(a) Where the presumption power of ownership transfer registration made under the Act on Special Measures for the Transfer of Real Estate Ownership is reversed;

(b) Where one of the successors has purchased real estate before the predecessor died and completed his/her registration of transfer, whether to seek for cancellation thereof constitutes a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance;

C. Whether the possessor, for whom the prescriptive acquisition has been completed, can request the cancellation of the registration of nullification of ownership transfer on behalf of the owner.

(d) A provisional registration has been completed in the name of a third party by a person liable for registration of transfer of ownership;

A. Where a registration of transfer of ownership has been made under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Transfer of Real Estate, such registration is presumed to have been lawfully made in accordance with the procedures prescribed in that Act and consistent with the substantive legal relationship. However, if it is proved that a letter of guarantee or confirmation under the aforesaid Act, which forms the basis of such registration, was forged or falsely prepared, or that such registration was not legally made in accordance with the aforesaid Act for any other reason, such presumption shall be reversed.

B. A lawsuit claiming the cancellation by subrogation of the remaining inheritors on the ground that one of the heirs purchased the land before the inheritee’s birth, even though there was no purchase of the land from the inheritee, and on the ground that the registration of transfer was made under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate, cannot be deemed as

C. If the registration in the name of a third party made before the possessor completes the acquisition by prescription is null and void, the possessor may seek to cancel the registration invalidation of the cause made in the name of the third party on behalf of the owner at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription, and also seek the registration of ownership transfer based on the completion of the acquisition by prescription from the owner.

D. Even if a person liable for the registration of ownership transfer completes a provisional registration in the name of a third party on the real estate, the provisional registration is merely the effect of preserving the order of priority of the principal registration, and the provisional registration does not lose the disposal authority of the person liable for the registration of ownership transfer. Therefore, the obligation to register ownership transfer cannot be deemed impossible.

A. Article 186 of the Civil Act, Article 6 of the Act on Special Measures for the Registration, etc. of Ownership of Real Estate (Act No. 3159, invalidation). Article 99(c) of the Civil Act, Articles 186 and 245(1)4 of the Civil Act. Article 390 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 89Da24797 delivered on May 25, 1990 (Gong1990, 1365) (Gong1993, 2266) 93Da7143 delivered on July 13, 1993 (Gong1993, 2760) B. Supreme Court Decision 81Da851, 852 delivered on September 26, 1982 (Gong1982, 299) 91Da27990 delivered on November 8, 1991 (Gong1992, 81), 92Da1805 delivered on September 25, 1992 (Gong1992, 294, 1994, 196Da196489 delivered on September 16, 198)

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant 1 and eight Defendants, Attorneys Kim Jung-chul, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellant

Daegu District Court Decision 92Na7229 delivered on January 27, 1993

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each appellant.

1. We examine the Defendants’ attorney’s grounds of appeal.

(a) On the first ground for appeal:

Notwithstanding the fact that Defendant 1 purchased the land 1 and 2 at the time of original adjudication from the deceased non-party 1 on the whole land of this case based on the evidence of this city, the court below found on August 11, 1981 that the above non-party 1 purchased the entire land of this case from the non-party 2, non-party 3, etc. under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership Transfer, etc. (Act No. 3094) on March 10, 1974 and completed the registration of ownership transfer under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership Transfer, etc. of this case on August 11, 1981, and determined that the above transfer registration under Defendant 1 on the whole land of this case was null and void as it was made by a false certificate of guarantee and confirmation, and it is also null and void as the provisional registration for preserving the right to claim ownership transfer registration under the name of Defendant Clldong-gun, which was made on each of the above land, but on the other hand, it is valid within the above ownership transfer registration within the title of ownership.

Where a registration of ownership transfer has been made under the Act on the Special Measures, the registration is generally presumed to have been made lawfully in accordance with the procedure prescribed in that Act and in conformity with the substantive legal relationship. However, if it is proved that a letter of guarantee or confirmation under the Act on the Special Measures, which forms the basis of the registration, was forged or falsely prepared, or that the registration was not made lawfully in accordance with the Act on the Special Measures, or for any other reason, such presumption shall be reversed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 89Meu24797, May 25, 190). In light of the records, it is just for the court below to recognize that the above registration of ownership transfer made under Defendant 1 in relation to the land 1 and 2 was made by the false certificate as above, and there is no error in law. The argument is without merit.

