Defendant 1 and one other

Sponsortization

Attorney Jeong-jin

Defendants are not guilty.

1. Summary of the facts charged

Defendant 1 (Defendant 2 of the Supreme Court’s judgment) is the actual operator of Nonindicted Co. 4 established for the purpose of providing a program of automatic driving on behalf of proxy, and Defendant 2 (Defendant 1 of the Supreme Court’s judgment) is the representative of Nonindicted Co. 5, established for the purpose of developing a computer program, and no person shall circumvent technical protection measures without legitimate authority by means of avoidance, removal, damage, etc.;

A. From April 2007 to June 2007, at the office of Non-Indicted. 5 Co., Ltd. operated by Defendant 2, the victim Co., Ltd. developed the I-Driver's substitute driving training program and registered it in an information and communication department, and let proxy driving technicians use it, Defendant 1 requested Defendant 2 to develop the substitute driving training program, and Defendant 2 used it as proxy driving engineers only with the above I-Driver's program, and Defendant 2 used it as proxy driving engineers. The AiCall program was operated by proxy driving engineers without being placed in the PDA and without being placed in the PDA's possession, so it was possible to request the victim Co. 5 to alter the A-Dri's substitute driving program more preferentially than the substitute driving engineers using the I-Dri program, but at the same time, the victim Co., Ltd. operated the I-D program with only the automatic driving program and the A-D-A-A-A-A-the basic device to be operated at the same time.

B. At the same time, at the same place, the victim company interfered with the business of the victim company that provides I-Driver program to substitute drivers by nullifying the protection devices for I-Driver program as above.

2. Determination

A. As to the violation of the Computer Programs Protection Act:

(1) According to the Defendants’ legal statement, Nonindicted 2’s statement at the court and investigation agency of Nonindicted 3, reference materials (Evidence Records 17 pages), self-statement and reference materials (Evidence Records 41 pages), each investigation report (Evidence Records 184 pages, 194 pages, 197 pages). The proxy driving program of the victim company developed by the victim company is operated on behalf of the customer at the call of the customer at the time of the client’s request, the user company’s call center staff’s call center staff’s call call, including departure, destination, customer telephone numbers, etc. The above input information is transmitted to the victim company’s database, and the victim company sent the victim company a list on the screen of the proxy driving engineer’s request for implementation of the program to ensure that the proxy driving engineer is not allowed to use the program on behalf of the victim. On the other hand, the victim company is not allowed to use the program on behalf of the victim. On the other hand, if the proxy driving engineer is allowed to use the program on behalf of the victim.

Sheb, however, with respect to the fact that the victim company taken measures to operate the I-DA screen physically as stated in the facts charged, it is not sufficient to recognize the evidence of Non-Indicted 2's testimony at the investigation agency and court, the statement at the investigation agency of Non-Indicted 3, the statement at the investigation agency of Non-Indicted 3, the statement at the complaint, the statement at the investigation agency of Non-Indicted 3, each investigation report, the reference materials (Evidence 17 pages, 41 pages of the evidence record), etc., and there is no other evidence

Secondly, I will examine whether the victim company's action at the same time constitutes "technical protection measures" under Article 30 (1) of the Computer Programs Protection Act, other than the measure that allows the termination of the I-Driver program at the same time, and the basic program that is automatically implemented at the time of PE hosting, provided that the measure that prevents the operation of other programs at the same time in the I-Driver program (hereinafter "the measure of this case") constitutes "technical protection measures".

Article 30(1) main text and Article 30(2) of the Computer Programs Protection Act (hereinafter “Act”) provides that “no person shall manufacture, import, transfer, lease, or distribute to the public equipment, devices, parts, etc. that circumvente considerable technological protection measures by means of avoidance, removal, damage, etc., and shall transmit or distribute a program that circumvents technical protection measures or provide technology that circumvents technical protection measures to the public.” Article 46(1)3 of the Act provides that a person who violates the above provision shall be punished. In full view of Articles 2 subparag. 9 and 7 of the Act, the above “technical protection measure” refers to measures that effectively prevent an infringement of program copyright, such as the right of publication, right of attribution, right of integrity maintenance, and right of reproduction, adaptation, translation, distribution, publication and transmission of a program, which are granted to a program author through core technology or device that protect the rights under the above provision (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do2743, Feb. 24, 2006).

However, with respect to the fact that the measure of this case is a measure to prevent copyright infringement of the I-Driver Program, the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is insufficient to acknowledge it, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. However, in light of the facts acknowledged earlier, it is reasonable to view the measure of this case as a measure terminated when AiCall Program is implemented in the I-Driver Program, which is merely a device controlling access to I-Driver Program.

As such, insofar as it is difficult to view the victim company's measures as technical protection measures under the Program Protection Act, it is difficult to view that the alteration of the implementation file constitutes a violation of the Computer Program Protection Act, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge

B. As to interference with business

As seen earlier, the Defendants’ act of changing the implementation files, etc. of AiCall Programs does not constitute “divating technological protection measures” as provided by the Computer Programs Protection Act, and it is difficult to view the aforementioned alteration alone as a deceptive act against the victim company. There is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, since the facts charged against the Defendants constitute a case where there is no proof of crime, each of the Defendants is acquitted under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Judges Kim Jong-tae