[1] The method of determining whether the legal provisions on taxes and charges are unconstitutional because they lack clarity

[2] The relationship between Article 75 of the Constitution and the principle of clarity of law concerning the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation

[3] The meaning of "predictability" as the limitation of delegated legislation and the standard for determining its existence

[4] Whether Article 11 subparagraph 6 of the former Special Act on the Management of Metropolitan Transport in Large Cities violates Article 75 of the Constitution concerning the principle of prohibition of blanket delegation (negative), and whether Article 38 and Article 59 of the Constitution violates Article 11 subparagraph 6 of the former Special Act (negative)

[1] Article 59 of the Constitution / [2] Article 75 of the Constitution / [3] Article 75 of the Constitution / [4] Article 11 of the former Special Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Large Cities (amended by Act No. 8251 of Jan. 19, 2007), Articles 38, 59, and 75 of the Constitution

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2005Du2612 Decided July 26, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 1379) / [2] Constitutional Court Decision 2004Hun-Ga29 Decided April 26, 2007 (Hun-Ga127, 447) / [3] Constitutional Court Order 2000Hun-Ba23 Decided November 29, 2001 (Hun-Ba63, 1131), Constitutional Court Order 2004Hun-Ba8 Decided June 29, 2006 (Hun-Ba17, 900)

Urban Environment Improvement Association in Zone 1-1 (Law Firm Roon Line, Attorneys Kim Young-hun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The request for adjudication on the constitutionality of the instant case is dismissed.

The reason for applying for an adjudication on constitutionality of a law is examined.

1. The record reveals the following facts.

A. The Plaintiff obtained authorization from the Defendant on December 23, 2005 to implement an urban environment improvement project to newly construct a building on the instant land under the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (hereinafter “Do Government Act”). On the same day, the Defendant imposed charges on the Plaintiff for metropolitan transport facilities based on Article 11 subparag. 6 (hereinafter “the instant legal provision”) of the former Special Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Large Cities (amended by Act No. 8251, Jan. 19, 2007; hereinafter “Special Act”).

B. The Plaintiff was sentenced by the first instance court to revoke the instant disposition on the grounds that an urban environment rearrangement project under the Do administration Act was not subject to charges for metropolitan transportation facilities in the interpretation of the relevant statutes (Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2006Guhap9634), but the appellate court revoked the first instance judgment and sentenced the Plaintiff’s entire failure judgment (Seoul High Court Decision 2006Nu22028).

C. On the other hand, the Plaintiff filed an appeal on the ground that the charges for metropolitan transport facilities are similar to the taxes in that they are the obligation to pay the money under public law, and thus, in light of the constitutional request and the principle of rule of law, it requires strict interpretation of the relevant tax imposition disposition, as well as the tax imposition disposition, in light of the constitutional request and the principle of rule of law, the legal provision of the instant case violates Articles 38 and 59 of the Constitution that provides for the principle of no taxation without law, and Article 75 of the Constitution that provides for the limitation of delegated legislation, and Article 75 of the Constitution that provides for the principle of no taxation without law, and is null and void as it goes against Article 4 of the Framework Act on the Management of Charges in a superior corporation (this Court 2007Du9884). To the same purport, the Plaintiff filed an appeal on the ground that whether the legal provision of this case is unconstitutional

2. Even if the provisions of the Act stipulate the requirements for imposing and collecting taxes or charges as well as the procedures for collecting charges may cause arbitrary interpretation and enforcement of the imposing authority if they are excessively abstract and unclear, so the provisions of the Act or orders and regulations based on delegation shall be meaningful and clear. However, since the provisions of the Act have generality and abstractness, and thus their meaning can be embodied and clear through interpretation as a judge's supplementary action, if their meaning can be clearly stated in light of the legislative intent, overall system, and contents of the Act, it cannot be deemed unconstitutional even if it lacks clarity (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du2612, Jul. 26, 2007). Article 75 of the Constitution provides that "The President may issue Presidential Decrees with regard to matters delegated by the Act, which are specifically set forth in the scope of delegation." However, the Constitutional Court may reasonably determine the meaning of the provisions of the Act, which are prescribed in the Presidential Decree No. 200 and the Constitutional Court's basic provisions of the Act.

In full view of the relevant provisions including Articles 1, 2, and 11 of the Special Act, the charges for metropolitan transport facilities are a system that seeks to secure financial resources required for the construction and improvement of metropolitan transport facilities in order to solve traffic problems in metropolitan areas by bearing part of the charges for the installation of transport facilities to the causes provider or the beneficiaries in preparation for the rapidly increasing traffic demand caused by various development projects, etc. in metropolitan areas. Since the kinds and forms of development projects affecting transport in metropolitan areas are very diverse, it is very different to what projects should be subject to the payment of charges in order to achieve such legislative purpose, and it is impossible or inappropriate to require the special Acts enacted by the National Assembly to provide all the detailed matters in full.

On the other hand, Article 11 of the Special Act does not comprehensively delegate the subject matter of the metropolitan transport facility charges to the Enforcement Decree, but sets forth in subparagraphs 1 through 5 that a person who implements the “other projects prescribed by the Presidential Decree as projects similar to those provided for in subparagraphs 1 through 5” may be subject to the payment. The purpose of the provision is to limit the scope of delegation by establishing the criteria for objectively similar projects compared to the cases provided for in subparagraphs 1 through 5, and to ensure that the detailed matters concerning them can be determined flexibly by the Presidential Decree depending on the socioeconomic circumstances at the time.

Thus, the legal provision of this case takes a legislative method that provides for the contents of the major lecture by the Presidential Decree and provides for partial supplement by the Presidential Decree. Since it can be predicted through specific cases as stated in Article 11 subparagraphs 1 through 5 of the Special Act, it does not violate Article 75 of the Constitution concerning the principle of prohibition of comprehensive delegation. Since the legal provision of this case, which is the authorized law for Presidential Decree, does not violate Article 38 and Article 59 of the Constitution, as long as it does not violate Article 75 of the Constitution, which is the special provision of Article 38 and Article 59 of the Constitution, which is the general provision, it shall not be deemed to violate Articles 38 and 59 of the Constitution.

Article 11 subparag. 5 of the Special Act, which was amended by Act No. 8251, Jan. 19, 2007, after the disposition of this case, stipulates that a person who implements an urban environment improvement project (limited to the case of constructing at least 20 households of multi-family housing), is subject to the payment of charges for metropolitan transport facilities. However, this is merely a change in the regulatory method about the applicable area, and thus, cannot be deemed to have any change in the effectiveness or legal character of the legal provision of this case.

Therefore, all of the arguments in the grounds for application that the legal provisions of this case violate the Constitution cannot be accepted.

3. The argument that the contents of the legal provisions of this case conflict with the provisions of Article 4 of the Framework Act on the Management of Charges cannot be deemed to be the purport of disputing the constitutionality of the provisions of this case. Thus, this part of the argument is unlawful (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 2006Hun-Ba92, May 26, 2006; Constitutional Court Order 96Hun-Ma54, Nov. 26, 1998); and the argument that the urban environment improvement project under the Do administration Act is included in the subject of the provisions of this case, not merely dispute over the constitutionality of the law itself, but merely dispute over the interpretation and application of the law itself, and thus, this part of the argument is not acceptable (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Order 2004Hun-Ba1, Dec. 22, 2005; Constitutional Court Order 2005Hun-Ba37, May 31, 2007).

4. Therefore, the instant application is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)