A. Since the acquisition and loss of the ownership of a motor vehicle has the effect of registration, the acquisition and loss of the ownership of the motor vehicle cannot be acquired not only in external relations but also in internal relations between the parties, unless it is registered.

(b) insofar as an illegal possessor does not actually possess the article by delivering it to another person even if it is, it is unjustifiable to require delivery or surrender to that person.

C. If one of the parties has expressed his intent to cancel the contract to the other party within a specified period, the contract shall be interpreted as rescinded upon the lapse of the above period.

A. In order to claim the surrender or surrender on the ground of an illegal possession, it must be done against the person who actually occupies the subject matter, and as long as the illegal possessor does not actually possess the subject matter by delivering it to another person, the claim for surrender or surrender against that person is unreasonable.

Article 5 of the Road Transport Vehicles Act, Article 213 of the Civil Act, Article 194 of the Civil Act, Article 544 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff

East Sea Passenger Transport Corporation

Daegu High Court Decision 69Na463 delivered on June 11, 1970

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

(1) We examine the Plaintiff’s first ground of appeal by the Plaintiff’s attorney;

According to the records, the plaintiff originally owned a motor vehicle and registered the ownership transfer of the motor vehicle in the name of the defendant company by investing it in kind with the defendant company (the plaintiff acquired the share certificates from the defendant company): Provided, That the plaintiff is merely operating and managing the motor vehicle under the so-called land entry contract with the defendant company, and it is apparent that the plaintiff is merely managing the motor vehicle. Thus, the court below is just in holding that the ownership of the motor vehicle is only in the defendant company and it cannot be deemed that the plaintiff has the ownership of the motor vehicle. Even if the defendant used the phrase "Borrower" as "Borrower," the defendant takes the above facts and records without any dispute between the above parties, and it is merely the fact that the plaintiff was the owner of the motor vehicle in the past and the plaintiff was the owner of the motor vehicle, and the fact that the plaintiff was the owner of the motor vehicle under the law is not acknowledged, and there is no reason to believe that the court below's judgment did not have any legal relation with the plaintiff's ownership transfer of the motor vehicle as a legitimate attack since it is not legitimate in the judgment of 16.

(2) As to the ground of appeal No. 2

In order to file a claim for surrender or surrender on the ground of an illegal possession, the person who actually occupies the object must do so, and even if the illegal possessor does not actually possess it to another person, the claim for surrender or surrender against him/her shall be deemed unjustifiable (see Supreme Court Decision 68Da1594, Feb. 4, 1969; Supreme Court Decision 68Da1594, Feb. 4, 1969; Supreme Court Decision 68Da1594, Feb. 4, 196). Since it is apparent that the Defendant company does not actually possess the motor vehicle at present, it shall not be deemed that the request for surrender against the Defendant, which was not actually occupied as above, was dismissed as unjust, and there is no error of omission of judgment, such as the theory of lawsuit, the ground of appeal No. 2, is groundless.

(3) As to the ground of appeal No. 3

According to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the plaintiff, who was the owner of this motor vehicle, was invested in kind in the defendant company to register it in the name of the defendant company, and the plaintiff acquired the share certificates from the defendant company. However, when the plaintiff operated the above motor vehicle under the so-called branch contract with the defendant company and paid the gross income to the defendant company, but the plaintiff agreed to pay the plaintiff the amount after deducting the wage for the driver's vice-general and other public charges which the plaintiff would pay to the defendant company, and the plaintiff is obligated to pay the balance to the defendant company by the amount of 2,221,458 won for the same reason as the original purchase price. Thus, the plaintiff was liable to the defendant company for the payment of the above branch admission fee, management fee, insurance premium, etc. under the above branch entry contract with the defendant company. Thus, the defendant company did not pay the above debt to the plaintiff by July 22, 1968 by July 29, 1968.

Therefore, if one of the parties to a contract notifies the other party of the performance of the obligation within a specified period and if it is not performed within such period, the right to cancel the contract at the expiration of the above period shall be interpreted to have been terminated at the same time. It is not erroneous in the judgment of the court below that the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was terminated by the above facts. As above, as long as the plaintiff made an investment in kind to the defendant company in the name of the defendant company and made a transfer registration under the name of the defendant company, and the plaintiff received a transfer registration under the name of the defendant company, the defendant shall cancel the investment in kind and return the motor vehicle to the plaintiff, and it is not reasonable in the grounds for appeal No. 3 is without merit.

(4) As to the ground of appeal No. 4

Even though the plaintiff filed a claim for damages on the premise of the tort of the defendant company, the court below did not recognize the fact that the defendant lawfully terminated the contract with the plaintiff for the land entry into the court, which caused the other party to operate the motor vehicle, as seen above, as well as that the court below did not recognize that the defendant cannot recognize the tort of the deprivation of possession, such as the theory of lawsuit, in view of the purport of the judgment before the original judgment and its evidence time, etc.

In addition, it cannot be said that there is no violation of the law of denial of judgment as to the assertion of restitution of the theory as the reasons mentioned above. Thus, the ground of appeal No. 4 cannot be said to be groundless.

Therefore, the grounds of appeal cannot be adopted or any others. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

The judges of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge)