[1] The meaning of “aviation route” as stipulated under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act / Whether the route from the time all the doors of the aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of the aircraft open for unloading are included in the “aviation route” above (negative)

[2] The case holding that in case where the defendant, the vice president of the airline Gap, was prosecuted for violation of the Aviation Security Act on the ground that he had the captain alter the flight route of an aircraft in flight by force by getting the aircraft operating by force, which was separated from the boarding bridge of the mooring place, return to the boarding plane again, and let the aircraft in flight go to the boarding plane in order to let the flight aircraft get its crew get off a self-employed passenger aircraft scheduled to depart from a foreign airport scheduled to depart from the Republic of Korea, the defendant's act of having the aircraft in flight which was in flight by force go to the boarding plane return to the boarding plane does not constitute an alteration of the flight route of the aircraft

[1] [Majority Opinion] (A) Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act provides, “A person who obstructs the normal flight of an aircraft by forcing another person to alter the aviation route of an aircraft in flight by fraudulent means or by force shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years.” Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the same Act defines “in flight” as “from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft close.” However, there is no provision regarding what “aviation route” in the Aviation Security Act.

(B) The principle of no punishment without the law requires that crimes and punishments be prescribed by law in order to protect individual freedom and rights from the arbitrary exercise of the State’s penal authority. In light of such purport, the interpretation of penal provisions shall be strict, and interpreting it in a direction unfavorable to the defendant beyond the possible meaning of the text shall not be permitted in accordance with prohibition of extended interpretation, which is the substance of the principle of no punishment without the law. The method of systematic and logical interpretation that takes into account legislative intent and purpose, history of the enactment and amendment, harmony with the entire legal order, relations with other Acts and subordinate statutes may be used in interpreting the law, but if the text itself consists of relatively clear concepts, in principle, such a method of interpretation shall be neither necessary nor limited.

(C) In the absence of a definition provision on the terms used in a statute, the term “airway” should, in principle, be in accordance with the generally accepted meaning, such as a prior definition. The Standard Dictionary of Korean Language published by the National Institute of Korean Language defines aviation route as “airway along which an aircraft passes.” In a Korean language sense, aviation route includes the concept of the public. There is no example that “airway” is used as a term “airway” in relation to aircraft operation, which refers to a passage on the ground.

(D) Article 115-2(2) of the former Aviation Act (repealed by Act No. 14116, Mar. 29, 2016) provides that the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport shall set the operation conditions, such as “air route to be operated” when operating operation certification for an air transport business entity. Article 90(2) of the Aviation Safety Act (Act No. 1416, Mar. 29, 2016) which includes the contents of this provision alters “air route to be operated” into “air route to be operated.” Thus, it is obvious that the term “air route” was used as “air route.” The legal definition of air route is clearly defined as “air route indicated on the earth’s surface designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport as suitable for navigation of aircraft, etc.” (Article 2 subparag. 13 of the Aviation Safety Act; the definitions of the former Aviation Act) and the term “air route” as “air route to be used by the public.” Thus, it can be seen as a combination of aviation and aviation.

(E) On the other hand, there is no legislative data that can be seen that legislators used the “sea route” only in the instant penal provision, unlike ordinary meaning, as a means to include the passage on the ground.

This crime was first stipulated in Article 11 of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act (Act No. 2742 of Dec. 26, 1974), the telegraph of the Aviation Security Act. The minutes of the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee meeting on Nov. 26, 1974 for the examination of the legislative bill during the process of the enactment of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act, and there is no discussion as to the penal provision of this crime, so it is difficult to directly proviso the meaning of the “aviation route.” However, the explanation of the reasons for the proposal is that the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act was enacted to provide for aggravated punishment regulations for criminal offenders by performing the duty of cooperation following the accession to the international convention for the suppression of crimes against private aircraft by Korea.

(F) The subject matter of this crime is an aircraft “in flight.” However, “aviation route” subject to alteration by deceptive means or by force is a separate constituent element and ought to be interpreted in conformity with the principle of no punishment without the law in itself. Aviation route is a word “public” and there is no evidence to deem that legislators used the word in a wider sense than the prior definition. It goes beyond the possible meaning of the text and language to interpret it as “air route” even on the ground passage from time to time solely on the ground that an aircraft is “in flight.”

