Main Issues
(a) The time when the “housing is supplied or has another person get another person to occupy the housing” as provided in subparagraph 6 of Article 51 and Article 47 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992) (the time when the status of the right to occupy the housing is confirmed);
(b) In case where the workplace housing association is organized, the time when the association member supplies the housing (when the specified housing construction project plan is approved);
Summary of Judgment
A. The phrase "a person who has received or had others receive a house constructed and supplied under Article 51 subparagraph 6 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992) and Article 47 by deceit or other unlawful means as referred to in the same Act means a person who does not refer to a person who has received or had others occupy a house under the same Act in light of the fact that the legal provision aims to disrupt the order in the supply of a house as a crime, and thus, intends to do so.
B. In case where a workplace association is formed, it is reasonable to view that a partner receives a supply of housing by determining the status of the right to move into the house when the housing construction project plan of the workplace association determined for the resident.
[Reference Provisions]
Articles 51 subparag. 6 and 47 of the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992)
Reference Cases
A. (2) Supreme Court Decision 92Do2991 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong1993, 879) (Gong193, 979) delivered on March 9, 1993, 92Do3115 delivered on May 14, 1993, 93Do3006 delivered on May 14, 1993 (Dong Branch) 80Do512 delivered on April 22, 1980 (Gong1980, 1283)
Escopics
Defendant
upper and high-ranking persons
Defendant
Defense Counsel
[Defendant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellee] 5 others
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul Criminal Court Decision 92No4671 delivered on October 16, 1992
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
We examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal.
A person who received or allowed another person to receive a house constructed and supplied under Article 51 subparagraph 6 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 4530 of Dec. 8, 1992) and Article 47 by deceit or other unlawful means as referred to in Article 51 subparagraph 6 and Article 47 of the same Act means a crime that disturbs the housing supply order and does not necessarily mean that the above provision of the same Act requires a person to take over, or allow another person to take occupancy in, the house under the same Act, in light of its purpose, and the right to take occupancy in, is confirmed (see Supreme Court Decision 80Do512, Apr. 22, 1980; 80Do512, Apr. 22, 1980). In this case, in a case where a workplace association is formed as a member of the association, it is reasonable to deem that the partner received the housing supply after confirming the status of the right to take occupancy in the house (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do2991, Jan. 26, 19393). 1993>
The theory of theory is that Article 24-2 (1) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (amended by the Ordinance of the Ministry of Construction and Transportation No. 491 of Aug. 24, 191) provides that "the first date of supply" as referred to in Article 38-3 (1) of the same Act prior to the amendment means "the starting date of occupancy of the house in which the project owner notifies the prospective occupants," so the meaning of supply under Articles 51 subparagraph 6 and 47 of the same Act should also be equally interpreted. However, the provision of the above Enforcement Rule provides that the starting date of the period of restriction on the resale of national housing under Article 38-3 (1) of the same Act shall be the same as the first date of supply under Articles 51 subparagraph 6 and 47 of the same Act, and it shall not be deemed that the meaning of supply under Articles 51-3 (1) of the same Act is also the same as the first date of the above restriction period under Article 38-3 (1) of the same Act.
Therefore, according to the judgment of the court below, the defendant prepared a certificate of employment as if he was working as an employee of the company, even though he was not a member of the US Engineering Co., Ltd. on December 8, 198, and obtained authorization for the establishment of the workplace housing association of the above company that is composed of the defendant from the head of Eunpyeong-gu, Seoul. On August 23, 1990, the above union confirmed that the head of the Gu of Seoul, which obtained approval for the establishment plan for the association housing construction project of this case from the head of the Gu as one of the occupants, and that the defendant was supplied with the association housing of this case by deceit or other unlawful means, and it is just to maintain the judgment of the court of first instance that held that the above association's establishment was revoked on March 9, 192, and therefore, it cannot be punished for the crime of this case that had been already
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)