Plaintiff 1 and seven others (Attorney Kim Young-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Court of Law, Attorney Kim Tae-hoon, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

June 21, 2019

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2013Gahap526555 Decided September 3, 2015

1. The decision subject to review shall be revoked.

2. The defendant (the defendant) shall pay to the plaintiff (the plaintiff) 15,00,000 won with 5% interest per annum from June 26, 2013 to July 12, 2019, and 12% interest per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

3. The plaintiff (the plaintiff)'s remaining claims are dismissed.

4. The sum of the costs of the lawsuit before and after the review shall be 50% borne by the plaintiff (the plaintiff) and the remaining 50% by the defendant (the defendant for review).

5. Paragraph 2 can be provisionally executed.

1. Purport of claim

Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant”) shall pay 50,000,000 won each to the Plaintiff (hereinafter “Plaintiffs”) and each of them shall be 5% per annum from the delivery date of a copy of the instant complaint to the pronouncement date of this judgment, and 20% per annum from the next day to the full payment date.

2. Purport of request for retrial;

The decision subject to a retrial is revoked. The defendant pays each of the plaintiffs 30,000,000 won with 5% per annum from June 26, 2013 to September 3, 2015, 15% per annum from the next day to May 31, 2019, and 12% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment.

1. Basic factual basis

A. Circumstances leading to the establishment of the original judgment

1) On June 18, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the Defendant in this court (Seoul Central District Court 2013Gahap52655555) against the Defendant, stating that “The Plaintiffs, working at △△△△△△△△△△ Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “△△△△△△”) at the time of December 1980, were dismissed the Plaintiffs, and they committed human rights violations, such as: (a) preparing and managing so-called “booms” containing the Plaintiffs, and distributing it so that the Plaintiffs could not be re-employed; and (b) the Plaintiffs filed against the Defendant the instant lawsuit (Seoul Central District Court 2013Gahap5265555) to the effect that “The Plaintiffs sought damages against each of the Defendant for such unlawful acts.”

2) On September 3, 2015, this Court rendered a decision to recognize the Plaintiffs as persons related to democratization movements to the effect that “ insofar as the Plaintiffs received living allowances by applying for payment of each living allowance pursuant to the Demotion Compensation Deliberation Committee,” the Plaintiffs’ decision to pay compensation, etc. under this Act shall be deemed to have established judicial reconciliation under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act for damage incurred in relation to democratization movements, as the Plaintiffs were enacted by Act No. 6123, Jan. 12, 2000; and prior to being amended by Act No. 13289, May 18, 2015; hereinafter “Remotion Compensation Act”) under Article 2 subparag. 2(d) of the former Act on the Restoration of Honor and Compensation to Persons Related to Democratization Movements, etc. (hereinafter “Remotion Compensation Act”). Since the Plaintiffs’ decision to pay compensation, etc. under this Act, the Plaintiffs’ decision to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit against the same kind of damage in relation to democratization movements was unlawful.”

3) As the Plaintiffs and the Defendant did not appeal against the instant judgment subject to a retrial, the instant judgment subject to a retrial became final and conclusive on September 24, 2015.

B. Acknowledgement of the plaintiffs' constitutional complaint claim and request for retrial of this case

1) Meanwhile, on July 28, 2015, when the instant lawsuit was pending, the Plaintiffs filed an application for a motion to seek adjudication on the unconstitutionality of statutes on the grounds that “Article 18(2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act recognizes the effect of judicial compromise as to mental damage suffered by the Plaintiffs due to democratization movements, and thus contravenes the Constitution,” but this court dismissed the Plaintiffs’ application for adjudication on the unconstitutionality of statutes on August 30, 2015, and the Plaintiffs filed a petition with the Constitutional Court for adjudication on constitutional complaint under Article 68(2) of the Constitutional Court Act.

