(a) Whether the municipal ordinances and regulations that grant a part of the members of the administrative complaint settlement coordination committee to the Speaker of the Provincial Council are unlawful;

B. Whether municipal ordinances and regulations governing the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of an Office of Education are unlawful, which require the Governor to take charge of administrative complaints under the jurisdiction of the Governor;

C. Whether the effect of the re-resolution of the Ordinance is denied if part of the Ordinance is unlawful

A. The passive ex post facto intervention of the local council in relation to the personnel rights of the executive organ is allowed if it is required within the scope of checks, but it is not possible to exercise the personnel rights of the executive organ independently or in equal status, and actively intervene in advance. As a matter of principle, it is not allowed to actively intervene in the appointment or dismissal of a member of the administrative complaint settlement coordination committee as stipulated in the Ordinance, which is made to obtain the consent of the local council ex post facto passive intervention, and thus, it should be deemed a legitimate provision required for the scope of checks to the executive organ of the local council. However, it is an illegal provision that allows the local council to commission part of it to actively intervene in advance in the executive organ's personnel rights, which is contrary to the purpose of separation and allocation between the deliberative organ and the executive organ as stipulated in the Local Autonomy Act, and it cannot be permitted by Municipal Ordinance without the authority to participate in the executive organ's personnel rights as the chairperson's individual qualification. Therefore,

B. In full view of the provisions of Article 3 of the Government Organization Act, Article 18 of the General Rules on the Organization and Personnel of Administrative Agencies, Article 112 of the Local Autonomy Act, Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Local Education Autonomy Act, etc., the Superintendent of the Office of Education, as an executive agency, which is a special local administrative agency, established to have the inherent division of the education and arts of the Do, shall independently take charge of education, arts, education delegated by the Do, education delegated by the State, art, and academic affairs. Thus, the Do governor, as an executive agency of a local government, takes charge of the above affairs concerning the handling of administrative complaints concerning the unique duties of the Superintendent of the Office of Education, is unlawful as it violates

(c) If part of the Ordinance is unlawful, the re-resolution of the Ordinance shall be denied in its entirety.

(a) Articles 15, 43, 94, 96, and 107 of the Local Autonomy Act; Articles 41 and 42 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act; Article 3 of the Government Organization Act; Article 112 of the Local Autonomy Act; Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Local Education Autonomy Act; Article 18(c) of the General Rule on the Organization and Fixed Number of Administrative Agencies; Article 159 of the Local Autonomy Act;

A.C. Supreme Court Decision 92Da31 delivered on July 28, 1992 (Gong1992, 2575). Supreme Court Decision 92Da116 delivered on March 9, 1993, Supreme Court Decision 92Da123 delivered on April 27, 1993

Attorney Kim Jung-sik, Counsel for the defendant-appellant in charge

[Defendant-Appellant-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 3 others (Law Firm Gangnam- Line, Counsel for defendant-appellant-appellant-appellant)

1. The re-resolution on the draft of the Jeollabuk-do Ordinance on the Disposal of Administrative Appeals, which was made by the defendant on July 31, 1993, shall not be effective.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

same as the text of the claim.

1. According to the evidence Nos. 1-2, 1-2, 2-1, 2-2, 3-1, 2-2, 5, and 1-1, 1-2, 5, and 1-2, for which there is no dispute over establishment, the following facts may be acknowledged:

A. On June 23, 1993, the defendant resolved the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance of this case") and transferred it to the plaintiff on the 28th of the same month. The plaintiff requested reconsideration from the defendant on July 12 of the same year in accordance with the Ordinance of the Ministry of Home Affairs under Article 159 of the Local Autonomy Act, but the decision was finalized by the same resolution as before the 31st of the same month.