(G) Clearly, changing the course of an aircraft moving on the ground is a highly dangerous act in conflict with other aircraft or facilities. However, the need for punishment ought not only to reverse the principle of no crime without the law. Such an act may not only be punished as an interference with business against the plane captain, but also may constitute interference with the execution of duties, which may be punished by imprisonment with labor for not more than 10 years (Article 43 of the Aviation Security Act), as it entails violence, intimidation, or deceptive scheme. Therefore, there is no gap in punishment.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Poe-young, Justice Jo Hee-de, and Justice Park Sang-ok] (A) The Standard Dictionary of Korean Language published by the National Institute of Korean Language defines aviation route as “airway along which an aircraft passes.” The term “airway” and the term “airway” as “designated air passage of an aircraft navigating in a given way.” However, the subject of punishment under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act is to allow an aircraft in flight to change the course of actual operation, and it does not allow the change of the public passage itself designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.

(B) The expression “airway” can be interpreted as a concept that includes aircraft transit routes on the ground, depending on the context of the law, and as a result, controversy over whether the concept of “air route” includes aircraft transit routes on the ground, it appears that the term “air route” of the former Aviation Act changed into an expression “air route” which meets the context of the aviation safety Act. Accordingly, the argument of the Majority Opinion is in accord with the Dissenting Opinion, which regards it as a concept distinguishing between a sea route and an air route.

(C) A sea route (air route) refers to “a vessel or aircraft (air route) route” if grassed according to Chinese characters. A vessel is operated along the sea route from a port to a port. On the other hand, an aircraft is operated from an airport to an airport. Although it mainly operates in the air, it is inevitable to operate the aircraft on the ground of the airport to take-off and land. Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Aviation Security Act provides that “in flight” means from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft open for their unloading. The Standard Dictionary of Korean Language published by the National Institute of Korean Language defines navigation as “the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board the aircraft.” Accordingly, it is natural and natural to understand aviation route as “the way an aircraft navigates.”

(D) The fact that the sea route of this crime is used in close relation with navigation is also revealed in the structure of the text of the law. From the perspective of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act, the telegraph of the Aviation Security Act, the aviation route was used exclusively for the elements of this crime, including all of the entire laws, and the phrase “aircraft in flight” is the word “aircraft in flight.” In light of the fact that the legislators did not have a separate definition provision on the aviation route, it can be seen that the phrase “operation in flight” used in the manual was deemed to have clearly made it possible for the general public to recognize the meaning

In light of the pertinent relationship, it is reasonable to understand the meaning of “aviation route” of this crime in the fishing gear, rather than separately removing it. Under the Aviation Security Act, the term “in flight” is a language with a clear meaning that legislators intend to protect on-the-ground aircraft from crimes. Therefore, the term “air route” dealing with the fishing gear does not deviate from the scope of the possible meaning that is broad enough to read “air route along which an aircraft in flight is in flight,” regardless of the ground and the public.

(E) Since the act of arbitrarily changing the course of an aircraft moving on the ground is highly likely to lead to large strings, it is in line with the legislative intent of enhancing the degree of punishment for an act that threatens safe navigation, which shall be punished by imprisonment with labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years, as a principal crime. The act of obstructing the performance of duties under the Aviation Security Act (Article 43) does not include the act as a crime because on the ground, the aircraft ought to proceed with the optimal route under the judgment of the captain and the control of the control authority for the safety of passengers, and there is a need to suppress the act of obstructing it by reasonable punishment. The crime of interference with business under the Criminal Act is not only more than five years of imprisonment, but also may be punished by a fine, and it is not appropriate to punish a serious crime related to the operation of an aircraft.

(F) In conclusion, it should be interpreted that the routes from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft open for their unloading are included in the “aviation route” under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act.

[2] The case affirming the judgment below which acquitted the defendant in violation of the Aviation Security Act on the ground that, in case where the defendant, the vice president of the airline Gap, was indicted on charges of violating the Aviation Security Act on the ground that the defendant, who was a passenger of a foreign airport scheduled to depart from the Republic of Korea, was an act of getting the aircraft in flight by force, return to the boarding exit of the aircraft in flight by getting the aircraft in flight, which was separated from the boarding bridge at the moorings of the moorings, in order to let the flight crew get off the aircraft in flight from the aircraft in order to let the aircraft take off the aircraft in flight from the aircraft in order to let the aircraft in flight take off from the aircraft in question on the ground that the manner provided for in the guest room service manual, which is known to him, the person in charge, who was a one-class passenger, was not an act of having the aircraft in flight return to the boarding exit in a Pushbk and the aircraft in the moorings, the defendant's act did not constitute changing the aviation route of the aircraft