2) After the Constitutional Court consolidated a related case on August 30, 2018, it sentenced that "the part concerning mental damage caused by a tort among "damage caused in connection with a democratization movement" under Article 18 (2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act is in violation of the Constitution (the Constitutional Court Decision 2014Hun-Ba10, 18, 20, 22, 25, 2018Hun-Ba1, 2014Hun-Ba180, 304, 305, 305, 2015Hun-Ba13, 283, 284, 357, 434, 435, 436, 437, 441, 442, 2016Hun-Ba23, 4964, 67, 385, 381, 47, 205, 3748, 257, 2018

3) The Plaintiffs filed a petition for reexamination of the instant case pursuant to Article 75(7) of the Constitutional Court Act on the grounds that the instant decision of unconstitutionality was rendered.

【Ground for recognition】 Facts that the court has remarkably or has no dispute, entry in Gap 7 and 8 evidence, and purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the existence of a ground for retrial

A. Existing legal principles regarding the meaning of "damage inflicted in relation to democratization movements" under Article 18 (2) of the former Act on the Compensation for Democratization Movement

Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the former Act on the Compensation for Democratization Movement provides that "The purpose of this Act is to promote the stabilization of livelihood and the improvement of welfare by the State for persons who have sacrificed in relation to democratization movements and their bereaved family members, and to contribute to the development of democracy and the harmony of national unity." Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the same Act provides that "d)" means activities that disturb the basic liberal democracy order on or after March 24, 1964 and contribute to the realization of ideology and values of the Constitution and the establishment of democratic constitutional order and to the recovery and extension of citizens' freedom and rights by resisting the authoritative rule that infringes on the fundamental rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution, and that "any person related to democratization movements" shall be construed as "any person who has made a deliberation and decision in relation to democratization movements in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 among persons falling under any of the following items, who are subject to the payment of compensation benefits, and any person who intends to receive the payment of compensation benefits in accordance with the provisions of Article 10(1) of the Civil Procedure Act shall be construed as "any person who has agreed to receive the payment of compensation benefits, etc."

In addition, Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act provides that "where an applicant who has received a notice of decision on compensation, a notice of decision on the payment of living allowances or a notice of decision on the restoration of honor intends to receive compensation, etc., he/she shall submit to the Committee a written consent and a written request stating the following matters (attached Form 10), along with one copy of the decision on compensation, decision on the payment of living allowances or the original decision on the restoration of honor, and one copy of the applicant's certificate of personal seal impression," and subparagraph 3 of the above Enforcement Decree provides that "A consent and a written request for compensation, etc." (attached Form 10) refers to "A consent and a written request for compensation, etc., if the applicant has received the compensation, etc., he/she shall enter into

In addition to the legislative purport of the Act on the Compensation for Democratization, the relevant provisions, and the contents of the “agreement and claim” prepared and submitted by the applicant, when the legislative purpose of Article 18(2) of the former Act on the Compensation for Democratization has consented to a decision on the payment of compensation, etc., the legislative purpose of the Act is to promptly terminate and implement it through the procedures for the decision on the payment of compensation, etc. prior to litigation by granting res judicata, and to ensure stability in the decision on the payment of compensation, etc., in full view of all the damage suffered by the applicant, including consolation money, in relation to the democratization movement for which he/she received compensation, etc. pursuant to Article 18(2) of the former Act on the Compensation for Democratization (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da204365, Jan. 22, 2015; Supreme Court Decision 2012Da45603, Mar. 13, 2014).

B. The meaning and validity of the decision of unconstitutionality of this case

First, with respect to whether the decision of unconstitutionality of this case can be binding upon the court, the following circumstances recognized by the records of this case and the purport of the entire pleadings, namely, active damages and passive damages and mental damages suffered by tort, are different in the subject matter of a lawsuit (see Supreme Court Decisions 2016Da270568, Mar. 22, 2017; 2002Da34581, Sept. 10, 2002, etc.). The existence and scope of each of the above damages should be individually determined. ② Even if the "damage incurred in relation to democratization movements" under Article 18 (2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act was not explicitly expressed, it is only a matter of legislative technology, and its type and nature can be divided into formal and qualitative damages according to the subject matter of a lawsuit, rather than a substantive interpretation of the provisions of law, and it is reasonable to include only a part of the damages, which are unconstitutional in accordance with each of the above unconstitutional decision of unconstitutionality, in light of the form and form of Article 18 (2).

