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(영문) 대법원 1994. 1. 14. 선고 93도2579 판결
[주택건설촉진법위반][공1994.3.1.(963),753]
Main Issues

A. The meaning of "any falsity that supplies or makes others acquire a house by deceit or other unlawful means" under Article 51 subparagraph 6 and Article 47 (1) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992), and whether the above provision violates the principle of legality or not.

(b) A case that cannot be viewed as a case where a statute was amended after the crime was committed.

Summary of Judgment

A. "Act of obtaining a supply of housing or making another person obtain a supply of housing by fraudulent or other unlawful means" punished by Article 51 subparagraph 6 and Article 47 (1) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992) means an act of obtaining a supply of housing (or having another person obtain a supply of housing by fraudulent or other unlawful means) in an unlawful manner that lacks justification, such as pretending that a person who is not entitled to receive a supply of housing under the above Act (or a person who is not entitled to such a supply), does not necessarily require speculation to the person, and it does not necessarily require a limited list of the meaning of "private or other unlawful means" in the above provision, and it does not violate the principle of no punishment without law.

B. Article 51 Subparag. 6 and Article 47(1) of the above Act was amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992 (the enforcement date) prior to the amendment excluded the act of "to receive or to have a house constructed and supplied under the above Act by deceit or other unlawful means," which was subject to punishment. However, the above amendment was re-amended by Act No. 4540 of Feb. 24, 1993 (the enforcement date) prior to the enforcement date, "the act of receiving or to have a house supplied under the above Act by deceit or other unlawful means" included again in the subject of punishment, so criminal facts that the defendant received a house by unlawful means cannot be deemed to constitute a case where the law was modified after the crime was committed.

[Reference Provisions]

A. B. Article 47(1)(b) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992); Article 51 subparag. 6 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4540 of Feb. 24, 1993); Article 326 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Reference Cases

B. Supreme Court Decision 92Do3168 delivered on March 9, 1993, 93Do44 delivered on May 25, 1993, 93Do1211 delivered on January 11, 1994

Escopics

Defendant

upper and high-ranking persons

Defendant

Defense Counsel

Attorneys Kim Gi-sop et al.

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 93No3456 delivered on August 19, 1993

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

We examine the grounds of appeal.

Examining the evidence admitted by the court below after comparing it with the records, the court below's decision that recognized the defendant's criminal intent for the crime of this case is just and acceptable, and even if the defendant knew that the act of this case was not punished by law, it cannot be deemed that there was a justifiable reason, and thus, the responsibility cannot be deemed to be avoided.

In addition, "the act of being supplied with or being supplied with a house constructed and supplied under the above Act by fraud or other improper means" which is punished by Articles 51 subparagraph 6 and 47 (1) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992) means the act of being supplied with a house (or having a person who is not qualified to be supplied with a house) by a person who is not entitled to be supplied with a house under the above Act by improper means, such as pretending that he is qualified to be provided with a house under the above Act, and it does not necessarily mean that the act can be punished with speculativeness, and it does not necessarily mean that the above provision is not limited to what meaning "private or other improper means" in the above provision, and it does not violate the principle of no punishment without the law. The judgment of the court below to the same purport is justified.

In addition, Article 51 subparagraph 6 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act and Article 47 (1) of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act were amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 192 (the enforcement date of the amended Act) and excluded from the act of "to acquire or to obtain a house constructed and supplied under the above Act by deceit or other unlawful means," which was subject to punishment, but the above amended Act was re-amended by Act No. 4540 of Feb. 24, 1993 (the enforcement date of the amended Act was March 1, 1993) prior to the enforcement date of the amended Act (the enforcement date of the amended Act was March 1, 1993). Thus, the criminal facts of the defendant in this case cannot be viewed as falling under the case of change after the crime was committed.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yoon Young-young (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-서울형사지방법원 1993.8.19.선고 93노3456