Nonparty 2 (Law Firm Don Law Firm, Attorneys Kim Il-hee, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant) in bankruptcy who is the administrator of the rehabilitation debtor treatment-related development corporation, the administrator of the non-party 1's lawsuit.

As shown in the attached Form (Law Firm Lee & Lee, Attorneys Choi Yong-seok et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

[Defendant-Appellant] LLC (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Hy-po et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

June 17, 2016

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2013Gahap28204 Decided March 27, 2015

1.The judgment of the first instance shall be modified as follows:

A. On March 7, 2013, the Seoul Central District Court changed the final claim inspection judgment of 2011 Ma1363 on March 7, 2013 as follows. Bankruptcy claims against the Defendants (including the Counterclaim Plaintiff) against the Defendant, the medical claim judgment of the Defendants, which was entered in the column of the amount of the “personal Fee List” in attached Table 2, shall be finalized.

B. The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s remaining principal claim is dismissed.

2. All the counterclaims of the Defendant (Counterclaims) brought at the trial are dismissed.

3. Of the total costs of the lawsuit, 60% of the part due to the principal lawsuit is borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the remainder is borne by the Defendants (including the Counterclaim Plaintiff), and the part due to the counterclaim is borne by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

1. Purport of claim

(a) Main claim;

On March 7, 2013, the Seoul Central District Court revoked the final claim inspection judgment 2011 Ma1363. The Defendants (including the Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendants”, without any separate indication, do not exist any bankruptcy claim against the Defendants, who are the Counterclaim Plaintiff, and all the Defendants, who do not do so).

(b) Counterclaim;

Defendant Lessee (Counterclaim Plaintiff) confirmed that each of the rehabilitation claims and the rehabilitation claims equivalent to the amount of the counter-claim listed in attached Form 3’s attached Form 3’s “amount of the counter-claim claim” (1) and attached Form 3’s “amount of the counter-claim claim”) against the treatment industry development corporation has a bankruptcy claim equivalent to the amount listed in attached Form 3’s “amount of the counter-claim claim” (the Defendant Lessee filed a counter-claim in the first instance) against the treatment industry development corporation (the Defendant Lessee filed a counter-claim).

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The same judgment as that of the purport of the claim shall be sought.

1. Basic facts

The reason why this Court is used in this part is that, except for the dismissal or addition of the corresponding parts as follows, the entry of “1. Basic Facts” in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that of “1. Basic Facts”, and thus, it is cited in accordance with the text of Article 420 of the

(a)be divided in accordance with Part 18 of the second sentence of the first instance court, which shall add the following:

The main contents of the rehabilitation plan authorized by the above rehabilitation plan approval plan are as follows (hereinafter referred to as "the rehabilitation plan of this case"):

It shall be divided into three companies: 16.3% of the total assets of the company A; 11.7% of the company B; and 72% of the company C; ○○ other rehabilitation claims (including the bonds finally confirmed as outstanding bonds) shall be divided into real transfer ratio (9% of the company A; 5.20% of the company B; 85.8% of the principal and interest before commencement; 45.2% of the total amount of the rehabilitation claims of the company C shall be converted into 5,00 won per share; 26.7% of the interest after the conversion into equity shall be exempted; 30% of the total assets of the company A; 4.5% of the total amount of the rehabilitation claims of the company B shall be converted into 25% of the total amount of the rehabilitation claims of the company A; and 4.5% of the total amount of the rehabilitation claims of the company B shall be converted into 26.7% of the total amount of the new shares after the conversion into equity shall be substituted for the repayment of the total amount of the new shares.

Meanwhile, the treatment Motor Vehicle Sales Co., Ltd. divided according to the instant rehabilitation plan changed its trade name on October 25, 2012 to the self-employed Motor Vehicle Sales Co., Ltd., and changed its trade name on May 29, 2015 to the self-employed Motor Vehicle Sales Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “treatment Motor Sales Co., Ltd. after division, regardless of whether before or after the aforementioned change was made).

