Defendant

Defendant

Lee Jong-sik (Court of Prosecution), Kim Ho-ho (Court of Justice)

Attorney O Sung-sung

Cheongju District Court Decision 2012Ma1305 Decided May 9, 2013

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. As to the embezzlement against the victim non-indicted 1 (as to Article 1-2(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act)

1) In order to secure the instant claim against Nonindicted Co. 3 (the representative director: Nonindicted Co. 4; hereinafter “Nonindicted Co. 3”) (hereinafter “instant claim”), the victim Nonindicted Co. 1 established the right to collateral security (hereinafter “instant right to collateral security”) on the Chungcheongbuk-gun ( Address 1 omitted) owned by Nonindicted Co. 3 (hereinafter “the instant real estate”). However, the prior right to collateral security established on the instant real estate could not be entirely distributed from the voluntary auction procedure (hereinafter “instant auction procedure”) commenced on the instant real estate due to the prior right to collateral security (hereinafter “the instant real estate”), and the Defendant, who was aware of the fact that he received dividends from Nonindicted Co. 5 (hereinafter “Nonindicted Co. 5”) and was not able to receive dividends from Nonindicted Co. 3’s debt collection or the instant right to collateral security (hereinafter “the instant right to collateral security”) at his own expense and did not receive dividends from Nonindicted Co. 3 as the transferee of the instant claim to be distributed from the Defendant’s right to collateral security at his own expense.

2) Even if the Defendant formally acquired the instant claim and the right to collateral security from the victim non-indicted 1 for the collection of the instant claim, the Defendant received the dividend in the position of the person having the right to demand distribution as a person having the right to demand distribution by participating in the instant auction procedure as a mortgagee. Thus, apart from the fact that the Defendant bears the civil liability to return the dividend received under the delegation agreement with the victim non-indicted 1, it cannot be deemed that the said dividend itself is in the position of keeping the victim non-indicted 1 for the sake of the victim

B. As to the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act with respect to Non-Indicted 1 (related to Paragraph (A) of Article 1 of the Decree)

1) The Defendant, who received the instant claim and collateral security from Nonindicted Party 1 as a genuine transfer of the instant claim and collateral security, carried out the right to take over at the instant auction procedure, which is one’s own case, and the Defendant’s act does not constitute Article 109 subparag. 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act premised on handling legal affairs

2) Even if the Defendant was delegated by Nonindicted 1 to collect the instant claim, including distribution based on the instant right to collateral security, and was formally transferred the instant claim and collateral security in the process of administrative affairs thereof, the Defendant, as the assignee of the instant claim and collateral security, participated in and procedural acts in the instant auction procedure in the position of the party as the assignee of the instant claim and collateral security. As such, since the Defendant’s act is formally and formally executed his/her right, there is no room to apply Article 109 subparag. 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act premised on handling “legal affairs regarding others’ legal cases,” and further, it cannot be deemed as an “agent” in the form of handling legal affairs under Article 109 subparag.

3) There was no promise that the Defendant would receive money, valuables, etc. from Nonindicted 1 when receiving the instant claim and collateral security transfer from Nonindicted 1 for the purpose of collecting the instant claim and filing a lawsuit of demurrer against distribution or distribution.

C. As to the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act with respect to Non-Indicted 2 (related to Paragraph A(a) of Article 2 of the Prosecution Act)

When Nonindicted 2 was unable to receive the cost of his construction work, Nonindicted 2 attempted to receive a distribution in the voluntary auction procedure for the land that was executed by the Corporation, but it was determined that there was no possibility of receiving a distribution due to senior collateral security, etc., Nonindicted 2 merely delegated the affairs related to distribution by receiving a distribution to the Defendant who was known to the same district in high school and was in a common sense, and there was no fact that the Defendant received or promised to receive the said money, valuables, etc. in relation to the management of delegated affairs between Nonindicted

D. The assertion of unfair sentencing

The punishment of the court below (a year of imprisonment, 2 million won additional collection) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to the ground of appeal on the embezzlement against the victim non-indicted 1

Money received from a third party for a delegating person by an act of receiving money shall be deemed to belong to the delegating person at the same time as the money was received by the delegating person, and the delegated person shall be deemed to have the relation of keeping the money for the delegating person, barring any special circumstances, such as the money received by the delegating person for the purpose or purpose (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2005Do3627, Nov. 10, 2005; 97Do3057, Apr. 10, 1998; 95Do1923, Nov. 24, 1995).

