[1] The requirements and criteria for determining a defective administrative disposition to be null and void as a matter of course

[2] Whether Article 11 subparagraph 4 of the former Special Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Metropolitan Areas applies only to cases where a housing site development project, etc. is approved after the enforcement date of the said Act (negative)

[3] The case holding that an administrative agency's erroneous interpretation of the application scope of the proviso of Article 11 subparagraph 4 of the former Special Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Metropolitan Areas and thus imposed charges for metropolitan transport facilities on a business operator who obtained approval for a housing site development project before the enforcement date of the above

[1] Article 1 [General Administrative Disposition] and Article 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [2] Article 11 subparagraph 4 of the former Special Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Metropolitan Areas (amended by Act No. 6852 of Dec. 30, 2002), Article 2 of the Addenda (amended by Act No. 6852 of Jan. 29, 2001) / [3] Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act / [1] Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act, Article 19 of the former Special Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Metropolitan Areas (amended by Act No. 6852 of Dec. 30, 202), Article 2 of the Addenda (amended by Act No. 6852 of Jan. 29, 200

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Nu4615 delivered on July 11, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2633), Supreme Court Decision 95Da4672 delivered on May 9, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 1719), Supreme Court Decision 2001Du4566 delivered on December 10, 2002 (Gong2003Sang, 379), Supreme Court Decision 2002Da68485 Delivered on October 15, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1807) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2003Du9145 delivered on April 27, 2004 (Gong204, 912)

Daesan Housing Development Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Lee Han-woo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Gwangju Metropolitan City (Law Firm Law Firm, Attorneys Noh Young-dae et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Gwangju High Court Decision 2003Na8342 decided May 13, 2005

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Gwangju High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Summary of the judgment below

According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that the Plaintiff’s disposal of the housing site development project under the former Housing Construction Promotion Act (amended by Act No. 6916 of May 29, 2003) was not subject to the imposition of charges under Article 11 subparag. 4 of the Act if the Plaintiff’s housing site development project was implemented on April 17, 200 for new construction of apartments within the Gwangju Metropolitan City’s Class 2 district (hereinafter “the instant housing site development project”). The Seoul Metropolitan City Mayor’s disposal of the housing site under the proviso to Article 1 of the Act was not subject to the imposition of charges under Article 11 subparag. 4 of the Housing Construction Promotion Act (hereinafter “the Act”) on May 23, 2002, the Plaintiff’s imposition of charges under the proviso to Article 1 of the Act on the Management of Intercity Transport in Metropolitan Areas (hereinafter “the Act”) is not subject to the imposition of charges under Article 11 subparag. 4 of the Housing Site Development Promotion Act, regardless of the purpose of the Act’s imposition of charges.

2. Judgment of the Supreme Court

However, we cannot accept the above judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

In order for a defective administrative disposition to be null and void as a matter of course, it must be objectively obvious that the defect violates the important part of the law and is objectively obvious. In determining whether the defect is significant and obvious, the purpose, meaning, function, etc. of the law shall be examined from a teleological perspective, and at the same time, reasonable consideration shall be made on the specificity of the specific case itself. In a case where an administrative agency has taken an administrative disposition by applying a certain provision to a certain legal relation or factual relations, despite the lack of room for dispute over the interpretation of the law, the legal principles as to the legal relation or factual relations are clearly stated, and thus, if an administrative agency has taken the disposition by applying the above provision, it shall be deemed that the defect is significant and obvious. However, if there is room for dispute over the interpretation because the legal principles as to the legal relation or factual relations are not clearly revealed, it is merely erroneous as to the fact of the disposition (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da68485, Oct. 15, 2004).

Article 2 of the Addenda of the Act provides that a project subject to the imposition of charges shall be subject to charges in cases where a project under any subparagraph of Article 11 of the Act is approved or authorized after the enforcement date of the Act, and there is a provision in the above Addenda, so that the proviso of Article 11 subparagraph 4 of the Act shall not be subject to the imposition of charges in cases where a housing construction project is approved after the enforcement date of the Act (see Supreme Court Decision 2003Du9145, Apr. 27, 2004). Thus, the plaintiff who carries out a housing construction project within the housing site development project is not subject to charges. The disposition of this case is subject to the imposition of charges in cases where a project is approved or authorized after the enforcement date of the Act due to erroneous interpretation of the relevant statutes, and it is serious that the defect is serious.

However, the above legal principle is that the Supreme Court ruling was made after the disposition of this case, and Article 2 of the Addenda of the Act only provides that the charges shall apply to the projects that were approved or authorized after the enforcement date of the Act, and it can be deemed that the legislative purpose of the proviso of Article 11 subparagraph 4 of the Act is not clear, but also the requirements other than the imposition of charges. However, if the land subject to the housing site development project becomes land subject to the imposition of double-use charges, it is deemed that the land is exempt from the imposition of charges under the proviso of Article 11 (4) of the Act. It is sufficient to exclude the imposition of charges if the housing site development project is conducted within the area subject to the imposition of charges after the enforcement date of the Act, and it is not subject to the imposition of charges under the proviso of Article 10 of the Act, which is the one of the public officials in charge of the housing site development project, after the enforcement date of the Act. It is not subject to the imposition of charges under the proviso of the Act.

Therefore, even though the above defects existing in the disposition of this case cannot be deemed to be null and void as a matter of course, the judgment of the court below which accepted the plaintiff's claim of this case on the premise that the disposition of this case is null and void as a matter of course, which affected the conclusion of the judgment by misapprehending the legal principles as to the invalidation of the administrative disposition. The ground of appeal

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Jeon Soo-ahn (Presiding Justice)