B. The third and fifth instances of the judgment of the court of first instance (hereinafter collectively referred to as the “Bankruptcy Company”) in the first and fifth instances of “the first instance court’s 4 and fifth instances of “the first instance court’s ” collectively referred to as “the Bankruptcy Company,” including “the Treatment Automobile Sales Company,” and “the Treatment Shipping Development Company,” before and after the division,” and “the Bankruptcy Company,” but if it is necessary to distinguish it, the transfer to be divided according to the rehabilitation plan is divided into “the bankrupt Company before and after the division,” and “the bankrupt Company after the division,” respectively.

(c) The third and third third first half of the judgment of the court of first instance “Plaintiff” is dismissed as “Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”)”, and the fifth and first half of the judgment “amount” is raised as “amount”.

D. On the 8th and 5th of the judgment of the court of first instance, “The EL City General Construction and the bankrupt company are currently dissatisfied with the above judgment and currently pending a lawsuit at the appellate court (the Busan High Court 2013Na9307).”

In response to the above judgment, the Plaintiff filed an appeal against the Busan High Court Decision 2013Na9307, and at the above appellate court, the Plaintiffs, other than ○○○, △△△△△, and △△△△△, among the plaintiffs in the above lawsuit, changed the lawsuit against the bankrupt company into a lawsuit for confirmation of bankruptcy claims. The appellate court dismissed the lawsuit against the above plaintiffs on the ground that the lawsuit against ○○○, △△△△, and △△△△ is unlawful. The remaining claims of the plaintiffs are justified. ① The bankrupt company was obligated to pay a refund under the above refund agreement, and ② even if some occupants were to receive some of the funds from ELDD Co., Ltd. according to the agreement on June 14, 2013, the above occupants are still entitled to participate in the rehabilitation and bankruptcy proceedings, ③ The bankruptcy claims against the bankrupt company are limited to the amount claimed and the amount equivalent to the legal interest on the commencement date of rehabilitation proceedings on the claim and the judgment on the commencement date of rehabilitation proceedings on May 15, 2015.

E. On November 20, 2014, the court of first instance rejected the Defendants’ bankruptcy claims on the grounds that the Defendants did not have any obligation at the meeting of creditors on November 20, 2014. The Defendants denied all the Defendants’ bankruptcy claims on the ground that the Defendants did not have any obligation at the meeting of creditors on November 20, 2014.

F. Each “ELKC” of the 8th judgment of the first instance court and the 2nd judgment of the second instance are different from “ELKC”.

(g)as follows conduct Nos. 5 and 6 of the judgment of the first instance.

“2) The remainder payment rate of the instant apartment occupants was 61.46% around June 23, 201, and the remainder payment rate was 80% on the date of the closing of argument in the first instance trial at the latest, and the requirements for refund of 10% of the intermediate payment loan interest and the sales price determined by the instant notice were established.”

(h)Paragraph 6 of the 9th sentence of the first instance court shall add the following:

(j) Agreement between ELKC and some occupants.

1) On June 14, 2013, ELK Co., Ltd. agreed with the following (hereinafter “instant agreement”) between 55 and (2) occupants including some Defendants (hereinafter “the Defendants to the instant agreement”) (hereinafter “instant agreement”).

1. Table 1, contained in the main text, the said 55 occupants withdraw a lawsuit on the above 50 million won for the withdrawal of the said lawsuit and the waiver of the said claim, with respect to the Ulsan District Court 201Gahap5451 and 2011Gahap6980, Seoul Central District Court 201da1363, and where the above 55 occupants' claims are determined in the litigation proceedings and the case proceedings, the said 55 occupants' claims against the bankrupt company after division shall be waived out of the claims, and the 1.5 billion won shall be paid to the above 55 occupants from among the payment of the above amount, 4.5 billion won for the withdrawal of the said lawsuit and the waiver of the said claims, and the said 5.5 billion won shall be deducted from the above 5.5 billion won for the said creditors' claims to the above 5.5 billion won for the waiver of the claims against the above 5.5 billion won, the said 5.5 billion won occupants' claims against the above company and the said 5.

