2018Do5475 Special Bodily Injury, Violence

Defendant

Defendant

Suwon District Court Decision 2017No3162 Decided March 27, 2018

January 21, 2021

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Case summary and key issue

A. A. Around December 23, 2016, the Defendant prosecuted Nonindicted 1 on the charges of assaulting the victim Nonindicted 2 on a knife knife, which is a dangerous object, but Nonindicted 2 committed a crime of assaulting Nonindicted 2’s hand and attempted special injury. The Defendant was prosecuted on the charges of assaulting Nonindicted 2’s clothes and attempted special injury. The first instance court selected the Defendant to be sentenced to imprisonment by applying Article 260(1) of the Criminal Act with regard to the charge of assaulting the Defendant, and found the Defendant guilty of attempted special injury by applying Articles 258-2(3) and (1) of the Criminal Act and Article 257(1) of the Criminal Act with a prison term of imprisonment with prison labor for not more than two years (the statutory punishment for attempted special injury by the first instance court was less than 1 to 10 years, and the Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for not more than 6 years, and the Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for not more than 6 years and less than 5 years for special injury under Article 255(2) of the Criminal Act.

B. Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act provides that "the punishment of an attempted crime may be mitigated than that of an attempted crime," and that "the above punishment may be mitigated." When a reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized, the Supreme Court held that "the reason for voluntary mitigation is not erroneous even if the court below did not render statutory mitigation according thereto with respect to the reason for voluntary mitigation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Do985, Jun. 11, 1991; 2005Do6120, Sept. 29, 2005; 2014Do15131, Feb. 12, 2015)" means that the court’s discretion is limited to a case where voluntary mitigation exists, and it is not reasonable for the court to determine the maximum statutory mitigation of punishment as the minimum statutory mitigation of punishment in accordance with Article 5(1)3 of the Criminal Act. In addition, it is unreasonable for the court below to have determined that all of the reasons for voluntary mitigation of punishment are the minimum statutory mitigation of punishment in accordance with Article 25(1).

2. Determination of the meaning of discretionary mitigation is classified into two stages, such as confirmation of statutory punishment, confirmation of the applicable sentences, and determination of the sentence. Judges, when determining a sentence, should determine a sentence by taking into account the conditions of sentencing only within the scope of the applicable sentences formed through the aggravation, mitigation, etc. of punishment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Do8376, Sept. 11, 2008).

Article 25 of the Criminal Act provides that an attempted crime shall be punished if the commission of a crime was not completed or if the result does not occur (Article 1). The punishment of an attempted crime may be mitigated than that of a prison offender (Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act). The mitigation of a sentence pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act is a kind of statutory mitigation, and is distinguishable from discretionary mitigation (Article 53 of the Criminal Act). As regards statutory mitigation, statutory mitigation is distinguishable from that of a judicial mitigation.

Article 55(1) of the Criminal Act provides a method of mitigation of punishment according to the type of punishment. The Criminal Act and special cases where mitigation of punishment must be provided when the reason for statutory mitigation is recognized and the reason is recognized.

The provisions on mitigation are individually and specifically stipulated in the Act. Such mitigation provisions stipulate that “a sentence may be mitigated” or “a sentence may be mitigated” under the law, but a case in which “a sentence may be mitigated” is expressed as “a necessary mitigation and mitigation may be mitigated” under Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act. The term “a sentence to be mitigated” refers to discretionary mitigation under Article 5(2) of the Criminal Act. In the case of a necessary mitigation, if the existence of grounds for mitigation is recognized, a judge may be granted statutory mitigation under Article 55(1) of the Criminal Act, even if the existence of grounds for mitigation is recognized, and in the case of a discretionary mitigation, a judge may not be granted statutory mitigation under Article 55(1) of the Criminal Act even if there is recognition of the existence of grounds for discretionary mitigation and thus, insofar as a judge recognizes the existence of grounds for discretionary mitigation and grants statutory mitigation on imprisonment accordingly, both the upper and lower limit under Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act and the following interpretation are reasonable. This is still reasonable.

A. The Criminal Act specifically prescribes the methods, contents, and reasons for statutory mitigation, and its meaning is clear. The Criminal Act sets the statutory penalty corresponding to the acts constituting the constituent elements of a crime, and sets the final punishment through statutory aggravation, mitigation, and discretionary mitigation of statutory punishment.