C. Existence of grounds for retrial

Furthermore, in the lawsuit of this case brought by the plaintiffs against the defendant, the application for filing a constitutional complaint pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Constitution was dismissed, and the plaintiffs filed a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Constitution, the judgment subject to a retrial was affirmed and finalized, which dismissed the lawsuit of this case concerning the claim of consolation money for mental suffering suffered by the plaintiffs by applying Article 18(2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act, and the fact that some of the above provisions of the law became null and void due to the issuance of a decision of unconstitutionality that accepts the plaintiffs' constitutional complaint, is all the same as seen earlier. Accordingly, in the judgment subject to a retrial of this case, there is a ground for retrial that "the constitutional complaint pursuant to Article 68(2)

3. Judgment on the merits

(a) Basic facts;

1) The Plaintiffs joined a labor union while working at △△△△△△ (hereinafter “labor union”) and engaged in labor campaign, including improving working conditions and treatment within the company and securing three labor rights, and were dismissed on December 1980.

2) From November 12, 2007 to May 15, 2007, the Plaintiffs filed an application for restoration of honor for each dismissed position on the grounds that “△△△△ was forced to move the Plaintiffs to a factory located in △△△△ on the grounds of the labor union activities and labor movement within the company, or was dismissed by the labor union purification measures in accordance with the government’s labor union policies at the time.”

3) On November 2, 2009, the Compensation Deliberative Committee made a decision that "the plaintiffs recognize as a person who was dismissed on the ground of democratization movement and is related to democratization movement under Article 2 subparagraph 2 (d) of the former Democratization Compensation Act, and refer the subcommittee for the promotion of restoration of honor to deliberate on specific measures for restoration of honor" and notified the plaintiffs of such decision.

4) On December 14, 2009, the Democratization Compensation Deliberation Committee decided to pay KRW 50 million to the Plaintiffs under the former Democratization Compensation Act. Accordingly, Plaintiff 3 submitted the consent and written request stating that “I will not claim the payment of living allowances in any way with respect to the case,” and received KRW 50 million each on December 28, 2009, respectively, on December 17, 2009, respectively.

5) 한편, 1970년대부터 1980년대까지 ◇◇◇◇노조, ☆☆☆☆노조, ▽▽▽▽노조, ◎◎◎◎◎◎노조, ◁◁노조, ▷▷▷▷▷노조, ♤♤♤♤♤♤♤노조, ♡♡♡♡노조, ●●●●●●노조, ▲▲▲▲노조에 각 간부 또는 조합원으로서 노동운동에 참여했던 사람들은 진실·화해를 위한 과거사 정리 기본법에 따라 설립된 진실·화해를위한과거사정리위원회(이하 ‘과거사정리위원회’라 한다)에 “중앙정보부, 경찰, 노동부 등 국가기관이 노조 간부 및 조합원들을 불법연행하거나 삼청교육대에 강제입소 시키고, 공장을 폐쇄하거나 해직하는 방법으로 노동조합 활동을 방해하였으며, 사회정화조치 등을 통해 노동조합을 와해시키고, 이른바 ‘블랙리스트’를 작성·관리하면서 해직된 노동조합 간부 및 조합원의 재취업을 막는 등의 행위를 하였다는 사실의 규명을 구한다.”는 취지의 진실규명신청을 하였다.

6) On June 30, 2010, the past History Settlement Commission rendered a ruling on the inspection of truth on the ground that “In the course of the economic development of the new regime in the 1970s, state agencies interfered with the establishment and activities of the union and participated in the old and old damages, and as a result, such acts became more serious after the emergence of the new military forces in 1979, there was a violation of human rights as alleged by the applicants.”

7) The following facts were confirmed according to the National Intelligence Service’s “The Central Information Department (hereinafter “Information Department”) and the National Security Planning Board (hereinafter “National Security Planning Board”) published to the purport of reflecting and considering the anti-discrimination and human rights violations activities committed by the former authority agencies.”