In full view of the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the court below, the defendant agreed to receive dividends from the victim non-indicted 1 on behalf of the victim non-indicted 1 and received dividends from the victim non-indicted 1 in the above auction procedure and received dividends from the victim non-indicted 1 after participating in the above auction procedure on behalf of the victim non-indicted 1. Therefore, the fact-finding and judgment of the court below on this part of the facts charged are just and acceptable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding facts or by misunderstanding the legal principles as argued by the defendant, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, this part of the defendant's assertion is without merit.

1) around 209 to 2010, Nonindicted 4, the representative director of Nonindicted Company 3, was the victim Nonindicted 1, who was the creditor, paid the full amount of the senior collateral obligation under the name of Nonindicted Company 5, which was established on the instant real estate, and thus, the said right to collateral security was null and void. 1) Note 2

[Defendant’s defense counsel against this case’s defense counsel argues that since Nonindicted 4 received part of the dividend payment based on the instant mortgage from the Defendant, but was unable to receive the Defendant’s failure to perform the promise, Nonindicted 4’s above statement is not reliable since it made unfavorable statements against the Defendant in the hostile sentiment against the Defendant. However, Nonindicted 4 consistently stated from the investigation agency that “the Defendant was assigned the instant claim on behalf of the Defendant with the money that the Defendant would have received from Nonindicted 1. Therefore, the right holder of the instant claim is known to the Defendant. Therefore, if Nonindicted 4 made a false statement in the hostile appraisal against the Defendant, there is no reason to make the Defendant make the above statement favorable to the Defendant regarding the right holder of the instant claim (as seen earlier, the Defendant did not have any claim against Nonindicted 1). Furthermore, Nonindicted 4 refused to sell the instant real estate to Nonindicted 1’s first priority mortgagee prior to the sale of the instant real estate in the auction procedure, and thus, refused to sell the instant real estate upon the Defendant’s request to sell the instant real estate to Nonindicted 100 million won.

2) On March 4, 2011, Nonindicted 1 stated that Nonindicted 5’s claim was repaid from Nonindicted 4 and documents related to the termination of the right to collateral security had been recorded (in this regard, the defense counsel stated that, around April 7, 2011, when Nonindicted 1 was investigated by the police, Nonindicted 1 stated that Nonindicted 5’s claim was repaid to Nonindicted 5’s Defendant at the time when Nonindicted 5’s claim was made (the date following the sale of the instant real estate in the instant auction procedure) and that Nonindicted 1 stated that “The defense counsel stated that Nonindicted 5’s claim was repaid to Nonindicted 5’s Defendant on the ground that Nonindicted 5’s claim was paid to Nonindicted 5’s claim at the time when Nonindicted 1 stated that Nonindicted 5’s claim was paid to him/her at the time of the instant auction, and that there was no consistency in the statement that Nonindicted 1 stated that Nonindicted 5’s claim was paid to Nonindicted 5’s claim at the time of the instant auction.” However, it appears that the Defendant 1 stated that there was no credibility at the Defendant 1’s signature at the time of this case’s claim.

3) On or around March 13, 2011, Nonindicted 1 entrusted the Defendant with the receipt of dividends in the instant auction procedure, the victim Nonindicted 1 prepared a power of delegation (Evidence 2: 55 pages) to the Defendant to delegate all of the “legal act regarding the receipt of dividends and dividends” (Evidence 1: Cheongju District Court 2009Mata, 17366). After that, on or around April 12, 2011, the Defendant did not know that Nonindicted 1 was the creditor of the instant claim from Nonindicted 4 or Nonindicted 5, and that Nonindicted 1 was aware of the fact that Nonindicted 5’s obligation was transferred to Nonindicted 2 and Nonindicted 5’s right to receive dividends (Evidence 4) at the time of the Defendant’s embezzlement and Nonindicted 1’s execution of dividend-related business (Evidence 2). The victim did not know that Nonindicted 1 was aware of the Defendant’s right to receive dividends from Nonindicted 2 and Nonindicted 5’s share Distribution (Evidence 2).).