(b) On the second ground for appeal:

Around January 20, 1978, the land of this case was owned by the above non-party 1 at the time of the death of the above non-party 1, and the fact that the remaining Defendants except for the defendant Samsung-gun was the co-inheritors of the above non-party 1 was legally determined by the court below. Thus, the land of this case was jointly inherited by the above non-party 1. The plaintiff's ground for claim of this case is clear that the defendant 1 purchased the land of this case from the deceased non-party 1's birth without the purchase of the land of this case 1 and 2, on the ground that he purchased the land of this case on the ground that he requested the cancellation by subrogation of the remaining inheritors on the ground that he purchased the land of this case without the purchase of the land of this case from the deceased non-party 1's birth, and thus the lawsuit of this case cannot be deemed as a lawsuit for recovery of inheritance (refer to the case of this case

(c) On the third ground for appeal:

The court below determined that the non-party 4 purchased the land of this case from the non-party 5 on April 1957 and occupied the land of this case from the non-party 1 on or around November 1964 to acquire it through exchange, and sold each of the above land to the plaintiff on or around January 28, 1987 and May 3 of the same year. Since each of the above possession of the above non-party 4 is presumed to have been jointly and openly held by his will, the non-party 4 is presumed to have been jointly and openly held by his will, the non-party 1's heir, the above non-party 4 is liable to implement the procedure for ownership transfer registration on each of the above land.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just, and the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are justified, i.e., the above non-party 4 or the plaintiff neglected the registration, or Defendant 1 did not raise an objection in imposing public charges on the land of this case, and even if the plaintiff's housing constructed on the land of this case extends to the land owned by other persons, it cannot be viewed that the presumption that the possession of the land of this case by the above non-party 4 or the plaintiff is the possession of the land of this case is the possession of

On the other hand, in principle, if the possessor has completed the registration of transfer of ownership by a third party before the completion of the acquisition by prescription, the possessor cannot assert the acquisition by prescription against the third party. However, this is premised on the legitimacy of the registration in the third party's name, and if the registration in the third party's name is null and void, the possessor can seek cancellation of the registration in lieu of the owner at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription and seek a registration of transfer based on the completion of the acquisition by prescription against the third party (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 85Meu2306, Aug. 19, 1986; Supreme Court Decision 87Meu2561, Jan. 31, 1989; etc.). In addition, if the third party is the inheritor at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription, the possessor can seek the registration of transfer of ownership for the third party based on the completion of the acquisition by prescription directly against the third party.

In addition, even if a person liable for registration of ownership transfer completes a provisional registration in the name of a third party on the real estate, the provisional registration is merely the effect of preserving the order of the principal registration, and the provisional registration does not lose the disposal authority of the person liable for registration of ownership transfer, so the provisional registration alone cannot be deemed an impossible performance of the obligation to register ownership (see Supreme Court Decision 91Da8104 delivered on July 26, 191).

In the same purport, the judgment of the court below rejected the defendants' assertion that the above non-party 4's obligation to transfer ownership due to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition of the above non-party 4 was impossible, or that the above non-party 4's obligation to transfer ownership due to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition of the above non-party 4 was not satisfied or that it cannot be asserted against the defendant 1 by the prescriptive acquisition of the above statute of limitations, on August 11, 1981, after the expiration of the statute of limitations for the acquisition of the above non-party 4's possession of the land of this case.

Since the Plaintiff’s filing of the instant lawsuit had not completed the principal registration of the transfer of ownership on the instant real estate due to the filing of the instant lawsuit, it is obvious that Defendant Liber has to regard it as having completed the principal registration. However, it is evident that the assertion itself is groundless. All of the arguments are without merit.

2. We examine the Plaintiff’s attorney’s grounds of appeal.

As seen earlier, the court below held that the registration of transfer of ownership made under Defendant 1 in the name of the above non-party 1 as to the land Nos. 1 and 2 of this case is null and void, but since Defendant 1 is co-inheritors of the above deceased non-party 1, and the share of inheritance is 4/21, provisional registration of the above transfer of ownership or provisional registration of the name of the defendant Daldong-gun, which was made based on the above transfer of ownership, is valid registration in accordance with the substantive legal relationship within the extent of 4/21.

In theory, since the above defendant completed registration under his name with the knowledge that the above non-party 1 was already disposed of to another person, it is null and void as a juristic act in violation of social order. However, it is clear that the registration of the above defendant's name is valid within the scope of the above shares based on inheritance and it is not based on a juristic act, and the above argument is without merit.

3. Accordingly, each of the appeals by the plaintiff and the defendants is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)