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(영문) 대법원 1964. 7. 14. 선고 63다639 판결
[부동산소유권이전등기말소][집12(2)민,001]
Main Issues

The effect of a sales contract concluded by the general secretary of the affairs of the Gu Yellow Property without deliberation and resolution by the Gu Yellow Property Management Committee for the important property of the Gu Yellow Dust.

Summary of Judgment

In disposing of the Gu's actual property, deliberation by the Gu's actual property management committee is required.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 5 (2) 7 of the former Yellow Property Act (Law No. 339 of the Act prior to the Amendment of 1961, 10, 17)

Plaintiff-Appellee

Korea

Intervenor joining the Plaintiff

U.S. Attorney Lee In-bok (Attorney Lee In-bok)

Defendant-Appellant

Han Jae-gu, a foundation (Attorney Go Jae-ho et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

original decision

Seoul High Court Decision 63Na307 delivered on August 29, 1963

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal No. 1 by the defendant's agent are examined.

However, according to Article 5 (2) 7 of the former Yellow Property Act (amended by Act No. 339, Oct. 17, 1961; hereinafter the same), since the matters requiring deliberation and resolution by the committee for the management of the property of the Yellow Dust are stipulated only as the matters requiring deliberation and resolution of the committee for the management of the property of the Yellow Dust, and only the disposal of important property is not required, and there is no provision for deliberation and resolution by the committee. In addition, since the area of the forest land located in the Seoul Special Metropolitan City is limited to 23 regular9No. 810, and its size is not limited to 23 regular 98No. 10,07,750 as of November 22, 1958, it cannot be deemed that the forest land is not an important property. Therefore, all of the theories are

The second ground of appeal is examined.

However, as mentioned in the above, it is clear that the disposal of the forest land is not an important property, and that the disposal of the property in the old Yellow Dust requires deliberation by the old Yellow Dust Property Management Committee, and despite the clear provision of the law, the approval of the President and the Minister of Finance is more effective than the resolution of the Committee, such as the theory of the lawsuit, and if the approval of the President and the Minister of Finance is the same, it is clear that the approval of the President and the Minister of Finance are superior to the law, and that the opinion of the lawsuit is wrong.

In addition, since the organization of the property management committee of the Gwanak-gu Office was enacted, but in reality the above committee is not organized, there is no legal basis for the approval of the President and the Minister of Finance to substitute the above committee's resolution, and the regulations requiring the deliberation of the committee's decision on the disposal of the old Yellow Actual Property cannot be considered as the regulations on internal affairs. Therefore, the theory of lawsuit based on this premise is the Germany, and it is without merit.

Each ground of appeal No. 1 by the defendant Kim Jae-ho, Kim Jong-ho, is examined.

However, in Article 5 (4) of the former Yellow Property Act, considering that the "General Bureau is executing the matters decided by the Committee", it shall be deemed that there is no authority to conduct independent affairs, and it shall not be deemed that the deliberation and decision of the Committee is an internal consultation on the affairs of the General Affairs Bureau. Therefore, the deliberation and decision of the Committee shall be deemed as an effective requirement for the act of disposing of the Gwanak Yellow Real Property, and all the arguments are groundless.

The defendant's representative's second ground for appeal is examined as to the second ground for appeal. However, according to the facts established by the court below, the organization of the fund management committee of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund of the fund

In addition, according to Article 1 of the former Yellow Property Act, since it is apparent that the Act was enacted separately from the State Property Act, it shall not be subject to the State Property Act, such as the theory of lawsuit, with respect to the sales contract. In addition, if the act that the Secretary General of the Affairs Office of the Yellow Yellow Actual Property invalidated without deliberation and resolution by the Committee without regard to the committee, it shall not be interpreted as valid for the reason that such act would result in confusion as a result. In addition, the opinion that the disposal of important property requires a resolution of the Property Management Committee, which is not an important property, is without merit, that the forest land is not an important property. It is so decided in the

In addition, the claim for cancellation of the ownership transfer registration which was passed through the invalid sales contract cannot be viewed as the exercise of the right in violation of the good faith principle, and the exercise of the right in the private law cannot be considered as invalid because it violates the principle of equality, and it cannot be viewed as invalid. In addition, it cannot be found that the court below erred in interpreting the old Yellow Property Law.

The defendant Kim Jong-won's ground of appeal No. 2 is examined.

However, this case's sales contract is different from the general sales contract, and since this case's sales contract itself becomes null and void as in the original sale contract, it cannot be deemed that the court below erred by failing to exercise its right of explanation as to the theory of lawsuit, and there is no ground for appeal on the premise that the sales contract is valid and the plaintiff bears its duty of registration of ownership transfer.

The third ground of appeal is examined.

However, because the committee on the management of the old Yellow Office is not actually organized, there is no legal ground that the above committee's resolution can substitute with the approval of the president or the president of the Council. Therefore, even if the president and the president were approved by the president, this contract cannot be deemed valid unless the above committee's deliberation was approved by the president and the president of the Council, and it cannot be deemed that there was any error like the theory in the original judgment. Thus, all arguments should not be adopted.

The ground of appeal No. 4 is examined.

However, it is located in Seoul Special Metropolitan City, the area of which is 23,99,810,000 won or 1,807,750 won as of November 22, 1958.

It should not be viewed as an important property, and it should not be regarded as an important property because it is not a permanent preservation property, but a property is not a important property, and it is not an important property, and it is not possible to interpret that the disposal of the above other property is not necessary because it is stipulated only in Article 5 (2) 7 of the former Yellow Property Act.

The grounds of appeal No. 5 are examined.

However, the reasoning of the judgment in which the theory of lawsuit is limited is just, and it is not possible to employ it only in the German body.

The grounds of appeal No. 6 are examined.

However, the court below reviewed the original judgment in detail and found that the original forest was the property trusted to the plaintiff by the plaintiff assistant intervenor, not the property trusted to the plaintiff by the plaintiff assistant intervenor, and since the original forest was the trust property of the intervenor assistant intervenor, the "property of the nature to return it to the plaintiff" is recognized as other property under Article 3 of the former Yellow Dust Property Act as data such as the purport of the plaintiff's oral argument. Thus, there is no argument that the original forest is recognized as the trust property.

Accordingly, according to Articles 400, 395, 384, and 89 of the Civil Procedure Act, all participating judges are decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

[Judgment of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Mag-Jak Park Mag-gu

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