2) According to the instant agreement, the said 55 occupants received KRW 1.5 billion from ELK Co., Ltd., and withdrawn the lawsuit for ELD Construction. On August 16, 2013, the said 55 occupants notified the bankrupt company that they would waive the exercise of their rights against the bankrupt company among 3 companies divided by the instant agreement.

3) The aforementioned 55 occupants received KRW 1.5 billion from ELNC, and each of the aforementioned occupants received the payment in proportion to the ratio of the refund claims to be paid to them. The amount received therefrom is only a part of the sum of the amount recognized as a refund claim from the Ulsan District Court 201Gau5451 and the Seoul Central District Court 201Gao1363 at 2011.

(i) Parts 7 to 9 of the first instance judgment are as follows.

"In the absence of dispute", entry of Gap's 2, 6, 7 evidence, Eul's 1 through 4, 6 through 8, Eul's 16 through 3) 18, Eul's 1 through 17 (including branch numbers, if any; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul's 5, part of Eul's 5, and the purport of the whole pleadings."

2. Determination on the legality of a counterclaim

A. We examine ex officio the lawfulness of the instant counterclaim.

B. The defendant may, only if it does not substantially delay the litigation procedures, file a counterclaim with the court in which the principal lawsuit is pending, not later than the closure of pleadings (Article 269(1) of the Civil Procedure Act), and in the appellate trial, the counterclaim is not likely to prejudice the interests of the other party in the instance, or may be filed with the consent of the other party (Article 412(1) of the Civil Procedure Act)

The main lawsuit of this case was filed on April 11, 2013, and on August 7, 2014, the bankrupt company commenced bankruptcy proceedings upon being declared bankrupt, and the date for preparatory pleading and the date for preparatory pleading on two occasions at the court of appeal at the court of appeal at the court of appeal, and only on June 14, 2016, which is three days before the date for preparatory argument at the court of appeal, the date for preparatory pleading at the court of appeal, and the date for preparatory pleading at the court of appeal at the court of appeal (in particular, the date for secondary pleadings are designated to supplement the purport of the plaintiff's claim, and they are not designated to supplement both parties' claims or to continue the date for preparatory argument to submit evidence). In light of the purport of the counterclaim of this case and the cause of the claim and the scope of hearing, etc., the counterclaim of this case constitutes unlawful cases where it is likely to significantly delay litigation procedures or undermine the interests of the court of appeal at the court of appeal (the plaintiff at the court of second instance at the court of appeal at the same time agreed to the counterclaim).

C. Otherwise, inasmuch as the Defendant (Counterclaim)’s bankruptcy claim against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) becomes final and conclusive in the principal lawsuit, there is no benefit in confirmation as to the part on which the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) seeks confirmation of the bankruptcy claim against the bankrupt company, and the instant Plaintiff, as the bankruptcy trustee of the bankrupt company after division, is the subject of independent rights and obligations, which are separate from the above “The company after division” and “the Treatment Industry Development Co., Ltd.,” and thus, there is no benefit in confirmation as the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) seeks confirmation of the rehabilitation claim against the Plaintiff with respect to the “The Treatment Automobile Sales Co., Ltd. after Division” and “The Treatment Industry Development Co., Ltd.”.

D. Therefore, the counterclaim in this case is deemed unlawful, as a single copy.

3. Determination as to the claim on the principal lawsuit

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The instant notice is unilaterally sent by ELN Construction without the consent of the bankrupt company, and the bankrupt company consented to the dispatch of the said notice or did not confer the power of representation on ELN Construction. In addition, the instant notice does not aim at any legal effect or not at any legal effect, but does not constitute the subject of the rights and obligations under the Civil Act that can receive the expression of intent. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was a refund agreement between the bankrupt company and the Defendants that the bankrupt company would refund the amount equivalent to 10% of the intermediate payment loan interest and the sales price to the Defendants. Thus, there is no claim for refund of the Defendants.