[1] Article 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Articles 1(1) and 314(1) of the Criminal Act; Article 2 subparag. 2 of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act (wholly amended by Act No. 6734, Aug. 26, 2002; see current Article 2 subparag. 1); Article 11 (see current Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act); Article 1, Articles 2 subparag. 1, 42, and 43 of the Aviation Security Act; Article 2 subparag. 21 of the former Aviation Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Aviation Safety Act (Act No. 1416, Mar. 29, 2016; see current Article 2 subparag. 13); Article 115-2 (2) of the Aviation Safety Act (see current Article 90(2) of the Aviation Safety Act); Article 2 subparag. 21 of the Aviation Security Act (see current Article 2 subparag. 213, 2013 of the Aviation Safety Act);

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2007Do2162 Decided June 14, 2007 (Gong2007Ha, 1118), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035 Decided April 23, 2009 (Gong2009Sang, 724), Supreme Court Decision 2015Do17847 Decided March 10, 2016 (Gong2016Sang, 596)

Defendant 1 and two others

Defendant 2 and Prosecutor

Law Firm LLC et al. and two others

Seoul High Court Decision 2015No800 decided May 22, 2015

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Case principal details

A. Defendant 1, who is the vice president of Nonindicted Co. 1 and was in charge of the passenger flag room services, etc. On December 5, 2014, Defendant 1 was on board Nonindicted Co. 1’s ○○○○○○○○○ Flight, which was scheduled to depart from the Incheon International Airport of the Republic of Korea on the same day at a local point of 00:37 on December 5, 2014.

B. Defendant 1: (a) Switzerlandd Nonindicted 2, a one-class passenger, sent to Nonindicted 2, on the ground that the method to contact with him, was different from that set forth in the guest room service manual known to him; (b) Defendant 1: (c) had the head of the guest room Nonindicted 3, who was in charge of Nonindicted 3, called “the crew who is not aware of the manual, is unable to contact the captain with him; and (d) had the captain called “the crew who is not aware of the manual.” While continuing the said request, Defendant 1 assaulted Nonindicted 3’s hand, etc. with the guest room service manual; and (c) had Nonindicted 2 carried out verbal abuse, such as assaulting Nonindicted 3 with his chest.

C. At that time, Nonindicted 4, the captain, who was separated from the boarding bridge at the moorings, was moving from the boarding bridge to a food trial white (the moving of the aircraft at the moorings to the boarding bridge). Nonindicted 4, upon receiving a telephone call from Nonindicted 3 to the effect that “the occurrence of an abnormal situation,” Nonindicted 3, “the aircraft must return to the aircraft” was suspended. Until then, the aircraft was 17 meters later between 22 seconds, and was in a state that no entry was made to the way beyond the moorings. Nonindicted 4, who heard from Nonindicted 3, that “the vice president requires the person in charge of the flight to get off the aircraft due to the guest service, while demanding him to get off the aircraft,” and that Nonindicted 4 moved back the aircraft to the boarding bridge with the approval of the airport mooring control at the airport mooring.

D. Until now, Defendant 1 read the corresponding part of the guest room service manual, it is appropriate for Nonindicted 2 to provide the dogs according to the method prescribed by Nonindicted 3, who did not properly explain to himself, and Defendant 1 got wrong to get off the aircraft from the aircraft and got off the aircraft. Accordingly, Nonindicted 3 transferred his duties to the assistant director and got out of the aircraft at around 01:05 on the same day.

E. On the same day, at around 01:14, the aircraft began to take off a food white again, and arrived at the Incheon National Port at the latest, 11 minutes later than the initial plan.

2. First, Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal on the part of violation of the Aviation Security Act due to Defendant 1’s alteration of aviation route are examined.

A. The process of this part of the lawsuit

With respect to the above Defendant 1’s act, the Prosecutor indicted Defendant 1 for the violation of the Aviation Security Act due to the assault impeding the safe operation of an aircraft, ② the violation of the Aviation Security Act due to the alteration of the aviation route of an aircraft, ③ the obstruction of business against Nonindicted 4, 3, and 2, and ④ the coercion against Nonindicted 3.

The first instance court and the lower court convicted all of Defendant 1 of the violation of the Aviation Security Act, obstruction of business, and coercion due to assault that obstructs the safe flight of aircraft. Defendant 1 did not appeal, and the prosecutor did not state the grounds for objection to the aforementioned guilty part in the final appeal and the appellate brief.

