The judgment below

The part against Defendant A is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Defendant A’s ground of appeal

A. The crime of coercion 1 is an offense that interferes with the exercise of rights or makes another person perform an act without any duty by assault or threat. Here, intimidation refers to objectively restricting the freedom of decision-making or notifying harm and injury likely to be fright enough to interfere with the freedom of executing the intent. In order to recognize such intimidation, there must be a concrete threat of harm and injury to the extent possible. When an offender demands the other party to provide certain profits based on occupation or status, whether the act constitutes a threat of harm and injury as a means of coercion ought to be determined not only by the actor’s status but also by considering the content and circumstances of the act and behavior, the situation at the time of the demand, the character, career, and mutual relation between the offender and the other party, and whether the other party’s act of coercion and the other party could have reasonably predicted the other party as the actor’s position, etc. If a public official demands the other party to provide such profits, etc., it is difficult to recognize that the act constitutes a threat of harm and injury as a means of coercion, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 20198Da292).).