2) Even if the bankrupt company bears the obligation under the refund agreement, 55 occupants, including the Defendants of the instant agreement, received KRW 1.5 billion from the ELD C&C on the condition that they waive their claim against the bankrupt company in accordance with the instant agreement, and thus, in the case of the Defendants of the instant agreement, they did not have the claim for refund against the bankrupt company any longer.

3) As to the duty to pay a refund under the refund agreement, the bankrupt company and the ELAD Construction bears joint and several obligations. As long as the obligation of ELAD Construction has been repaid according to the agreement of this case, the repayment has absolute effect, so the claims for refund against the bankrupt company of the parties to the agreement of this case were extinguished.

4) Even if the Defendants’ refund claim is recognized, the Defendants’ bankruptcy claim should be calculated again in accordance with the instant rehabilitation plan. According to the instant rehabilitation plan, the amount of the Defendants’ bankruptcy claim against the bankrupt company after the split-off is divided into 85.8% for the bankrupt company after the split-off, and the amount of interest accrued before and after the start-up of the rehabilitation claim against the bankrupt company after the split-off is exempted from 28.1% for the principal and interest accrued after the split-off, and 45.2% for the rehabilitation claim against the bankrupt company after the split-off shall be converted into 5,00 won per share. However, since the above debt-equity swap obligation becomes impossible due to the bankruptcy of the bankrupt company after the split-off, the amount of the Defendants’ bankruptcy claim against the bankrupt company after the split-off shall be calculated by

B. Existence of refund claim

1) In addition to the following circumstances acknowledged by the aforementioned evidence and the purport of the entire pleadings, the instant notice ought to be deemed to have been sent under the joint name after the EL City Construction and the bankrupt company decided to refund 10% of the intermediate payment loan interest and the sales price to the Defendants, who are occupants through consultation between the EL City Construction and the bankrupt company.

A) The instant notice is the sender’s “Treatment Motor Vehicle Sales (State/Construction)”, and the lower part of the document indicated “Treatment Board(State/Construction, Representative Director in the EL City, and Representative Director in the EL City Construction.” On the other hand, the rubber seal of the bankrupt company is affixed to the notice of this case. Moreover, the notice of September 10, 2010 and December 3, 2010 were also posted or sent to the occupants in the name of the bankrupt company in the name of the EL City Construction.

B) The representative director of the bankrupt company affixed the seal on the request for financing execution prepared by the ELDD General Construction to pay the occupants the interest of intermediate payment loans and the first refund, and the said first refund was normally paid.

C) On June 23, 2011, the occupant notified the bankrupt company to perform the second and third-minute refund interest of intermediate payment by content-certified mail, and the bankrupt company did not raise any objection, such as that the bankrupt company did not have any obligation to refund even after receiving the said content-certified mail.

D) In the instant notice and the reply of February 23, 2011, the issue of refund of interest on intermediate payment loans, etc. was determined through consultation between the executor, EL comprehensive construction, and the bankrupt company, the contractor, and the bankrupt company, which is the contractor, stated that the subject of refund is the executor and the bankrupt company, which is the contractor.

E) In the examination of the case of the Busan High Court 2013Na9307, which was the vice president at the time of EL City Construction, Nonparty 3 testified to the effect that “each notice sent to the Defendant was sent to the Defendant through consultation with the bankrupt company, which is the corporation of the bankrupt, and each notice was signed and sealed by rubber rather than the corporate seal of the bankrupt company, and it was inevitable for the bankrupt company to obtain approval of the representative director because it was in a situation where the bankrupt company cannot obtain approval of the representative director, and thus, it became inevitable to have the rubber sealed

F) On January 17, 2011, the bankrupt company agreed to exempt those who refuse to take occupancy and the interest on the intermediate payment loan, and discount 10% of the sales price.