B. The Ordinance of this case was enacted for the purpose of dealing with administrative deficiencies only (Article 1); the Do Governor and the Superintendent of the Office of Education, etc. define that the Ordinance of this case refers to objections to administrative acts that the executive body, such as the Governor and the Superintendent of the Office of Education, etc. has dealt with (Article 2); to achieve this purpose, the Committee shall establish the Committee for the Settlement of Administrative Appeals in Jeollabuk-do (hereinafter referred to as the “Committee”); two members commissioned by the Chairperson of the Do Council and three members commissioned by the Do Governor, including three members commissioned by the Do Governor; and the Committee shall obtain the consent of the Council (Article 9); and the Committee may, upon receiving the application for administrative deficiencies of the Do residents, investigate the facts by means of explanation request, recording inspection or on-site investigation (Articles 11, 13, 14, and 15); the executive body shall respect the recommendations and opinions of the Committee for correction in accordance with the findings of its investigation; and shall report the results of processing to the Committee, such as corrective measures (Article 18).

2. Whether the Ordinance of this case violates the Governor's inherent authority to work

A. According to the Ordinance of this case, in the organization of the Committee, the Do Council grants the Do Council Chairperson the right to commission part of its members and the right to consent to the commission and dismissal of members.

However, the Local Autonomy Act (amended by Act No. 4741, Mar. 16, 1994; hereinafter the same) provides that the local council and the head of the local government shall grant independent authority to the local council and maintain balance with each other. Thus, barring special provisions in law, it is not possible to regulate regulations that infringe the other party's own authority beyond the scope of checks, and the ordinances that the other party exercises one's own authority violate the Local Autonomy Act.

Therefore, the passive ex post facto intervention of the local council in relation to the personnel rights of the executive organ is allowed if it is required within the scope of checks. However, it is not allowed to exercise the personnel rights of the executive organ independently or in an equal position, and actively intervene in advance is not allowed in principle (see Supreme Court Decision 92Do116 delivered on March 9, 1993).

B. Although the committee stipulated in the Ordinance of this case does not know the grounds for its establishment, it appears that the committee can find the grounds for its establishment under Article 107 of the Local Autonomy Act and Article 41 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which provides for the establishment of representative administrative organizations or advisory organizations, and Article 42 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which provides for the establishment of advisory organizations. The agencies under the above provision, even if they perform their duties independently, shall not be deemed as an agency for the execution of part of the affairs of a local government, which is ultimately belonging to the resolution agency, or as an independent third agency, which does not belong to the execution agency or which

Therefore, the fundamental nature of the above agencies, which were the basis for the establishment of the committee, is to consider the contents of the committee's duties in the Ordinance of this case as the settlement of complaints by the Do residents about the administration of the executive agency, and the operation of the administrative affairs in this Ordinance as the exclusive responsibility for the Do civil petition office, and the committee's activities should be deemed as belonging to the execution affairs of the local government, and the responsibility for them ultimately is ultimately made by the head of the executive

Therefore, it is an ex post passive intervention in the appointment and dismissal of a member to obtain the consent of the local council, and it should be deemed a legitimate provision required for the scope of the authority to check to the executive organ of the local council. However, it is an illegal provision that the local council actively intervenes in the personnel authority of the executive organ in advance and is contrary to the purpose of separation of authority and allocation between the deliberative organ and the executive organ under the Local Autonomy Act.

C. In addition, Article 9 (1) of the Ordinance of this case provides the Do Council Speaker with the authority to partially commission the members of the local council, the local council member has the status as a member of the local council under the Local Autonomy Act, politically has the status as the representative of the local council, and the local council member has the right to propose, question, debate, voting right, right to vote, right to vote, right to vote, right to vote, etc. The local council member has the voting right, right to vote, right to vote, etc. to criticize, monitor and check the executive organ, and is not a member of the local council, and the chairman of the local council is not a member of the local council, and is not a member of the local council, but a member of the local council has the duty to represent the local council and coordinate its proceedings, maintain order in the meeting place and supervise its affairs (Article 43 of the Local Autonomy Act);

Therefore, the chairman of the local council shall have the same status as an individual member except the above position, and in light of the above status and authority of the chairman of the local council and the individual member, there is no authority to participate in the personnel rights of the executive organ as an individual chairman, and it is not possible to permit it as an ordinance, and therefore, the provisions of the Ordinance that the chairman requires an individual to commission a part of the members shall be illegal.

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion on this point is justified.

