Main Issues
(a) Entry in the forest tax or land tax clearly stating and the estimated power of alteration of a right;
B. Whether ownership is lost in cases where no registration of recovery was made after the registration was destroyed (negative)
C. In a case where a judicial compromise is revoked in a lawsuit for quasi-adjudication, whether the legal relationship arising from a judicial compromise is invalidated (affirmative)
D. Whether a judicial compromise between the co-defendants has been established (affirmative)
Summary of Judgment
(a)There is no presumption of the alteration of a right in the entry in the forest tax entry or the land entry, but such entry may be made as data for fact-finding with regard to the alteration of a right;
B. Where a registration of change in the acquisition or loss of a real right due to a juristic act has already been made prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act, Article 10(1) of the Addenda to the Civil Act is not applicable even if such registration was destroyed or lost, and the owner at the time of loss of the register did not lose the ownership unless the restoration registration was made within
(c) When a judicial compromise has been cancelled by an action for quasi-examination, and the quasi-examination thereof has become final and conclusive, the effect of judicial compromise shall be extinguished, and therefore all legal effects arising from such judicial compromise shall be naturally null and void.
D. A party to a judicial compromise may become an assistant intervenor who is not a party to the lawsuit or a third party, and if necessary for the judicial compromise, it may add rights or legal relations other than the subject matter of the lawsuit. As such, the effect of a judicial compromise shall not necessarily be limited to the subject matter of the lawsuit between the parties to the lawsuit, and its effect shall affect the parties entered in the protocol according to the contents of the compromise recorded in the protocol of compromise. Therefore, if it is confirmed that the land in dispute between the plaintiff Gap, the defendant Eul, and Byung is co-ownership of one third share of the plaintiff Eul, Eul, and Byung, even if Eul were in the same position as the defendant together, the effect of the judicial compromise shall arise between Eul and Byung.
[Reference Provisions]
A. Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Act: Article 24 of the Registration of Real Estate Act; Article 186 of the Civil Act; Article 206 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 431 of the Civil Procedure Act
Plaintiff-Appellee
[Defendant-Appellant] Cho Jae-ho et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellee and 1 other, Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant
Defendant-Appellant
Defendant 1 and 46 others
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul High Court Decision 76Na2693 delivered on October 13, 1978
Text
(1) The part of the lower judgment on the land in attached Table 1-2 of the lower judgment against Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, and 47 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.
(2) The remaining appeals by the said Defendants and all appeals by Defendants 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, and 22, Defendant Dongdong Timber Co., Ltd., Defendant Dongdong Co., Ltd, Defendant 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, and 45 are dismissed.
(3) The costs of appeal by the Defendants as stated in Paragraph (1) are assessed against the said Defendants. The remaining costs of appeal are assessed against the said Defendants.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined together (to the extent of supplement).
1. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, while the members of the plaintiff clan naturally formed a 10.1 descendants from the members of the plaintiff clan who jointly set up the 20 years old Chocheon-gun's Chocheon-gun's right of common ancestor, the court below established a provision that the members of the clan gather the cryp to the 10.1 clans of Seongdong-gu, Seoul and handle the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the cryp to the plaintiff clan.
The name of the plaintiff clan, which is the clan of the same clan and the clan of the plaintiff clan, is not enough to separate it from the name of the clan of the plaintiff clan that is the clan of the same clan as the clan's common ancestor and the clan's clan's clan's clan in the Ansan-dong clan's clan. It does not affect the existence of the plaintiff clan because it is difficult to do so, and even according to the records, it is not recognized that the plaintiff clan's clan was incorporated and extinguished simultaneously with the establishment of the clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's clan's
2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized the registration of ownership transfer under the name of 1, 6, 7, 8, 2, 19, 21, 4, 19, 21, 3, 23, 23, 3, 4 (1, 4-2, 4) of the above list as well as 9, 25, 1, 7, 17, 24, 27, 1, 302, 4, 27, 1, 302, 26, 30, 4, 301, 1, 25, 17, 300, 17, 177, 300, 177, 24, 300, 300, 177, 300, 197, 24, 302, 197, 28, 31,002, 26, 31, 37,2,
According to the records and reasoning of the judgment below, the court below's determination that Gap evidence Nos. 9-1 and 2 ( Receipt of Forest Tax) is recognized as a public document in accordance with the method and purport of the document, and it is just to presume the authenticity of the document, and reject the defendants' evidential defense that this document and theory of lawsuit are forged. There is no error in the misapprehension of logical and empirical rules, misunderstanding of legal principles, or lack of reasoning, such as the misapprehension of legal principles, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the presumption of alteration of rights in the forest land register as evidence, and the court below's determination that the address of plaintiff 2, who is liable for tax payment, is not stated as the name at the time of the formation, and it cannot be concluded that the forest land register was forged unless it is stated as the name at the time of the formation, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the presumption of alteration of rights in the forest land register as evidence, and it is not clear that there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of law as evidence as evidence.
