(영문) 서울행정법원 2015.1.23. 선고 2014구합15832 판결

1. On July 24, 2013, the order issued by the Defendant against the Plaintiff to return KRW 37,956,000, which is equivalent to the amount of illegal receipt due to illegal withdrawal, and the disposition taken to additionally collect KRW 37,956,00, which exceeds KRW 32,456,000, respectively, shall be revoked.

2. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

3. 1/20 of the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Defendant, and the remainder by the Plaintiff, respectively.

Purport of claim

On July 24, 2013, the Defendant revoked the recognition of workplace skill development training courses conducted against the Plaintiff on July 24, 2013, a disposition to restrict recognition of entrustment of the two-year course, an order to return KRW 37,956,000 due to illegal withdrawal, and an additional collection of KRW 37,956,00 equivalent to the amount of illegal receipt.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On March 2, 2010, the Plaintiff was a stock company with the purpose of corporate consignment education and job training for employees, and operated six training courses for support based on the worker’s ability development card, including “sales chain improvement process” and “counseling for business performance improvement” pursuant to Article 19(1) of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 11272, Feb. 1, 2012; hereinafter “Vocational Skills Development Act”).

B. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 17(1)1 and (3) of the Vocational Skills Development Act, Article 15(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Vocational Skills Development Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 23467, Dec. 30, 201; hereinafter the same), and Article 44(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 23139, Sept. 15, 201), the Plaintiff is able to obtain full-time subsidies for training expenses for trainees who have taken the above training course from the Minister of Employment and Labor.

C. From September 14, 2010 to November 201, 2010, the Plaintiff reported the above training to the Defendant pursuant to Article 58(1) and (5) of the Vocational Skills Development Act, Article 28(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 20, Mar. 11, 201; hereinafter the same), Article 7 of the Regulations on Assistance to the Development of Vocational Skills Development (Notice of Ministry of Labor No. 2009-34), and accordingly, reported the above training to the Defendant in order to receive subsidies for training expenses.

A total of 89,593,500 won was paid by the Defendant.

D. However, in the above reporting process, the Plaintiff filed a false report on the following facts. (1) The Plaintiff’s process of improving the sales license (the Lao and the second round) that the Plaintiff implemented was actually conducted on September 7, 2010, 14, 28, 2010, and 12 October 2, 2010. The Plaintiff reported that the process was conducted on September 14, 2010, 20, 20, 20, 28, 28, 20, and 12, 2010, and reported to the Defendant that the date of training was conducted on October 12, 2010.

2) The Plaintiff’s process of improving the sales license (II.) was actually conducted on September 26, 2010 and October 3, 2010. The Plaintiff filed a false report on the completion date of the training as if the Defendant’s process was conducted on October 2, 2010 and October 3, 2010. Furthermore, the Plaintiff was found to have attended the training course as if some trainees who participated in the said training courses were not actually present at the training center by instead of signing in the attendance.

3) The Plaintiff’s process of improving the sales license (three times) was actually conducted on October and October 17, 2010, and on the 17th of the same month. The Plaintiff reported to the Defendant that the process was completed on October 16 and October 17, 2010, and filed a false report on the date on which the training was conducted. Furthermore, the Plaintiff reported as if some trainees who participated in the above training courses were present in a manner that would substitute their signatures in the attendance book.

4) The process of improving the sales license (five times) conducted by the Plaintiff was conducted on October 10, 201 and October 17, 2010. The Plaintiff reported to the Defendant that the process was completed on October 16 and October 17, 2010, and filed a false report on the date of conducting the training. Furthermore, the Plaintiff reported as if some trainees who participated in the training courses were present in the manner that they did not attend the training by instead of signing at the attendance.

5) A counseling system for improving the business performance conducted by the Plaintiff was conducted on November 6, 2010 and on November 27, 2010, and the Plaintiff reported to the Defendant as if the training was conducted on November 5, 2010 and on June 6, 2010, and filed a false report on the date of conducting the training. Furthermore, the Plaintiff reported as if some trainees who participated in the training course were present by means of substitute signature at the attendance.

