaware of the fact that the inheritance obligation exceeds inherited property (hereinafter “the fact that the inheritance obligation exceeds inherited property”), a special fixed approval report made within three months thereafter was lawful and valid since the Plaintiff became aware of the existence of the inheritance obligation only after issuing a seizure and collection order upon the Defendant’s application on September 2017. Accordingly, the Defendant’s ground of appeal is determined on the basis of the Plaintiff’s legal representative rather than the Plaintiff himself/herself and the Plaintiff’s legal representative during the period when the Plaintiff is a minor. Nonparty 2, the Plaintiff’s legal representative, who was aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, was aware of the fact that the lower court rendered a favorable judgment in the lawsuit claiming the amount of promissorysory notes first raised by the Defendant, and thus, the Plaintiff’s report on the qualified acceptance was filed at the expiration of three months thereafter.

C. The key issue of the instant case is whether the Plaintiff’s report on qualified acceptance and the acceptance thereof are valid. This is related to whether, in a special fixed approval under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act, the determination should be made on the basis of either a minor heir or his/her legal representative, “whether the heir becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation without gross negligence” and “the date on which he/she becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation.” Furthermore, even if a legal representative’s recognition is impossible based on the legal representative’s recognition, the issue is whether a heir may newly grant a special approval on the ground that the period of exclusion for three months from the date on which he/she becomes aware of the excess

2. In cases where an heir is a minor, the father or father of the special recognition shall be added to the heir or his/her legal representative based on whose awareness is given.

A. An inheritor may grant an absolute acceptance, a qualified acceptance, or a renunciation within three months from the date on which he/she becomes aware of the commencement of inheritance (Article 1019(1) of the Civil Act); and where an inheritor fails to grant a qualified acceptance or renunciation within the said period, or performs a disposal act on inherited property, an inheritor shall be deemed to have granted a simple approval (Article 1026 subparag. 1 and 2 of the Civil Act).

According to Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act amended by Act No. 6591, Jan. 14, 2002, where an inheritor, notwithstanding the above provisions of the Civil Act, without knowledge of the excess of the inheritance obligation within the period under Article 1019(1) without gross negligence (including the case deemed to have been simply approved under subparagraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1026), where an inheritor granted a simple approval without knowledge of the excess of the inheritance obligation within three months from the date he/she becomes aware of such fact.

Pursuant to Article 1019(3) and (4) of the Civil Act, Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act (amended by Act No. 7765, Dec. 29, 2002; hereinafter the same shall apply) applies to a successor who became aware of the commencement of inheritance from May 27, 1998 to the enforcement date of the above amended Civil Act, and a successor who became aware of the commencement of inheritance before May 27, 1998, but who became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation within three months from May 27, 1998 without gross negligence. Thus, it is possible for such a successor to grant special approval within the period stipulated in the above Addenda. However, since the above Addenda provision provides that the heir had already commenced inheritance and the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, all of the heirs were not subject to special approval under Article 101(3) of the Civil Act.

B. The Civil Act recognizes that, in order to prevent an inheritor from bearing unlimited liability on the inherited obligation due to the legal fiction of absolute acceptance without any cause or regardless of his/her will, an inheritor may freely waive his/her inheritance or accept a qualified acceptance. However, such options given to an inheritor are limited to three months for the exclusion period in which an inheritor may choose the qualified acceptance or renunciation in order to resolve the legal instability early by taking account of the fact that the legal status of the interested parties, such as junior inheritor or inheritance obligee, etc., may make unstable (Article 1019(1) of the Civil Act). The exclusion period under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act is also the exclusion period established to prevent the occurrence of legal instability that may occur in the event that the inheritor leaves the possibility of filing a report on special acceptance (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2003Du32, Aug. 11, 2003).

Meanwhile, a qualified acceptance or renunciation report of inheritance shall be subject to a judgment by the family court for acceptance. In principle, the procedures of family litigation shall be governed by the Civil Procedure Act. Thus, in cases where a heir has no litigation capacity, only a legal representative may conduct litigation (Article 12 of the Family Litigation Act and Article 55(1) of the Civil Procedure Act). This also applies to cases concerning acceptance of reports on qualified acceptance or renunciation of inheritance, which is a non-contentious family case, a qualified acceptance or renunciation report of inheritance. In other words, a non-contentious family case may be deemed valid for a minor to become a minor without his/her legal representative, and it shall not be generally recognized that the minor has the ability to become the other party to the non-litigation procedure (or non-litigation), i.e., the ability to become the other party to the lawsuit. In addition, in cases where a heir is a limited person with limited capacity, three months after the inheritance becomes aware of the inheritance approval or renunciation report period (Article 1020 of the Civil Act). Such provisions can be seen to the purport that the legal representative or guardian of the inheritor is restricted to determine the meaning and outcome

As can be seen, comprehensively taking account of the legal relationship as to inheritance early, and the legal representative established to protect minors and the content and purport of Article 1020 of the Civil Act, the respective period under Article 1019(1) and (3) of the Civil Act, where an heir is a minor, the determination of “whether he/she was unaware of the excess of the inheritance obligation within the period under Article 1019(1) or (3) and (4) of the Addenda to the Civil Act as to the retroactive application thereof” should be based on the legal representative’s awareness (see Supreme Court Decisions 2012Da440, Mar. 15, 2012; 2012Da15268, Apr. 23, 2015).

C. Therefore, if the legal representative of a minor heir became aware of the commencement of inheritance before May 27, 1998 and the excess of the inheritance obligation, the heir is not subject to Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act pursuant to the provisions of the Addenda to the Civil Act, and such heir cannot be subject to special approval.

In addition, even if Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act applies to an heir after May 27, 1998 on the date his/her legal representative becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, if the limitation period for special approval expires for three months on the basis of the date his/her legal representative becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation as above, the legal relationship of the existing simple approval becomes final and conclusive for the heir.

3. Whether a minor heir can newly approve the special case based on his/her own awareness after the minor heir has attained majority.

As seen earlier, the legal relationship of simple approval shall be finalized if the special fixed approval provision is not applicable at the beginning or if it is found that the exclusion period of the special fixed approval has already expired when examining based on the “whether the minor inheritor was unaware of the excess of the obligation without gross negligence” and “the date on which he became aware of the excess of the obligation,” based on the basis of the recognition of the legal representative of the minor inheritor. Therefore, even if an inheritor becomes adult after the commencement of inheritance and the excess of the obligation of inheritance have become effective, the special fixed approval cannot be newly granted on the ground that the special fixed approval provision is applied based on his own awareness and the exclusion period should be calculated separately. The reasons are as follows.

A. An act of representation becomes effective directly for a principal (Article 114 of the Civil Act). If, as a result of a legal representative’s perception, the provision on special authorization does not apply, or the limitation period of special authorization expires, it directly affects the heir himself/herself. As a result of the determination based on the legal representative’s awareness, if it is impossible to grant special authorization, the legal effect is based on the premise that the legal effect would affect a minor’s heir. As such, deeming that the heir may reverse the existing legal relationship by newly approving a special authorization within three months from the time when he/she becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation after he/she reaches the age of majority is inconsistent with the basic principle of representation.

B. The exclusion period is the exercise period of the right stipulated by the law and can no longer be exercised when the extinction of the right becomes effective upon the expiration of the exclusion period. Considering that a new exclusion period may be granted after the lapse of the previous exclusion period that could have been granted on the ground that a person was the initial minor, it does not coincide with the essence of the exclusion period as set out in order to determine the right relationship early. Special approval is an exception to general qualified acceptance, and it is also inconsistent with the legal system to view that a new special approval may be granted with an exception, even though the legal relationship on a single inheritance has already become final and conclusive.

C. As seen earlier, the inheritor may not report qualified acceptance on his/her own while he/she is a minor. If an inheritor exceeds inherited property but his/her legal representative does not give up qualified acceptance or renunciation due to mistake, omission, etc., it would be desirable to prepare a separate system in order to specially protect minor inheritors. However, on the basis of the theory of interpretation, even though the current Civil Act has no legal basis for exceptionally treating only a legal representative on special recognition under the current Civil Act, the inheritor may not newly grant a special approval on the ground that a separate exclusion period is calculated based on his/her own awareness after he/she reaches the age of majority.

