(a) The case holding that the possession of the possessor does not constitute objective circumstances to regard it as the possession of another owner;

B. Whether the prescriptive acquisitor can block a third party from exercising the ownership in a case where the real estate is held in title trust with a third party before the completion of the prescriptive acquisition and then the registration is completed

(c) Whether a third party who acquired less than a majority from co-owners of land at the time of completion of prescriptive acquisition may claim exclusion from possession against the person who acquired the whole land by prescription.

A. The case holding that the possessor of land cannot be deemed to be converted from the time when he promised to conduct a subsequent boundary surveying on the part of others, and that part of the land in possession of another person cannot be deemed to be converted from the time he promised to do so, on the ground that he did not object to the removal of the building and delivery of the site on the ground that he was notified by the possessor, or that he did not object to the removal of the building on the ground that he was notified by the owner, or that he did not object to the removal of the building on the ground that the possessor did not object to the removal of the land on the part of others, and that the possession of the land on the part of another person did not constitute an objective circumstance to view it as the possession as the owner on the part of others, and even if the possessor of the land together with the State-owned land paid the occupation fee for the State

B. Even if the period of prescription for the acquisition of real estate has expired, if the possessor first abandons the registration of ownership in the name of a third party without being registered in his/her own name, barring any special circumstance, he/she may not claim the acquisition by prescription against the third party. However, if the third party is entrusted or trusted to another person from the registered titleholder at the time when the period of prescription expires, the former registered titleholder may terminate it at any time and request the registration of ownership transfer, and the third party may exercise this right by subrogation of the former registered titleholder. As such, if such third party exercises his/her right as the owner, the possessor may restrain the third party from exercising the right

C. Co-owners holding a majority of co-ownership can independently manage the co-ownership without consultation with other co-owners, and determine the exclusive use and profit-making of a specific part of co-owned land is legitimate by the method of management of co-owned property. As such, a third party who has acquired a share from some co-owners at the time of completion of the prescription period, which does not reach the majority of the co-owners at the time of completion of the registration of ownership transfer, may not claim for the exclusion of possession of the possessor.

Articles 245, 103 [title trust], and 265 of the Civil Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 93Da24889 delivered on September 14, 1993 (Gong1993Ha, 2777) Decision 93Da28768 delivered on November 9, 1993 (Gong1994Sang, 795Sang, 2078), Supreme Court Decision 90Da202020 delivered on April 12, 1991 (Gong191, 1374), Supreme Court Decision 94Da22484 delivered on May 9, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 2078).

[Judgment of the court below]

Defendant-Appellant Lee Chang-chul, Counsel for defendant-appellant

Defendant 1 and two others, Counsel for the defendant-appellant-at-law

Seoul High Court Decision 94Na26969 delivered on April 26, 1995

Each appeal shall be dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each appellant.

1. As to the Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

The First Ground for Appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below recognized the fact that the non-party 1 newly built one house on June 13, 1972 and occupied part of the site (the part of the site of this case) as part of the site in the list No. 4 at the time of the original adjudication, which is owned by the plaintiff, through the non-party 2, the non-party 3, and the non-party 4, and the defendant purchased and possessed it on September 23, 198, and determined that the period of the acquisition by the above defendant as to the part of the site of this case is completed upon the lapse of 20 years from the starting date of possession of the above non-party 1. In light of records, the court below's finding and determination of this fact is sufficiently acceptable, and there is no violation of law such as the reasoning, reason, omission, omission of judgment, violation of the

The argument is that the above non-party 1 was newly constructed only on the second floor located over the area of 19 square meters in the land of this case among the land of this case, and the warehouse installed over the area of 15.2 square meters in the area of 190 square meters in the area of 190. The defendant newly constructed the building (A) section 17.8 square meters in the area of 17.8 square meters in the area of 49 square meters in the area of 17.2 square meters in the area of 49 square meters in the area of 190. However, although the above non-party 1 did not have any building on the area of 17.8 square meters in the area of 17.8 square meters in the area of 17.8 square meters in the area of 49 square meters in the area of 49 square meters in the area of the building of this case, the court below determined that the acquisition by prescription was completed not only on the part of the above (B) section but also on the part of the newly constructed warehouse.