6) In relation to the process of improving the sales compliance (six times) conducted by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff reported as if the trainees who did not actually attend the training course were present by instead of signing in the attendance book to some trainees who participated in the training course.

E. Article 60 of the Vocational Skills Development Act and Article 52 (1) 3 and 11 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act are the heads of local employment and labor offices who are delegated with the authority of the Minister of Employment and Labor to cancel recognition of workplace skill development training courses, restrict recognition and entrustment, refund of subsidies, and additionally collect additional collection. On May 26, 2011, the defendant filed a lawsuit seeking cancellation of training courses, limit of recognition, illegal receipt and additional collection (hereinafter referred to as "prior disposition") on the ground that the above act of the plaintiff (the act of different training days and the act of a trainee who did not appear in the place of attendance is reported to be present in the place of attendance) on the ground that there is a defect in the preceding disposition, and on the other hand, the above court stated 30 years prior to the above disposition in the 20th 6th 20th 7th 20 m20 m20 m210 m28.

A person shall be appointed.

G. The defendant organized the specific details of the violation listed in the table of this case in attached Form 2. to 7. and notified them together (attached Form 2. to 7.) (The table of this case No. 1 to 6) by the process and order.

H. The subsidization of the Plaintiff’s training costs is based on the number of trainees who actually attended the training, and the Defendant indicated the amount of illegal receipt by each trainee who falsely reported the attendance status on each sheet listed in attached Form 2. through attached Table 2.7, thereby indicating whether the attendance status is false or not, and accordingly, indicated the number of trainees who were unlawfully supported by each trainee.

(i) On October 17, 2013, the Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal seeking revocation of each of the instant dispositions with respect to the Central Administrative Appeals Commission, but the Central Administrative Appeals Commission dismissed the Plaintiff’s claim on June 3, 2014.

[Reasons for Recognition] Each entry of Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether each of the dispositions of this case is legitimate

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) On May 26, 201, the Defendant rendered the preceding disposition similar to each of the instant dispositions, but was sentenced by the Seoul Administrative Court to the effect that such disposition was unlawful, and the said judgment became final and conclusive. Nevertheless, the Defendant again rendered each of the instant dispositions. Each of the instant dispositions is unlawful as it is against the final and conclusive judgment.

2) The Plaintiff did not have any question as to which the Plaintiff did not specifically indicate the grounds for each disposition of this case. Accordingly, each disposition of this case is unlawful as a disposition contrary to Article 23 and Article 23(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act.

3) In relation to the disposition of the instant table Nos. 5, reporting the date of education to the Defendant on the date that the Plaintiff reported to the Defendant on the date that was earlier than the actual date of education is an act of personal deviation by the employees belonging to the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff was unaware of the fact. Each of the instant dispositions was unlawful since it did not comply with the existence of the Plaintiff’s negligence, and thus,

4) B, C, D, E, F, G, and H were sent to the instant order 6: Although the Defendant did not appear at each of the instant dispositions, as seen in attached Form 6, the Defendant deemed that the above trainees did not appear. Moreover, as seen in attached Table 6, the instant dispositions were led to each of the instant dispositions by deeming that the instant trainees were not present. Moreover, as seen in attached Table 7, I, J, K, L, M, M, C, N, D, P, P, Q, Q, M, T, F, U, G, V, V,W, W, X, and H were present at the instant order 6, and the Defendant did not appear at each of the instant dispositions. As can be seen in attached Table 7, each of the instant dispositions was unlawful since each of the instant dispositions was due to misunderstanding of facts.

5) On March 25, 2011, the Plaintiff voluntarily reported the fact that the Defendant pointed out as a violation. In such a case, the Defendant is required to reduce the amount additionally collected within a half limit pursuant to Article 22-2(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act, and the Defendant did not reduce such amount. Accordingly, each disposition of the instant case is unlawful.

B. Relevant statutes

Attached Form 1. The entry is as shown in Annex 1.