As to the violation of the Aviation Security Act due to the change in the aviation route of an aircraft, the first instance court convicted the Defendant, but the lower court reversed the judgment of the first instance and acquitted the Defendant. The prosecutor is disputing this by appeal.

B. Issues

The key issue of this part is whether Defendant 1’s act of having Defendant 1 return the aircraft that commenced a food confession to the boarding machine constitutes an alteration of “air route”.

The court below held that Defendant 1’s act does not constitute an alteration of “air route” on the ground that Defendant 1’s act is not in violation of the principle of no punishment without the law, since it is a length in which aircraft enters today, and it is interpreted in a wider manner to the disadvantage of Defendant without any special ground.

For this reason, the prosecutor argues that the prior definition of the sea route does not reflect the characteristics of aircraft to be moved before and after the takeoff, and that the Aviation Security Act has a definition provision in order to protect aircraft on the ground to open the door from the time when the aircraft gets on board and closes the door, so it does not violate the principle of no punishment without the law even if the aircraft’s navigation route, including the ground, is interpreted as “air route” as “air route” in accordance with this definition.

C. Legal provisions and the interpretation thereof

(1) Legal provisions

Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act provides, “Any person who obstructs the normal flight of an aircraft by forcing another person to alter the course of an aircraft in flight by fraudulent means or by force shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years.” Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the same Act defines “in flight” as “from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft close.” However, there is no provision regarding what “aviation route” under the Aviation Security Act.

(2) Interpretation

(A) The principle of no punishment without the law requires that crimes and punishments be prescribed by law in order to protect individual freedom and rights from the arbitrary exercise of the State’s penal authority. In light of such purport, the interpretation of penal provisions shall be strict, and interpreting it in a direction unfavorable to the defendant beyond the possible meaning of the language and text shall not be permitted in accordance with prohibition of extended interpretation, which is the content of the principle of no punishment without the law (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do17847, Mar. 10, 2016). The method of systematic and logical interpretation, which takes into account legislative intent and purpose, history of enactment and amendment, harmony with the entire legal order, relationship with other Acts and subordinate statutes, may be used in interpreting the law, but if the language and text itself consists of relatively clear concepts, such interpretation method in principle is not necessary or limited (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da81035, Apr. 23, 2009). It is more true in the interpretation

(B) If there is no definition provision on the terms used in the statute, in principle, it shall be in accordance with the meaning generally accepted, such as the prior definition. The Standard Dictionary of Korean Language of the National Institute of Korean Language defines aviation route as “airway along which an aircraft passes.” From a Korean language perspective, it can be clearly known that aviation route contains the concept of the public. Even after examining all the materials indicated in the record, for example, the term “airway” is used as the term “airway” in relation to aircraft operation.

(C) Article 115-2(2) of the former Aviation Act (repealed by Act No. 14116, Mar. 29, 2016) provides that the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport shall set the operation conditions, such as “air route to be operated” when operating operation certification for an air transport business entity. Article 90(2) of the Aviation Safety Act (Act No. 1416, Mar. 29, 2016) which includes the contents of this provision alters “air route to be operated” into “air route to be operated.” Thus, it is obvious that the term “air route” was used as “air route.” The legal definition of air route is clearly defined as “air route indicated on the earth’s surface designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport as suitable for navigation of aircraft, etc.” (Article 2 subparag. 13 of the Aviation Safety Act; the definition of the former Aviation Act) and the term “air route” as “air route to be used by the public.” Thus, it can be seen as a combination of aviation and aviation.

(D) On the other hand, there is no legislative data that can be seen that legislators used the “sea route” only in the instant penal provision, unlike ordinary meaning, as a means to include the passage on the ground.

This crime was first stipulated in Article 11 of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act (Act No. 2742 of Dec. 26, 1974), the telegraph of the Aviation Security Act. The minutes of the National Assembly Legislation and Judiciary Committee meeting on Nov. 26, 1974 for the examination of the legislative bill during the process of the enactment of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act, and there is no discussion as to the penal provision of this crime, so it is difficult to directly proviso the meaning of the “aviation route.” However, the explanation of the reasons for the proposal is that the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act was enacted to provide for aggravated punishment regulations for criminal offenders by performing the duty of cooperation following the accession to the international convention for the suppression of crimes against private aircraft by Korea.