G) The purchase-type sales agency contract entered into between ELAD Construction and ELDD Co., Ltd. includes the content that the contract is to implement the matters agreed upon with the non-Subrogation of the occupants in the lawsuit (Seoul Central District Court 2011da1363, U.S. District Court 201da5451) after the settlement of the purchase-type sales agency fee, and the bankrupt company affixed the seal on the above sales agency contract.

H) If a refund agreement is not concluded and the sale procedure does not proceed smoothly, not only the ELsi Construction but also the ELsi Construction, and the ELsi Construction and the bankrupt company were in a situation where the bankrupt company would have suffered a significant loss. Thus, in the process of negotiations and agreements with the Defendants for a refund agreement, the ELsi General Construction and the bankrupt company were closely consulted. Unlike the Plaintiff’s assertion, if the ELsi General Construction arbitrarily used the name, etc. of the bankrupt company, it is difficult to easily understand the reasons why the bankrupt company did not raise a civil or criminal issue against the person in charge of the ELsi General Construction.

2) Next, the instant notice includes not only the refund of an intermediate payment lender, but also the refund of an amount equivalent to 10% of the parcelling-out price, as presented in the notice on September 10, 2010 and December 3, 2010, and includes the specific requirements for refund and an essential and important details of the refund agreement, such as the refund schedule. Therefore, it is not merely a simple notice, but also deemed an expression of intent to subscribe for the refund agreement to the occupants including the Defendants.

Furthermore, even according to the entry of the instant notice, the addressee of the instant notice is not only the “non-Subrogation of occupants and occupants of the instant apartment,” but also the “non-Subrogation of occupants” is also a group comprised of occupants of the instant apartment complex including the Defendants. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the declaration of intent to make a refund agreement by the EL City Construction and the bankrupt company’s instant notice was received by the Defendants, who are the occupants of the instant apartment complex.

3) As seen earlier, the El City General Construction sent the instant notice to the bankrupt company, along with the Defendants, at the time of refunding the amount equivalent to 10% of the interest on loans from intermediate payments and the sales price to the occupants including the Defendants. Accordingly, the occupant subrogation agreement on the refund itself, but the occupant subrogation requested the refund on the basis that the arrival rate is earlier between the occupancy rate and the remainder payment rate. EL City General Construction made a reply that the repayment period would be determined on the basis of the remainder payment rate in subrogation by the occupant, and the remainder payment rate was paid to the Defendants with the consent of the bankrupt company at a certain level.

Through the above series of processes, ELAD General Construction and the bankrupt company and the Defendants agreed to either explicitly or at least impliedly express or implied declaration of intent that the bankrupt company would refund the amount equivalent to 10% of the intermediate payment interest and the sales price to the Defendants in six installments on the basis of the balance payment rate (hereinafter “instant refund agreement”).

4) Therefore, barring any other special circumstances, the Defendants have a claim for refund equivalent to 10% of the interest on an intermediate payment loan to the bankrupt company pursuant to the instant refund agreement and the sales price.

C. Whether to waive rights pursuant to the instant agreement

In full view of the following circumstances, the agreement in this case is deemed to have been received KRW 1.5 billion in return for the withdrawal of litigation against the company of the bankrupt after the split-off and the waiver of the execution of the claim against the company of the bankrupt after the split-off in accordance with the refund agreement in this case, where the existence and amount of the claim to be paid by the company of the bankrupt before the split-off is confirmed in the Ulsan District Court 201Gahap5451 and 2011Gahap6980 case and the Seoul Central District Court 2011Ma1363 case (hereinafter referred to as the "existing case"), the claim against the company of the bankrupt after the split-off (the amount equivalent to 85.8% of the total refund claim) is not to be executed. In other words, it is reasonable to view that the agreement in this case is a kind of sub-execution to waive the exercise of the rehabilitation claim against the company of the bankrupt after the split-off.

