[1] Where a person who requires a statement becomes unable to know his/her whereabouts as a result of the request for detection of location, or where a person who requires a statement refuses to comply with the summons of the court and the arrest warrant is not executed, whether the case constitutes "when a person is unable to make a statement by attending the court in the official ruling under Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act" (affirmative)

[2] The meaning of "drawing" under Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes

[3] The case holding that it is reasonable to view that the victim's degree of injury cannot be deemed as not requiring medical treatment, and that the defendant had an intention to escape from the scene in light of the circumstance where the accident occurred and the defendant immediately stops immediately after the accident and left the scene without considering the victim's condition

[1] Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act / [2] Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, Article 50 (1) of the Road Traffic Act / [3] Article 5-3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, Article 50 (

[1] Supreme Court Decision 95Do523 delivered on June 13, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2431), Supreme Court Decision 2000Do1765 Delivered on June 9, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 1698), Supreme Court Decision 2003Do732 Delivered on April 11, 2003, Supreme Court Decision 2003Do6460 Delivered on December 26, 2003 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 85Do1462 Delivered on September 10, 198 (Gong1985, 1375), Supreme Court Decision 200Do2563 Delivered on January 5, 201 (Gong2001, 4743, Supreme Court Decision 2005Do20475 delivered on December 26, 2005)

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Kim Jong-sung

Suwon District Court Decision 2005No130 decided Apr. 7, 2005

The appeal is dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The court's request for the detection of a witness's whereabouts was not delivered to a person who needs to make a statement several times, but the whereabouts of such person was unknown or the person who needs to make a statement could not be known even if the person had a certain residence, and in a situation where it is impossible to be examined in the court because of the failure to comply with summons by the court even if the arrest warrant was issued and the arrest warrant was not executed, it constitutes "when it is impossible to make a statement in the court" under Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, in a case where there is little room for false entry into the contents of the statement or the preparation of the protocol, and there is no specific and external circumstance to guarantee the credibility or decentralization of the contents of the statement, the admissibility of the statement is recognized (see Supreme Court Decisions 95Do523, Jun. 13, 1995; 200Do1765, Jun. 9, 200; 203Do732636, Apr. 11, 2003).

According to the records, since the court of first instance adopted the non-indicted 1 as a witness and served the summons as a witness on the date of trial, the court issued a arrest warrant against him but the execution was not possible. The above circumstances are that the non-indicted 1's written statement and written statement in the police officer's written statement constitute a case where the non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's questioning into the court because the arrest warrant is not executed, etc.'s non-indicted 1's written statement and written statement constitutes a case where the arrest warrant is not executed, etc.'s non-indicted 1's written statement and written statement are not executed. Meanwhile, in light of various circumstances indicated in the records, such as the specific facts of the statement and the situation before and after the statement were made, the credibility and ariness of the contents of the statement are also admissible by Article 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Meanwhile, according to the records, although the first instance court did not agree to the defendant's written statement and written statement of the police against the non-indicted 2 as evidence and summoned the non-indicted 2 as witness, it can be known that the summons was adopted as evidence of the police officer's written statement and written statement against the non-indicted 2 without being requested to detect the location of the non-indicted 2 at least three times from the 378-72, the second instance court's domicile. However, although the arrest warrant issued as his domicile was not executed, there is no special circumstance to recognize that it is difficult to expect the appearance as a witness even if the non-indicted 2 was served with the above written statement (i.e., the non-indicted 2's failure to service the above written statement and its location cannot be seen as being impossible in the court's summons or unknown, the non-indicted 2's oral statement and written statement cannot be viewed as evidence of the non-indicted 314 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Thus, the court below's judgment of conviction and the non-indicted 2's written statement cannot be admitted as evidence.

However, examining the remaining non-indicted 1's statements and other evidence admitted by the court below in light of the records, except for the non-indicted 2's statement, as stated in the facts constituting the crime in the court below, it is sufficient to recognize the fact that the defendant driven a rocketing car without any permission, as stated in the judgment of the court below, while driving it on the back part of the right side of the said vehicle, which was parked in the right side of the said vehicle, due to its shock, and the victim non-indicted 1 (n, 23 years old), and 2 (n, 28 years old), who was on the back side of the said vehicle, was on the back side of the said franchise, and was on the back side of the vehicle, and was in need of treatment for about two weeks of each time, without stopping or taking any specific measure, and therefore, the above error by the court below does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

2. Where an accident driver immediately stops and leaves the scene of the accident before taking necessary measures, such as aiding the victim, and brings about a situation where the identity of the person who caused the accident can not be confirmed, and this constitutes "when the driver runs away without taking measures under Article 50 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, such as stopping and aiding the victims" (see Supreme Court Decisions 2001Do471, Feb. 8, 2002; 2002Do6903, Apr. 25, 2003; 2004Do250, Mar. 12, 2004; 2004Do445, Mar. 25, 2004; 2004Do4775, Mar. 12, 2004; 2005Do481, Jun. 31, 2004).

According to the records, it is recognized that the victims suffered from the accident of this case caused by the traffic accident of this case caused interference with their daily life, and that the victims were hospitalized in the hospital from April 4, 2003 to the 16th day of the same month and conducted pharmacologic (pharmacologic treatment, complete therapy, medical control, etc.) and two times a day and two times a day from the following day. Thus, it cannot be said that there is no need for medical treatment as an over-the-day state where it cannot be evaluated as "injury" under Article 257 (1) of the Criminal Act. In light of the circumstance of the accident as shown in the records and the circumstance of leaving the site without examining the state of the victim immediately after the accident, it is reasonable to view that the defendant as the defendant had an intention to escape because he had the intention to escape, even though he knew that at least did not cause the victim's above injury, or had the victim's awareness that he suffered the above injury, left the site.

In the same purport, the court below is just in finding the defendant guilty of the charge of violating the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes of this case against the defendant, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, incomplete deliberation, or violation of Article 5-3 (1) 2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes, or any violation of the law such as

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-dam (Presiding Justice)