Here, the International Convention refers to the Convention on Offenses and Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (The Hague Convention), and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (the Montreal Convention). Any of these conventions does not deal with the act of allowing an aircraft traveling on the ground to change its course as an independent crime element. Nevertheless, there is no material suggesting that our legislators had established the penal provision on this crime with the intent to punish such act. If there is such intent, it is reasonable to deem that there was a provision that other horses were used instead of an “airway” without the meaning of the length moving on the ground, or that the act was also included in the “air route” of this crime.

(E) As seen earlier, the Aviation Security Act stipulated the definition of the Aviation Security Act to be “in flight” from the time when the aircraft gets passengers on board and closes its door. This definition was made from the time when the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act was enacted. This is based on the attitude that the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft extended the scope of aircraft subject to protection by providing a provision that expands the meaning of “in flight.”

The subject matter of this crime is an aircraft “in flight (i.e., during navigation)” under this definition. However, “air route” subject to alteration by deceptive means or by force is a separate constituent element and ought to be interpreted in conformity with the principle of no punishment without the law in itself. It is the word “air route” and there is no evidence to deem that legislators used the word in a more broad sense than the prior definition. It goes beyond the possible meaning of the text and text to interpret it as “air route” even on the ground passage from time to time solely on the ground that an aircraft is “in flight (i.e., during navigation)” on the ground.

(F) Clearly, changing the course of an aircraft moving on the ground is an act of high risk because it may conflict with other aircraft or facilities. However, the necessity of punishment alone does not change the principle of no crime of no crime of no crime of no crime of no crime of no crime of no crime of no crime of crime against the plane captain. Such an act may not only be punished as a crime of interference with business against the plane captain, but also may constitute a crime of interference with the execution of duties, which may be punished by imprisonment for not more than ten years (Article 43 of the Aviation Security Act). In many cases, Defendant 1 was punished as an offense of interference with business against the plane captain Nonindicted 4.

D. Determination on the instant case

Examining the instant case in light of the aforementioned legal principles, Defendant 1’s act of having Defendant 1 return an aircraft in a food whiteback to an boarding engine does not constitute an alteration of the aviation route of an aircraft. The lower court’s determination is justifiable, and the Prosecutor’s ground of appeal is without merit.

3. Prosecutor's remaining grounds of appeal and Defendant 2's grounds of appeal are examined.

A. The process of this part of the lawsuit

(1) In relation to a series of attempts to conceal the crime committed by Defendant 1 upon the commencement of an investigation by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport in the foregoing incident, the prosecutor indicted Defendant 3 of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport as a crime of obstruction of performance of official duties, as follows: ① Defendant 2, who was the regular director of Nonindicted Company 1 at the time, was forced, destruction of evidence, destruction of evidence, and concealment of concealment, ② Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 by deceptive means; ③ Defendant 3 of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport’s aviation safety supervisor

(2) The first instance court and the lower court acquitted both Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 of the charges of obstruction of the performance of official duties by fraudulent means, which were prosecuted by both Defendants 1 and 2, and the Prosecutor appealed against this. The first instance court and the lower court acquitted all of the remaining charges of the destruction of evidence, acquitted all of the charges of the destruction of evidence, and convicted all of the charges of aiding and abetting the destruction of evidence, concealment of concealment, and coercion,

In the first instance court, Defendant 3 convicted Defendant 2 of the charge of informing Defendant 2 of the results of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport’s investigation, and acquitted Defendant 3 of the part of the charge, but the lower court acquitted Defendant 3 of all the charges, and appealed by the prosecutor.

B. As to the Prosecutor’s Grounds of Appeal

(1) As to the obstruction of performance of official duties by fraudulent means by Defendants 1 and 2

In the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties by fraudulent means, “defensive means” means causing mistake, mistake, or land to the other party in order to achieve the purpose of an actor’s act, causing such mistake, mistake, or land, and the other party’s wrong act or disposition accordingly is established. If such an act does not result in preventing or making it practically difficult, it cannot be punished as the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties by fraudulent means (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do1554, Apr. 23, 2009).

The lower court acquitted Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 on the grounds that it is difficult to deem that there was an erroneous act or disposition by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, as the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport revealed Defendant 1’s act and made a criminal charge in violation of the Aviation Security Act, despite the false statement, etc.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court’s determination is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or

(2) As to the destruction of evidence by Defendant 2

The lower court found Defendant 2 not guilty on the ground that it is difficult to recognize that Defendant 2 was aware of the destruction of evidence in another person’s criminal case because it was before the case was reported or the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport initiates an investigation when Defendant 2 received a report on the affairs in the guest room Nonindicted 3’s office room.