Unlike this, the view that granting a new special approval does not differ from recognizing a special approval of the entirely new content, rather than a special approval recognized under the current Civil Act. Accordingly, according to this, the inheritor’s legal representative’s existing effect arising from legal representative for a minor without any legal basis, not only disregards the existing effect arising from legal representative for the minor, but also contradicts legal stability and equity. Although the legal relation of the simple approval has already been determined based on the voluntary consent or the legal fiction following the lapse of the exclusion period, if the inheritor grants a minor an opportunity to re-approve the special approval after the lapse of the exclusion period, referring only to the necessity or the justification that the minor should be protected as a guardian, referring to the fact or legal relationship in the past that the existing contract has already been concluded, thereby infringing the property rights of interested parties, such as inheritance obligee, etc., and further failing to reach the court’s guardianship duty, as provided for in Article 1020 of the Civil Act, the heir becomes a person with limited capacity or a person with limited capacity, who is not a minor (as defined in the Civil Act).

4. Determination as to the instant case

A. We examine the above facts in light of the above legal principles.

Since the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of commencement of inheritance, determination of “the day when he became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation” under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act and Article 1019(4) of the Addenda of the Civil Act shall be based on the legal representative’

However, Nonparty 2, as the spouse of Nonparty 1, appears to have been aware of the fact of commencing inheritance around February 18, 1993 and that there was no active property among the inherited property. The Defendant filed a lawsuit claiming a promissory note payment against the Plaintiff, Nonparty 1’s co-inheritors, who was Nonparty 1’s co-inheritors on two occasions over 1993 and around 2003, and received a favorable judgment and a decision of performance recommendation, respectively. Nonparty 2, who was the legal representative of the person with parental authority at the time, was involved in the said lawsuit on behalf of the Plaintiff who was a minor, is likely to have known of the excess of the inheritance liability at the time of the final judgment or the decision

As such, if the legal representative of the Plaintiff’s legal representative knew of the excess of the inheritance obligation during the first lawsuit prior to May 27, 1998, Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act does not apply to the Plaintiff, so there is no room for the Plaintiff to grant special approval. Thus, if Nonparty 2 became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation on September 25, 2017 while the second lawsuit was pending, then Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act may be applicable to the Plaintiff, but even in this case, the exclusion period under Article 1019(4) of the Addenda of the Civil Act (from December 29, 2005, when paragraph (4) of the amended Addenda was in force) based on Nonparty 2’s awareness as to the excess of the inheritance obligation, so it is difficult to recognize any special approval or validity of the report made by the Plaintiff on September 25, 2017.

B. Nevertheless, the lower court, based on the Plaintiff’s perception of the Plaintiff, who is not a legal representative, should have examined whether the Plaintiff knew of the excess of the inheritance obligation under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act, based on the erroneous premise, and determined that the Plaintiff’s report on special approval made within three months thereafter was lawful and valid, on the ground that the Plaintiff’s age continued in a situation where the Plaintiff was unaware of the excess of the inheritance obligation due to his/her inheritance relationship, and that the Plaintiff became an adult but became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation upon the seizure and collection order based on the Defendant’s application.

In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the special approval of Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-soo, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, and Justice Noh Jeong-hee, and a concurrence with the Majority by Justice Kim Jae-hyung, Justice Lee Dong-won, and Justice Min You-sook and Justice Kim

6. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Min You-sook, Justice Kim Seon-soo, Justice Noh Jeong-hee, and Justice Kim Jong-hee

A. Summary of the Dissenting Opinion

The key issue of the instant case is whether the heir can grant a special authorization within three months from the date on which the heir becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation when his/her legal representative did not grant a special authorization on behalf of the heir for three months after he/she becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation.

The Dissenting Opinion argues that a special approval should be granted in the above case. This accords with the principle of statutory interpretation, the legislative background of the special fixed approval system, the legal representative system for protecting minors, and the inheritor’s self-responsibility principle, and thus, should be faithfully interpreted as a result of the interpretation of the legal provision. Furthermore, it is reasonable in terms of the balance of interests with the inheritance obligee and the legal stability.

B. Interpretation in consideration of the constitutional principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative background of the special legislative approval system

1) From the date of the enactment of 1958, our Civil Act adopted the principle of ex officio succession that enables an heir to succeed to the comprehensive rights and obligations of the inheritee’s property as a matter of course (Article 1005 of the Civil Act), and for a period of 40 years, “three months from the date on which the inheritor becomes aware of the commencement of the inheritance” may grant a qualified acceptance or renunciation within the short limitation period, but it shall be considered as a simple approval if the period is exceeded (Articles 1019(1) and 1026 subparag. 2 of the Civil Act prior to the amendment of 2002).

Under the inter-family system, when an inheritor lives in a community by living together with or near the inheritee, there was no particular difficulty in determining whether to succeed to inherited property and debts at the time of the inheritee’s death. However, our society has experienced the rapid dissolution of the family system through the nuclear family era, and not only occupation, academic studies, but also the separation and divorce of the husband and wife, etc. The child was living away from his/her parents. In addition, it is difficult to grasp or investigate the status of inherited property in detail when an inheritee died because the scope of individual’s economic activities is wide, the transaction relationship becomes complicated and diverse.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has strictly interpreted the starting point of the reporting period for acceptance or renunciation of inheritance on the ground that the legal relationship surrounding inheritance is determined as soon as possible, and maintained the previous legal doctrine that the starting point of the reporting period for acceptance or renunciation of inheritance refers to the date on which he/she becomes his/her heir becomes aware of the occurrence of the cause for commencement of inheritance, and that the reporting period does not run only when he/she has been aware of the existence of the cause for commencement of inheritance (see Supreme Court Order 91S1, Jun. 11, 1991, etc.). If an heir becomes aware of the existence of the inheritance obligation after the expiration of the reporting period because he/she did not know of the existence of the inheritance obligation without any cause attributable to his/her heir, then it brought about the result that

2) The Constitutional Court ruled that Article 1026 subparagraph 2 of the Civil Act prior to the amendment that deemed a simple approval if the reporting period expires, infringes on the property rights and private autonomy of the heir (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 96Hun-Ga22, Aug. 27, 1998), and the amendment of the Civil Act in 2002, a special legislative approval system was newly established.

3) Despite the current application of a special authorization system, where a person who succeeds to an obligation exceeding inherited property is a minor, there still remains a blind spot for protection. An inheritor cannot perform a juristic act by himself/herself while he/she is a minor, and whether to grant special approval with the knowledge of the excess of inherited property is attributable to the person with parental authority, who is the full legal representative. There arises cases where a person with parental authority does not grant special approval for three months even though he/she becomes aware of the excess of inherited property. Where the property of a child is endangered due to an inappropriate management by a person with parental authority, a person with parental authority may appoint a guardian by declaring the loss of the right to represent the juristic act of a person with parental authority (Articles 925 and 932(2) of the Civil Act), but the procedure for loss of the right to represent a juristic act

4) If a special recognition is completely impossible as stated in the Majority Opinion, even if an inheritor becomes an adult and intends to grant a special recognition for his/her obligation, even if he/she becomes aware of the excess of obligation and intends to do so, he/she may not escape from an inheritance obligation because the limitation period has already lapsed. This is unreasonable as a result contrary to the legislative intent of the special recognition system to protect the heir’s right to self-determination and property rights under his/her own responsibility, and furthermore, it is inconsistent with the overall ideology of legal order with the highest norm of the Constitution (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Da48781, Jul. 24, 2003; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 99Hun-Ba9, Jul. 19, 2001).

5) In the past, the notion that parental authority is for the entire parent or family members was permitted, but there is no theory that it should be for the welfare of the child at present. The Civil Act amended on March 31, 2005 explicitly stated that “in exercising parental authority, a child’s welfare should be given priority to the exercise of parental authority.” The legal representative system is changing in the direction to protect the person with limited capacity gradually.

As a result of inheritance, countries taking the principle of natural succession have special provisions to protect minor inheritors. In particular, Germany amended the Civil Code in 1998, and newly established a provision to limit the liability of minor’s inheritance to the property held at the time of the minor’s becoming an adult (Article 1629a of the German Civil Code). The foregoing provision is a result of the legislation responding to the German Constitutional Court’s decision on May 13, 1986 that “if a parent, who is a legal representative, discharges a child to an adult life with his/her own obligation due to a cause, such as where he/she is unable to exercise parental authority properly, it would not be consistent with the child’s personality rights and the freedom of general action.”