[Attachment, the Defendant delegated the instant auction procedure to Nonindicted 1 for the allocation of dividends. On April 9, 2011, the Defendant alleged that the delegation relationship would be terminated, and that Nonindicted 1 would be able to receive a million won even through a separate corporeal movables provisional seizure procedure, etc. In so doing, Nonindicted 1 would accept the said claim transfer and takeover contract even if he did. However, the Defendant asserted that ① the victim’s non-indicted 1 did not have any such talk from the Defendant on the said temporary basis, and only stated that the Defendant did not receive a distribution from the Defendant at the same time on July 2011. ② If the Defendant and the non-indicted 12 together at the same time did not receive a dividend from the non-indicted 1, the Defendant made it difficult to conclude that the Defendant did not receive a dividend from the non-indicted 1, the Defendant made it difficult to conclude that the Defendant did not have the right to be forgotten or transferred the said claim to the non-indicted 1, and the Defendant made it difficult to conclude that the Defendant did not have any remaining evidence as above.

4) After selling the instant real estate, Nonindicted 4 asked the Defendant whether he was able to recover the instant real estate and repaid his obligations to Nonindicted Co. 5, and asked him that he was able to receive dividends by using the right to collateral security in the name of Nonindicted Co. 5, and thus, he did not repay the said money. However, the Defendant consistently stated that he was able to have divided the dividends if he received a written confirmation of repayment from Nonindicted Co. 5 and received a written confirmation of payment from Nonindicted Co. 5, and that he was able to receive dividends from Nonindicted Co. 5.

5) In full view of the above circumstances, the victim non-indicted 1 was aware that at the time when the contract for the transfer and takeover of the instant claim was made to the defendant, the victim non-indicted 1 was repaid with the claim of the non-indicted 5, a senior mortgagee, and was likely to receive dividends from the junior mortgagee, and there was no reason to transfer the instant claim to the defendant without compensation. In light of the fact that the defendant was aware of this circumstance by the victim non-indicted 1, the defendant was formally transferred the instant claim to the defendant in order to smoothly perform the affairs related to the receipt of dividends based on the instant claim and the right to collateral

Therefore, inasmuch as the Defendant was formally transferred the instant claim and the right to collateral security, which was delegated by Nonindicted Party 1, to smoothly carry out the affairs related to the receipt of dividends based on the instant claim and the right to collateral security, barring any special agreement between Nonindicted Party 1, the dividend that the Defendant received in the instant auction procedure shall be deemed to fall under the ownership of Nonindicted Party 1, the delegating person, at the same time as receiving the dividend, unless the Defendant agreed that the dividend would belong to the Defendant, unlike Nonindicted Party 1, (it is merely a civil claim, even if the Defendant had the right under an implied agreement with Nonindicted Party 1 to receive the payment, such as the fee, and the dividend itself does not fall under the ownership of the Defendant). Therefore, the Defendant’s arbitrary use of the dividend that the Defendant kept on behalf of Nonindicted Party 1 constitutes embezzlement. Accordingly

B. Ground of appeal on the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act concerning Non-Indicted 1

1) As seen earlier, the Defendant, while receiving delegation from Nonindicted 1 the distribution affairs of the instant right to collateral security, received formal acquisition of the instant claim and collateral security from Nonindicted 1, and actually conducted litigation at the instant auction procedure for Nonindicted 1, which was practically conducted for Nonindicted 1. As such, this part of the allegation on the premise that the Defendant was duly transferred the instant claim and collateral security from Nonindicted 1 without compensation is without merit.

2) Whether Article 109 subparag. 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act (hereinafter “instant penal provision”) applies

As examined below, comprehensively taking account of the legislative intent, legislative history, contents and form of the instant penal provision, and Article 32 of the Attorney-at-Law Act, which prohibits an attorney from taking over the right in dispute, a person who is not an attorney-at-law from taking over the right holder’s right to conduct another’s legal affairs for the purpose of money, goods, or other profit, thereby becoming a party and actually managing another’s legal affairs, constitutes an element of the instant penal provision. As such, the Defendant’s act of taking over the instant claim and collateral security in the auction procedure for the purpose of Non-Indicted 1 by taking over the instant claim and collateral security in formality from Non-Indicted 1, and practically taking over the instant claim and collateral security.