3. Whether the Ordinance of this case infringes on the inherent authority of the Superintendent of the Office of Education

According to the Ordinance of this case (No. 1-2 and No. 3-2), Article 2-2-2 provides that the executive agency refers to the Do Governor and its affiliated agencies, the superintendent of education and its affiliated agencies, and Article 20 provides that matters concerning the exclusive responsibility and operation of the Do civil petition office in order to handle the affairs of this Ordinance shall be prescribed by the Rules. Accordingly, according to the above, the purport of the above provisions is that the Do civil petition office shall take charge of the affairs under the jurisdiction of the superintendent of education and the committee under his/her jurisdiction.

However, in full view of the provisions of Article 3 of the Government Organization Act, Article 18 of the General Rules on the Organization and Personnel of Administrative Agencies, Article 112 of the Local Autonomy Act, Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Local Education Autonomy Act, etc., the Superintendent of the Office of Education is required to independently take charge of education, academic affairs, education delegated by the Do, education delegated by the State, and academic affairs as an executive agency, which is a special local administrative agency, which is established to take charge of education, academic affairs, and academic affairs, and administrative affairs concerning the above duties of the Superintendent of the Office of Education. Thus, it cannot be said that the Do governor, a general executive agency of a local government, takes charge of administrative affairs concerning the above duties of the Superintendent of the Office of Education

The plaintiff's assertion on this point is well-grounded.

4. Whether it is contrary to the fundamental nature of administrative acts;

An administrative act cannot be cancelled or withdrawn in any case, other than by an administrative appeal or administrative litigation, even though it is a fundamental nature of the administrative act, and it is possible to cancel it ex officio if it is found that there is a defect in the administrative act done by the administrative agency after the fact, and even if there is no defect, it can be withdrawn ex officio if there is a new circumstance.

Therefore, unless corrective recommendation and expression of opinion, etc. of the Commission are forced to exercise the right of revocation or withdrawal by an administrative agency, it can be used as reference materials to determine whether to exercise the right of revocation or withdrawal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Ordinance containing such contents are contrary to the fundamental nature of administrative act or have no practical benefit.

However, in light of the overall contents of the Ordinance of this case, the respect for the recommendation for correction and expression of opinion of the Committee under Article 17 of the Ordinance, report on the result of the Committee under Article 18, the publication of the Committee under Article 19, and the report on the operational situation, etc. are not the purport of forcing administrative agencies to engage in certain administrative acts, but it appears to the purport that administrative agencies respect the correction recommendation and expression of opinion of the Committee on erroneous matters as much as possible, and realize the fair and accurate administration by reflecting them. Thus,

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion on this point is without merit.

5. As to whether it overlaps with other remedies for infringement of rights against administrative fines

The plaintiff asserts that the citizen's remedy system against administrative disagreement is unlawful because it violates the superior laws and regulations, although various provisions are provided for in the Administrative Appeals Act and the Civil Procedure Act, again establishing the above remedy system in the Ordinance of this case.

However, an application for administrative non-payment, which is recognized in Article 11 of the Ordinance, is not a provision that excludes an application for the relief of rights by an administrative appeal or other system, or is not a provision that is a condition that is transferred to it, but a method of the relief of rights was added so that an applicant can exercise it at the same time or selectively. Therefore, it cannot be deemed unlawful because it violates the higher laws

The plaintiff's assertion on this point is without merit.

6. Whether the regulations on operation of the Committee are unlawful.

The plaintiff asserts that the bill of this case is unlawful because there is no provision such as a convening authority, convening procedure, and quorum which is essential for the operation of the committee, and thus it is likely to undermine the public interest, such as lack of operational fairness. However, in enacting the bill, matters directly related to the rights and duties of the people in the municipal ordinance should be directly stipulated in the municipal ordinance. However, the detailed matters concerning the operation of the committee can be determined by the municipal ordinance, not by all the municipal ordinance, but by the municipal rule, or by the general custom. Article 20 of the bill of this case provides for the matters concerning the operation of the affairs of this Ordinance, and Article 21 delegates to the enforcement authority for the enforcement of this Ordinance. Thus, the plaintiff's assertion on this point is without merit.

7. As seen above, if part of the Ordinance of this case is unlawful, and if so, the re-resolution of the Ordinance of this case shall be denied in its entirety (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Da31, Jul. 28, 1992). Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case shall be accepted, and the costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the losing party, so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)