[1] The meaning of “the abuse of authority” and “the abuse of authority” in the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights

[2] Whether a public official’s act constitutes “non-obligatory act” solely on the ground that the act constitutes abuse of authority (negative), and the standard for determining whether the act constitutes “non-obligatory act” / Where the other party to the act of abuse of authority is a private person, whether the act may constitute “when having the other party perform a non-obligatory act” (affirmative in principle)

[3] Whether the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights under the premise that a public official’s official authority exists (affirmative)

[4] The meaning and contents of “Intimidation” as referred to in the crime of coercion / In a case where an offender demands the other party to provide any benefit, etc. based on his/her occupation or position, the standard for determining whether such demand constitutes a threat of harm and injury as a means of coercion / Whether the perpetrator, who is a public official, requested the other party to provide any benefit, etc., but cannot be recognized as a threat of harm and injury, is established

[5] In a case where Defendants who are public officials belonging to the Office of the President of the Office of the President of the Office of the President and the Office of the Secretary of the Office of the Office of the President were indicted on charges of abusing official authority, obstructing another’s exercise of rights, and compelling another’s exercise of rights, on the grounds that they demanded the Federation of the National Economics to provide support for a specific political inclinations each year for three years from 2014 to 2016, and caused Gap of the National Federation of the National Economics to provide the pertinent organizations with financial assistance, the case affirming the judgment below that the Defendants’ act of demanding financial assistance constitutes an abuse of official authority on the grounds that the Defendants’ act falls under the general duties and duties of the Office of the President of the Office of the Office of the President and the Office of the Office of the President of the Office of the Office of the President and constitutes an abuse of official authority, and that Gap committed an act for which the Defendants did not have a duty of decision on financial assistance

[1] The crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights is established when a public official exercises official authority over matters falling under the general official authority and authority, and practically and specifically, unlawful and unreasonable acts are committed. The term “violation of authority” refers to a public official’s exercise of his/her authority over matters falling under the general official authority and authority. In order for a public official to be deemed a matter falling under the general official authority and authority of a public official, legal basis relating thereto is required. Although there is no express provision, the legal basis is not always required, it is interpreted as falling under the official authority and authority of the public official in question, and where it is deemed sufficient to cause the other party to perform an act, or to interfere with his/her rights, such abuse of authority and authority is included

The criteria for determining whether a specific act constitutes abuse shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account whether a specific public official’s act was conducted in accordance with the purpose for which the official authority was granted under the relevant statute, whether a specific act was necessary or reasonable in light of the situation where the official act was performed, whether the exercise of authority satisfies the requirements of the statutes

[2] Inasmuch as a public official’s act constitutes abuse of authority, it cannot be deemed that the other party’s act constitutes “non-obligatory act.” Whether it constitutes “non-obligatory act” ought to be determined individually by examining whether the other party has a legal obligation to perform such an act separately from whether it has abused official authority. In cases where the other party to the abuse of authority is a private person, barring any special circumstance, if the other party to the abuse of authority does not have a duty to respond to the ex officio, it constitutes “when one causes another to perform a non-obligatory act.”

[3] The crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights is an offense premised on a public official’s existence of official authority. Since official authority is granted or deprived by the State’s exercise of power, if a public official retires from his/her official office, the public official leaves the pertinent duties and his/her retirement is publicly announced. Since the Defendant, who is a public official, does not have such official authority after his/her retirement, barring any special circumstances to recognize that the Defendant continued to exercise a functional control over the crime committed before his/her retirement, it shall be deemed that he/she is not liable

[4] The crime of coercion is a crime of obstructing another person’s exercise of right or compelling another person to perform an act without any obligation by assault or threat. Here, intimidation refers to objectively restricting the freedom of decision-making or notifying a harm and injury sufficient to obstruct the freedom to enforce the intent. For such a intimidation to be recognized, there must be a concrete threat of harm and injury to the extent that it may be deemed possible to recognize the intimidation. When an actor demands another person to provide a certain profit, etc. based on his occupation or position, whether the act constitutes a threat of harm and injury as a means of coercion should be determined not only by the actor’s position but also by taking into account the content and circumstances of the act and behavior, the situation at the time of the demand, and the character, career, mutual relationship, etc. of the offender and the other party, and whether the other party can have awareness or reasonably predicted the harm and injury that may cause the other party to be in the position of the offender. If a public official offender demands another person to provide a certain benefit, etc., if it can not be acknowledged as a threat of harm and injury, it can be established as a crime of coercion.