C. Interpretation in accordance with the basic principle of statutory interpretation

1) Inasmuch as positive law is prepared in mind of a universal and typical matter, it is required to interpret that the law can be the most reasonable solution to a specific case in a variety of cases that occur in society reality, i.e., the application of the law. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to find a concrete feasibility to the extent that it does not undermine legal stability. The purpose of statutory interpretation is to faithfully interpret the ordinary meaning of the text used in the law as far as possible in the process, in principle, to the extent that it does not deviate from the ordinary meaning of the text, and to the extent that it does not go beyond the ordinary meaning of the text, it should be a reasonable interpretation responding to the request of statutory interpretation by adding a systematic and logical interpretation method that takes into account the legislative intent and purpose, history of enactment and amendment, harmony with the entire legal order, relationship with other Acts and subordinate statutes (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, Apr. 23,

2) In light of the above basic principles of statutory interpretation, the Dissenting Opinion’s view is faithfully interpreted in light of the ordinary meaning of the language and text of the above provision, in full view of the provisions on special approval of inheritance convenience in the Civil Act as to whether a minor’s heir can grant a special approval for three months after he/she becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation by himself/herself when he/she becomes adult.

A) The general provisions on the status of a person with parental authority as a legal representative of a minor are Parts IV and V (Inheritance) of the Civil Act which govern the act of status. On the other hand, the general provisions on the act of representation are Chapter V (Legal Act) of Part I of the Civil Act which regulates the act of status. The general provisions on the property law cannot be used as it is with respect to the act of status (see Supreme Court Decision 65Meu61, Dec. 28, 1965). Thus, there is room for a gap or gap between the two.

B) Article 5 and Article 911 of the Civil Act provides that, while an inheritor is a minor, a person with parental authority, who is a legal representative, should be represented by his/her agent (see, e.g., Articles 5 and 911 of the Civil Act). Article 116(1) of the Civil Act on the act of acting as an agent under the Property Act, shall be based on his/her agent. Meanwhile, Article 1020 of the Civil Act on the inheritance provides that the period for approval and renunciation of inheritance under Article 1019(1) of the Civil Act is calculated from the date on which the person with parental authority, who is a legal representative, becomes aware of the commencement of inheritance. In full view of the above provisions, a person with parental authority, who is a legal representative, has no choice but to grant special approval on his/her behalf of the inheritor within three months from the time when the heir, who is a minor, becomes aware of the excess of his

C) However, the above provisions applicable to an heir when he/she is a minor do not regulate the legal relationship after he/she reaches the age of majority. The conclusion does not lead to the conclusion that an heir cannot grant his/her special approval until he/she reaches the age of majority on the ground that he/she had even passed the special period of approval of the legal representative when he/she is a minor. Under the premise that all the effects arising from the legal representation during a minor are recognized, it can be interpreted that the act may cause a separate effect after the extinguishment of the legal representation right

D) Special authorization is a system that prevents a heir from forced inheritance without any cause by guaranteeing the heir’s right of choice on inheritance. The legal representative system is to protect minors, and thus, it should also be considered that the exercise of minor’s right should not be restricted.

Whether an inheritor is aware of the fact, which is the requirement for declaration of intention for a minor person, is subject to the limitation of Article 116(1) of the Civil Act that decides on the basis of his/her legal representative, and there is no error in doing so to the minor inheritor himself/herself. Therefore, in accordance with the literal interpretation of Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act, if an inheritor becomes an adult, he/she may grant special approval within three months from the date on which

E) Inasmuch as an inheritor has the nature of a personal determination conducted by comprehensively assessing the personal relationship with a decedent, it differs from a pure property law (see Supreme Court Decision 2011Da29307, Jun. 9, 2011; 201Da29307, Jun. 9, 201). Therefore, the most important consideration should be given to the inheritor’s decision on whether to grant a special authorization. Therefore, an inheritor who was unable to grant a special authorization for a minor has the right to obtain a special authorization pursuant to Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act after he/she reaches the age of majority, and the right cannot be denied on the grounds of the provisions on representation in the general provisions.

3) The above interpretation does not obstruct the fact that the heir had imposed a special fixed term approval period on the basis of his/her legal representative during a minor period.

A) The special approval is a system in which the effect of the simple approval is extinguished ex post facto after the occurrence of the validity of the simple approval and the new effect of the qualified acceptance is created.

B) Before the enactment of the special fixed approval system, the inheritance relationship was not determined for three months after the death of the inheritee, and the heir has reached a flexible status if he/she gives simple approval, limited approval, or renunciation, and the inheritance relationship was finalized, and the heir is regarded as a simple approval upon the expiration of the reporting period, and the inheritance relationship became final and conclusive upon the expiration of the reporting period. Accordingly, once the effect of the simple approval occurred, the qualified acceptance was not possible to extinguish that effect after the death of the inheritee.

C) However, at the present when the special approval system was enacted, an inheritor becomes able to extinguish the validity of the simple approval by granting a special approval again, even after the effect of the simple approval has occurred. Therefore, even if the legal representative maintains the validity of the simple approval after the lapse of the exclusion period, it cannot be deemed logical contradictory or contrary to the language and text of the relevant provision to extinguish the validity of the simple approval by granting a special approval after the inheritor reached an adult age.

D. Interpretation that conforms to the general principles of the Civil Act, such as the principle of good faith

1) In light of the principle of good faith, which is the major principle of the Civil Act, the Dissenting Opinion is reasonable even if interpreting the presumption of intention of the relevant persons.

A) The extinctive prescription of a general claim is ten years, and the short-term extinctive prescription is ten years after a judgment becomes final and conclusive (Article 162(1) and Article 165 of the Civil Act). However, Supreme Court precedents and trial practices allow creditors to file a lawsuit to interrupt the extinctive prescription repeatedly under certain conditions. As a result, inheritance creditors can enforce compulsory execution against the property acquired by successors, who commenced economic activities, by again accepting a judgment, even in cases where the inheritance obligee or minor heir’s proprietary property does not exist and thus cannot be executed.

Such legal relations can be seen by comprehensively considering the legal principles related to the provisions of the Civil Act concerning extinctive prescription and inheritance. Whether to repeatedly interrupt extinctive prescription is difficult to the extent that opinions have been divided in the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da22008 Decided July 19, 2018, it is difficult for the general public to easily understand the above facts (see, e.g., concurrence with the majority opinion of the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Da22008 Decided July 19, 2018, regarding the necessity of the active interpretation of the court for protecting young people who inherited debts in excess of inherited property.)

B) Although a legal representative may limit liability for the inheritance obligation through a relatively simple procedure, failure to grant special approval is due to lack of legal knowledge to the effect that “the inheritance obligee is able to make a lifelong compulsory execution against the income and property acquired by the inheritor himself/herself from his/her economic activity when he/she attains the age of majority.” Furthermore, if one of the parents has left a minor in excess of his/her obligation and died of the minor, the surviving parent suffers from a heavy difficulty in bringing up the essential child and maintaining the livelihood for the child. Considering such circumstances, even if there is no property under the name of the child to be executed by the party president, it is difficult for the inheritance obligee to expect to grant special approval in preparation for the interruption of the extinctive prescription period to prepare for the case where the heir’s child becomes an adult and forced execution against the money once.

2) In light of the balancing between inheritance creditors and inheritance creditors, the Dissenting Opinion is reasonable.

Whether an inheritance obligee establishes a legal relationship in light of the credit and property status of an inheritee at the time of the transaction, or does not mean that an inheritor’s inherent property after the death of an inheritee was expected to become a responsible property and traded. This is because an inheritor’s right is secured to prevent the execution of inheritance obligee’s inherent property due to qualified acceptance, special circumstances approval, and renunciation of inheritance. Furthermore, there is no need to recognize the expected interest to protect an inheritance obligee and an inheritor who was a minor at the time of the death of the other party to the transaction so that he/she can perform compulsory execution of the property acquired by having become an adult after the lapse

If an inheritance obligee refuses to relieve the rights of minor inheritors through special approval on the ground of the expected interest of inheritance obligee, it would result in excessive protection of inheritance obligee and excessive infringement of property rights and freedom of economic activities of minor inheritors by balancing wrong interests.

3) There is no concern that it would prejudice the safety of transaction by recognizing special approval of the heir who has become adult.

This is because Articles 1034(2) and 1038 of the Civil Act, as amended along with Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act, provide for the adjustment of interest on the premise that in cases where an inheritor disposes of inherited property, or has discharged part of inherited claims after the commencement of inheritance, the disposal act or performance is valid in cases where an inheritor disposes of inherited property, or has discharged part of inherited claims, after the commencement of inheritance. According to the foregoing provision, an inheritor is liable for the total sum of the values of inherited property to an inheritance obligee. A heir has already paid part of inherited claims and

4) A minor who succeeds to an obligation exceeding inherited property has no intention to protect the obligation under another system.

If it is impossible to fully repay the obligation to any inheritance obligee due to excess of the inherited obligation, the inheritor may file an application for bankruptcy of inherited property with the court, but the period of application for bankruptcy of inherited property is the same as the period of inheritance approval and renunciation (Article 300 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act) and the period of filing a report on inheritance approval and renunciation is not the same (Article 300 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act). The inheritor may file an application for bankruptcy of inherited property. However, the inheritor may file an application for bankruptcy of inherited property. However, if the inheritor is not reinstated after the declaration of bankruptcy, it is impossible to run a business requiring various authorization and permission, and there is a lot of disadvantage such as that it may be limited to financial transactions due

E. Specific criticism on the grounds of the Majority Opinion

1) The Majority Opinion points out that “The method of interpreting opposite opinions is desirable legislatively, but it is impossible to interpret it by interpretation.”

Since the interpretation of the Dissenting Opinion clearly stated that the interpretation of the Civil Act is based on the literal interpretation of the provisions, further discussion is omitted. However, since the Supreme Court en banc Decision 78Do246 Decided April 25, 1978 and the Supreme Court en banc Decision 95Da36466 Decided April 23, 1998 declared the duty of interpretation that takes precedence over the legislative theory, it shall be substituted to invoke the decision.

"Generally, all laws are not to change the nature of legal provisions to the extent that they are reasonably interpreted, and urge one legislative institution to amend laws, etc., which adapts to the social phenomenon prior to the amendment of laws, are belonging to the duties of the court, and it is unreasonable to give up the belief that it would inevitably be followed until the legislative institution, such as the amendment, is taken, even though it is aware that the conventional interpretation and application of the amended legal provisions would result in unfair consequences."

2) The Majority Opinion points out that the Dissenting Opinion’s interpretation contravenes the basic principle of representation.

The Majority Opinion is based on the premise that a provision on an agent for general convenience is applied without any restriction on special legislative approval. As seen earlier, the provision on an agent does not conform to the unique characteristics and purport of the institution’s legal act of a special legislative approval. As seen earlier, the legal relationship of “where a legal representation right exists.” Under the premise that all effects arising from the legal agent are recognized, the interpretation that an agent may engage in an act that generates a separate legal effect through a special statutory approval provision does not conflict with the fundamental principles of the agent. While an inheritor is a minor, the legal representative cannot be granted special approval if he/she considers the requirements based on his/her legal representative’s awareness and the exclusion period expires, the conclusion that the heir who reached the majority cannot automatically grant special approval.

Furthermore, the Majority Opinion may result in discriminatory treatment between a voluntary representation and an adult inheritor and a minor inheritor. A minor’s legal representative is remaining in principle, unlike his/her guardian, and our Civil Act does not have any provision or system capable of supervising the exercise of the right of representation by a person with parental authority. In cases of a voluntary representation, whether or not the principal grants his/her right of representation is determined by himself/herself. As such, being bound by an act of representation is the result of his/her own choice and the result of the act of representation is disadvantageous to himself/herself, and cannot be readily denied its validity without permission. However, a minor differs from this, a minor is deemed as a sole person with parental authority with respect to his/her remaining parents if one of his/her parents is restricted by law and dies, and there is no choice as to his/her agent or agent. In addition, failure of a qualified acceptance even though his/her legal representative is in excess of his/her inheritance obligation, which would result in the minor’s wrongful exercise of his/her legal representative’s right of representation for a long period, and thus, it cannot be deemed as a minor’s fault and an act of inheritance.

3) The Majority Opinion’s interpretation of the Dissenting Opinion is unreasonable as it points out that it does not coincide with the nature of the exclusion period.

It is a legislation that allows the reversal of the effect with the exclusion period under the premise that the special fixed acceptance system itself has expired with the exclusion period of inheritance qualified acceptance and renunciation. According to the Majority Opinion, the special fixed acceptance system does not fit the nature of the exclusion period.

Furthermore, as seen earlier, statutory interpretation should be in line with the overall ideology of the legal order with the highest norm (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Da48781, Jul. 24, 2003; Constitutional Court en banc Decision 99HunBa9, Jul. 19, 2001). According to the Majority, it would be contrary to the constitutional principle of statutory interpretation aiming at the protection of an individual’s property right and right to self-determination, which is for the purpose of protecting the right to self-determination, even when an inheritor can only grant special recognition, which is a right prescribed by the law.

4) If the Majority Opinion deems that a minor becomes an adult and is able to grant special approval, it is likely that the minor may ex post facto act on the legal relations already occurred during the minor and thus infringe on the property rights of interested parties, such as inheritance creditors, etc., and thus, if adopting the Dissenting Opinion, it is pointed out that the adoption of the Dissenting Opinion infringes on the rights of interested parties

However, unlike Article 1042 of the Civil Act, the effect of renunciation of inheritance is retroactive to the time of commencement of inheritance (Article 1042 of the Civil Act), in the case of qualified acceptance, the status of the inheritor or the existence of the obligation itself does not affect, and the liability for the inheritance obligations is limited (Article 1028 of the Civil Act). In the event that an inherited property disposed of prior to a special fixed acceptance or a part of an inherited claim is repaid, Article 1034 of the Civil Act provides for adjustment of interests on the premise that it is valid, thereby minimizing legal confusion. Accordingly, there is no room for infringing on the interests of other interested parties, as well

It cannot be deemed that limiting the liability to an inheritance obligee through a special approval may not be deemed to deprive the inheritance obligee of his/her property rights. The special approval system itself makes a sacrifice to a certain extent of legal stability in order to guarantee the inheritance obligee’s option. As seen earlier, the inheritance obligee’s property as security at the time of transaction with the inheritee is limited to the inherited property of the inheritee, and the inheritor is entitled to waive inheritance and make a qualified acceptance. An inheritor is free to waive inheritance and make a qualified acceptance. An inheritor’s right to expect by failing to waive inheritance or make a qualified acceptance is not a property reasonably expected at the time of transaction or is not a property that was based on the premise of transaction. It cannot be deemed that the inheritance obligee’s property right to an inheritance obligee is subject to a reasonable approval only

5) The Majority Opinion states that, if an inheritor who is a minor is protected, the heir does not comply with the principle of equity compared to the case where the adult ward or limited ward is an adult ward or limited ward. However, it is not justifiable to deem the difference between a minor and

The legal representative of a minor is most parents who are persons with parental authority (Article 909, Article 911 of the Civil Act) and there is no system that can supervise the exercise of parental authority by a person with parental authority under our Civil Act. Once adult guardianship commences, a guardian shall investigate the ward’s property and report it to the court (Article 941 of the Civil Act; hereinafter the same shall apply) and prepare a new list of property within two months after he/she is inherited by the ward (Article 944 of the Civil Act). Since an adult guardian performs his/her duties on a regular and detailed basis by the court, he/she may take necessary measures, such as qualified acceptance of inheritance, for the ward who becomes his/her heir in the process. As such, in the case of adult guardianship and limited guardianship, institutional support is provided to supervise the exercise of the right of legal representation by the guardian pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Act. Accordingly, it cannot be said that it is contrary to equity on the ground that the guardian treats the ward in the blind area of management, if necessary, it should be interpreted in the direction to protect all persons with limited capacity.

F. Conclusion

1) It is necessary to endeavor to ensure that young generation does not commence in the playgrounds from the point of origin due to the occurrence of a dispute between young generation and young generation. The Dissenting Opinion presented an interpretation theory available to the court for this purpose.

