[1] The method of determining whether a candidate constitutes a "selective campaign" under Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act

[2] The case holding that the act of sending text messages to publicize specific candidates during the period of the intra-party competition falls under the category of "selective campaign" under Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act

[3] The purpose of limiting the method of campaign for the intraparty competition under Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act, and whether the competition campaign conducted prior to the period of the intraparty competition constitutes a violation of the intraparty competition campaign even in cases where it exceeds the permissible scope of

[1] The term "election campaign" under Article 58 (1) of the Public Official Election Act refers to all acts that are advantageous to the necessity or favor of a specific candidate for election or defeat, and the objective of promoting election or defeat is objectively recognized. Specifically, in determining whether an act constitutes an election campaign, it shall be determined simply by observing not only the name of the act, but also the form of the act, i.e., the time, place, method, etc. of the act, and whether the act is an act accompanying the purpose of promoting the election or defeat of a specific candidate. This standard shall apply likewise to determining which act constitutes "election campaign" under Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act.

[2] The case holding that the act of sending text messages to publicize specific candidates during the period of the intra-party competition constitutes "selective campaign" under Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act

[3] The purpose of restricting the method of the intra-party competition campaign is to prevent the competition campaign from being carried out in a manner other than that provided for in each subparagraph of Article 57-3(1) by giving the right to vote to the party members and those who are not the party members under Article 57-3 of the Public Official Election Act is to prevent the competition campaign from being used as a legal means to avoid the regulation that prohibits the excessive competition of the intra-party competition campaign, and to prevent the deterioration of the intra-party competition campaign into the election campaign and to substantially avoid the regulation that prohibits the advance election campaign. Therefore, even before the period of the intra-party competition, if the competition campaign is conducted beyond the scope permitted by the Public Official Election Act for the election

[1] Article 58 (1) of the Public Official Election Act / [2] Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act / [3] Article 57-3 (1) and Article 255 (2) 3 of the Public Official Election Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2005Do301 Decided October 14, 2005 (Gong2005Ha, 1818), Supreme Court Decision 2006Do9043 Decided March 30, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 655) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2006Do8869 Decided March 15, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 585)

Defendant

Defendant

Seoul High Court Decision 2008No1083 decided July 1, 2008

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

The term "election campaign" under Article 58 (1) of the Public Official Election Act refers to all acts necessary or favorable for the election or defeat of a specific candidate, and the objective of promoting the election or defeat of a specific candidate is objectively recognized. Specifically, in determining whether an act constitutes an election campaign, it shall simply observe not only the name of the act, but also the form of the act, i.e., the time, place, method, etc. of the act, and determine whether the act constitutes an act accompanying the purpose of promoting the election or defeat of a specific candidate (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do9043, Mar. 30, 2007). This standard applies likewise to determining which act constitutes "election campaign" under Article 57-3 (1) of the Public Official Election Act.

The court below, after compiling the evidence duly admitted, found the facts as stated in its reasoning. The defendant sent a lot of text messages that promote the Lee Jong-chul from May 2, 2007 to June 18, 2007 as stated in its holding during the short period of time from May 2, 2007, which had been put on a candidate's attack for Lee Han-chul as the candidate's primary election period, in light of the fact that the defendant sent a lot of text messages to the candidate for Lee Il-Ga's primary election in order to help the candidate for Lee Il-Ga's primary election, this constitutes an active and planned act that can objectively be objectively recognized as the objective purpose of promoting the election of the candidate for Lee Jong-Ga's primary election, i.e., the act of promoting the election of the candidate for Lee Il-Ga's primary election. In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below's fact finding and judgment are justifiable and there is no violation of

2. As to the third ground for appeal

Pursuant to Article 57-3 of the Public Official Election Act, candidates who give voting rights to party members and non-party members can not conduct the competition campaign in a way other than that provided for in each subparagraph of Article 57-3(1). The purpose of restricting the method of the intra-party competition campaign is to prevent the orderly competition campaign preventing the overheated of the intra-party competition campaign, and to prevent the deterioration of the intra-party competition campaign into the election campaign and the actual use of it as a legal means to avoid the provision prohibiting the pre-party election campaign (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Do8869, Mar. 15, 2007). Thus, if the competition campaign is conducted beyond the extent permitted by the Public Official Election Act for the election of a specific candidate even before the period of the intra-party competition, it constitutes a violation of the intra-party competition campaign.

In the same purport, the court below is just in finding the Defendant guilty of all the charges of this case, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the violation of the intraparty competition

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Nung-hwan (Presiding Justice)