C. Determination

1) Prior to examining the Plaintiff’s assertion as to the grounds for each disposition of this case, the Defendant specified the grounds for each disposition of this case. As seen earlier, the Defendant discovered the Plaintiff’s act of falsely reporting the training date or the Plaintiff’s act of falsely reporting trainees present at the training course. As can be seen in the instant table, the Defendant deemed that the Plaintiff’s act of falsely reporting the training date falls under Article 19(2)7 of the Vocational Skills Development Act, and that it is appropriate for the Defendant to issue “a disposition of cancellation of recognition and restriction on recognition of the relevant process” under Article 6-3 [Attachment 1-2](b)(7) of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act. However, as seen earlier, the “disposition of the consignment and restriction on recognition of the relevant process other than the revocation of recognition” did not separately incorporate the “a disposition of cancellation of recognition and restriction on recognition of entrustment of the pre-approval process” on the ground that the total illegally received training courses of this case five million won or more.

On the other hand, examining the laws and regulations on the grounds of each disposition of this case, Article 19 (2) 2 of the Vocational Training Act, Article 56 (2) of the same Act, Article 3 of the same Act is based on Article 56 (3) 1 (b) of the same Act, and Article 56 (3) 1 (b) of the same Act. All of the aforementioned relevant Acts and subordinate statutes are the requirements for the disposition that the plaintiff received training costs by fraudulent or other illegal means. As can be seen in the attached Form 2, 2, 7, the plaintiff did not receive training costs unlawfully through filing a false report, and only received training costs for trainees reported falsely by falsely reporting the birth of trainees.

Thus, each of the dispositions of this case does not regard the act of falsely reporting training date as the reason for disposition, and only reports training trainees signed by proxy in the attendance book as the reason for disposition of receiving training fees as if they actually attend the attendance book. The plaintiff's assertion should be examined on this premise.

2) The assertion that it is unlawful against the judgment of the preceding lawsuit

When a judgment revoking an administrative disposition becomes final and conclusive due to an error in the quality or form of an administrative disposition, the res judicata effect of the final and conclusive judgment shall only apply to the grounds for illegality in the procedure and form stated, so administrative agencies may supplement the grounds for illegality and make a new administrative disposition again, and such new administrative disposition shall be deemed a separate disposition from the previous administrative disposition revoked by a final and conclusive judgment (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu5242, May 26, 1992) and it shall not be overlapped with the previous administrative disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu5242, May 26, 1992). As seen earlier, even if the prior disposition was revoked by a judgment on the ground that the grounds that the grounds for the prior disposition in this case were not stated, and the judgment becomes final and conclusive, if each of the dispositions in this case were to be made again by supplementing the procedural defects of the previous disposition, it shall not be deemed that each of the dispositions in this case

3) The assertion that the reasons for the disposition are not specifically indicated.

According to Article 23(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act, an administrative agency shall present the basis and reasons for the disposition to the parties when rendering a disposition. Even if an administrative agency somewhat lacks factual basis and grounds for the pertinent disposition, the other party to the disposition could sufficiently know his/her violation, which served as the basis of the disposition, through the process of the disposition. Accordingly, if there is no particular obstacle to the objection while asserting that there was no such violation, the disposition does not constitute an unlawful procedural violation of Article 23(1) of the Administrative Procedures Act regarding the presentation of the grounds and reasons for the disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Du13219, Jul. 28, 2006). The defendant returned to the instant disposition. The defendant presented to the plaintiff a written disposition stating the disposition stated in the instant table, and the above disposition is accompanied by the attached table 2 through 7, and the list of trainees present by each of the curriculum, and thus, it does not appear that there was no objection to the pertinent disposition. Accordingly, it does not appear that there was any interference with the Plaintiff’s own disposition.

Of course, as seen earlier, each of the dispositions of this case is merely a disposition that the Plaintiff reported as if the trainees signed by proxy at the attendance of the Plaintiff were present at the training course. However, it is difficult to deem that there was an obstacle to the Plaintiff’s objection to each of the dispositions of this case solely based on the above circumstances, as long as it is apparent that the Defendant’s conduct of the training date false report or training for the issuer of the ability development card was the grounds for the disposition, and the Plaintiff could have caused confusion as to the accuracy of the grounds for the disposition of this case. However, as long as it is evident that the details of the violation and the relevant laws and regulations are specified in the disposition, and that “the revocation of recognition and the restriction on the stabilization of commission by the relevant process” was not carried out, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have been aware of the grounds for the dispositions of this case through the above disposition.

