[1] The standard for determining whether the expression act of the media harms another's reputation

[2] The grounds for rejecting illegality in defamation by the media

[3] Matters to be considered when establishing the limitation between freedom of press and publication and protection of honor

[4] The standard for determining whether a person involved in defamation by reporting a press report is liable

[1] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 309 of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Articles 309 and 310 of the Criminal Act / [3] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 21 (4) of the Constitution / [4] Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 21 (4) of the Constitution

[1] [2/4] Supreme Court Decision 2000Da37524, 37531 decided Jan. 22, 2002 (Gong2002Sang, 522) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 96Da38032 decided Oct. 28, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 3625) / [2/4] Supreme Court Decision 2003Da52142 decided Mar. 23, 2006 (Gong2006Sang, 713)

Plaintiff church Central Educational Association and four others (Law Firm Samung General Law Office, Attorneys Kim Young-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff church-appellant)

Cultural Broadcasting Co., Ltd. and seven others (Attorneys Han Han-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2003Na83292 Delivered on April 26, 2005

The part of the lower judgment against Defendant 2, 3, and 7 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. All appeals by the Plaintiffs and the remaining Defendants are dismissed. The costs of appeal between the Plaintiffs and the remaining Defendants are assessed against each party.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Plaintiffs’ ground of appeal Nos. 1 and 2, and Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 1 (whether tort due to defamation is constituted)

Whether the expressive act of the press harms another person’s reputation or not shall be determined on the basis of the overall appearance of the expression in comprehensive consideration of the objective contents of the article, the ordinary meaning of the words used, and the connection method of the words, etc. under the premise of the ordinary method in which the general readers contact an article, under the overall purport of the expression. Furthermore, the meaning of the relevant expression should be taken into consideration in the social flow that served as the background of the relevant expressive act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 96Da38032, Oct. 28, 1997; 200Da37524, 37531, Jan. 22, 2002).

However, even if an expression harms another person’s reputation, if the expression concerns the public interest and its purpose is solely for the public interest, there is no illegality. Here, “the purpose of the expression is solely for the public interest” means that the alleged fact concerns objectively and objectively and is related to the public interest, and an actor also indicates the fact for the public interest. If the principal purpose or motive of the actor is for the public interest, it is unreasonable even if the actor’s major purpose or motive is incidental for other private interest purposes or motive, it means the fact that the important part is consistent with objective facts. Here, the term “actual fact” means that the entire contents are consistent with objective facts, even if there is a little difference from the truth or exaggerated expression (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Da37524, 37531, Mar. 23, 2006; 2003Da52142, Mar. 23, 2006; 96.

On the other hand, in setting the limit between the freedom of speech and the protection of reputation, there is a difference between the contents expressed in question and whether the contents of the expression are private relations or private relations. Accordingly, the restriction on the freedom of speech should be mitigated in cases of expression of public and social meaningful matters by setting a difference in the standard of review depending on whether the expression pertains to public existence or private existence, or whether the expression pertains to a pure private relation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2000Da37524, 37531, Mar. 23, 2006; 2003Da52142, Mar. 23, 2006).

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the above legal principles and the records, the court below acknowledged the facts of the judgment after compiling the evidence, and denied the establishment of tort on the grounds that the plaintiff church's central church members (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff church"), the reports related to the sexual abductions against the plaintiff plaintiff 2, the cultural report on May 12, 199, the Korean cultural report on May 13, 1999, the Korean-region newspaper, the tendency newspaper, the female club of June 199, the female union of June 6, 199, and the MBC news published on June 199, and the news report on the plaintiff 3 and 4 were recognized as tort by defamation, and since the social evaluation on the remaining parts was not affected, the court below rejected the establishment of tort on the grounds that the above part of the judgment below is justified, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal by the plaintiffs and the defendants.

2. The Plaintiffs’ ground of appeal Nos. 3 and Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 2

Upon examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in light of the records, the court below is just and acceptable to order the defendants to pay consolation money as stated in its judgment, and there is no violation of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The plaintiffs and the defendants' grounds of appeal in this part are without merit.

3. As to the Plaintiffs’ ground of appeal No. 4 (whether the determination on a corrective statement is legitimate)

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, it is just and acceptable that the court below determined that a corrective report need not be ordered, and there is no violation of law as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. The plaintiffs' ground of appeal in this part is without merit.

4. As to the remainder of the Defendants’ ground of appeal No. 2 (whether partially recognized the Defendants’ liability)

A. Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, we affirm the judgment of the court below that the reputation of the plaintiff church was damaged due to the report of the sexual question, and there is no violation of law as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal. This part of the grounds of appeal is without merit.

B. The media organization has a large number of people involved in the planning and planning for a single news report from the planning to the final report stage. The existence of a person who participated in the news report should be determined depending on whether the person actually participated in the news report production and the news report process in each specific case.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, Defendant 2 is the president of the defendant cultural broadcasting company who is in the position to comprehensively direct the production, broadcasting, and affairs related thereto of the program as the president, and Defendant 3 is in the position to direct the production, broadcasting, and affairs related thereto of the program produced in the cultural production country, such as the PD pocket book, and Defendant 7 is in the position to direct the production, broadcasting, and affairs related thereto. However, the above circumstance alone does not lead to the conclusion that the above Defendants is liable for tort of defamation as stated in the judgment of the court below.

Therefore, the court below should have deliberated on whether the above Defendants actually participated in the contents of reports or news articles, etc. which judged that tort caused defamation was constituted, and should have judged whether they were responsible, but without examining the above circumstances, recognized the above Defendants' liability for damages. The court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the establishment of tort caused by defamation by persons related to the press, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the ground of appeal on this part is with merit.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against Defendant 2, 3, and 7 shall be reversed, and that part of the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. All appeals by the plaintiffs and the defendant corporation cultural broadcasting, and by the defendant corporation 4, 5, 6, and 8 shall be dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)