In other words, the applicable sentence is a result of the legal application of judges based on the provisions of the law in office. While discretionary mitigation is the sole result of the reduction of punishment by judges’ discretion, statutory mitigation is to reduce punishment in cases where the grounds for mitigation prescribed by the Criminal Act are recognized, and the method of statutory mitigation or mitigation is to follow the provisions of Article 55 of the Criminal Act according to the type of punishment. Statutory mitigation is distinguishable from the requisite mitigation to be mitigated even if the existence of grounds for mitigation is recognized if mitigation is recognized, and the existence of grounds for mitigation is recognized. Where it is determined that mitigation or exemption of punishment may be possible, either of the mitigation of punishment or exemption of punishment may be selected.

Specifically, the necessary reasons for reduction of or exemption from punishment prescribed by the Criminal Act are those for attempted crimes (Articles 90, 101, 111(3), 120, 175, and 213), perjury, accusation, and confession and withdrawal (Articles 153, 154, and 157) and the relationship between the principal offender and the principal offender (Article 365(2)). Voluntary reasons for reduction of or exemption from punishment are excessive defense (Article 21(2)), excessive escape (Article 22(3)), Article 23(2) of the Criminal Act (Article 27 of the Criminal Act), Article 10 of the Criminal Act (Article 27 of the Criminal Act), Article 27 of the Criminal Act (Article 365(1) of the Criminal Act), Article 32 of the Assistance Act (Article 32(2) of the Criminal Act). Voluntary grounds for reduction of or exemption from punishment are those for voluntary reduction of punishment, Article 27(2) of the Criminal Act (Article 27) of the Criminal Act) of excessive punishment (Article 9).2 of the Criminal Act).

B. In light of the principle of no punishment without law, the interpretation of the current precedent and practice regarding discretionary mitigation is faithful to the legal text and accords with the system of criminal law.

The principle of no punishment without the law requires that crimes and punishments be prescribed by law in order to protect individual freedom and rights from the arbitrary exercise of the State’s penal authority. In light of such purport, the interpretation of penal provisions shall be strict, and the interpretation of penal provisions in a direction unfavorable to the defendant beyond the possible meaning of the language and text shall not be permitted in accordance with prohibition of extended interpretation, which is the content of the principle of no punishment without the law (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do17847, Mar. 10, 2016). In interpreting statutes, the method of systematic and logical interpretation, which takes into account the legislative intent and purpose, history, harmony with the entire legal order, and relationship with other Acts and subordinate statutes, may be used. However, if the language and text itself consists of relatively clear concepts, such a method of interpretation, in principle, is unnecessary or limited (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do835, Dec. 21, 20

In the case of the necessary mitigation of punishment, the Criminal Code states that "a punishment shall be mitigated" in the case of the necessary mitigation, and in the case of the discretionary mitigation, it states that "a punishment may be mitigated in the same way as the discretionary mitigation may be mitigated."

In light of the meaning of the language and text, the phrase "may be interpreted as a word indicating the possibility of any proposition or general ability" includes the meaning that "may not be interpreted as a word indicating the general ability." In light of the meaning of the language and text, legislators allow to reduce or mitigate the punishment according to circumstances, etc. in the case of voluntary mitigation, and give judges the power and discretion. Such interpretation may be understood not only by nature in the literal context, but also by those who are close to the use of daily language. As long as it conforms to the legislative text and the legislative intent, it does not constitute an analogical interpretation that is not allowed under the principle of no punishment without law.

Meanwhile, Article 55(1) of the Criminal Act provides for the method of statutory mitigation according to the type of punishment. Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act provides that “When a person reduces imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor, it shall be 1/2 of the term of the punishment.” Therefore, it is clear in the text of the Act that the term “short-term or long-term imprisonment” means that both a “short-term” term and a “long-term” term should be mitigated by 1/2, not a “long-term” term, but a “long-term” term,” i.e., a “long-term” term and a “long-term” term should be mitigated by 1/2. As the applicable sentence is the final standard, the scope is strictly determined in accordance with the relevant Act, and unless there is a separate provision, it is not possible to recognize the grounds for statutory mitigation, which do not constitute grounds for statutory mitigation or mitigation as listed in Article 56 of the Criminal Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2017Do14609).

