(a) the scope of application of the provisions on ipso facto retirement provided for in Articles 21 and 7(2)5 of the Police Officials Act;

B. Whether a notification of ipso facto retirement is an administrative disposition subject to appeal litigation (negative)

A. Since the provisions of Articles 21 and 7(2)5 of the Police Officers Act, which are subject to a suspended sentence of qualification suspension or a heavier punishment, are newly established as a result of the full amendment of the said Act by Act No. 3606, Dec. 31, 1982, that a police official shall retire ipso facto, the said provision applies only to a police official who is under the period of suspended sentence only from that time after being sentenced to a suspended sentence of qualification or more severe punishment after the enforcement of the said new Act, and with respect to a person who was sentenced to a suspended sentence after being sentenced to a judgment of suspension of qualification or more severe punishment at

B. The notification of ipso facto retirement is a mere notification of the fact that the legal grounds for ipso facto retirement are verified and known to the public, and the notification itself is not a new formative act that loses the status of a public official, such as disciplinary dismissal or ex officio dismissal, so it cannot be an independent administrative disposition that is the object of an appeal litigation.

A. Articles 7(2)5 and 21 of the Police Officers Act; Articles 10(2)4 and 45(b) of the former Police Officers Act (amended by Act No. 3606, Dec. 31, 1982); Article 1 of the Administrative Litigation Act

[Judgment of the court below]

Seoul Special Metropolitan City Mayor

Seoul High Court Decision 83Gu1021 delivered on April 27, 1984

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

In its reasoning, the court below acknowledged the fact that, based on macro-Evidence, the plaintiff received a bribe of one million won or more from Feb. 28, 1980, the court below affirmed the fact that the court rendered a final and conclusive judgment suspending the suspension of qualification sentence on Jan. 20, 1982. As to the plaintiff's assertion that retroactive effect cannot be applied to the administrative laws and regulations of the court below, Article 10 (2) and Article 45 of the Police Officers Act, effective at the time the above judgment became final and conclusive (hereinafter referred to as the "former Act"), does not provide that a person subject to the suspended sentence of qualification who is subject to the suspended sentence shall be automatically retired from office, and that the person subject to the suspended sentence shall not be automatically dismissed from office (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da3606, Dec. 31, 1982; hereinafter referred to as the "New Act"), which was completely revised under Articles 7 (2) 5 and 21 of the former Act, which are merely an administrative disposition (see, 198Da197).

Article 10(2)4 and Article 45 of the former Police Officers Act (Law No. 3189, Dec. 28, 1979) provide that a person who has been sentenced to suspension of qualifications or more severe punishment shall be retired ipso facto from office, and that a person who is under the period of suspension of qualifications or more shall not be retired ipso facto from office after being sentenced to the suspension of qualifications or more severe punishment. This provision was newly established in Articles 7(2)5 and 21 of the former Police Officers Act (Act No. 3606, Dec. 31, 1982), which entered into force on January 1, 1983, and that the period of suspension of qualifications or more severe punishment for a person whose period of suspension of qualifications remains until after the enforcement of the former Act, would result in unfavorable treatment in his place by retroactive legislation, and thus, the purport of the new Act becomes null and void only after being sentenced to suspension of qualifications or more punishment after the enforcement of the new Act. This provision of the new Act becomes null and void as a new one of disciplinary punishment.

Therefore, even if the plaintiff was under the period of suspension of qualification at the time of the enforcement of the former Act, it cannot be said that the plaintiff's judgment constitutes a cause of obligatory retirement as stipulated in Articles 7 (2) 5 and 21 of the said new Act, even though he was under the period of suspension of qualification at the time of enforcement of the new Act. Thus, it is obvious that the notification of the retirement of this case to the plaintiff as a cause of obligatory retirement is erroneous in the application of statutory interpretation.

However, it is merely a notification of the fact that the legal grounds for retirement naturally confirm and inform the public, and the notification itself is not a new formative act that loses the status of a public official, such as disciplinary dismissal or ex officio dismissal, so it cannot be an independent administrative disposition that is the object of appeal litigation.

As seen earlier, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on Articles 7(2)5 and 21 of the New Police Officers, but, on the premise that the instant notification of ipso facto retirement is not an independent administrative disposition, the measure that dismissed the Plaintiff’s lawsuit on account of its illegality is eventually justifiable, and therefore, the argument is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Jong-sung (Presiding Justice)

Since the fixed number of judges of the Supreme Court is during overseas business trips, it is impossible to sign and seal.The fixed number of judges of the Supreme Court.