The plaintiff's assertion of this part cannot be accepted unless the grounds for disposition are sufficiently presented.

4) The plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff's negligence does not intervene

Sanction against violation of administrative laws is a sanction against the objective fact that is a violation of administrative laws and regulations to achieve administrative purposes, and thus, barring any special circumstance, such as where a failure to perform the duty of the violator is not caused due to a justifiable reason, etc., it may be imposed even if there is no intention or negligence on the violator (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 79Nu251, May 13, 1980; 98Du5972, May 26, 2000).

In light of the above legal principles, the plaintiff's act was committed by the plaintiff's author, and even if the plaintiff did not recognize it, the plaintiff cannot avoid liability unless there are special circumstances, such as the plaintiff did not make sufficient efforts to prevent the plaintiff from filing a false report. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion on this part cannot be accepted, since there is no proof of such circumstances.

5) The instant table Nos. 5, 6, and misunderstanding of facts relating to the process

A) The evidence submitted and the summary of the evidence are as follows with respect to trainees who dispute the plaintiff's misunderstanding of facts.

(In units of illegally received amount: Won

A person shall be appointed.

B) On the other hand, in the so-called appeal litigation claiming the illegality of an administrative disposition and seeking the revocation of the disposition, the defendant who asserts that the disposition is lawful has the burden of proving the legitimacy of the disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 84Nu515, Jan. 2, 1985).

(1) However, in light of the above list, there is no evidence to deem that E and H did not participate in the process No. 5, or that the Plaintiff’s employee confirmed the withdrawal by proxy (the statement of AA that substituted E’s withdrawal by proxy is merely the statement of the instant table No. 6 on the process). Therefore, it is insufficient to deem that the Plaintiff received training expenses of KRW 500,000 for E and H by fraud or unjust means.

(2) The F and G took the entire course of the instant table Nos. 15 and 27 of this case. They stated that all of them participated in the first session and all of the remaining classes were present. The evidence that F and G did not take the 15 process of the instant table Nos. 5 of this case shows that the said statement is the only one (F and G’s statement appears to be the statement concerning the process Nos. 6 of this case’s table Nos. 5 of this case’s table Nos. 5 of this case’s table Nos. 6 and 27 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 5 of this case’s table No. 5 of this case’s table No. 5 of this case’s table No. 5 of this case’s table No. 5 of this case’s No. 270. G.

(3) There may be evidence that D, P, and X did not participate in the instant table Nos. 6, or that the Plaintiff’s employee confirmed the withdrawal by proxy. Therefore, it is insufficient to deem that the Plaintiff received training costs of KRW 500,000 for each of the KRW 500,000 for D, P, and X.

(4) On the other hand, J, E, and H state that they were present in the process No. 6 of this case’s table (J, E state that they were directly signed by the attendance book, and H state that the remainder is not memory only once, and H state that they were not memory). This conflict with the Z and AA’s statement that the aforementioned trainees had been replaced by confirmation of their withdrawals. In addition, F and G state that the first out of the education conducted in November as seen earlier was present and the remainder was present. Since the above education was conducted on November 6 of the instant table No. 5 of this case’s table No. 6 of this case’s table, the above statement was eventually made by F and G to the effect that they were present in the process of the instant table No. 6 of this case’s table No. 5, and therefore, the above statement was inconsistent with the statement of F and G state that it confirmed the withdrawals of F and G’s entrys in the instant order No. 6 of this case.

Furthermore, according to Gap evidence No. 5, which was submitted by the plaintiff, it is recognized that the plaintiff reported that J, E, H, F, and G were present during the process at the time of reporting his own illegal act.