1) Even if the claim under the instant refund agreement against the bankrupt company prior to the split-off becomes final and conclusive in the previous case, the Defendants of the instant agreement appears to have reached the agreement of this case on the premise that the principal of the claim against the Daewoo Motor Sales Co., Ltd. and the Treatment Industry Development Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “A, Company B after the split-off”) after split-off under the attorney’s assistance is not reduced and the exercise of the claim is still possible, taking into account the fact that the amount of the claim under the instant refund agreement against the bankrupt company prior to the split-off is only 26.7% of the amount of the claim that can be exercised against the bankrupt

2) In fact, the aforementioned 55 occupants received the payment of only the amount equivalent to part of the amount that can be paid under the instant refund agreement as a result of the previous case, and if the amount is treated as having been actually paid, the amount of claims that can be exercised against the Company A and the Company B after the division according to the instant rehabilitation plan would be reduced to that extent. However, according to the instant rehabilitation plan, the claim against the Company A and the Company A after the division is not reduced or exempted, and the proportion of recovery of claims is relatively higher due to cash reimbursement or conversion into investment. Under such circumstances, under the instant rehabilitation plan, the Defendants of the agreed parties, who were receiving legal assistance from the attorney-at-law, did not reduce the amount of claims against the Company A and the amount of claims against the Company B after the division, which reaches 85.5% of the share of claims under the rehabilitation plan, and that the agreement in this case was concluded with the effect that the claims against the bankrupt company after the division, which

3) The instant agreement states to the effect that the Defendants of the instant agreement waives their claims against the bankrupt company after the split-off. However, in the process of formulating the instant agreement between the Defendants of the instant agreement and the Defendants of the instant agreement, it seems to have stated the phrase “a renunciation” in order to clarify the performance of their responsibilities pursuant to the instant refund agreement under the special agreement among the purchase-type sales agency contracts entered into between ELK Construction and the bankrupt company. In fact, the Defendants of the instant agreement, in around August 16, 2013, notified the bankrupt company of the contents of the instant agreement as “a notice of refusal of exercise of their rights,” and clearly indicate that the part of claims against the bankrupt company after the split-off would be “a renunciation of exercising their rights,” if claims pursuant to the instant refund agreement are finalized. In addition, in light of the circumstances that the instant agreement was prepared under the attorney’s assistance, it appears that the Plaintiff did not waive the rehabilitation claim itself if the rehabilitation claim was finalized before the confirmation of the rehabilitation claim itself in the existing case.

(d) Whether claims are extinguished due to the absolute effect of the repayment of joint and several obligations;

1) In rehabilitation procedures, where multiple persons are jointly and severally liable, when rehabilitation procedures commence for all or part of the claims that they hold at the time that the rehabilitation procedures commence, the creditors may exercise their rights as rehabilitation creditors in each rehabilitation procedure for the total amount of the claims that they hold at the time that the rehabilitation procedures commence. In such cases, even when anyone who is wholly and severally liable for the other persons performs the act of extinguishing the repayment and other obligations to the creditors after the rehabilitation procedures commence, such creditors may exercise their rights for the total amount of the claims they hold at the time that the rehabilitation procedures commence, except for the case where the total amount of the claims are extinguished (see Article 126 of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act). In addition, as in the bankruptcy procedures, as in the bankruptcy procedures, where multiple debtors are jointly and severally liable for any obligation, if all or some of the debtors are declared bankrupt, the creditors may exercise their rights as bankruptcy creditors against each bankruptcy estate with respect to the total amount of claims that they hold at

As can be seen, even if rehabilitation creditors received a partial repayment from another debtor or a repayment or distribution through participation in the rehabilitation procedures or bankruptcy procedures for another debtor after the commencement of rehabilitation procedures, the creditor does not thereby cause a decrease in the amount of rehabilitation claims unless the creditor obtains the satisfaction of the total amount of the claims. Thus, creditors may continue to participate in the rehabilitation procedures with the total amount of the claims at the time of the commencement of rehabilitation procedures (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Da67482, May 30, 2003; 2006Da53382, Jan. 26, 2007).