The Supreme Court Decision 2012Da440 Decided March 15, 2012 ruled that “If an inheritor is a incompetent person in determining whether to recognize the excess of inheritance obligations under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act, the heir shall be based on his/her legal representative.” However, there is room to deem that the heir has determined only the legal relationship during the period in which he/she is a minor. However, the foregoing decision has denied the validity of special recognition only after the heir has become an adult. The Supreme Court Decision 2012Da15268 Decided April 23, 2015 invoked the legal doctrine of the above 2012Da15260 Decided April 23, 2015. Accordingly, the above precedents should be modified to the extent inconsistent with the Dissenting Opinion.

2) We examine the instant case.

Examining the aforementioned facts in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the Plaintiff was a minor at the time of the death of Nonparty 1, and regardless of whether Nonparty 2, a person with parental authority, as a legal representative, has given special approval within 3 months from the time he/she became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, the Plaintiff may obtain special approval within 3 months from the time he/she became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation.

The Plaintiff was born in 1986 and became adult in 2006, and the Defendant, on August 31, 2017, became aware of the existence of the inheritance obligation and the excess of the inheritance obligation in the course of enforcing a seizure and collection order upon the Plaintiff’s deposit upon obtaining a seizure and collection order on August 31, 2017. The Plaintiff’s report of special acceptance within three months thereafter is valid.

For the same reason, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding Articles 1019(3) and 1020 of the Civil Act, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, thereby dismissing the Defendant’s appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion.

7. Concurrence with the Majority by Justice Kim Jae-hyung and Justice Lee Dong-won

A. We examine the principles and limitations of statutory interpretation.

The authority to determine the meaning, contents, and scope of application of the Act, the authority to interpret and apply the Act is the essential substance of the judicial authority, and the judicial authority is not unlimited. However, the statutory interpretation authority of the court is not unlimited (Article 101(1) of the Constitution). Since legislators have broad legislative formation rights within the limit permitted by the Constitution, judges should interpret the Act in the direction of respecting it, and should not distort, distort, or substitute the legislative intent expressed in the Act through legal interpretation. This accords with the principle of separation of powers and the principle of rule of law under the Constitution that distinguish legislative power and judicial power (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2013Da218156, Jun. 20, 2019).

The starting point of legal interpretation is the language and text of the law expressed by the legislator’s intent. The interpretation of the law is in principle faithful to the ordinary meaning of the language and text. Furthermore, the interpretation of the law should be made to ensure that it is the most reasonable and reasonable interpretation meeting specific cases by additionally using a systematic and logical interpretation method that takes into account the legislative intent and purpose of the law, the history of its enactment and amendment, harmony with the entire legal order, relations with other Acts and subordinate statutes, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, Apr. 23, 2009).

However, as seen above, there is a limit in such a statutory interpretation. The distinction between the legislative theory and the interpretation theory is a basic issue of the statutory interpretation. If it is difficult to distinguish it, the basis of the rule of law may collapse if it disregards the boundaries of two fields. Development of the interpretation contrary to the overall legal order and system, including the provision of law, the legislative intent and purpose, and the Constitution would lead to confusion between the legislative theory and the interpretation theory, and it goes beyond the limit of the statutory interpretation. Since a variety of statutory provisions are different, the constitutional interpretation that ought to be interpreted in conformity with the Constitution if it is possible to interpret in many future cases (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Du10289, Feb. 12, 2009; Constitutional Court Decision 89Hun-Ga113, Apr. 2, 1990) should also be observed.

The matter that can be resolved through constitutional interpretation is limited to the part that can be resolved by interpretation. Even if the purpose is just and the relief of the rights against the parties is required, it is not allowed to resolve the part that can only be resolved by legislation in the current legal system through interpretation. This interpretation is not to interpret existing laws, but to exercise the legislative power by creating a new law under the pretext of statutory interpretation, and to debris the boundaries of legislation and judiciary.

If there is a doubt that the unconstitutionality of a law is unconstitutional because the legal discipline determined by the legislators significantly go against the concept of social justice, and is extremely unfair and constitutional as a way of statutory interpretation, a judge shall file a petition for adjudication on the constitutionality of a law. In such a case, as seen earlier, a judicial decision should not be replaced with the fact that the legislative decision should be made under the pretext of statutory interpretation (see, e.g., the Concurrence with the Majority by Justice Kim Jae-hyung in the en banc Decision 2013Da218156

B. The Dissenting Opinion is inconsistent with the language and structure of the provisions of the Civil Act, and thus cannot be adopted as an interpretation theory.

1) The interpretation theory taken by the Dissenting Opinion is beyond the ordinary meaning of the text of the Act on Special Acceptance and Representation.

Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act provides that an inheritor may grant a special approval within three months from the date on which he/she becomes aware of such fact if he/she simply approves the excess of the inherited obligation without gross negligence within the period under Article 1019(1) of the Civil Act. In cases of a person with limited capacity, the period under Article 1020(1) of the Civil Act is calculated from the date on which a person with limited capacity or a guardian, who is a legal representative, becomes aware of the commencement of the inheritance. However, there is no provision in the Civil Act as to the requirements for special approval under Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act or the starting date of the exclusion period (whether there is gross negligence or not).

In light of the exclusion period, the legal representative system, the purport of Article 1020 of the Civil Act, etc., the previous Supreme Court precedents held that the recognition of excess of the inheritance obligation and the gross negligence should be determined on the basis of the legal representative (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da440, Mar. 15, 2012). The Dissenting Opinion also accepted this as a matter of course and took the position that if the legal representative’s exclusion period of special approval expires, the special recognition on behalf of the heir cannot be granted any longer if the heir becomes an adult. In addition, the Dissenting Opinion, unlike the legal representative, is based on the literal interpretation of Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act.

However, as seen earlier, the language and text of Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act only provides for the requirements and period of a special fixed approval with the “heir” as a single subject (other than capacity or representation for acts, most of the provisions of the Civil Act stipulate only the right holder or the obligor and do not separately stipulate the agent). In addition, any provision on a special fixed approval, including the foregoing provision, does not distinguish between the cases where a legal representative acts as an agent for a special fixed approval and the cases where the heir himself/herself

2) The Dissenting Opinion runs counter to the basic principle of representation.

A) In a case where the special period of approval has elapsed based on the legal representative’s awareness, as seen earlier, the Civil Act does not separately provide for what effect the heir has to take. This ought to be in accordance with the general legal doctrine of representation.

An agent’s act of representation is the foundation of the agency system (Article 114 of the Civil Act) that immediately affects the principal as if he/she had been directly engaged in an act of representation (Article 114 of the Civil Act). If an agent acted within a lawful agency system, even if the result is unfavorable to the principal, the validity of the agent’s act of representation cannot be denied without permission. The interested parties surrounding the principal and the agent form a transaction and trust on the premise that the agent’s act of representation directly infringes on the principal, and multiple legal relations are formed based on this premise. If an agent’s act of representation within the agency system does not belong to the principal, it should be exceptionally invalidated because it constitutes abuse of agency authority and this constitutes an act of conflict with the interest of the principal. This is an exceptional case where there is no room for forming such trust.

B) The Dissenting Opinion argues that the qualified acceptance, renunciation, or special fixed acceptance of a minor heir shall be based on the legal representative’s agency, and that the starting point of counting the period of a report on qualified acceptance, renunciation, or special fixed acceptance shall be based on the legal representative’s awareness. If so, the legal effect that a legal representative becomes unable to grant a simple approval even though he/she knows the excess of the inheritance obligation and does not grant a special fixed approval, i.e., to no longer grant a special fixed approval even after he/she knows the excess of the inheritance obligation, belongs to the heir himself/herself. This does not change even if the result is unfavorable to the heir himself/herself. Therefore, the heir cannot obtain a special fixed approval any longer, and this is the same even

C) If the exclusion period has lapsed based on the legal representative’s awareness, the Dissenting Opinion deems that no special approval cannot be granted during the legal representative’s right to represent (if the legal representative is a minor) while the legal representative’s right is in existence, the heir may grant a special approval again if he/she has attained majority. As to the reason, the provision on the representation applied when the heir is a minor does not regulate the legal relationship after the heir reaches majority, but it is possible to interpret that the legal representative’s legal representative’s legal representative’s legal representative’s legal representative’s legal representative’s legal representative’s legal representative’s

Although an inheritor may perform a legal act by himself/herself without the need to act as an adult, even at that time, the legal effect or the legal relationship formed thereby by an agent for a minor has been maintained without any change, and cannot be reversed or reversed without permission by disregarding it. As seen earlier, if the period of report has elapsed without any special approval by a legal representative, the effect arising therefrom belongs to the inheritor himself/herself, and the inheritor cannot obtain any special approval, and if the effect is recognized, it is natural to view that the inheritor cannot obtain any new special approval even if he/she becomes an adult. It is naturally reasonable to view that a heir may obtain any new special approval by an adult when he/she becomes an adult. It is a view that it is possible on the premise that the heir does not recognize any effect arising from the limitation period that has arisen during the period of a minor. In this respect, the logic of the Dissenting Opinion is inconsistent with that of the Dissenting Opinion.

