[1] The meaning and degree of intimidation in the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties

[2] The case holding that it is difficult to view the so-called "Korean Public Officials' Union's Union members to have the other party feel fear objectively considering the circumstances and surrounding circumstances at the time of the act in light of the bathing theory that was made to the public officials

[1] In relation to the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties, the term "Intimidation" means an act of notifying harm and injury to the other party for the purpose of causing fears, and the content of harm and injury so notified should be objectively made to cause fears to the other party objectively by taking into account various circumstances at the time of the act, such as its circumstance, surrounding circumstances at the time of the act, the offender's tendency, the degree of friendship with the offender and the other party, and the relation between the offender and the other party, etc.

[2] The case holding that it is difficult to view the so-called "Korean Public Officials' Union's Union members to have the other party feel a fear objectively considering the circumstances and surrounding circumstances at the time of the act, etc. of the public official's desire to make the executive members feel a fear

[1] Article 136 of the Criminal Act / [2] Article 136 of the Criminal Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 89Do1204 delivered on December 26, 1989 (Gong1990, 427)

Defendant

Prosecutor and Defendant

Attorney Kim Kim-chul

Daegu District Court Decision 2005No629 Decided June 21, 2005

All appeals are dismissed.

1. Judgment on the prosecutor's appeal

In the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties, the term "Intimidation" means an act of notifying harm and injury for the purpose of causing fears to the other party, and the content of harm and injury notified should be objectively made the other party feel fear by taking into account various circumstances at the time of the act, such as its circumstance, surrounding circumstances at the time of the act, the offender's tendency, the degree of friendship with the other party, and the relationship between the offender and the other party, etc.

The following circumstances revealed by the record: (a) Nonindicted 2 and Nonindicted 3, etc. interested in Nonindicted 1’s improper speech officers, who are the head of information and communications network of the Daegu Metropolitan City Dong-gu Office (hereinafter “Dong-gu Office”) (hereinafter referred to as “Dong-gu Office”); (b) were abused as indicated in the facts charged; (c) the head of Dong-gu Office and the head of Dong-gu office and the head of Nowon-gu office and the head of Nowon-gu office and the executives of Dong-gu office were in dispute; (d) the number of union members was more than 10, and the number of union members was more than 15, as well as Nonindicted 1, the other party to the union members, including the Defendant, and Nonindicted 1, a public official working in the Dong-gu Office, the other party to the union members of the Dong-gu Office (hereinafter referred to as “the other party to the union office”), and Nonindicted 1, the head of the union and the head of the division and the head of the division, agreed to provide meals after the consultation, and assault against the Defendant.

In the same purport, the court below is just in holding that it does not constitute intimidation, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the obstruction of performance of official duties, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. Judgment on the defendant's appeal

In light of the records, the court below's decision that the defendant's act constitutes "collective activity for activities other than public duties" prohibited under Article 58 (1) of the Local Public Officials Act is just in light of the records, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to collective activity under the Local Public Officials Act, as alleged in

The Defendant’s ground of appeal No. 2 was offered only in the final appeal, and thus, cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal against the judgment below. In addition, according to the records, it is difficult to view that there is a justifiable ground for misunderstanding that the Defendant was able to hold an assembly in the Dong-gu, Dong-gu, Dong-gu, Cheong field square without reporting an assembly or demonstration to the chief of the competent police station, and therefore,

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Kim Hwang-sik (Presiding Justice)