A) Legislative intent of the instant penal provision

The instant penal provision prohibits a person, other than an attorney-at-law, from handling all legal affairs in order to prevent any harm to the people’s interests in legal life and judicial function that arise from the handling of legal affairs with respect to other persons’ legal affairs. In a case where a person, who is not an attorney-at-law, exercises his/her rights in a lawsuit or in other ways to realize his/her rights, there is no room to cause any harm that the instant penal provision intends to regulate, but if a person, other than an attorney-at-law, either receives or agrees to receive compensation with a view to receiving it and exercises his/her rights formally to deal with other persons’ legal affairs, then he/she cannot be deemed an act of dealing with other persons’ legal affairs, and therefore, it is necessary to regulate the harm

B) Legislative history of the instant penal provision

Article 78 Subparag. 2 of the former Attorney-at-law Act (amended by Act No. 4544 of Mar. 10, 1993), which is the original provision of the instant penal provision, did not include “other general legal cases” in cases prohibited by non-legal attorneys-at-law, and also did not stipulate “legal counseling or preparation of legal documents and other legal affairs” in the prohibited acts. However, the prohibited acts are limited, in principle, contrary to the legislative intent of the Act to allow attorneys-at-law to deal with legal cases, there was a violation of the legal order such as impairing the interests of the parties and other interested persons, impairing the fairness of legal life, and hindering smooth operation of the attorney-at-law. In order to eliminate the deficiency of legal norms and secure effectiveness, the act prohibited by amendment of the Act, including “other general legal cases”, and the act prohibited by law, including “the act subject to the prohibition” and “the act subject to the general provision of the penal provision of this case 90-20-2” can be seen as the legislative purpose of the Act.

The method of dealing with legal affairs by a person, other than an attorney-at-law, may arise in a variety of ways to intervene in other persons' legal cases for the purpose of money, valuables, or other benefit. To this end, the appearance of acquiring rights formally or pretending to acquire rights is a typical means of protection to lead the handling of other persons' legal cases, and the process is likely to impede the fair and smooth operation of the judicial system and to cause harm to the people's legal life (including the case where the harm of the people's legal life is greater, such as not returning the profits he/she acquired from the other party to the exercise of rights to the position of a party to the actual right and causing another dispute by the act of distribution, such as he/she directly has an standing. Therefore, if the above action cannot be regulated by the instant penal provision, it is clear that the legislative intent of the instant penal provision will be dismissed (where the instant penal provision is interpreted in the form of acquiring rights of others, it is likely to legally support or encourage the handling of legal affairs by a person, other than an attorney-at-law

C) Details and form of the instant penal provision

In the case of a genuine acquisition of rights, the assignee’s act in order to realize the right is a legal affairs pertaining to the case of a transferee and does not deal with legal affairs pertaining to another person’s legal affairs, and there is no room to regard it as constituting the constituent elements of the instant penal provision. However, in a case where a person takes over and exercises a formal right to deal with another person’s legal affairs, it is practically dealing with another person’s legal affairs in light of the genuine right holder. The instant penal provision does not expressly state that the case or act subject to the instant penal provision is “the case of a third person” or “the act of dealing with another person’s legal affairs.” Therefore, the instant penal provision applies to the act of dealing with another person’s legal affairs

D) The issue of equity in punishment in the case of a change in punishment depending on the form of dealing with others’ legal affairs

The instant penal provision includes all legal cases in addition to “other general legal cases” in cases subject to prohibition, and includes acts subject to prohibition such as appraisal, representation, arbitration, reconciliation, solicitation, legal consultation, preparation of documents, and other legal affairs. Therefore, in cases where there is no possibility that the acquisition of formal rights to participate in another person’s legal affairs may be at issue, for instance, preparation of documents, such as legal consultation, complaint, written opinion, etc. concerning investigation may be subject to punishment in accordance with the instant penal provision if it is related to receipt of money or other benefits or payment agreement. However, in cases where a person, other than an attorney, takes over a formal right to participate in another person’s legal affairs and directly takes charge of handling a case, the degree of involvement in another person’s legal affairs may be serious or its harm may be more serious, but the instant penal provision does not apply merely because it is the exercise of a right in appearance as a party, if it is not applied to another person’s legal affairs, depending on the type or appearance in which he/she handles another person’s legal affairs in his/her name.