D) The Dissenting Opinion argues that the provision on an agent in the general provisions of the Civil Act does not apply to a special approval, which is an identification legal act. In a case where there is a special provision on an agent in the general provisions of the general provisions of the Civil Act, or where the general provisions of the general provisions are not applicable due to the nature of the act, the provisions of the general provisions shall not apply. However, the qualified acceptance of an inheritance is an act of succeeding to the comprehensive rights and obligations of the inheritee with respect to the property of the inheritee on the condition that an inheritor shall repay his/her obligations within the scope of his/her inherited property, and where an inheritor is a person with limited capacity, the legal representative is premised on the acceptance or renunciation of the inheritance. The method or validity of an agent act is stipulated in the general provisions on the method and validity of an agent act is stipulated in the agent act, and such provision is applied to the general agent act without distinguishing a discretionary agent and legal agent. As such, the Civil Act does not oppose the general legal doctrine on an agent’s legal representation in addition to Article 1020 of the Civil Act.

3) On the ground that the special approval system is premised on the ex post facto extinction of the validity of the existing simple approval system, it cannot be interpreted as the Dissenting Opinion.

The introduction of the special fixed approval system to ex post facto extinguish the validity of the simple approval due to the excess of the reporting period for approval and renunciation. However, in order to prevent the legal instability from being excessively prolonged and to promote stability and harmony with the legal relations surrounding the inheritance relationship, the Civil Code has set a exclusion period even for the special fixed approval. Accordingly, the heir shall be granted only once an opportunity to grant the special fixed approval for three months from the date on which he/she first becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, and the inheritance relation of the simple approval becomes final unless the heir does not grant the special fixed approval (no matter how the cause exists, or whether it is excessive) during that period, and the heir shall no longer change.

If a legal representative becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, there is no dissenting opinion on this point). As such, if a legal representative becomes aware of the inheritance obligation, if a legal representative has already an opportunity to obtain special approval through his/her legal representative and a legal representative becomes final and conclusive on the inheritance relationship of his/her heir with respect to the inheritor, then he/she shall be deemed to have reached the age of majority, and there is no legal basis to interpret that a legal representative is newly granted an opportunity to obtain special approval on his/her heir as he/she has already been given the opportunity to obtain special approval through his/her legal representative, and that his/her legal representative is not exercising his/her right.

In short, the special legislative approval system only allows the extinction only once through the “special limited approval” exceptionally to the effect of the simple approval resulting from the previous “period of approval or renunciation,” and it does not have been legislated to ensure that the legal representative and the principal of a minor heir can destroy the system, or that the special limited approval period has expired.

4) In light of the legislative background of the special approval system, there is no ground to exceptionally treat only the special approval among the acts of representation disadvantageous to minors, as shown in the Dissenting Opinion.

In 202, Article 1026 subparag. 2 of the Civil Act, which provides that the heir shall be deemed to have granted a simple approval even after the period for filing a report on inheritance approval or renunciation of inheritance even if the heir’s excess of the inheritance obligation expires, is subject to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 96Hun-Ga22, Aug. 27, 1998) and that the heir’s right to choose inheritance according to its purport. However, in cases where the heir is a minor, the heir shall be able to exercise his/her right of choice directly by himself/herself or shall be granted an exception to legal representation, and there is no ground for exceptional interpretation under the language and text of Article 1019(3) of the Civil Act.

The Dissenting Opinion seeks to restrict the validity of the exercise of the right of legal representation by a person with parental authority over a special approval at a certain time. Such circumstance is not only an issue with special approval, but also an overall exercise of the right of legal representation by the person with parental authority. The case where a person with parental authority conducts an unfavorable transaction with a minor, such as disposing of salt owned by the minor, in an area where the person with parental authority has no capacity or intent to exercise his/her right of representation, can find it difficult to do so in real life. In this case, the validity of the act of representation cannot be denied solely on the ground that the act of representation is legally or factually unfavorable to the minor unless the act of representation with legitimate right of representation does not constitute an act of this sea-bed or abuse of his/her right of representation. The same applies to a case where a legal representative fails to exercise his/her right within the fixed period of time, such as special approval, and a minor’s legal representative’s right to claim compensation for damages after being aware of damages caused by a tort and an offender, even though his/her legal representative did not have been aware of the cause for revocation within 7 years (Article 366).

5) The constitutional principle of statutory interpretation cited by the Dissenting Opinion cannot be applied to the instant case.

As seen above, the limit of statutory interpretation ought to be observed when interpreting a constitutional law. Although the legislative intent expressed through the language and structure of a law is clear, it is not permissible to infringe legislative power by exceeding the limit of statutory interpretation under the name of the constitutional statutory interpretation. As such, the Dissenting Opinion’s interpretation goes beyond the limit of statutory interpretation, it cannot be said that it is the method of statutory interpretation.

On the other hand, the conclusion that the Majority Opinion accords with the Constitution and laws. As mentioned above, the essence of the instant case is a matter of how to ex post correct the exercise of the right of legal representation inappropriate for a person with parental authority. However, matters concerning the authority and duties of a person with parental authority, restrictions on, and supervision of parental authority are legislative discretion to be determined on a legislative policy by taking into account various circumstances, such as the tradition and customs of the relevant country, family system, and ethical awareness. As to parental authority, which serves as the basis for the right of legal representation under Article 913 of the Civil Act, the Civil Act provides for the right of parental authority to manage a child’s property and the right to represent a child widely, unless otherwise, may be deprived or restricted by the loss, suspension, or restriction of parental authority, or loss of the right of representation, and there is no other system that may supervise the exercise of parental authority or ex post facto nullify the exercise of an individual act based on parental authority.

Furthermore, the provisions on the capacity to act in the general provisions of the Civil Act stipulate the act of a minor without the consent of his legal representative in order to protect the minor (Article 5), but it is deemed that the act of a minor without the consent of his legal representative has been ratified unless a confirmation of ratification has been given within the period urged by his legal representative (Article 15) or that a minor has committed a fraudulent act as if his legal representative gave consent of his legal representative (Article 17) and that a minor cannot cancel his legal act after the expiration of the exclusion period of his right to cancel (Article 146).

Considering that parental authority is for the welfare of a child, even if the legal representative system has changed more in the direction to protect a person with limited capacity, it cannot be said that the Civil Act is unconstitutional because it infringes on the right to self-determination or personal right of a minor beyond the limit of legislative discretion, on the ground that our Civil Act does not take measures to supervise an individual act disadvantageous to a minor or to invalidate it ex post, or there is no special provision to protect a minor with respect to special legislative approval.

6) The principle of good faith and the presumption of a person with parental authority, cited by the Dissenting Opinion, cannot serve as a basis.

The principle of trust and good faith under the Civil Act is a principle that a party to a legal relationship shall not exercise his right or perform his/her duty by taking into account the other party’s interest, in a way that is contrary to equity or reliance (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Da53490, May 15, 2001). The principle of trust and good faith does not act as a basis for interpretation of legal acts, such as a contract, or as a basis for performance of obligations, and does not allow exercise of rights contrary to the principle of trust and good faith. For example, in special circumstances where an inheritance obligee does not grant a trust that an inheritor does not enforce a compulsory execution on the inheritor’s proprietary property, and where an inheritor does not grant a special approval, the exercise of the inheritance obligee’s right may constitute abuse of rights in individual cases. However, it is a natural legal effect that an inheritance obligee can enforce compulsory execution on the inherited property of an inheritor granted simple approval from the legal system of succession principle, and thus, it cannot be restricted

The Dissenting Opinion considers the circumstances that a person with parental authority does not grant a special approval of a specific situation is most cases due to negligence and that a person with parental authority would naturally grant a special approval if he/she well-known the law. The Civil Act, as a matter of course, succeeds to the comprehensive rights and obligations of an inheritee’s property (Article 1005 of the Civil Act), and is entrusted to the choice of an inheritor who is to grant a qualified acceptance or a renunciation of a qualified acceptance. If an inheritor does not report a qualified acceptance or a renunciation of a qualified acceptance or a refusal of a qualified acceptance, regardless of the heir’s intent or motive, the effect of the qualified acceptance or refusal of a qualified acceptance does not take place, and it cannot be viewed differently from the fact that there was an error in law. Legislatively, the Dissenting Opinion argues that a qualified acceptance should be made in principle on the grounds that there are many cases where a person with parental authority exceeds active property, but this can only be considered as a legislative theory, and it cannot be interpreted by taking the presumption of an inheritor’s intent under the current Civil Act.