In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

(3) As to Defendant 3

The lower court found Defendant 3 not guilty of all the charges of disclosure of official secrets on the ground that: (a) the evidence submitted by the prosecutor alone is difficult to recognize the fact that Defendant 3 informed Defendant 2 of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport’s investigation result; and (b) the future investigation plan that Defendant 3 informed Defendant 2 was already distributed in the news report materials, and thus it is difficult to view it as confidential on official duty.

In light of the records, the judgment of the court below is just, and there were no errors by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending relevant

C. As to Defendant 2’s ground of appeal

The court below rejected all of Defendant 2’s grounds of appeal that Defendant 2 could not have expected to cause destruction of evidence or concealment of evidence, or that this part of the charges was not specified. The court below rejected Defendant 2’s grounds of appeal on the following grounds: (a) Defendant 2, by intimidation, ordered the head of the guest room Nonindicted 3 to prepare a statement of the contents different from his/her will; (b) made a false statement in the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport; or (c) ordered the head of the guest room room and office to make a false statement or prepare a written confirmation; and (b) ordered the head of the team team belonging to the head of the guest room and office to remove files, which are evidence related to his/her criminal case from the office computer,

Examining the evidence duly admitted, the lower court’s determination is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the specification of facts charged and the establishment of principal offender and principal offender in the crime of coercion, or by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for a dissenting opinion by Justice Park Poe-young, Justice Jo Hee-de, and Justice Park Sang-ok as to the violation of the Aviation Security Act due to the alteration of aviation route of aircraft.

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Poe-young, Justice Jo Hee-de, and Justice Park Sang-ok on the violation of the Aviation Security Act due to changes in aviation routes

A. The gist of the Majority Opinion is that since the course along which an aircraft moves on the ground is not included in the “aviation route” under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act, Defendant 1’s act of having Defendant 1 return an aircraft in a Pasik to the boarding exit does not constitute a violation of the Aviation Security Act due to the alteration of an aircraft’s aviation route. However, for the following reasons, we cannot agree with the Majority Opinion.

(1) A penal provision shall not be excessively expanded or analogically interpreted in the direction unfavorable to the defendant. However, within the possible scope of the language and text, clearly expressing its purport in light of the legislative intent and purpose, the structure and structure of the law to which the provision belongs, and the relationship with other Acts and subordinate statutes is an interpretation that conforms to the principle of no punishment without the law (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Do2162, Jun. 14, 2007).

(2) Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act provides that a person who obstructs the normal flight of an aircraft by forcing another person to alter the “air route of an aircraft in flight” by fraudulent means or by force shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years. Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Aviation Security Act provides that “from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft open for their disembarkation.”

(3) The Majority Opinion grasps the meaning of a sea route as “air route” on the grounds that the term “air route” is defined as “air route” in the standard Korean Language published by the National Institute of Korean Language, and that in light of the amendment process of Article 90(2) of the Aviation Safety Act, it is clear that the term “air route” is the same as “air route”. The legal definition of an air route is determined as “air route indicated on the earth’s surface designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport as suitable for air navigation of aircraft, etc.” and then, it determines that the course along which an aircraft moves on the ground does not constitute a sea route.

The Standard Dictionary of Korean Language published by the National Institute of Korean Language defines aviation route as “airway along which an aircraft passes (airway.).” Moreover, the term “airway” refers to “airway,” and the term “designated air passage of an aircraft navigating in a given way” refers to aviation route.

However, the subject of punishment under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act is to allow an aircraft in flight to change the course of actual operation, and it does not require the change of the public passage itself designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport. As stated in the Majority Opinion, when considering the meaning of “air route” as a part of the Standard Korean Language Ambassador of the National Institute of Korean Language, Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act is established when changing “air route designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport” and resulting in the change of “air route designated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport,” thereby resulting in

(4) According to Article 115-2(2) of the former Aviation Act, with respect to “air route to be operated by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport when operating the air transport service provider,” the Majority Opinion changed the “air route to the “air route to be operated” under Article 90(2) of the Aviation Safety Act, which received the foregoing “air route to be operated.” Thus, it is apparent that “air route” under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act has been used as the same meaning as “air route.” However, according to the context of the legal text, the expression “air route” can be interpreted as a concept that includes air transit routes on the ground, and actually, the concept of “air route” includes air transit routes on the ground due to the instant case, etc., it seems that the “air route” under the former Aviation Act changed to the “air route”, which is an expression that meets the context of the aviation safety Act. Therefore, this part of the Majority Opinion’s reasoning is consistent with the Dissenting Opinion, which differs from the concept of aviation route and aviation.