[5] In a case where Defendants who are public officials belonging to the Office of the President of the Office of the President and the Office of the Office of the Office of the President were indicted on charges of abuse of authority, obstruction of use, and coercion on the ground that they demanded the Federation of the National Economic Personnel (hereinafter “Seoul”) to provide support to civic groups with a specific political inclinations each year for three years from 2014 to 2016, and thereby ordered them to provide financial assistance to the pertinent organizations, the case affirming the judgment below that the Defendants’ act of demanding financial assistance constitutes an abuse of official authority on the ground that the Defendants’ act constitutes an abuse of official authority, and that the Defendants committed an act of abusing official authority on the ground that public officials belonging to the Office of the President of the Office of the Office of the Office of the President and the Office of the Office of the Office of the Office of the President did not have a duty to render financial assistance to the relevant remuneration-related civil organization on the ground that they did not comply with the above demand, and that there were no other reasonable grounds to believe that the Defendants did not have any disadvantage with the demand to provide financial assistance to the other party.

[1] Article 123 of the Criminal Act / [2] Article 123 of the Criminal Act / [3] Articles 30 and 123 of the Criminal Act / [4] Articles 30, 123, 129 (1), and 324 (1) of the Criminal Act / [5] Articles 30, 123, and 324 (1) of the Criminal Act

[1] [1] [2] [3] Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do2236 Decided January 30, 2020 (Gong2020Sang, 545)/ [1] [4] Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do13792 Decided August 29, 2019 (Gong2019Ha, 1891)/ [1] Supreme Court Decision 2006Do339 Decided February 22, 2007 (Gong201Ha, 1881)/ [1] Supreme Court Decision 201Do1739 Decided July 28, 2011

Defendant 1 and eight others

Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, Defendant 9, and Prosecutor (Defendant 1, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 6, and Defendant 9)

Law Firm Selection and 15 others

Seoul High Court Decision 2018No2856 decided April 12, 2019

Of the lower judgment, the part on Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, and Defendant 9 (including the part on innocence of Defendant 3 and Defendant 9), the part on Defendant 4’s conviction and the part on the perjury of Defendant 1 on November 24, 2017 (including the part on innocence in the grounds), Defendant 5’s abuse of authority and obstruction of another’s exercise of rights, coercion, and violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Loss on National Treasury, etc.) are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. The remainder of the appeal by Defendant 1 and Defendant 5, the Prosecutor’s appeal against Defendant 6, Defendant 4, and the remainder of the appeal by Defendant 1 and Defendant 5 are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

A. The part on the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bribery) by Defendants 4, 5, and 6 (hereinafter “Aggravated Punishment of Specific Crimes Act”).

The lower court determined that it is difficult to readily conclude that the above Defendants received money in relation to their duties only with the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, and rejected the Prosecutor’s allegation of grounds for appeal.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on bribery.

B. Defendant 5’s violation of the Public Official Election Act

The lower court reversed the first instance judgment convicting Defendant 5 of this part of the facts charged and acquitted Defendant 5 on the ground that the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone was insufficient to recognize that Defendant 5’s act constituted a competition campaign.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on competition campaign

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of final appeal are different from this case, and thus are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

C. The part on Defendant 6’s violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.)

The lower court determined that it is difficult to recognize that Defendant 6 actively participated in the crime of loss, such as the National Treasury, based on the evidence submitted by the prosecutor, and rejected the Prosecutor’s allegation of mistake of facts and misapprehension of legal

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the record, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the timing and timing of committing a loss by the National Treasury, etc.

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of final appeal are different from this case, and thus are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

D. The part on perjury by Defendants 1, 3, and 9

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined as follows. (1) Defendant 1’s testimony as indicated in its holding on June 12, 2017 and testimony related to Defendant 1’s purchase of ○○○○○ movie viewing on November 24, 2017 is difficult to readily conclude that the false statement was made. (2) Defendant 3’s testimony related to the production of subsidies TF documents was made, but subsequently withdrawn and corrected the false statement before the examination of the witness was completed, and it is insufficient to readily conclude that Defendant 3 made a false statement contrary to memory. Even if so, it is difficult to conclude that Defendant 9’s testimony related to the order of △△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△△ was withdrawn and corrected before the examination of the witness was completed.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the intent of testimony

2. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9

A. The part concerning abuse of authority and obstruction of another’s exercise of rights by Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9

1) The establishment of the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights

A) The crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights is established when a public official exercises official authority over matters falling under the general official authority and authority, and practically and specifically, unlawful and unreasonable acts are committed. The term “violation of authority” refers to a public official’s exercise of his/her authority over matters falling under the general official authority and authority. In order for a public official to be deemed a matter falling under the general official’s authority and authority, legal basis relating thereto is necessary. Although there is no express provision, the statutory basis is not always required, the overall and practical examination of statutes and institutions is interpreted as falling under the official’s authority and authority, and where it is deemed sufficient that the abuse of authority and authority would cause the other party to perform a non-performance of his/her duty or interfere with his/her right, such abuse of authority and authority shall be included in the general official authority as stated in the crime of abusing authority and authority (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2011Do1739, Jul. 28, 2011; 2018Do

The criteria for determining whether a specific act constitutes abuse should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the following: (a) whether a specific public official’s specific act was conducted in accordance with the purpose for which the official authority was granted; (b) whether a specific act was necessary or reasonable in light of the situation in which the official act was performed; and (c) whether an ex officio exercise satisfies the requirements of the law that is permissible (see Supreme Court Decisions 2006Do339, Feb. 22, 2007; 2018Do236, Jan. 30, 2020, etc.).

Inasmuch as a public official’s act constitutes abuse of authority, it cannot be deemed that the other party’s act constitutes “non-performance of obligation.” Whether it constitutes “non-performance of obligation” ought to be determined individually by examining whether the other party has a legal obligation to perform such an act, separate from whether the other party has abused official authority. In the event that the other party to the abuse of authority is a general private person, barring any special circumstance, barring any obligation to comply with the ex officio, if the other party to the abuse of authority causes another person to perform an act, then the act constitutes “when having caused another person to perform an act without obligation” (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do236, Jan. 30

B) Based on its stated reasoning, the lower court determined that: (a) Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 8, and Defendant 9’s demand to the Korean Federation of Economic Personnel (hereinafter “Korean Federation of Economic Personnel”); (b) constitutes an abuse of official authority, belonging to the general duties and authority of the presidential secretary and the office of secretary general; (b) Nonindicted 1 committed an act for which he was not obligated to render a decision to provide funds to the relevant civil organization with respect to the remuneration of the former police officer; (c) the said Defendants were jointly processed with intent to realize the crime of abusing official authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights; and (d) the said act of abusing official authority does not constitute a justifiable act under Article 20 of the Criminal Act.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise

The Supreme Court precedents cited in the grounds of final appeal are different from this case, and thus are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

2) The scope of the criminal liability against Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 as joint principal offenders

A) The crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights is an offense premised on the existence of official authority. Since official authority is either granted or deprived by the State’s exercise of power, if a public official retires from public office, the public official leaves the pertinent duties and the retirement is publicly announced. Since the Defendant, who is a public official, has no such official authority after his/her retirement, barring any special circumstances to recognize that the Defendant continued to exercise a functional control over the crime committed before his/her retirement by exercising substantial influence after his/her retirement, he/she shall be deemed not to be liable as an accomplice (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2018Do236, Jan. 30, 202).

Where a number of acts or a series of acts falling under the name of the same crime continues to be conducted for a certain period under the single and continuous criminal intent and where the legal benefits from such damage are the same, each of these acts shall be punished by a single comprehensive crime. However, where the unity and continuity of the criminal intent are not recognized or the method of committing a crime is not the same, each crime constitutes substantive concurrent crimes (see Supreme Court Decisions 2005Do4051, Sept. 30, 2005; 2018Do10779, Nov. 29, 2018, etc.).

B) On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the entire charges of abuse of official authority and obstruction of another’s exercise of rights, whose scope of establishment of joint principal offense against the pertinent Defendants was specified by each year, constituted a single comprehensive offense; Provided, That the lower court acknowledged the joint principal offense against Defendant 3 and Defendant 4, including the crimes committed before and after retirement, in 2014 and the entire crimes committed in 2015, on the grounds that the determination of the nature and nature of the crime should be made within the scope of prosecution instituted by the prosecutor.

C) Examining the following circumstances revealed by the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine, the crime of abusing official authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights is recognized only within the scope of each year, and Defendants 3 and 4, respectively, may be deemed to have continued to have been functional control over the crime committed before retirement in the part of 2014 and the part of 2015, respectively.

(1) The opportunity to seek ways to provide funds to the specific political inclination organizations of this case begins with Defendant 2’s attempt to provide financial support to the remuneration organization and utilize it as a support organization for the management of government affairs. However, as seen in the facts charged and the facts charged by the lower judgment citing a part of the first instance judgment, the specific resolution of crimes, methods, and details are separately determined among co-principals each year, and each of them was conducted accordingly. In light of these circumstances, even considering the circumstances cited by the lower court, it is difficult to recognize the identity of the criminal intent and the method of identity among the activities requiring financial support among the activities requiring financial support each year, and it is difficult to view that the demand for financial support conducted within each year and the acts of providing funds to the various remuneration organizations multiple times.