C. It seems that the Dissenting Opinion’s position that the special approval of this case is valid is because, most of all, it seems that protecting the inheritor rather than the inheritance obligee in the case where the heir who was a minor intends to enforce compulsory execution against the newly acquired income and property when the heir who was a minor attains the age of majority is justifiable in terms of the specific feasibility. The Dissenting Opinion argues that: (a) there is no error on the part of a minor in failing to give special approval to a person with parental authority; (b) there are cases where a person with parental authority did not give special approval; and (c) there are cases where a person with parental authority knew of the law well; and (c) there is no other institutional means to protect a minor’s heir in Korea; (d) it is harsh that a minor bears the inheritance obligation without restriction on the ground that there is no other legislative means to protect the minor’s rights.

As to the necessity to protect minor inheritors from inheritance obligations, it is reasonable to fully reflect the awareness of the Dissenting Opinion, and to establish a special system for protecting minors (see, e.g., the necessity of legislation and legislation in other countries). However, it goes beyond the limit of statutory interpretation to relieve minors through interpretation rather than legislation, as stated in the Dissenting Opinion.

1) It cannot exceed the bounds of statutory interpretation on the ground that a specific type of case is seeking a concrete feasibility. If exceptional interpretation exceeding the essence and principle of statutory interpretation is permitted on the grounds that a specific propriety is ensured in the instant case, the citizens cannot be aware at any time in the future that the court does not have exceptional interpretation different from that provided by law, and there is no doubt that a trial shall be held in accordance with the standards set by a judge rather than that set by the legislative body, rather than that set by the legislative body. Furthermore, even if all disputes are not considered to be brought to the court, legal stability may be significantly undermined (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, Apr. 23, 2009).

As seen earlier, the Civil Act does not have any provision that can invalidate the exercise of individual legal representation right by a person with parental authority, except for cases falling under the act of deprivation of or restriction on parental authority itself, or abuse of power of representation. In such a situation, allowing an inheritor himself/herself to reverse the legal effect that his/her legal representative imposed on the need to protect a minor or the lapse of the exclusion period on the sole ground of the need to protect the minor, or on the sole ground of the need to protect the minor, following the enactment of a new system that limits the liability for the inherited debt actually borne by a minor at a certain time after a certain period of time. If such interpretation is permitted, the citizens would be likely to not deny the validity of the act of representation without any specific legal basis even in other cases where the legal effect of a minor is at issue in the future. As a result, the overall predictability and legal stability surrounding the legal representation will be significantly impaired in the legal relationship surrounding the legal representative, and ultimately, it may bring about a threat to the economic activities of the minor by preventing the

2) In a case where a court amends an existing precedent on legal interpretation, the changed precedent is retroactively applied to all cases to which the relevant law applies in principle. This is because the change of a precedent is corrected to correct the erroneous interpretation of the existing law, and it is not a change in the law itself.

It is reasonable that inheritance obligee cannot be seen that he expected and traded the heir's proprietary property as responsible property at the time of transaction with the decedent.However, in our legal system that requires the principle of succession, inheritance obligee is able to enforce compulsory execution to the heir's proprietary property, i.e., the heir's trust in the legal relationship that became final by simple approval if the heir does not grant qualified acceptance or give up, with the reporting period of acceptance or renunciation and the reporting period of special circumstances expires.

Furthermore, this case’s amendment of the Civil Act in 2002 leads to a question as to whether the special statutory approval provisions can be applied retroactively prior to the establishment of the special statutory approval system. According to the Addenda of the Civil Act, the special statutory approval provisions do not apply to the inheritors who had known the fact of exceeding the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, which was the time when the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution was rendered. This provision does not violate the Constitution because the heir, who was aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, did not discriminate without reasonable grounds, or infringe on his private autonomy or property rights. If the heir knew of the excess of the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, and did not dispute the simple approval system under the former Civil Act, the legal relationship of the simple approval becomes final and conclusive for the reason of neglecting the inheritance obligation at the time of the declaration of the inheritance obligee’s 20th of May 27, 1998, the inheritance obligee’s freedom to exercise the inheritance obligation cannot be seen retroactively prior to the inheritance obligee’s right.

If the legal representative of a minor heir becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, the provision on special authorization does not apply to his/her heir pursuant to the Addenda to the Civil Act. However, according to the Dissenting Opinion, the heir may grant a special authorization upon the expiration of his/her majority. As a result, this would extend the range of the retroactive application of the provision on special authorization, rather than that prescribed by the Addenda to the Civil Act, and thus deprives the obligee of the expectation of compulsory execution and property rights by the same retroactive effect as the said decision of the

D. Finally, we examine legislative theory.

However, as seen above, it is desirable to consider as legislative policy that the heir who was a minor at the time of inheritance does not suffer difficulties due to the inheritance obligation. It is reasonable to consider the legislation of other countries that can be seen as the progress of discussions and related legislation.

As in the Republic of Korea, France among countries taking the principle of natural succession with respect to inheritance, allows the legal representative of a minor inheritor to grant simple approval only when qualified acceptance is possible and it is obvious that inherited property exceeds inherited property (Article 507-1 of the French Civil Code). In Germany, if an inheritor simply approves the inheritance obligation without knowing the excess of inherited property, a simple approval may be revoked for a long period of 30 years (30 years). Even after the expiration of the period for filing a report on inheritance approval or renunciation, Germany has several provisions for protecting inheritors, such as restricting liability for inherited property upon filing an application for management of inherited property or bankruptcy (Article 1954, Article 1980, Article 1981 of the German Civil Code, Article 317 of the Bankruptcy Act). Further, Germany, as mentioned in the Dissenting Opinion, newly established a special provision that limits liability for minor’s inheritance obligation to property at the time of the minor’s age (Article 1629aa of the German Civil Code).

The Republic of Korea does not have a provision to protect minors with respect to the approval or renunciation of inheritance. Although there is a reason for revocation on the approval or renunciation of inheritance, it may be revoked if there is a reason for revocation on the approval or renunciation of inheritance, it is difficult to utilize it properly as well as Germany (30 years), France (5 years), and Japan (10 years) prior to the date of approval or renunciation of the period of revocation (Article 1024(2) of the Civil Act). The period of application for bankruptcy against inherited property is substantially the same as the period of approval or renunciation of inheritance (Article 300 of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act, Article 1045 of the Civil Act), and it is difficult to utilize the system if the period of application for bankruptcy against inherited property expires, the period of filing a report on the approval or renunciation of inheritance is not the same as the period of approval or renunciation of inheritance (Article

Reference to the above legislation cases is expected to improve legislation so that minor heirs can be systematically protected in Korea.

As above, I respectfully agree with the Majority Opinion.

8. Opinion concurring with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Min You-sook and Justice Kim Jong-hwan

A. To understand the conflict between the majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in a large frame as follows.

There have been a conflict of opinions in the en banc Decision over whether the court should make an active interpretation as far as possible within the framework of the current law in order to solve the problems that were not scheduled for legislation, and whether to leave it to legislation and refrain from legislation. The Supreme Court has adopted an active position at the time, and at the time, adopted a passive position. The former’s opinion is to actively interpret the law and protect the rights of the socially weak. The latter’s opinion is presented as the reason why it cannot waive the role of the judiciary that can be possible in the case in question under the pretext of putting the legislation. The latter’s opinion is opposed to resolving the issue through a trial even if the need for remedy of rights is recognized. The latter’s opinion is contrary to the nature of the law, “a violation of the nature of the law,” “a violation of the legal doctrine,” and “a violation of the territory of the law.” The majority opinion in this case can also be understood in the conflict of opinion structure.