3. Where a registration for a change in the acquisition of a real right by a juristic act has already been made before the enforcement date of the Civil Act, even if the registration was destroyed or lost, Article 10(1) of the Addenda to the Civil Act does not apply, and since the owner at the time of loss of the registration does not lose the ownership because he did not make the restoration registration within the period for recovery registration, it is justifiable for the court below to determine the fact that the registration of ownership transfer has been made in the name of the plaintiffs prior to the enforcement of the Civil Act as seen above, and there is no argument in the contrary opinion that there is a misunderstanding of
4. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendant 1's claim for cancellation of non-party 1's legal relation as to non-party 2's non-party 1's legal relation with non-party 6's non-party 1's legal relation with non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 6, non-party 8, non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 7's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 7's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 7's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 2's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 6's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1'63'
(A) First, we examine the remaining lands of this case except for the above 3-(2) land. According to the records and reasoning of the judgment below, the judgment of the court below that the land is owned by the plaintiffs and the registration of the defendants' name that was completed is a registration of invalidation of the cause of action is just, and there is no such unlawful cause as a theory of lawsuit, incomplete deliberation, and lack of reasoning. The argument that the registration of the defendants' name is valid, which corresponds to the substantive relation, is without merit, since the theory is developed from the viewpoint of objection, and it is obvious that the purport of the court below has rejected such argument is that it is clear that there is an error of law of omission of judgment in the judgment, and since the registration is not recognized as a public trust in the registration, the registration of this
(B) Next, we examine the above 3-2 of the land of this case (the appeal by Defendant 7 on the part of the above land was dismissed)
The registration of the co-ownership transfer of Nonparty 14 and Nonparty 13, who completed the above land, was completed by the above Nonparty 6 and six other persons who were unentitled persons, and thus the original judgment was invalid as at the time of original adjudication. However, as stated in its reasoning, it becomes a matter of whether the judicial compromise has been established and whether the judicial compromise has been revoked is valid or not;
(1) First, as to the part related to the above non-party 14, a compromise in court is revoked by a lawsuit for retrial, and the judgment of review becomes final and conclusive, all legal effects arising from such a compromise shall become null and void as a matter of course. Accordingly, since the part between the plaintiff 2 and the above non-party 14 among the dispute settlement in this case is revoked by a lawsuit for retrial, and the legal relationship between the plaintiff 2 and the above non-party 14 confirmed that the right to 1/3 share of the land in the above non-party 3-(2) was owned by the non-party 14 was the same as that of the non-party 14, the degree of original coercion was determined as to the non-party 2's failure to resist the plaintiff 2, or whether the above non-party 14 was transferred with the right to share in the above land, the court below's rejection of the aforementioned defendants' defense in the same purport is justifiable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the cancellation of a legal theory or declaration of intent, etc.
(2) Next, as to the part related to the above non-party 13, a party to a judicial compromise or a third party may serve as an intervenor or a third party who is not a party to a lawsuit, and if necessary for the judicial compromise, the effect of judicial compromise cannot be deemed to have been limited only to the parties involved in the lawsuit, and it shall affect the parties entered in the protocol in accordance with the content of the compromise entered in the protocol. If the legal relationship between the plaintiff 2, the above non-party 13, and the non-party 14-3 were to have no effect on the plaintiff 2, the non-party 13, and the non-party 4's legal relationship with the plaintiff 2 and the non-party 4's legal relationship with the above non-party 2, the legal relationship with the non-party 3 as to the above legal relationship with the plaintiff 1 and the non-party 2 were to have no effect on the non-party 4's legal relationship with the plaintiff 2 and the above legal relationship with the non-party 13 as to the above legal relationship with the plaintiff 2.
5. Defendant 36 did not state the grounds of appeal in the petition of appeal and did not submit the appellate brief within the prescribed period.
6. Therefore, the part concerning the above 3-B land against Defendant 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, and 47 is reversed (the above part concerning the above 17, 19, 21, 24, 25, 26, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 42, 43, 47, and 47 is reversed, and the remaining part of the appeal against Defendant 1 against Defendant 2, 35, 26, 37, 49, 40, 42, 43, 446, 47, and 47 are not applicable to the above part of the appeal against Defendant 1.
Justices Jeong Jong-tae (Presiding Justice) Kim Jong-young (Presiding Justice)