As such, in the case of J, E, H, F, and G, the Plaintiff’s employees’ statements and statements conflict with each other. On the contrary, the Plaintiff’s employees were considerably large number of trainees who have been in charge of verifying their attendances, and on the other hand, they have no choice but to be distorted as to whether they had attended the Plaintiff’s training course, and they are relatively accurate as to whether they had participated in the training course. Ultimately, as long as the Plaintiff’s statements conflict with the Plaintiff’s employees’ statements from the trainees who participated in the actual training course, the credibility of the Plaintiff’s employees’ statements is unlikely to be considerably reduced. Accordingly, the Defendant’s voluntary reports submitted by the Plaintiff are inconsistent with the Plaintiff’s statements. However, it is difficult to view the Plaintiff’s voluntary reports that the above trainees did not attend the training course, and then failed to take an equivalent disposition after undergoing additional investigations on the fact that they did not attend the training course. However, it is difficult to view the Defendant’s non-existence of the Plaintiff’s testimony or non-performance of the instant training program.

(5) Ultimately, it is insufficient to view that the Plaintiff was unlawfully paid training costs by 500,000 won for each of the 500,000 won for E and H in the process of the instant table Nos. 5,000 won for E, F, and G. In short, it is insufficient to view that the Plaintiff was unlawfully paid training costs by 50,000 won for D, P, X, J. E, H, and F in the process of the instant table Nos. 6 (total of 5,00 won).

C) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff asserted that, in the case of the instant table B, C, D, and the instant table Nos. 6 of the instant table Nos. 6, the remaining trainees only stated that they participated in the curriculum on behalf of the Plaintiff’s employees, even in the case of K, L, M, M, C, N,0, Q, Q, Q, R, T, T, U,V, and W, the Plaintiff merely stated that the Plaintiff’s employees signed the curriculum on behalf of the Plaintiff’s employees. Therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have participated in the curriculum, and therefore, the training fees paid to the trainees should be excluded from the amount of illegal receipt.

However, in the instant table No. 5, the instant table No. 7, stating that the Plaintiff’s employees were not qualified to attend the Plaintiff Company’s training (Evidence No. 7), and that the instant table No. 6, the instant table No. 3, and the instant table No. 6 were stated to have requested the Defendant to make a false statement that the Plaintiff’s employees were present at the time of being examined by the Defendant by phone call to C and U, and in the case of D, C, and U, it is deemed that not only the proxy signature in the attendance book but also the actual training course.

In addition, according to the evidence evidence Nos. 8 through 11, the plaintiff's employees were found to have fabricated a false statement of 40 conditions to manipulate the facts of the plaintiff's attendance. In light of the situation where the plaintiff company widely manipulates the plaintiff's attendance at the plaintiff company, the plaintiff's employees signed the plaintiff's attendance at the attendance as proxy for the trainee's attendance.If there is no special counter-proof, the trainee can be presumed to have failed to attend the attendance at the attendance. However, since the plaintiff did not present any counter-proof as to the fact that the above trainee who signed by proxy at the attendance at the attendance book was present at the attendance, the plaintiff's employees did not attend the training course and paid training expenses paid to the trainee's share, it cannot be deemed unlawful.

D) The Defendant deemed that the Plaintiff’s total amount of illegal receipt was KRW 37,956,00. However, as seen earlier, it is reasonable to view that the amount of illegal receipt was limited to KRW 32,456,00 (=37,956,000 - 5,000) since the Plaintiff’s assertion against illegal receipt was deemed reasonable, and thus, it is reasonable to view that the reduced amount of illegal receipt was equivalent to the amount of KRW 32,456,00 (i.e., KRW 37,956,500).

(1) We examine the Disposition No. 1 of this case. According to Article 19(2)2 of the Vocational Skills Development Act and Article 6-3 [Attachment Table 1-2](b)(e) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, if the sum of the costs subsidized by fraud or other improper means is at least 20 million won, the revocation of recognition and the restriction on recognition of entrustment of the two-year course shall be imposed.

Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion in light of social norms, shall be determined by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement on public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual due to the degree of infringement on public interest by objectively examining the content of the act of violation and the public interest to be achieved by the relevant act of disposal and all the relevant circumstances. In such cases, where the criteria for a punitive administrative disposition have no effect externally by the people or the court, it cannot be immediately deemed legitimate as it conforms to the criteria for the disposition. However, unless the above criteria for disposition are not in itself consistent with the Constitution or laws, or there is no reasonable ground to believe that the result of the application of the criteria is considerably unreasonable in light of the content of the act of violation and the relevant statutes and the purport of the relevant statutes, it shall not be readily determined that the disposition in accordance with such criteria has deviates from the scope of discretion or abused discretionary power (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du6946, Sept. 20, 207).