The Dissenting Opinion reached the conclusion that, through the interpretation of the general provisions of the Civil Act, relatives, and inheritance convenience provisions, “if an inheritor’s legal representative fails to grant a special approval on behalf of the inheritor within the statutory period on behalf of the inheritor, the inheritor may grant a special approval on his/her own within three months from the date on which he/she becomes aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation when he/she becomes a minor,

The point of the legal dispute in this case through a tension with the Majority Opinion becomes clear as to whether it is possible to interpret the interpretation theory presented by the Dissenting Opinion in the literal interpretation of the Civil Act. A considerable part of the above concurrence with the Majority Opinion is the argument that the legal doctrine presented by the Dissenting Opinion is impossible by the interpretation of the Civil Act. It is not necessary to repeat because the Dissenting Opinion has already expressed that interpretation is possible by the literal interpretation of the Dissenting Opinion and that it is possible in detail as to the grounds therefor.

Furthermore, many precedents show that the legal opinion of the Supreme Court en banc Decision is in accordance with any interpretation, whether the legislation is made, and the extent of relief according to the time and contents of the legislation is entirely different political process. As a result, the Supreme Court’s opinion that “in the event that the legislation is not carried out, the legislation shall be based on the legislation” did not relieve the parties to the relevant case, as well as that it did not present the legal doctrine on resolution in the same kind of case in the future.

If it is difficult for the majority opinion to adopt the dissenting opinion while recognizing the need for the protection of minor successors, it is necessary to present the relief of the rights of the plaintiff and the interpretation theory applicable to the same kind of case in the future, rather than to be entrusted to the legislation.

B. Opinion concurring with the Majority Opinion seems to have reconvened the situation before the Constitutional Court’s decision and the amendment of the Civil Act.

As indicated in the Dissenting Opinion, while the Supreme Court has accepted a request for the protection of a debt inheritor due to social change and accepted the previous legal principles from around 1996, the Korean Civil Act No. 1026 subparag. 2, which is legal fiction of the period for filing a report on inheritance approval or renunciation and the simple approval. Although the Constitutional Court’s ruling of inconsistency with the Constitution (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 96Hun-Ga22, Aug. 27, 1998) was made, the legislative improvement of the National Assembly was required for more than three years until the legislative improvement of the National Assembly was made. Although the Civil Act was amended by Act No. 6591, Jan. 14, 2002 and the special legislative approval system was newly established, the Civil Act amended by Act No. 6591, but it was found that the provisions on special approval of inheritance commenced before May 27, 1998 were not applied to most special cases. The Constitutional Court en banc Decision 209Hun-Ga56, Feb. 29, 2094.

Examining these two cases of the Constitutional Court’s decision and the process of the amendment of the Constitution, it can be seen that it is not easy to remedy by legislation as to this issue. In particular, in many decisions rendered before the amendment in 2005, since the amendment in 2002, the heir was irrelevant to substantive issues, i.e., the date on which the principal is unable to control, such as the date on which the deceased was dead or the date on which the deceased was brought a lawsuit from the inheritance obligee, and the date on which the decision of inconsistency with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea was made (the Addenda of the Civil Act is the date on which the date before August 27, 1998, which was the date of the first decision of inconsistency with the Constitution, was determined as of August 27, 1998, which was the date on which the Civil Act was the first decision of inconsistency with the Constitution, and thus, it was still excluded from protection due to the need for special protection. Even if some successors are still subject to the application of the current regulations.

In the same area as the issue of this case, if the court maintains precedents and administers the resolution of the problem to the Constitutional Court or the legislation on the ground that the request for legal stability is complied with, it would have been awarded a decoration that the legal relations can be expressed for a long time unstable and that the relief of rights can not be effectively achieved. Nevertheless, we feel easy to see the view that the majority opinion seems to go back to the situation before 20 years.

C. Since the blind spot of protection is not eliminated because it became an improvement legislation, it is necessary for the court to flexibly interpret the law in consideration of the legislative intent.

However, the Supreme Court Decision 2003Da43681 Decided July 22, 2005 ruled that there was a need to mitigate the previous interpretation theory even about the starting point of the renunciation of inheritance, and that in the event that unreasonable results occur by strictly limiting the reporting period of the renunciation of inheritance to three months from the date on which the commencement of inheritance was known, the meaning of the starting point of the commencement of inheritance was flexiblely interpreted, thereby responding to the request of the heir protection. The need to protect the inheritor in accordance with the changes in society would arise in another area, and the instant case would be one of the two.

D. As to the supplementary opinion to the Majority Opinion, I endeavour to the extent necessary.

1) The Dissenting Opinion does not need to protect minor successors until harming the trust of the opposite contractual party or impairing the transaction safety. As already examined in detail, as seen in the Dissenting Opinion, the opposite contractual party would be able to execute within the scope of “self-sufficient resources of an ancestor who had been considered as responsible property at the time of transaction,” and the heir would reasonably coordinate the interests of both parties by providing “where the opposite contractual party did not grant any special approval without any cause attributable to himself/herself, he/she would be able to follow the property that has become the majority and formed with

As there is concern for the concurring opinion with the Majority, the Dissenting Opinion’s purport is that the overall legal effect created and formed by a representative for a minor, in particular, the validity of property legal act has reached an adult age. The right to claim damages against minors, the right to revoke fraudulent act, the right to appeal, and the right to apply for parcelling-out with respect to redevelopment projects, etc., mentioned in the concurring opinion, are areas where the conciliation of interests between the parties, including the opposite contractual party, is necessary, while there is no ground to newly regulate the legal relationship after the completion of the adult age under the relevant statutes. The Dissenting Opinion’s view is based on the literal interpretation of the provisions

2) The Dissenting Opinion does not protect a party only once in the instant case. An inheritor meeting the requirements presented by the Dissenting Opinion is entitled to grant special approval and it must be settled as a legal principle governing special approval for a minor inheritor.

3) As the supplementary opinion to the Majority reveals that the Plaintiff’s person with parental authority began the inheritance before May 27, 1998 and became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation, it is pointed out that the Plaintiff’s special approval of “the Plaintiff” should be denied pursuant to Article 4 of the Addenda to the Civil Act, and that if the Plaintiff’s special approval of the Plaintiff who became adult is affirmed, it would deprive the inheritance obligee of his property right by a retroactive effect

However, the Dissenting Opinion’s key point is to determine whether an heir, even though the period of special recognition was expired based on his/her legal representative during a minor period, can grant a special recognition on the basis of his/her adult status after the heir reaches his/her adult age. Therefore, whether to apply the provisions of the Addenda ought to be determined based on the time when the heir voluntarily approves the special status of the heir when he/she came into existence. Even if the Plaintiff was aware of the excess of his/her inheritance obligation before May 27, 1998, insofar as he/she became an adult after the Plaintiff’s enforcement of the amended Civil Act and became aware of the excess of the inheritance obligation

E. The Dissenting Opinion is also expected to resolve legislative issues.

1) Prior to the conclusion, Article 766(3) of the Civil Act provides that “The extinctive prescription of a claim for damages caused by sexual impairment of a minor shall not proceed until the time when the extinctive prescription of the claim for damages of the minor becomes adult,” which was recently established by Act No. 17503 on October 20, 2020, is introduced. The sexual infringement against a minor, even though the perpetrator is in the surrounding area and it is difficult to exercise his/her authority through his/her legal representative, the extinctive prescription period has run on the basis of his/her legal representative pursuant to Article 766(1) of the Civil Act. The extinctive prescription period has expired during the period of the claim for damages by legal representative, such as a person with parental authority, etc., and the victim’s right has expired during the period of his/her claim for damages, and unreasonable results have already been extinguished at the time of the victim’s claim for damages against the minor (other than the issues in this case). To

2) Although the Dissenting Opinion presented an active solution to protect minor inheritors, it is different from the Majority Opinion’s view that the Civil Act provides for legislative resolution that “a person shall be granted the right to grant special approval after becoming a minor” with the provision of the Civil Act. As the Dissenting Opinion did not reach the Supreme Court’s legal opinion, the legal doctrine of the Dissenting Opinion is to acquire normative power only by legislation. A future legislation can be prepared to protect minor inheritors.

As above, the Dissenting Opinion’s arguments are supplemented.

Chief Justice Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)