A. Whether the crime of causing bodily injury resulting from a special obstruction of performance of official duties is a secondary crime, including where the crime was committed with intent to commit the serious result

B. In the case of a secondary crime resulting from an intentional severe result through a basic crime, if the severe result constitutes a separate constituent element, whether the intentional concurrent relationship between the resulting result and the serious result is deemed to exist.

A. The crime of injury resulting from the obstruction of performance of special duties is an initial and critical crime, but this is not predicted even if there is a possibility for a serious result, it includes not only the case where it was unexpected but also the case where it was intentional, even though it was not foreseeable, but also the case where it was predicted.

B. In a case where a person intentionally causes a heavy result, if the elements of the punishment are separately provided, the punishment specified in the elements of the crime shall be imposed, as a matter of course, if the punishment is heavier, and in a case where the punishment of the resulting double crime is heavier, the punishment of the punishment for the resulting double crime is to be imposed. Therefore, if the resulting double crime resulting in a heavy result intentionally through a basic crime constitutes a separate element, if the resulting result constitutes a separate element, it shall be deemed that the resulting double crime is in a concurrent relationship between the intentional multiple crime and the excessive result.

(b)Articles 15(2) and 144(2)(b) of the Criminal Act; Articles 40 and 257(1) of the Criminal Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 80Do796 delivered on May 27, 1980, 90Do765 delivered on June 26, 1990

(b) Supreme Court Decision 90Do670 delivered on May 8, 1990

Defendant 1 and one other

Defendant’s Attorney Jeon Byung-hoon

Busan High Court Decision 94No1173 delivered on October 19, 1994

All appeals are dismissed.

The 30 days of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the original sentence against the Defendants.

The grounds of appeal by the Defendants and the defense counsel are also examined.

1. As to Defendant 1’s ground of appeal No. 1

Although special obstruction of performance of official duties is an initial and critical crime, it is not an aggravated crime, which includes not only foreseeable crime but also intentional crime despite the possibility of predictability of the result (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do765, Jun. 26, 1990). However, it does not mean that punishment cannot be imposed on the intentional crime even in cases where there is a provision punishing the intentional crime more harsh as to the result of an intentional crime, on the ground that the intentional crime is included in an aggravated crime. If an intentional crime could not be punished for a more severe result than an aggravated one, the punishment shall be aggravated, even if the perpetrator could not have predicted it, and if it could not be punished for a more severe result than an intentional crime than an aggravated one, the punishment shall be imposed for a more severe result than an intentional crime (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do765, Jun. 26, 1990).

In light of the above legal principles, the judgment of the court of first instance that affirmed the judgment of the court below that ruled that Defendant 1's first instance applied the crime of "2-B" to ordinary obstruction of performance of official duties and the crime of violation of Article 3(2)(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act and the crime of violation of Article 257(1)(injury) of the Criminal Act as it is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the resulting double concurrent crimes and ordinary concurrent crimes. The part of the grounds of appeal pointing this out is without merit.

2. As to Defendant 1’s ground of appeal No. 2 and Defendant 1’s ground of appeal

Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in light of the records, the judgment of the court below that Defendant 1 did not have a state of mental disorder and mental retardation at the time of the second crime of the Dongin's first trial, is just, and there is no error of misconception of facts due to the violation of the rules of evidence or the incomplete hearing, and the determination of the sentence against the defendant is also appropriate. The part of the grounds of appeal pointing this out is

3. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 2 and his defense counsel

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, it is justifiable for the court below to have maintained the measures that the court of first instance found guilty of the facts constituting the crime in its judgment, and there is no error in violation of the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and a mere mistake of facts cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal in this case where the court of first instance sentenced three years imprisonment to the defendant. The grounds for appeal cannot be accepted.

4. Therefore, all appeals shall be dismissed, and thirty days of detention days after the appeal shall be included in the principal sentence of the judgment of the court of first instance against the Defendants. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)