The Second Ground of Appeal

The possessor of land may not be deemed to be converted from the time when he/she promises another person to conduct a boundary survey in the future on the ground that he/she committed an offence against the boundary of the land, and cannot be deemed to be converted from the time he/she promises to do so, and the possession of part of the land by taking over it at a somewhat low price with the knowledge of the fact that the possessor of the land is another person’s ownership, or did not raise any objection despite being notified by the owner of the content certification that he/she seeks removal of the building and delivery of the site, it cannot be deemed to constitute an objective circumstance that the possessor’s possession of the land is deemed to be the possession of the land. In addition, even if the possessor of the land owned by another person together with the State-owned land paid the occupation fees for the State-owned land out of the possession land,

In the same purport, as to the plaintiff's assertion that the possession by the above non-party 4 and the possession by the defendant is the possession by a third party, the decision of the court below that rejected the plaintiff's assertion on the grounds that various circumstances cited by the plaintiff do not constitute an objective circumstance that can recognize the possession by the above non-party and the defendant as the possession by a third party is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to autonomous possession,

As to the third ground for appeal

The plaintiff's assertion that the possession of the above non-party 1 in the site of this case is the possession of the owner of the land of this case is pointed out by the court below, but there is no evidence to recognize the possession of the above non-party 1 as the possession of the owner of the land of this case, even after examining the record, the court below's error cannot be deemed to have affected the conclusion of the judgment.

In addition, with respect to the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's possession of the land in this case and the removal of the part on the ground of the building in this case is impliedly acknowledged by the failure to raise any objection despite the plaintiff's proof of contents, the court below rejected such circumstance from the ground of the judgment that it cannot be viewed as an occupation of a third party, and therefore, it is obvious that such circumstance does not constitute an occupation of a third party. Therefore, it is not reasonable to

The grounds of appeal Nos. 4 and 5

Even if the period of the acquisition by prescription has expired, if the possessor of a real estate has first filed an ownership transfer registration under the name of a third party and abandoned it, barring any special circumstance, the possessor cannot claim the acquisition by prescription against the third party, barring any special circumstance. However, if the third party is entrusted or trusted in trust from the registered titleholder at the time the period of the acquisition by prescription expires, the former registered titleholder may terminate it at any time and file a claim for the registration of transfer. Since the person who acquired by prescription can exercise this right by subrogation of the former registered titleholder, if such third party exercises his/her right as the owner, the possessor may restrain it on the ground of the completion of the acquisition by prescription.

On the other hand, co-owners who have a majority of co-ownership can independently manage it without consultation with other co-owners, and decide to exclusively use and benefit from a specific part of the co-owned land is lawful by the method of management of the co-owned property. Thus, a third party who has acquired a share from some co-owners at the time of completion of the prescription period, but has not yet completed the registration of ownership transfer, may not claim for the exclusion of the possessor's possession from the whole co-owners.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below recognized that the plaintiff was entrusted with the ownership of the site of this case from the previous registrant and that more than the majority is co-owners' shares at the time of the expiration of the prescription period of the above defendant. In such a case, the plaintiff can not seek the transfer of the site of this case or the removal of the building on its ground by excluding the defendant's claim for the acquisition by prescription. The judgment of the court below to the same purport is just, and there is no error of law such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no error of law in the misapprehension

2. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendants 1, 2, and 3

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the defendants' assertion that the non-party 5 occupied each part of the site of this case from September 15, 1969, and from October 20, 1968, the non-party 6 occupied each part of the site of this case from October 20, 1968. In light of the records, this decision of the court below is justified, and it cannot be said that there is a violation of the rules of evidence or an unlawful exercise of the right to explanation as to the process of the lawsuit, such as the theory of lawsuit. The precedents citing the lawsuit are not appropriate to be invoked in this case. The court below's rejection of the defendant 3's assertion on the prescriptive acquisition is merely based on the ground that there is no evidence to prove that the possession was commenced on the date of the lawsuit, and it is not on the ground that the possession was

3. Therefore, each appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jae-soo (Presiding Justice)