A. Whether a person who has obtained permission to occupy and use a river site may seek a return of unjust enrichment directly from the person who occupies and uses it without title

(b) The time when the possessor can exercise his/her right to demand reimbursement of the necessary and non-profit expenses;

(c) The time limit in which an appeal may be filed;

(a) A person who has obtained permission to occupy and use a river site may seek the return, etc. of unjust enrichment directly from a person who occupies and uses the river site without title;

B. Under Article 203(1) and (2) of the Civil Act, the possessor’s right to demand reimbursement of necessary or beneficial expenses may be exercised against the person to be restored only when the possessor claims the return of the possession from the person to be restored or the possessor returns the possession to the person to be restored.

C. It is reasonable to view that the time when an appeal can be filed is the expiration of the period for submitting the appellate brief corresponding to the time of closing argument in the appellate court.

Articles 741, 203(1), and 203(2) of the Civil Act; Articles 395 and 397 of the Civil Procedure Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 69Da726 delivered on July 22, 1969 (No. 1720) (No. 1994Sang, 522) 93Da30471, 3048 delivered on December 28, 1993 (Gong1994Sang, 522). Supreme Court Decision 92Da46394 delivered on January 26, 1993 (Gong193Sang, 861) 93Da4250 delivered on August 27, 1993 (Gong193Ha, 2616) 93Da4524 delivered on December 14, 1993 (Gong194Sang, 366)

Plaintiff 1 and 2 plaintiffs, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant Kim Il-young

Defendant 1 and one other Defendants, Attorneys Long-term and Shin Young-young, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 92Na2044 delivered on December 1, 1993

All appeals by the Defendants are dismissed.

All of the plaintiffs' appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendants and the costs of appeal against them.

1. We examine the Defendants’ grounds of appeal.

(A) On the first ground for appeal

A person who has obtained permission to occupy and use a river site may seek a return of unjust enrichment directly from a person who occupies and uses the river site without title. In this purport, the court below determined that the plaintiffs obtained permission to occupy and use the part of the land of this case, which is a state-owned river site, until December 31, 1990, and that the defendants occupied part of the land within the area for which they obtained permission to occupy and use since before March 16, 1987, and that the defendants occupied each part of the land within the area for which they obtained permission to occupy and use. The defendants have a duty to return the benefits acquired from the possession and use from March 16, 1987 to December 31, 190 to the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs have a reflect interest, the defendants cannot seek a direct return of unjust enrichment against the defendants, and the defendants' assertion that the owner can not seek a return of unjust enrichment in subrogation of the state-owned river site is not necessary to separately determine the right to claim the return of unjust enrichment. Therefore, there is no error in the judgment below.

(B) On the second ground for appeal

In light of the above facts, the scope of unjust enrichment to be returned by the Defendants shall be the amount equivalent to the rent for the corresponding part of land occupied and used by the Defendants, and it shall not be deemed that the Plaintiffs’ occupation fees to be paid to the authorities, such as the theory of lawsuit, are reasonable. In addition, in light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just, and it is consistent with the measures of the court below rejecting the Defendants’ assertion on the premise that the Defendants are the possessor or beneficiary of bad faith

There is no reason to conclude that the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the scope of unjust enrichment or by inconsistent reasoning.

(C) On the third ground for appeal

In accordance with Article 203(1) and (2) of the Civil Act, the possessor’s right to demand reimbursement of necessary or beneficial expenses may be exercised against the person to be restored only when the possessor has received the return of the object of possession from the person to be restored or the possessor has returned the object to the person to be restored (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da30471, 30488 delivered on December 28, 1993).

According to the records, while the defendants did not return the above part of the land which they occupied or used to the plaintiffs, they obtained permission to occupy and use the above part of the land until December 31, 1995, which was after the termination of the plaintiffs' occupancy period, from July 23, 1991. Thus, even if the defendants paid necessary or beneficial expenses as alleged above, the defendants who already occupied and used the above part of the land cannot assert the necessary or beneficial expenses as to the plaintiffs whose occupancy period has already expired. Thus, the judgment below is just, and there is no error of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to beneficial expenses, etc., such as the theory of lawsuit.

In addition, as long as the defendants' arguments regarding the deduction of necessary or beneficial costs or offset are not inevitable, it cannot be said that the judgment of the court below has affected the conclusion of the judgment even if there were errors in the rules of evidence or incomplete deliberation, such as the theory of litigation, on the preparation of evidence and the fact-finding of facts.

In the end, the issue will return to the absence of reason.

2. We examine the dismissal of the plaintiffs.

The time when the appeal is allowed to file an incidental appeal shall be deemed to be the time when the submission period of the appellate brief corresponding to the time of the closing of argument in the appellate trial expires (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 93Da44524, Dec. 14, 1993). In this case, the plaintiffs received the notice of receipt of the appellate brief on January 25, 1994; and it is apparent that the plaintiffs filed the supplementary appeal of this case only on February 18, 1994 of the last year, and therefore, the incidental appeal of the plaintiffs shall not be dismissed.

3. Therefore, all appeals by the Defendants are dismissed, and all appeals by the Plaintiffs are dismissed, and the costs of appeal and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)