Since the 1970s, the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Labor managed and supervised workers engaged in labor movement throughout the 1980s. In particular, during the 1980s, the Ministry of Information and Communications distributed the list of dismissed workers during the democratic labor union, distributed it to various levels of industrial and local offices through the Ministry of Labor, supervised their trends, and discovered and shorten their reemployment, and promoted labor union and piracy.

○ 1987. 8.경 ○○○○ 파업 중 발견된 이른바 ‘○○○○ 블랙리스트’에는 ▽▽▽▽, ♡♡♡♡ 등의 해고 근로자 명단과 상세한 신상정보가 기재되어 있었는데, 이는 정부 당국이 해고 노동자들의 재취업 제한 등 노동운동이 지속되는 것을 탄압하기 위하여 작성된 것이었다.

8) 또한, 국정원 발전위원회는, 국정원 보존문서 분석 결과 다음과 같이 다양한 형태의 ‘블랙리스트’가 존재함을 확인하였고, 이러한 ‘블랙리스트’가 안기부 등 노동 관계기관이 협조하여 민주노조활동에 참여하는 노동자를 격리한다는 명분 아래 그러한 노동자들의 재취업을 막고, ■■■■■■■ 등의 노동운동에 대한 지원을 사전에 차단하기 위하여 활용되었으며, 각 개별 사업장에서는 이를 근거로 불법적인 해고를 자행하였는데, 이는 헌법상 보장된 노동권과 직업선택의 자유를 침해한 것이라고 발표하였다.

○ 1984. 1.경 작성된 안기부 문서에 “한국수출산업공단 내 ◆◆◆가 1983. 11.경 작성한 총 1,060명의 명단이 기재된 ‘블랙리스트’에는 1970년 이후 사업장에서 해고된 해고 도산근로자 명단이 있었는데, 위 ◆◆◆에서 각 사업장에 400부를 배포하였고, 이 명단이 유출될 경우 문제가 발생할 소지를 염려하여 노동부가 1983. 12. 19. 파기를 지시한 내용”이 기재되어 있다.

○ 1987. 8.경 발견된 ‘○○○○ 블랙리스트’에는 1978년 ▽▽▽▽ 해고자 124명을 비롯하여 ◁◁, ◎◎◎◎◎◎, ♡♡ 등 1970년대부터 1980년대 후반까지의 민주노조활동가 925명, 1985. 5. 30.까지 근무한 인천 지역 위장취업자 299명, 직종별 노동자 253명 등 총 1,662명의 명단이 등재되어 있는데, 그들의 업체, 성명, 본적, 주소, 주민번호, 최종학력, 활동사항, 근속기간 등이 기재되어 있고, 위장취업자는 A, B, C급으로 분류하고 있다.

○ 1988. 6.경 성남공단 내 주식회사 ★★★★에서 발견된 이른바 ‘★★★★ 블랙리스트’에는 총 763명의 명단과 해고일자, 사진 등이 등재되어 있고, 관리공단 이사장이 각 기업체의 장에게 “관리공단에 의식화 근로자의 명단이 보관되어 있으니 필요하면 요청하라.”는 내용의 협조문이 함께 발견되었다.

On September 17, 1991, 8,00 people, including students and workers, were found at the Busan New Enterprise, and on March 1990, the "boom list" was found with respect to the core executives of the labor union in the area of the Corporation, such as Changwon, Ulsan, and Yangsan, taken charge of the local department of the Gyeongnam-do Office around the end of 199.

9) As above, the “○○○○” list discovered around August 1987 includes the list of the Plaintiffs, and includes the names, origin areas, gender, resident registration numbers, and the details of working at △△△△△△△△△△△.

【Ground of recognition】 The fact that there is no dispute, Gap 1 through 6, 8, and 10 certificates (including numbers)

B. Occurrence and scope of liability for damages

1) Summary of the plaintiffs' assertion

The Defendant’s involvement in the dismissal of the Plaintiffs who had engaged in the labor movement at the time as part of the suppression of the democratic labor movement through its affiliated agencies, such as information department or internal contributions, and the Plaintiffs registered and managed the Plaintiffs in the so-called “blue list,” and distributed them to the workplace, thereby hindering the re-employment of the Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Plaintiffs seek damages against the Defendant for emotional distress caused by the Defendant’s tort, each of which is KRW 30 million.