The legal grounds as seen earlier are most relevant to the elements for establishment of a crime, such as constituent elements, illegality, and liability, or to the degree of infringement of legal interests and interests. The legislators prescribed important matters related to the establishment and punishment as statutory requirements for mitigation, comprehensively taking account of the impact or importance on the determination of the establishment or scope of punishment, and stipulated them as necessary mitigation and voluntary mitigation. The legal effect should also be clearly distinguishable in view of the purport that the grounds for necessary mitigation and the reasons for voluntary mitigation are separately stipulated. For instance, disability attempts which began to commit a crime but do not fall short of the completion of a crime due to external circumstances should be clearly distinguishable from statutory punishment according to the purport of the provision by distinguishing between (i) the act performed by the person before the completion of the crime from the crime; (ii) the attempt to prevent the occurrence of the crime from occurring ought to be clearly distinguishable from the statutory punishment that stipulated in the provision by distinguishing the statutory minimum statutory punishment from the statutory punishment for attempted mitigation, but (iii) an attempt to commit an attempted crime by himself/herself does not have to be reduced by 1/2 of the minimum statutory punishment for unlawful mitigation and non-violation.

D. If it is not necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentence, it cannot be deemed that there is no need to voluntarily reduce the applicable sentence.

The Criminal Act stipulates, with respect to the order of application, the aggravated punishment under this Article, the aggravated punishment under Article 34(2), the aggravation of repeated crimes, the statutory mitigation, the aggravation of concurrent crimes, the aggravation of discretionary mitigation, the aggravation of discretionary mitigation (Article 56), and the applicable punishment is computed through the procedures of aggravated and mitigated punishment according to such order (Article 56). Voluntary mitigation is a kind of statutory mitigation, and where the existence of the relevant grounds for mitigation is acknowledged, it is reasonable to independently determine whether to implement mitigation according to the relevant grounds for mitigation, such as mental and physical disability, attempted punishment, and the voluntary mitigation, taking into account the proportion of the relevant grounds for mitigation in illegal acts or as a result, or the impact on the crime, etc. on the illegal act or result: Provided, That in order to determine whether the relevant grounds for voluntary mitigation are the degree of influence on the illegal act or result of the relevant crime, it is inevitable to consider other factors for sentencing.

In addition, a judge’s determination of discretionary mitigation of punishment by taking account of the sentencing conditions against the defendant in the course of determining the applicable sentencing may not be deemed to be erroneous in legal and logical sense. The determination of punishment, namely, the determination of punishment, based on the statutory penalty, requires the choice of the type of punishment and the aggravation or mitigation thereof, and requires the determination of specific sentencing within the scope of the applicable sentencing. Statutory mitigation is stipulated in Article 55, along with the conditions of sentencing (Article 51), voluntary mitigation (Article 52), voluntary mitigation (Article 53), selective mitigation (Article 54), selective mitigation and discretionary mitigation (Article 56), order of aggravation (Article 56), etc. In order to determine discretionary mitigation of punishment, it is difficult for a judge to take into account whether or not he/she has given his/her authority to discretionary mitigation or discretionary mitigation of punishment, such as choice of punishment, volume mitigation of punishment, etc., in order to determine discretionary mitigation of punishment without taking into account whether or not he/she has given his/her authority to decide discretionary mitigation of punishment.

In practice, even if there exists a reason for voluntary mitigation in practice, the method has been widely used either to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentencing or not to reduce the discretionary mitigation. However, such practical practice does not mean to determine whether to grant discretionary mitigation after having first decided the applicable sentencing. As seen earlier, insofar as legislators grant discretionary mitigation to the judge’s discretion or authority, judges cannot inevitably take into account other sentencing conditions than the reason for voluntary mitigation, and can be said to have reached the margin of a certain degree of sentencing in the process of determining whether to grant discretionary mitigation. Therefore, in practice, unless there is a need to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentencing in the process of such determination, it can be understood to the effect that it is sufficient to consider the sentencing or sentencing conditions, which are the sentencing guidelines, as there is no practical benefit in granting voluntary mitigation. If there is no need to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentencing, it does not necessarily mean that there is no need to grant voluntary mitigation.

E. Until a sentence is determined after conviction, a large amount of discretion is given to a judge, and the discretion of a judge in relation to discretionary mitigation cannot be deemed unfair as one of them.

The Criminal Act provides for the punishment of multiple types of punishment for one crime and requires a court to decide the type of punishment to be applied to a defendant (Article 54). The most of the penal provisions except for the concurrent crime that only provides death penalty (Article 93 of the Criminal Act) include two or more principal punishment among the principal punishment provided for in subparagraphs 1 through 8 of Article 41 of the Criminal Act (a death penalty, life imprisonment, imprisonment without prison labor, imprisonment without prison labor, imprisonment without prison labor, imprisonment without prison labor, suspension of qualification, suspension of qualifications, punishment, penal detention, and minor fine), and grants a judge the authority to choose the most appropriate type of punishment for the relevant defendant. The legislators prescribed a sentence with respect to the punishment of individual crime, and made a judge choose the punishment first and make a decision on the specific sentence within the scope of the principal punishment. This is to give a judge a reasonable discretion from the selection of the principal punishment, which cannot be determined in advance, taking into account all the sentencing conditions into account.

