[1] In a case where there is no provision punishing a person who intentionally causes a heavy result in a secondary crime, the relationship between the enemy and the intentional crime, in which there is no provision punishing the person who intentionally causes a heavy result in a secondary crime

[2] Where a public official performing his/her duties intentionally inflicts an injury by carrying dangerous articles, whether the crime of causing bodily injury resulting from a special obstruction of performance of official duties constitutes a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (negative)

[1] In a case where an aggravated result resulting from an intentional act through a basic crime, in a case where an intentional act resulting from an intentional act constitutes a separate constituent element, and where there is a provision which punishs an intentional act more severe than the punishment prescribed by a crime resulting from an intentional act, the intentional crime and the resulting double crime are in a commercial concurrent relationship, but where there is no provision which imposes more severe punishment on the intentional crime, the resulting double crime is in a special relationship with the intentional crime. Therefore, if there is no provision which imposes more severe punishment on the intentional crime, the resulting double crime is established only as a result, and it does not constitute a separate crime against the intentional crime under a legal agreement.

[2] Where a public official performing his/her duties intentionally inflicts an injury by carrying dangerous articles, only the crime of bodily injury resulting from special obstruction of performance of official duties is established, and it does not constitute a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.)

[1] Articles 40 and 144(2) of the Criminal Act; Article 3(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act / [2] Article 144(2) of the Criminal Act; Article 3(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 94Do2842 delivered on January 20, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 947) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 82Do2341 delivered on January 18, 1983 (Gong1983, 463) Supreme Court Decision 96Do485 delivered on April 26, 1996 (Gong196Sang, 1782)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Attorney Jeong-mo

Seoul High Court Decision 2008No1478 decided July 24, 2008

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

In a case where an aggravated result resulting from an intentional act through a basic crime is deemed as a separate constituent element, and in a case where there is a provision punishing an intentional act heavier than the punishment prescribed by the hostile double crime with regard to such intentional act, the intentional crime and the resulting double crime shall be deemed as a superior concurrent relationship (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Do2842, Jan. 20, 1995; 96Do485, Apr. 26, 1996; 96Do485, Apr. 26, 1996). In a case where there is no provision punishing an intentional crime more harshly, the resulting double crime is interpreted as having a special relationship with the intentional crime, and it cannot be deemed that the intentional crime constitutes a separate crime with regard to the intentional crime, which is established only as a result, and it constitutes a separate crime of obstruction of performance of official duties, such as a special act of violence, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Do2842, Apr. 26, 1996).

According to the records, the defendant's act constitutes a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.) and a violation of special obstruction of performance of duties (a crime) and the crime of causing bodily injury to the above police officer while driving a car, and thereby prosecuted the defendant by deeming that the defendant's act constitutes a commercial concurrent relation.

The court below rendered a not guilty verdict as to the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc.) by deeming that the act of the defendant constitutes a crime of bodily injury resulting from a special obstruction of performance of official duties, and the crime of violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a crime of bodily injury resulting from a special obstruction of official duties) does not constitute a separate crime. In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just and there is no

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Chang-soo (Presiding Justice)