E) Relationship with Paragraph 1 of Article 112 of the Attorney-at-Law

Article 112 Item 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act provides for the punishment of those who have acquired rights of others or who are engaged in business by means of lawsuit, etc. by pretending the acquisition of rights of others, and where the above provision is applied in cases where the rights are implemented by means of lawsuit, etc., it cannot be deemed that the penal provision of this case is not applicable. Article 112 Item 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act provides for regulating acts of avoiding the penal provision of this case by lending the same form as the acquisition of rights from others without attorneys-at-law and actually taking over rights from others, which is not the same as the exercise of rights from others, shall be included in the legislative purpose, but basically, the legislative purpose of which is to prevent the abolition of the rights of attorneys-at-law (see Supreme Court Decision 201Do3149, Jun. 27, 2013; Supreme Court Decision 201Do3514, Apr. 1, 2013).

F) However, the term “agent” under the instant penal provision means “the party’s involvement in a legal case in the name of the party on behalf of the party” (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 98HunBa95,96,99HunBa2,200HunBa4, Apr. 27, 2000). Thus, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant’s actual act of taking over Nonindicted Party 1’s claim from Nonindicted Party 1 in the name of the party constitutes an act of representation.

However, under the premise that Article 109 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act applies, the facts charged in this part of the facts charged are the act of "agent", which is one of the several types of punishment provided in the above provision. Under the premise of the same facts charged, the rate of "other legal affairs", which is one of the types of punishment provided in the same Article, is within the same scope as the facts charged, and as long as deliberation has been conducted by the defendant and his counsel on the third trial date, such as giving the defendant and his counsel an opportunity to state their opinions in relation thereto, it does not cause any disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of his right to defense. Thus, without going through the amendment procedure of the indictment, this part of the facts charged can be recognized differently as falling under the act of "handling other legal affairs" provided in Article 109 subparagraph

3) Whether there was an agreement between the Defendant and Nonindicted 1 regarding the receipt of money, valuables, and other benefits

The instant penal provision does not distinguish cases where a person, other than an attorney-at-law, performs an act of representation, etc. in relation to a litigation case and commits the same act in return for promising to receive money and other valuables. This is because the legislative intent of the instant penal provision is to punish a person, regardless of the time prior to or after the time of receiving money and other valuables, etc. and the time of handling legal affairs, who is not an attorney-at-law, intends to perform legal affairs related to a litigation case for the purpose of receiving a quid pro quo. In fact, giving and receiving money and other valuables, etc. as remuneration is a common example after the process of legal affairs or the process is completed. Even if there was no express promise, if he/she could have sufficiently anticipated or predicted it in advance, and even if he/she had an intention to pay it, it constitutes "act of handling legal affairs related to a litigation case, etc. in return for promising to receive money and other valuables, etc." as prescribed in the instant penal provision. Furthermore, if the person actually received money

The following circumstances acknowledged by the court below and the court of first instance, namely, ① Nonindicted 1 did not specify the specific amount of the cost to be paid in return at the time of delegation of the business related to the distribution of dividends based on the right to collateral security of this case to the Defendant. However, there was an interview related to water expenses among two persons ( Nonindicted 1 stated that, upon receiving the distribution, the Defendant would have reduced the amount of KRW 5 million through KRW 10 million at the expense). ② Around 2009, the Defendant received the dividend-related business as described in paragraph 2 of the facts charged of this case from Nonindicted 2 and received the dividend in advance, and it was difficult to view that the agreement was not explicitly and explicitly, and it was difficult to determine the amount of the Defendant’s payment and the amount of the dividend that the Defendant received from Nonindicted 1, who received or could not receive from Nonindicted 1, as the dividend-related business of this case, because it was difficult to expect the Defendant to receive the dividend at the time of the distribution of the right to collateral security of this case.

4) Sub-committee

As stated in this part of the facts charged, the judgment of the court below that the act of filing a lawsuit of distribution and a lawsuit of demurrer against distribution in its own name on the basis of the right which the defendant had been formally acquired from Nonindicted 1 as a means to handle dividend affairs and received dividends constitutes an act of acting as an agent in the form of dealing with another person's legal affairs prohibited under the instant penal provision is not appropriate, but it is reasonable to find the defendant guilty of this part of the facts charged as long as it constitutes an act of dealing with other legal affairs as provided in the same provision

C. As to the ground of appeal on the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act with respect to Nonindicted 2

The following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence adopted by the lower court, namely, ① at the time Nonindicted 2 entrusted Nonindicted 2 with the affairs related to the distribution of dividends to the Defendant around 2009, the Defendant was subject to KRW 13,572,603 as dividends by actively handling the affairs such as provisional seizure on the land owned by Nonindicted 2 as an agent after participating in the auction procedure as an agent of Nonindicted 2, and ② the Defendant, who was not particularly closely related to Nonindicted 2, cannot be deemed to have performed the above acts without implied promise or expectation on remuneration. ③ In fact, the Defendant received KRW 2 million for expenses after receiving dividends (at the time, the Defendant was deemed to have received dividends from Nonindicted 2 as total KRW 7 million, and the Defendant had received dividends from Nonindicted 2 as a security expense and received dividends from Nonindicted 2, who could have received dividends from Nonindicted 2, which would have been delegated to him/her at the time of receiving dividends, and the Defendant could have received dividends from Nonindicted 2, 3000,000 won for dividends to him/her.

D. As to the assertion of unreasonable sentencing

The fact that the defendant agreed with the victim non-indicted 2, and that there is no past record of punishment or punishment for the same kind of crime, etc. are favorable to the defendant.

However, the crime of embezzlement of this case is a normal situation against the defendant, in that the defendant used money received in the course of performing the business of distributing dividends from the victims who are high school creatives without returning it, and it is not good to commit such crime. The crime of violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act also may damage the foundation of the attorney system, harm the interests of the parties and other interested persons in the legal life, and disrupt the legal order. The case is not easy, and the defendant does not oppose the mistake while disputing the factual relations up to the trial, and the defendant does not object to the mistake, and the victim non-indicted 1 want to punish the defendant.

Therefore, in light of the above circumstances and the various sentencing conditions indicated in the records, such as the Defendant’s age, character and conduct, environment, motive and circumstance of the crime, and circumstances after the crime, the lower court’s punishment is too unreasonable.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the defendant's appeal is without merit, and it is dismissed pursuant to Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition (However, the part of the crime No. 1-A of the judgment of the court below which stated that "the defendant promises to receive money and valuables from a person who is not an attorney-at-law and acted on behalf of the defendant with respect to a litigation case and other legal cases" shall be corrected as "this defendant promises to receive money and valuables from a person who is not an attorney-at-law

Judges Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)

(1) Nonindicted 4 and Nonindicted 1 of the victim made a consistent statement from an investigative agency to the original trial or the trial court.

2) At the time of investigation conducted by the police, Nonindicted 4 made a statement that “Nonindicted 1 would have been able to receive money and the circumstances of the low-scar factory,” and Nonindicted 4 made a statement that Nonindicted 4 would have been aware of the fact that Nonindicted 4 had been repaid the claim of Nonindicted 5, a senior mortgagee, in order to make Nonindicted 4 aware of the possibility of repayment while continuously lending money to Nonindicted 4, and Nonindicted 4 made a statement that Nonindicted 4 had been repaid the claim of Nonindicted 5, a senior mortgagee, instead of taking one time (Evidence No. 270 pages) at the court below’s trial (Evidence No. 1).

3) In addition, at the instant auction procedure, the power of attorney (which delegates to the Defendant all the “service and the Act on the Receipt of Dividends and Distribution of Dividends”) was submitted as of April 7, 201 with almost the same contents written in the name of the victim Nonindicted Party 1 (Evidence No. 15 pages).