(2) The part regarding abuse of authority and obstruction of exercise of rights in 2014 was committed by Defendant 3 in collusion with Defendant 2, etc. to compel Nonindicted 1 to provide a total of KRW 2,389,935,000 to a total of 21 remuneration organizations. From August 6, 2013, Defendant 3 served as a chief secretary for the affairs of the President of the Office of the President, and retired on June 13, 2014. However, Defendant 3 conspired with accomplices to provide a specific remuneration organization in sequence, i.e., requesting a specific remuneration organization to provide a total of KRW 3,00,000 for each organization. From February 15, 2014, Defendant 3 was ultimately demanded by Nonindicted 15 to provide an additional subsidy to Nonindicted 3, a total of KRW 15,000,000,000 for each of the above organizations, and Defendant 3 was not required to provide a specific subsidy to Nonindicted 15, which was an initial 2014.

(3) The part regarding the abuse of official authority and obstruction of exercise of rights in 2015 committed a crime of having Nonindicted Party 1 support totaling KRW 3,509,611,050 with Defendant 8 in sequence. Defendant 4 served as a chief secretary for political affairs from June 14, 2014, and retired on May 20, 2015. However, Defendant 4 conspired with accomplices to demand funding to a specific remuneration organization in sequence, namely, having the demand for funding, the act of abusing official authority was around December 2014. The purpose was to provide a total of KRW 4,00,000 for each group of 31 organizations. Accordingly, the provision of funding was commenced from January 2015 to January 2015, 2015. In light of the intrinsic nature of Defendant 4’s act of abuse of official authority and obstruction of another’s exercise of rights within the scope of the initial demand for funding in the year 2015.

D) Therefore, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the blanket crime of the crime of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights over a three-year period, but with respect to Defendant 3’s entire charges of abusing authority and obstructing another’s exercise of rights in 2014, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the blanket crime, the scope of the responsibility of joint principal offenders, etc., contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal by Defendants 3 and 4, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

B. The part on coercion by Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, and 9

1) The crime of coercion is an offense that interferes with the exercise of a person’s right or makes another person perform an act without any obligation by assault or threat. Here, intimidation refers to objectively restricting a person’s freedom of decision-making or notifying a harm and injury likely to be frighten enough to interfere with the freedom to enforce a will. To recognize such intimidation, there must be a concrete threat of harm and injury to the extent possible. When an offender demands the other party to provide a certain benefit, etc. based on his occupation or position, whether the required act constitutes a threat of harm and injury may be deemed as a means of coercion. In light of the content and circumstances of the act and behavior, the demand, situation at the time of the demand, and the character, career, mutual relationship, etc. of the offender and the other party, it is difficult to determine whether the other party has the awareness that it would be a threat of harm and injury if the offender and the other party request the other party to provide a certain benefit, etc. as above, if it can not be acknowledged as a threat of harm and injury, the crime of coercion or abuse of authority can also be established as a requirement (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 29819.

2) As stated in the above 2-A, the prosecutor prosecuted the Defendants’ act of demanding support from a non-governmental organization with respect to a specific political inclination to be a person with abuse of authority and forced the same other party to the same act. The lower court affirmed the first instance judgment that found the said demand constituted intimidation in the crime of coercion and affirmed the first instance judgment that convicted him of the crime of coercion in this part.

3) However, examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the foregoing legal doctrine, it is difficult to readily conclude the said demand as a threat, i.e., the requirement of coercion, solely on the grounds that the lower court determined

Recognizing that the above demand constitutes intimidation in the crime of coercion, the lower court acknowledged that the demand was made by taking advantage of the authority and position of the Presidential Secretariat that may affect the decision-making of the President, or exercise de facto influence over business activities, such as the passage of communication between the President and the executive Ministries, the National Assembly, and enterprises. However, the demand is not immediately deemed as a threat of harm and injury on the ground that a public official belonging to the Presidential Secretariat demands the provision of certain profits, etc. based on his/her status, and the said demand should be determined by comprehensively taking into account the various circumstances as

In light of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted, there are no circumstances as to the language and behavior that may be deemed to have had the other party perceived that it would have been harmful to the other party at the time of such request, the details and circumstances leading up to the demand, the situation at the time of the request, and the character, career, and mutual relationship between the perpetrator and the other party. There was no reasonable ground to deem that it is reasonable to anticipate that the former employees would be disadvantaged by policy suggestions, delay in authorization and permission for the former employees without complying with the demand of the Presidential Secretariat even upon receipt of the request from the former Secretariat. The lower court, upon requesting the former employees to provide financial support, did not suggest that the said Defendants mentioned the upper line or refused the request for reduction, urged the payment of the funds, and regularly confirmed the current status of financial support by delivering complaints and civil complaints by the relevant non-indicted 1, who requested the latter to provide an interview with the latter. However, it is insufficient to deem that there was a notice of harm and injury solely on such circumstances. Moreover, the statement by the former employees is merely a specific pressure and pressure by the organization.