2) We examine the instant case in light of the aforementioned legal principles. The fact that the Defendants received the instant agreement by the parties to the instant agreement is only a part of the money entitled to receive under the instant agreement is as seen earlier, and thus, it is determined that the Defendants may still participate in the rehabilitation and bankruptcy proceedings of the instant case in full in full.

Therefore, we cannot accept this part of the plaintiff's assertion.

(e) Confirmation of amount of bankruptcy claims;

1) According to Article 288(4) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, the discontinuation of rehabilitation procedures does not affect the implementation of the rehabilitation plan and the effect arising under the provisions of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act. Thus, even if the rehabilitation procedures for the bankrupt company are discontinued, there is no particular obstacle to the legal effect of exemption and alteration of rights according to the authorization of the rehabilitation plan (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da57438, Oct. 11, 2007).

2) As seen earlier, with respect to the bankrupt company prior to the division, the Defendants had a rehabilitation claim equivalent to 70% of the remainder other than the amount of the first refund (30% interest on loan and 30%) already received, and the amount of the cited amount in attached Form 2, corresponding to 10% of the purchase price, respectively, as stated in the column of the cited amount in attached Form 2, corresponding to 10% of the purchase price.

However, according to the approved rehabilitation plan of this case, the bankrupt company prior to the division was divided into Gap, Eul, and the bankrupt company after the division. The rehabilitation claim against the bankrupt company prior to the division was divided into the ratio of Gap company 9% after the division, Eul company 5.2% after the division, and 85.8% of the bankrupt company after the division, and the interest was exempted from the principal and interest accrued before the commencement of the rehabilitation claim against the bankrupt company after the division.

Meanwhile, there is no evidence to deem that rehabilitation claims against the bankrupt company after division were actually paid in cash or converted into equity through the issuance of new shares. Thus, 71.9% of the principal and interest of rehabilitation claims against the bankrupt company after division remains.

In regard to this, the Plaintiff alleged to the effect that the bankrupt company’s obligation to convert into investments was extinguished due to the bankruptcy, but insofar as the obligation to convert into investments was not fulfilled due to the bankruptcy, as alleged by the Plaintiff, the bankruptcy claim in the above 45.2% portion cannot be deemed to be extinguished on the ground that the bankrupt company’s obligation to convert into investments was extinguished due to the impossibility of implementing the said obligation (the assertion to the effect that the bankrupt company’s obligation to convert into investments was impossible is merely the fact that the bankrupt company did not

3) Meanwhile, the Defendant (Counterclaim) asserts to the effect that the subject matter of the instant lawsuit is not the confirmation of the rehabilitation claim against the bankrupt company after dividing it into the confirmation of the rehabilitation claim against the bankrupt company. However, as seen earlier, the instant lawsuit is pending in the lawsuit of demurrer against the rehabilitation claim inspection claim at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy, and it is an uneconomic and unreasonable way to allow the bankruptcy trustee to take over the lawsuit interrupted by the bankruptcy trustee. As seen earlier, the Plaintiff’s amendment to the purport of the appeal seeking the confirmation of the rehabilitation claim, which is not the confirmation of the bankruptcy claim, is dismissed, and thus, the allegation on the other premise cannot

4) Ultimately, a bankruptcy claim against the bankrupt company following the division of the Defendants under the instant rehabilitation plan is 61.6% of each amount indicated in the amount column for the amount cited in the “Personal Fee List” in attached Table 2 (i.e., 85.8 x 71.9 x less than KRW 71.9%, and hereinafter the same shall apply). When calculating the amount, each amount recorded in the column for the amount cited in the original trial of the same Table is 8 weeks).

4. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim of the principal lawsuit shall be accepted within the scope of the above recognition, and the remainder of the claim shall be dismissed as it is without merit. Since the part on the principal lawsuit among the judgment of the first instance is unfair with a different conclusion, the judgment of the first instance is modified as above, and since the defendant (Counterclaim) raised in the trial is illegal, the counterclaim claim filed in the trial is dismissed as it is so decided as per Disposition.