4) The victim non-indicted 1 stated that, upon receiving the request from the non-indicted 4 for the cancellation of the instant right to collateral security before the instant real estate was sold during the auction procedure, it was difficult to demand the non-indicted 4 to confirm the repayment of the non-indicted 5’s claim directly due to the non-indicted 4’s non-indicted 4’s refusal, and thus, it was difficult to demand the non-indicted 4 to confirm the repayment of the non-indicted 5’s claim (in this regard, the non-indicted 2 stated that “the non-indicted 1 could not prove the circumstances in which the non-indicted 5’s claim was repaid, and that the defendant transferred the instant claim to Non-indicted 4 and the non-indicted 5’s claim because he had to be deemed as his own claim.”

5) Nonindicted 2 consistently makes statements from the police to the original trial court as above.

(6) The defense counsel asserts that, at the time when Nonindicted 2 was first examined by the police, the victim Nonindicted 1’s above statement was not reliable. However, at the time of the investigation by the police, the victim Nonindicted 1 stated that “the defendant had obtained his seal impression and affixed his seal on the transfer documents prepared in advance.” The prosecutor’s office and the court below stated that “the defendant transferred the instant bonds to another person, affixed his seal and affixed his seal to the defendant, and Nonindicted 2, and even Nonindicted 2 delegated his dividends to the defendant, it is believed that Nonindicted 2 was paid the seal impression to the defendant, and it is difficult for the defendant to believe that his seal impression was affixed to Nonindicted 2’s office, and that the defendant prepared the transfer documents using the above seal impression, and it is also difficult to conclude that Nonindicted 2 made the above statement to the effect that Nonindicted 1 had the victim’s consent and affixed his seal to the defendant with his own signature affixed to him.” In light of the fact that Nonindicted 2, from the police to the court below, it is also difficult to see that the defendant had given his consent to the above Defendant’s second statement that he made the above distribution of dividends.

7) Meanwhile, the Defendant asserts that Nonindicted Party 1 transferred the instant claim on the basis of the instant agreement dated April 12, 201 (Evidence No. 81 page). However, Nonindicted Party 1, at the time of making a statement at the prosecution, appears to have prepared a written agreement with the Defendant on the Internet before signing the agreement with the Defendant on October 28, 201, and affixed a seal imprint affixed the said written agreement with the Defendant at the office of Nonindicted Party 2. However, the Defendant would not have prepared the said written agreement and prepared the written agreement with the Defendant on the condition that it would be difficult to have prepared a new written agreement with the Defendant on the condition that it would have been signed and sealed by Nonindicted Party 1. In addition, Nonindicted Party 1 prepared a new written agreement with the Defendant on the condition that it would have been destroyed or sealed by Nonindicted Party 1’s signature or seal affixed to the Defendant’s signature or seal affixed to Nonindicted Party 4, and that it would have been difficult to say that it would have been destroyed by the Defendant’s signature or seal affixed to the Defendant’s signature.

8) According to the contents of Nonindicted 4’s telephone call with the victim Nonindicted 1 on November 1, 201, Nonindicted 4 attempted not to prepare and inform the Defendant that the Defendant was transferred the instant claim from Nonindicted 1 because it was not good for Nonindicted 1’s appraisal. However, it was difficult for the Defendant to provide a letter of confirmation that Nonindicted 5’s claim was repaid, taking into account the Defendant’s link with Nonindicted 1’s friendship (Nonindicted 1 is Nonindicted 4’s friendship and friendship with Nonindicted 4’s friendship), and it was considered that Nonindicted 1 was unable to receive dividends from the Defendant, and that Nonindicted 4 strongly criticized the Defendant of the defect that Nonindicted 1 was unable to receive dividends from the Defendant (Evidence 1, 260-262 page of evidence record).

9) In the lower court’s judgment, Nonindicted Party 1 stated that at the time when he delegated the Defendant with the dividend-related affairs of the instant right to collateral security, Nonindicted Party 1 stated that he would receive the Defendant’s premium, and that at that time Nonindicted Party 1 expressed that he would not interfere with himself “in the process” (the second police interrogation protocol against the Defendant, No. 71 & No. 71).

Note 10) At the time of being investigated by the police, the Defendant stated that he handled 2 million won out of the dividends received at the time when Nonindicted 2 was entrusted with the dividend-related affairs as above by Nonindicted 2 (Evidence No. 1,57 pages).