(5) The term “air route” refers to a “air route or aircraft (aviation) route” if grasss depending on one’s intent. The passage along the sea route from a port to a port is operated by an airport. On the other hand, an aircraft is operated mainly from an airport to an airport. Although it is operated in the air, the operation on the ground of an airport is inevitable for takeoff and landing. As seen earlier, Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Aviation Security Act provides that “in flight” means from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft close for their unloading. The Standard Dictionary of Korean Language published by the National Institute of Korean Language defines navigation as “the passage along which an aircraft navigates.” Accordingly, it is natural and natural to understand navigation as “the passage along which an aircraft navigates.”

(6) The purpose of the Aviation Security Act is to provide for criteria, procedures, obligations, etc. to prevent illegal acts in airport facilities, navigation safety facilities, and aircraft and to ensure the security of civil aviation in accordance with the International Convention on International Civil Aviation, etc. (Article 1). As seen earlier, the Aviation Security Act defines “from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors of an aircraft open for departure.” The aviation security Act defines “in flight” as “from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board until the time all the doors open for departure.” The commencement of navigation prior to the arrival of an aircraft may not conform to ordinary language or prior definition. The aviation security Act provides for special definition provisions as seen above, reflects the legislative intent to expand the scope of aircraft subject to protection in order to respond to international efforts to restrain the threat to the safe flight of an aircraft.

(7) The fact that the sea route of this crime is used in close relation to navigation is also revealed in the structure of the text of the law. From the perspective of the former Aircraft Navigation Safety Act, the telegraph of the Aviation Security Act, the aviation route was used exclusively for the elements of this crime, including all of the entire laws, and the phrase “aircraft in flight.” The legislators, who did not have a separate definition provision of the aviation route, deemed that the term “aviation in flight” used in the manual to clearly state the meaning of the sea route to the extent that the general public can recognize it.

(8) In light of such relation, it is reasonable to understand the meaning of “airway” in the context of “airway of an aircraft in flight,” rather than to separately remove it. As seen earlier, under the Aviation Security Act, the term “in flight” in the aviation security Act is a term having a greater meaning than the ordinary word, which the legislators intend to protect an aircraft on the ground from crimes. As such, the term “airway” dealing with the fishing gear also includes both “airway along which an aircraft in flight is in flight,” regardless of the ground and the air. It does not deviate from the scope of the possible meaning.

(9) The Majority Opinion also recognizes that the act of arbitrarily changing the course of an aircraft travelling on the ground is highly dangerous that may lead to large strings. As such, it conforms to the legislative intent to raise the degree of punishment for an act that threatens safe navigation, which shall be punished by imprisonment with labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years, with a view to enhancing the degree of punishment for an act that threatens safe navigation. This is because on the ground, an aircraft ought to proceed under the optimal route under the judgment of the captain and the control of the control authorities for the safety of passengers, and it is necessary to suppress the act of obstructing such act by reasonable punishment. The crime of interference with business under the Criminal Act presented on the grounds that there is no gap in punishment as the Majority Opinion does not only exceed five years, but also may be punished by a fine, and thus, it does not constitute a serious crime related to the operation of an aircraft. Interference with the performance of duties under the Aviation Security Act (Article 43) does not include the act in this case as it fails to “the force” in the category of such act.

B. In conclusion, it should be interpreted that the course from the time all the doors of an aircraft close after passengers board to the time all the doors of an aircraft open for their unloading is included in the “aviation route” under Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act. Paccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccaccina

C. However, the lower court acquitted Defendant 1 of the part on the violation of the Aviation Security Act due to Defendant 1’s change in the aviation route. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on “aviation route” as stipulated in Article 42 of the Aviation Security Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the part on Defendant 1’s acquittal in the lower judgment should be reversed. In so doing, the part on Defendant 1’s acquittal in the lower judgment should be reversed, which constitutes a concurrent crime under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act with the conviction that was transferred to the lower court by the prosecutor’s appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, we respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion.

Chief Justice Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)