2) Determination

앞서 든 증거 및 변론 전체의 취지를 종합하여 알 수 있는 다음과 같은 사정들, 즉 ① 원고들은 1976년경부터 ■■■■■■■의 지원을 받아 △△△△ 사업장에서의 부당 노동행위에 대하여 항의하고, 근로조건 개선 등의 요구를 하다가 해직된 점, ② ■■■■■■■는 공장 내에서 벌어지는 노동자에 대한 비인격적 대우, 열악한 근로조건, 부당 해고와 임금체불 등의 시정과 개선 등 노동자들의 인권과 민주화를 위해 활동한 개신교 선교단체로, 1970~1980년대 노조활동을 지원하는 과정에서 정보부, 안기부 등 국가기관으로부터 탄압을 받기도 한 점, ③ 원고들이 해직될 무렵의 시대상황, 그리고 당시 국가기관이 다른 사업장의 노조 간부 및 조직원들에 대한 해직에 개입한 사실도 공식적으로 확인된 점 등에 비추어 △△△△가 원고들을 해직할 당시에도 정보부 등 국가기관이 관여한 것으로 추정되는 점, ④ 원고들이 해직된 이후 정보부 등 국가기관이 해직 노동자들의 재취업 제한 등 노동운동을 탄압하기 위하여 관리·배포한 명단 중 하나인 이른바 ‘○○○○ 블랙리스트’에 원고들도 앞서 본 다른 사업장의 노조 간부 및 조합원들과 함께 등재된 점, ⑤ 위 ‘블랙리스트’가 발견된 시점도 원고들이 해직된 1980. 12.경으로부터 약 7년이나 지난 때인 점에 미루어, 원고들도 실제로 상당 기간 동안 위 명단에 등재됨으로써 재취업 제한 등의 불이익을 당한 것으로 보이는 점, ⑥ 앞서 본 바와 같이, 원고들은 모두 민주화보상법에 의한 ‘민주화운동 관련자’로 인정되었는데, 이는 민주화보상법 제2조 제1호 에서 규정하고 있는 “민주화운동”의 정의 등에 비추어, 원고들이 해직을 당한 것은 단순히 자신들의 근로조건 개선을 위한 노동운동을 한 것 때문이 아니라, 자유민주적 기본질서를 문란하게 하고 헌법상 기본권을 침해한 피고의 권위주의적 통치에 항거하는 과정에서 입게 된 부당한 불이익 또는 탄압의 일종이었음을 피고가 스스로 인정한 것으로 보아야 하는 점 등을 모두 고려하여 보면, 피고는 정보부, 안기부, 노동부 등 그 산하 기관을 통해 원고들의 해직에 관여하였을 뿐만 아니라, 해직된 원고들을 다시 이른바 ‘블랙리스트’에 등재하여 관리하고 이를 사업장 등에 배포함으로써 원고들의 재취업을 방해하는 불법행위를 하였다고 봄이 타당하다.

Therefore, taking into account the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant has a duty to compensate the Plaintiffs for each mental distress suffered by the Plaintiffs due to the above tort; (b) the content and degree of the above tort; (c) the degree of mental suffering that the Plaintiffs suffered; and (d) the Plaintiffs’ living allowances of KRW 50 million recognized as persons related to democratization movements; and (e) other circumstances that can be known by taking into account the overall purport of pleadings, such as equity with union executives and members of other workplaces who were arrested, detained, etc. for a considerable period of time or who was convicted of a final and conclusive judgment of conviction; and (e) the amount of consolation money that the Defendant is liable for compensation to the Plaintiffs is reasonable.

C. Judgment on the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription

1) Summary of the defendant's assertion

The plaintiffs were recognized as persons related to democratization movements at the latest and finally received living allowances on December 28, 2009. Since the lawsuit of this case was filed after the lapse of three years thereafter, each of the plaintiffs' claims for consolation money has expired due to the completion of prescription.