However, the provisions of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act providing that a business operator who illegally received training costs of not less than 20 million won shall be revoked and a disposition to restrict the recognition of entrustment of the two-year course shall be deemed to be significantly unfair in light of the size of the amount. According to the above standards, even if the amount of the plaintiff's improper receipt exceeds 20 million won even if the amount of the plaintiff's improper receipt of training costs is reduced as above, it shall be subject to the same disposition as the first disposition in this case. Thus, the reduction of the amount of the above improper receipt of training

(2) Next, we examine the Disposition Nos. 2 and 3 of the instant case. According to Article 56(2) of the Vocational Skills Development Act, the Defendant may order the person who received training costs by fraud or other improper means to return the amount. According to Article 56(3)1(b) of the Vocational Skills Development Act, Article 50 of the Enforcement Decree of the Vocational Skills Development Act, and Article 22-2(1)2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act, the Defendant may additionally collect the amount from the person who received training costs of at least one million won. As such, since the Act and subordinate statutes based on the Disposition Nos. 2 and 3 of the instant case provide that the amount of return and additional collection shall be the same as the amount of unlawful receipt, the amount of return and additional collection shall be reduced accordingly. Ultimately, the amount of return and collection exceeding KRW 32,456,00 among the Disposition Nos. 2 and 3 of the instant case is unlawful, since it is unlawful

6) The assertion that it was unlawful because it did not reduce the amount of voluntary report

A) Article 22-2(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act provides that the amount to be additionally collected shall be reduced by up to one half of the amount to be additionally collected if a person who received subsidies by fraud or other improper means voluntarily files a report on the fact. As such, the purport of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act that allows a voluntary reporter to reduce the amount additionally collected for a voluntary reporter is to reduce administrative expenses incurred in detecting the act of violation by inducing voluntary report prior to the commencement of an investigation or investigation, but before the materials proving the fact are sufficiently secured, and to induce the relevant institution to voluntarily report the relevant act of violation and correct the relevant statutes. Therefore, in a case where a voluntary report is filed while an investigation was conducted on the relevant act of violation, the purpose of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Skills Development Act to reduce the amount additionally collected for a voluntary reporter is not fully realized,

B) In full view of the purport of the argument in this case’s return to health class, and evidence Nos. 5, the Plaintiff confirmed that on March 25, 2011, the Plaintiff submitted a voluntary report to the Defendant that some trainees were present and received training costs. However, according to each of the evidence Nos. 4 through 11, the Defendant reported that the Plaintiff was present on February 9, 201, and received training costs from the Plaintiff’s employees on February 23, 201 (see, e.g., Z, AA, and Y), the Plaintiff’s employees were not present on the part of the Plaintiff’s employees (see, e.g., e., the Plaintiff’s 201 testimony that the Plaintiff was not present on the part of the Plaintiff’s employees, and that the Plaintiff was not present on the part of the Plaintiff’s employees’ 1, 201, 201.

C) As such, since a significant portion of the Plaintiff’s voluntary report was made after an investigation into the Defendant’s violation, and as such, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant’s respective dispositions of this case were based on the Plaintiff’s voluntary report, the Plaintiff’s report on March 25, 201 cannot be deemed as a “voluntary report as prescribed by the grounds for reduction of additional collection pursuant to Article 22-2(1)3 of the Enforcement Rule of the Vocational Training Act.” The Plaintiff’

3. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim is justified within the scope of the above recognition, and each claim is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges

presiding judge, judge and assistant judge

Judgment Notarial decoration

In case of being a judge Kim Gi-hee leave, a signature or seal impossible.

The presiding judge

Judges

Note tin

1) Article 19(2)2 of the Vocational Skills Development Act and Article 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act, since the total amount of illegal receipt of five training courses is at least 20 million won.

-3 [Attachment 1-2] 2. 2. (e) and revocation of recognition and restriction on the recognition of entrustment of a two-year course;