[1] The meaning of "public official" under Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Code and Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act

[2] Whether a “office clerk of the performance officer’s office” constitutes a “public official” who is the subject of bribery (negative)

[1] Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Code and Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 8321 of March 29, 2007) mean public officials under the State Public Officials Act and the Local Public Officials Act, and those who are engaged in the affairs of the State or local governments and public corporations equivalent thereto under other Acts and subordinate statutes, and whose contents of labor are not limited to mere mechanical or physical.

[2] The clerical staff of the office of enforcement officers shall be a person employed by the representative enforcement officer with permission from the court and the chief of the district court (Article 21(2) of the Enforcement Rule) from among those who have served in the position of Grade 9 or higher in the public prosecutor’s office (Article 21(2) of the Enforcement Rule), who are paid remuneration corresponding to the public officials of the court and the public officials of the general position, on the other hand, the provisions of the law on enforcement officers shall apply mutatis mutandis to working hours, such as leave, service and grounds for exclusion, auction articles, etc. (Articles 3(1), 22(1) and 25 of the same Rule). Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act and Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 8321 of Mar. 29, 2007). However, in light of the legal principles and the nature of the administrative affairs of the public officials assigned to the district court and other administrative affairs under the law, it is difficult to apply the above provisions or to the defendant.

[1] Articles 129, 130, 131, and 132 of the Criminal Act; Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 8321 of March 29, 2007) / [2] Articles 2, 13, and 15(1) of the Execution Officer Act; Articles 3(1), 21(2), 22(1), and 25 of the Enforcement Rule; Articles 129, 130, 131, and 132 of the Criminal Act; Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 8321 of March 29, 2007)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2000Do4593 decided Nov. 22, 2002 (Gong2003Sang, 264)

Defendant 1 and five others

Defendants (except Defendant 6) and the Prosecutor

Attorneys Kim Young-ho et al.

Daejeon High Court Decision 2010No345 decided October 8, 2010

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act and Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 8321, Mar. 29, 2007; hereinafter the same shall apply) mean public officials under the State Public Officials Act and the Local Public Officials Act, and persons engaged in the affairs of the State, local governments and public corporations equivalent thereto on the basis of other Acts and subordinate statutes other than those to be regarded as public officials in applying the above provisions, and those whose labor is not limited to simple mechanical or physical (see Supreme Court Decision 2000Do4593, Nov. 22, 2002).

The clerical staff of the enforcement officer's office is a person employed by the representative execution officer with permission from the chief of the district court to which he belongs (Article 21 (2) of the Enforcement Rule), the staff of the enforcement officer's office is a person employed by the representative execution officer with permission from the chief of the district court to which he belongs (Article 21 (2) of the Enforcement Rule), the staff of the enforcement officer's office is a person employed in accordance with the working hours, such as leave, service and grounds for exclusion, and the obligation to prohibit purchase of auction items, etc. (Articles 3 (1), 22 (1), 25 of the Enforcement Rule) of the Criminal Act and Article 129 through 132 of the former Attorney-at-Law and Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law. However, the staff of the enforcement officer's office is a person employed by the representative execution officer, unlike the officer (Article 21 (1) of the Enforcement Rule) who is affiliated with the district court and is not in the position of the person who performs the work independently or independently.

In light of the above legal principles, the above provisions of the statutes, and the fact that the analogical application of penal provisions against the defendant should be strictly restricted, as seen above, it is difficult to deem that the office clerk constitutes a “public official” under Articles 129 through 132 of the Criminal Act and Article 111 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act solely on the ground that the nature of affairs by which the office clerk assist the execution officer is equivalent to the affairs of the

The court of first instance affirmed the judgment of the court below that the office personnel of the execution officer office cannot be deemed a public official under the above provisions by taking into account the circumstances of the judgment, and found Defendant 2 not guilty of the facts charged on the premise that the office personnel of execution officer office of this case constitutes a public official under the above provisions.

In light of the above legal principles and the evidence admitted by the court of first instance, it is just that the court below maintained the above judgment of the court of first instance, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the concept of a public official who is the subject of bribery

2. As to the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

Examining the evidence adopted by the first instance court, which cited the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below was just in finding the Defendants guilty of the facts constituting the crime, and it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles, failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or violating the logical and empirical rules, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

Furthermore, according to Article 383 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the Defendants, the grounds that the sentencing of the sentence is unreasonable cannot

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Hong-hoon (Presiding Justice)