2) Relevant legal principles

A) Legal principles relating to the principle of pleading

The initial date of the extinctive prescription is the starting point of calculating the period of extinctive prescription, which falls under the legal effect requirement of the extinction of a debt, and it constitutes a specific fact that constitutes the legal requirement of the defense of extinctive prescription, and thus, is subject to the application of the principle of pleading. Therefore, in cases where the initial date of the extinctive prescription and the initial date of the pleading are different, the court shall calculate the extinctive prescription based on the initial date claimed by the parties in accordance with the principle of pleading. This also applies not only to cases where the parties assert the date later than the initial date of the initial date, but also to cases where the parties oppose the initial date, barring special circumstances (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2016Da258124, Mar. 22, 2017; 94Da358

B) The principle of good faith or abuse of rights

The exercise of a debtor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of trust and good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. Thus, where there are special circumstances, such as where the debtor, prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, was unable or considerably difficult for the creditor to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription, committed an act that makes the creditor believe that such measures are unnecessary, or where the creditor objectively obstructed the creditor from exercising his right, or where the debtor was unable to invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where there are circumstances, such as where the debtor made the right holder trust it, or where other creditors under the same conditions as the need to protect the creditor receives the repayment of the debt, etc., the debtor's refusal to perform the obligation may not be allowed as abuse of rights against the principle of trust and good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2014Da230535, Feb. 15, 2017; 209Da72599, Jun. 30, 2011)

3) Determination

Considering the following circumstances based on the aforementioned facts and the overall purport of oral arguments, even if the Plaintiffs were to know the fact that mental damage was caused by the Defendant’s tort, which was finally paid living allowances as above, around December 28, 2009, the Defendant’s exercise of rights or interruption of prescription is deemed to have been impossible or considerably difficult, or there was an obstacle that the Plaintiffs cannot exercise rights objectively or objectively, during the period before the expiration of the three-year extinctive prescription period from December 28, 2012, and the extinctive prescription period from December 28, 2012 to the time the instant lawsuit was filed, there is a great need to protect the Plaintiffs from the situation that the Defendant violated the Plaintiffs’ fundamental rights, while the Defendant’s refusal of performance of damages liability by asserting the expiration of the extinctive prescription period is remarkably unfair or unfair, and thus, it is reasonable to deem the Defendant’s assertion that the extinctive prescription period has expired as abuse of rights against the principle of trust and good faith.

① Even if the Plaintiffs were to be dismissed from office at △△△△△△, and were able to find out the fact that the State could not only suppress the labor movement, but also participate in their dismissal, the Plaintiffs could not easily find out what public officials in any of the agencies under the Defendant’s control were involved in their dismissal in any way.

② Even if the plaintiffs knew that they were so-called “○○○○ Blucing,” who is the subject of preparing the above Blucing, is involved in any state agency, and it seems that it was difficult for the state agency to easily find out how they interfere with their reemployment, etc. In light of the nature of the organizational and confidential power actions of state agencies, such as such information division, it is limited to collecting the evidence. Thus, the plaintiffs could not be seen further until they claim damages by designating the defendant as a tort on the grounds of their registration and management of the list.

③ The former Act on the Compensation for Democratization Movement provides that persons related to democratization movements and their bereaved family members may be compensated according to the degree of sacrifice of persons related to democratization movements (Article 6). Accordingly, “compensation” such as the amount of monthly income (Article 7) calculated based on a certain standard to their bereaved family members or their bereaved family members, who died or were missing in relation to democratization movements, and persons who need continuous medical treatment due to their wounds at the time of the enforcement of the Act, or the full time protection or use of supplementary aid devices, shall be granted “medical subsidies” for the expenses actually incurred in treatment, protection and purchase of supplementary aid devices (Article 8), “persons detained for at least 30 days on the ground of democratization movements or wounded in relation to democratization movements, whose period of office is at least one year, or whose bereaved family members are determined to have been disabled in relation to democratization movements, and shall be entitled to “living subsidies” for public officials in special service or their bereaved family members, according to Article 9(2) of the former Act on the Compensation for Democratization Movement and Article 2 of the Enforcement Decree thereof.

