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(영문) 대법원 1977. 11. 8. 선고 76므15 판결
[유언무효확인][집25(3)행,68;공1978.1.15.(576),10493]
Main Issues

A. Interpretation of requirements for will by an instrument of acceptance of an instrument

(b) Method of disputing the validity of a judgment of approval seal affixed with the lapse of the application period; and

Summary of Judgment

A. Although a will by an instrument of acceptance is stipulated as one of the ordinary forms of will under the Civil Act, its substance is different from that of another form of will, it shall be interpreted by relaxing the requirements for will.

(b)the length of appeal is only the method of filing an immediate appeal to challenge the validity of the approval seal even if the application period has been filed with the intention of passing the approval seal;

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 1060, 1065, and 1070 of the Civil Act; Article 97(2) of the Family Trial Rules

claimant-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Defendant 1 and 1 other

Appellant-Appellee

Appellant 1 et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant 1 and 3 others

Judgment of the original Tribunal

Gwangju High Court Decision 75Reu20 decided April 2, 1976

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by a claimant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

(1) On the first ground for appeal

The court below held on March 15, 1974 that, in the situation where the deceased non-party to the claim was unable to move freely and self-conscept as a witness, the court below held that there was an imminent reason to make a will by means of the old document at the time of the will of this case, the deceased non-party to the claim shall be present as a witness of the leapok, normal insignia, Lee Hong-gu, and Gyeong-gu, and the knife as a knife, and that the knife shall accept the will at issue in this case, and approved the knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's knife's k's kn

(2) On the second, third, and fourth grounds:

Article 1060 of the Civil Act provides that the method of a will shall be five kinds of certificates of completion, sound recording, notarial and secret documents and instrument of acceptance as a common form of will. Article 1065 of the Civil Act provides that "If a will by an instrument of acceptance is unable to be made according to the preceding four Articles (self-certificate, sound recording, notarial and secret document) due to illness or any other urgent reason, the testator may demand the will to be made in his presence of two or more witnesses, and the person who received the instrument shall write it into this, and then sign or affix his signature and seal to each testator and witness after approving the accuracy of the will." In full view of these provisions, even though a will by an instrument of acceptance is common method, it shall be judged that it is not a common method, but a common method in substance, and therefore, the court below is justified that a will by an instrument of acceptance should be interpreted to relax the requirements of a will different from those of another instrument of acceptance.

Therefore, the court below is just in holding that: (a) the statement of this case is disqualified; (b) there is only an indication of her tin in front of the tin’s name and seal of the remaining four witnesses; and (c) there is no indication of her “witness” in front of the tin’s name and seal; (d) there is no indication of her “witness” in fact, but there is no indication of her seal in front of the name and seal of leapok, normal scars, and Lee Hong-il; (b) the fact that the tin in fact is a witness and the her tin in front of her name and seal is in conformity with the method under Article 1070 of the Civil Act; and (c) the fact that the testator and the witness approved the accuracy of her will is recognized by reading out by the witness’s testimony; and (d) even if the will did not state such reason itself, it does not violate the method of the will in this case. Therefore, all of the arguments are groundless.

(3) On the fifth ground for appeal:

Article 97 (2) of the Family Trial Rules provides that "interested persons may file an immediate appeal against a will. The period of an immediate appeal shall be calculated from the date on which the appellant has received notice of the trial." If the appellant contests the validity of the approval seal, the interested parties such as the claimant shall file an immediate appeal within seven days from the date of receipt of notice of the decision (i.e., termination of March 25, 1975) that "the inspector shall file an immediate appeal within the period of seven days from the date of receipt of notice of the decision (i.e., termination of March 25, 1975)", and if this period expires, the seal of approval shall become final and conclusive. Thus, even if the "seven days", which is the period of application for the approval seal in question, was rejected for the reason of this period, even if the appellant knew that the period of approval seal was still valid, it shall not be deemed that it was just and void as the method of an immediate appeal.

(4) On the sixth ground:

According to the judgment of the court below, the court below held that the claimant's appearance of a man outside of the deceased's claim is a man with no male consciousness and only three persons with female consciousness, and that the fact that the deceased was actually committed by the birth and death of the deceased, depending on custom, can be determined, and that there are three persons other than the deceased, and that the fact that most of the deceased's donation was made by the deceased, among these three persons, it cannot be determined that such fact is in violation of the public order and good morals. Considering all the circumstances shown in the records, the court below's decision does not recognize that there was an error of law in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the public order and good morals at the time of the above judgment, and there is no reason for this argument.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)

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심급 사건
-광주고등법원 1976.4.2.선고 75르20
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