(attached Form omitted)

Judges Kim Jong-chul (Presiding Judge)

1) The instant case pertains to a case where rehabilitation procedures are abolished after authorization is granted for the rehabilitation plan and the rehabilitation court declares bankruptcy ex officio pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act (hereinafter “Rehabilitation Act”). In such a case, the said litigation procedures are suspended and taken over by the bankruptcy trustee pursuant to Article 6(6) of the Debtor Rehabilitation Act, and it is reasonable to proceed with the bankruptcy claim confirmation procedure by amending the purport of the claim. The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) took over the instant lawsuit from the administrator of the rehabilitation procedure, who was appointed as the bankruptcy trustee of the bankrupt company in the bankruptcy procedure, and the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)’s claim was stated in the first instance judgment to seek confirmation of non-existence of the bankruptcy claim. The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) filed a petition of appeal stating the same purport of the appeal as the purport of the claim stated in the first instance judgment, and the amendment of the amount of the bankruptcy claim was rejected on May 11, 2016 [the purport of the amendment of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)].

(2) Of the list of the Defendants, the Defendants 2, 3, 8, 9, 14, 19, 20, 21, 26, 32, 33, 41, 42, 47, 48, 53, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 68, 71, 72, 73, 78, 88, 89, 90, 91, 96, 98, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 1116, 117, 119, 125, 134, 140, 141, 145, 145, 154, 153, 15, 145, 15, 106, 106, 104

Note 3) Although “B” must be indicated as “Nos. 9 through 11”, the Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff’s indication shall prevail.

Note 4) The Plaintiff stated in the briefs dated May 11, 2016 that the said conversion of investment into equity was 45.8%, but in light of the content of the instant rehabilitation plan, the said “45.8%” appears to be a clerical error in the “45.2%” (see, e.g., evidence 18).

5) On the other hand, when concluding the instant refund agreement, LAD General Construction directly contacted the Defendants, and the bankrupt company was aware of the fact that it did not completely leave the Defendants, but it can be deemed that the bankrupt company, which was unable to make a prompt decision through the representative director due to the internal circumstances of the company at the time, granted the power of representation to LAD General Construction for the purpose of resolving all the problems by entering into the instant refund agreement in a prompt and smooth manner, and at least in light of the series of measures thereafter, it can be deemed that it explicitly ratified the act of representation of LAD General Construction.

Note 6) According to the instant rehabilitation plan against the bankrupt company after division, 28.1% of the principal and interest accrued prior to commencement of the rehabilitation plan is exempted, and 45.2% of the interest is to be converted into equity investment.

7) Of the Defendants, the Defendants filed a lawsuit with the U.S. District Court 201Gahap5451 against the 70% of the interest on intermediate payment loans is the amount equivalent to 10% of the sales price in the case of the Defendants.

8) As seen earlier, the instant case, where a lawsuit on the disputed claim is pending at the time of the declaration of bankruptcy, newly requiring the Defendants to file a final inspection judgment to take over the lawsuit interrupted by the trustee in bankruptcy. In the case of statutory interest claims, “where a lawsuit is pending” cannot be deemed to be “where a lawsuit is pending.” As recognized earlier, the Defendants filed a report on rehabilitation claims only on the principal claim of a refund while reporting the rehabilitation claim, and the Defendants raised an objection against this. As such, the final claim inspection judgment dated March 7, 2013 concerns the principal claim of a refund (see, e.g., “a claim adjustment of the principal claim amount of a refund claim by the applicant” (see, e.g., evidence 7). Therefore, the Defendants cannot seek the confirmation of legal interest and a claim in the instant case without going through a separate final claim inspection judgment. Meanwhile, in the instant case, the Defendants did not assert any assertion as to the statutory interest claim, interest rate, specific amount, etc., and only reported the principal claim (see, e.g., evidence No., No. 1 or 7).