In light of the purport that the former Democratization Compensation Act requires persons related to democratization movements or their bereaved family members to pay compensation, medical allowances, and living allowances in the name of such persons, the payment standards, methods of payment, and the source of living allowances may be appropriated in the form of money, and the provision that may not be paid in accordance with the degree of living or status, etc., the provision on compensation, etc. under the former Democratization Compensation Act seems to have the original purpose of promoting economic stability by compensating persons related to democratization movements for compensation or medical allowances in cases where they meet certain standards among property damage suffered in relation to democratization movements, and by providing them with the money in the name of living allowances for persons related to democratization movements who have suffered economic difficulties.

Therefore, considering the purport of various regulations on the payment of compensation, etc. under the former Democratization Compensation Act, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiffs’ “living support fund” received under the former Democratization Compensation Act includes the nature of consolation money for mental damage (a separate issue is to restrict the Plaintiffs’ claim for consolation money pursuant to Article 18(2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act).

④ Meanwhile, Article 10(2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act provides that an application for the payment of compensation, etc. shall be filed within six months from May 27, 2007, the enforcement date of the former Democratization Compensation Act (the current Act on the Compensation for Democratization). In addition, Article 18(2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act provides that where the applicant consented to the decision on the payment of compensation, etc., a judicial compromise under the Civil Procedure Act shall be deemed to have been established as to the damage incurred in relation to the democratization movement. Furthermore, prior to the decision on the unconstitutionality of the instant case, the court consistently held that “mental compensation” shall also be included in the scope of “judicial compromise under Article 18(2) of the former Democratization Compensation Act”

In addition, prior to the payment of KRW 50 million for living allowances to the plaintiffs, each "agreement and written request" that states that "the applicant shall conclude a settlement contract for the case when he/she received living allowances, and he/she shall not claim it again in any way with respect to the case," is submitted by the plaintiffs, and such "agreement and written request" are also used in accordance with Article 20 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act (attached Form 10).

Ultimately, according to the above provisions on the payment of compensation, etc. under the former Democratization Compensation Act and the precedents of the court, the plaintiffs were objectively unable to expect or expect to claim consolation money against the defendant by submitting the above "agreement and written claim" and receiving living allowances. In addition, considering the overall purport of the arguments in light of the above circumstances, it seems that the plaintiffs were bound to recognize that the claim for consolation money is limited as a matter of course when they received living allowances.

⑤ As long as the former Democratization Compensation Act practically limits the claim for consolation money to a person who received compensation, it can be deemed that the Defendant, the obligor, through the enactment and enforcement of the Democratization Compensation Act, made it impossible or considerably difficult for the Plaintiffs to exercise the right to claim consolation money or to extinctive prescription before the expiration of the extinctive prescription. Also, even if objectively, it can be deemed that there was a legal disability that the Plaintiffs could not exercise

(6) The former Democratization Compensation Act requires persons related to democratization movements to apply for compensation, etc. within the short period of six months after the enforcement of the Act, and the person who received compensation, etc. by applying for compensation, etc. within the said period is unable to claim more compensation than the Defendant. However, the Defendant again did not claim consolation money within a reasonable period from the date of payment on the premise that it is possible for the Defendant to claim consolation money at the time of payment, etc. on the premise that the Defendant again did not claim consolation money within a reasonable period

7) In addition, it may be deemed that the Plaintiffs’ exercise of the right to claim consolation money after receiving living allowances from the Democratization Compensation Deliberation Committee pursuant to the former Democratization Compensation Act and the exercise of the right to claim consolation money is limited until the time when the Plaintiffs became able to exercise the right to claim consolation money due to the instant decision of unconstitutionality.

D. Sub-committee

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay to the plaintiffs the consolation money of 15 million won and each of them, which is calculated at the rate of 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act from June 26, 2013 to July 12, 2019 and 12% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the next day to the day of full payment, which is reasonable to dispute over the existence and scope of the defendant's obligation to perform as to the defendant from June 26, 2013 when the copy of the complaint of this case was served on the defendant as requested by the plaintiffs.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment subject to review of this case has grounds for retrial, and it is revoked, and each of the claims of this case is accepted within the scope of each of the above recognition, and each of the remaining claims is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Jeong-chul (Presiding Judge)