In short, it cannot be readily concluded that the said demand constitutes a threat of harm and injury, which is the elements for the establishment of the crime of coercion. Nevertheless, the lower court found the Defendant guilty of this part of the charges of coercion solely on the basis that the demand constitutes a threat of harm and injury. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on intimidation of the crime of coercion, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The grounds of appeal by the said Defendants

C. Defendant 5’s violation of the Public Official Election Act

The lower court determined that Defendant 5 participated in the planning of an election campaign by taking advantage of the status as a public official or in the implementation of such planning, and investigated the elector’s support plan for a political party or candidate by engaging in a series of acts, such as conducting a large number of public opinion pollss, such as political party support rating surveys, and participating in the formation and public order of the Gongsan Party.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on election campaigns and intraparty competition campaign

Meanwhile, the argument that this part of the facts charged is not specified is not a legitimate ground for appeal, since the court below alleged as the ground for appeal at the court below or the court below did not consider it as the object of ex officio.

D. The part on Defendant 5’s violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss of National Treasury, etc.)

The court below rejected Defendant 5’s allegation in the grounds of appeal for erroneous determination of facts and misapprehension of legal principles, on the ground that Defendant 5 was reported by Defendant 7 to request the National Intelligence Service to support public opinion poll costs and was approved, and the specific progress was reported, and that there was also a conspiracy and functional control over the crime of loss, such as the National Treasury, etc.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on joint principal offenders and the timing of receiving embezzlement

E. Defendant 1’s violation of the Public Official Election Act and the State Public Officials Act

The court below rejected Defendant 1’s allegation in the grounds of appeal for misconception of facts and misapprehension of legal principles, on the ground that Defendant 1 planned and assisted a demonstration campaign supporting or opposing a specific political party or political organization and participated in the planning of an election campaign by taking advantage of his status as a public official.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on election campaign, status

F. The part on perjury by Defendants 1, 3, and 9

For the reasons indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined as follows. (1) Defendant 1’s testimony related to the ○○○○○○ film and the video-related testimony pertaining to the video constitutes a false statement contrary to memory. (2) Defendant 3’s testimony related to the order to organize a subsidy TF and the testimony related to the transfer of subsidies constitutes a false statement contrary to memory. (3) Defendant 9’s testimony related to the order to respond to the film constitutes a false statement contrary to memory.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on perjury, etc.

3. Scope of reversal

Of the judgment of the court below, the part on coercion against Defendant 1, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, Defendant 5, Defendant 8, and Defendant 9 should be reversed for the same reason as stated in the above 2-B(b). Since the above reason for reversal is common in relation to the part on coercion against Defendant 7, a co-defendant, this part of the judgment of the court below should also be reversed pursuant to Article 392 of the Criminal Procedure Act. In addition, the part on the above reversal and the part on conviction with concurrent crimes under Article 37 of the Criminal Act and the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act must also be reversed. Ultimately, the part on conviction against Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, Defendant 9 (including the part on acquittal of reasons), Defendant 4, Defendant 1’s violation of the Public Official Election Act, the remaining part on conviction (including the part on acquittal of reasons), except for the part on the violation of the State Public Official Election Act, and the remaining part on conviction of Defendant 5 should be reversed.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, among the judgment below, the part against Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 7, Defendant 8, and Defendant 9 (including the part on acquittal of Defendant 3 and Defendant 9 on the grounds), the part on Defendant 4’s guilty and the part on the charge of abuse of official authority, obstruction of another’s exercise of rights, coercion, coercion, violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss on National Treasury, etc.) on November 24, 2017 (including the part on acquittal of the grounds), Defendant 5’s abuse of official authority, obstruction of another’s exercise of rights, obstruction of another’s exercise of rights, coercion, and violation of the Specific Crimes Aggravated Punishment Act (Loss on National Treasury, etc.) are reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeals by Defendants 1 and 5, the Prosecutor’s appeal against Defendant

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)