A. Criteria for determining similarity of combined trademarks

(b) whether the term "combined trademark" and "human trademark (1)" are similar to those of the trademark "combined" and "human trademark (2)";

(c) Whether a simple and trace mark has no distinctive character even if it is a part of the entire trademark;

A. At all times, a trademark is not necessarily named or conceptualized by the name or pattern of the entire constituent part, but can be conceptualized simply by only a part of the constituent part unless it is inseparably indivisible to the extent that is natural if observed separately from each constituent part, and if it is possible to think at least two names or concepts from one trademark, if one of them is deemed identical or similar to another’s trademark.

B. The registered trademark, the cited trademark (1) and the cited trademark (2) are similar trademarks whose appearance is lower than or lower than or referred to as “elin” or “the cited trademark” can be abbreviationd only by “elin” or “the window”, and where the cited trademarks are deemed to be abbreviationd by each “EL” or “the window”, their names and concepts are the same if they are used for goods of the same kind, and they are likely to cause mistake or confusion as to the origin of goods by general consumers or traders if they are used for goods of the same kind.

C. Even if a simple and trace mark is a mark, it is only the fact that the trademark cannot be registered due to lack of distinctiveness, and it is combined with other parts, and it does not have any entirely distinguishability. Thus, in determining the similarity of a trademark, this part cannot be excluded from the comparison on the ground that it has no unconditional distinguishability.

(a)Article 7(1)7(c) of the Trademark Act;

A.B. Supreme Court Decision 94Hu418 delivered on August 23, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2531) 94Hu692 delivered on September 30, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2689) 94Hu814 delivered on October 14, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 294)

Doksung Commercial Co., Ltd.

Patent Attorney Kim Dong-sik, Counsel for defendant-appellant

Korean Intellectual Property Trial Office Decision 93Hun-Ba24 dated October 31, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the respondent.

We examine the grounds of appeal by the appellant.

A trademark is not necessarily named and conceptualized by the name or pattern of the entire constituent part at all times, but is not necessarily distinguishable from each constituent part so far as it is not inseparably indivisible to the extent natural if it is observed by dividing and observing each constituent part, if only a part of the constituent part can be briefly named and conceptualized, and if it is possible to think at least two names and concepts from one trademark, one of them is deemed identical or similar to another's trademark.

According to the reasoning of the original decision, the court below determined that the registered trademark of this case is a similar trademark that is applied on April 19, 1991 and registered on December 16, 191, and that the cited trademark (1) and the cited trademark (2) are registered on March 7, 1990, respectively, and that the trademark of this case may be abbreviationd only with "EL" or "Gain" in the appearance of both trademarks, and that the cited trademark of this case may be abbreviated only with "EL" or "Gain", and that the cited trademark of this case may be abbreviated only with "EL" or "Yel", and that if the above trademarks are deemed to be "EL" in each of the trademarks, their names and concepts are identical, and it is similar to those that would cause ordinary consumers or traders to mislead or confuse about the origin of goods, and thus, the registered trademark of this case is null and void as it violates Article 8 of the Trademark Act.

In light of the records, the above recognition and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable. No theory is just and acceptable in determining the similarity of trademarks. It is hard to see that there is no distinction between the two trademarks, which is a simple and shaking mark, and there is no possibility of misconception and confusion as a whole. However, it cannot be seen as a simple and shaking mark since both trademarks have been devised in a somewhat distinctive form, and even though a simple and sealed mark is used, it cannot be registered due to lack of distinctiveness, and even if it is combined with other trademarks, it cannot be registered as a part of the entire trademark. Thus, in determining the similarity of trademarks, this part cannot be excluded from the comparison because there is no unconditional distinctiveness, and it is also difficult to view that there is no other difference between the two trademarks to avoid mistake and confusion as to the origin of goods, notwithstanding the similarity of names and concepts as above. Ultimately, there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the similarity of original trademark and the judgment on the similarity of trademarks, or there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the judgment on similarity of trademarks.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)