Furthermore, a judge may reduce the punishment when there are grounds for considering the circumstances of the crime with regard to the punishment that has been subject to statutory aggravated and mitigated punishment (Article 53 of the Criminal Act). This is unfavorable to judicial mitigation, discretionary mitigation, or extenuating circumstances. It is a final mitigation when a sentence that is lower than the applicable punishment is to be imposed even after the statutory mitigation is fully mitigated (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 91Do985, Jun. 11, 1991); and where the applicable punishment that has completed statutory aggravated and mitigated punishment or statutory mitigation is excessively harsh, a judge functions as a device for correcting it.

Finally, judges will consider all sentencing conditions within the applicable sentencing range and determine sentence by referring to the sentencing guidelines of the Sentencing Committee.

As can be seen, in light of the specific sentencing process conducted by a judge to determine a sentence after a judge was found guilty of criminal facts, it can be seen that a number of discretion has been given to a judge. This is a measure chosen for sentencing with objective, reasonable, and concrete feasibility by fully taking into account all individual sentencing conditions for each individual case starting from the choice of a sentence and ending up to the decision of a sentence. Considering such a large number of discretion given to a judge, it cannot be said that the authority or discretion to decide whether to grant mitigation or not is unreasonable to interpret that a judge has the authority or discretion to a judge. The need or method of appropriate control over such discretion of a judge is a separate issue

F. Legal effects by discretionary mitigation need not be uniformly determined.

Even if the existence of a reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized, it would go against the concept of justice rather than to grant statutory mitigation. Even if an attempted crime that does not take place, there is a case where the result is almost the same as the existing one (e.g., in the murder crime, where the victim did not reach the death but has fallen short of a long-term mixed status or where a plant is simple) or where it is inappropriate to reduce punishment due to mental and physical disability, such as the case where it is inappropriate to grant voluntary mitigation, but it is recognized that it is reasonable not to grant such mitigation. In other words, the Criminal Act provides that "the punishment may be mitigated" means that even if a reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized, there is both cases where it is necessary and unnecessary to reduce the punishment, and thus, the illegal or consequence reduction effect caused by a reason for voluntary mitigation is insignificant, or where the degree of mitigation of the responsibility of the offender is low, it is limited to a punishment without taking into account the authority or authority to grant a variety of legal discretion to the judge.

3. Resolution of the instant case

A. On the grounds stated in its reasoning, the lower court recognized all guilty of the crime of assault and the crime of attempted special injury, and maintained the first instance court’s judgment, which, while mitigation of attempted special injury pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act, mitigated both the upper limit and lower limit of the term of punishment to 1/2 pursuant to Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act, and determined the applicable punishment through the aggravation of concurrent crimes. In light of the aforementioned legal principles, the lower court’s aforementioned measures are lawful.

B. Meanwhile, the argument that the lower court’s judgment on sentencing did not reflect the agreement with the victim Nonindicted 1 constitutes an allegation of unfair sentencing. However, under Article 383 subparag. 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, an appeal on the ground of unfair sentencing is allowed only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment with or without labor for not less than ten years is imposed. In this case where the Defendant was sentenced to a more minor sentence, the argument that the sentence is too unreasonable or that the reduction of probation and community service order would be applied is not a legitimate ground

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except a separate opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik, and there is a supplementary opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik as to the separate opinion.

5. The separate opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik is as follows.

A. The following is the form of a Korean criminal trial.

(1) The same crime is committed and the grounds for aggravation or reduction of punishment is also different from each other against the same Defendants.

(2) In the judgment of conviction, the sentence which is the first sentence and the subsequent sentence shall be determined.

(3) The punishment of a defendant for the same crime is lawful even from 3 to 30 years, and it is legitimate from 4.5 to 3.9.

(4) In the event that multiple concurrent crimes are subject to heavy aggravation of punishment among different crimes, the question of whether to increase the penalty provided for in any crime depends upon the discretion of the judge.

(5) An appeal may be lodged on the grounds of unfair sentencing even in cases where a sentence is set at the lower limit of the applicable sentences.

(6) In order to accept the grounds for appeal of unfair sentencing and to impose a minor sentence than that of the first instance trial, the applicable parts of the statutes to determine the applicable sentences need not be amended.

As above (1) through (6) above, the current criminal trial appearance appears even though it did not apply discretionary mitigation under Article 53 of the Criminal Act, and it should be deemed unlawful rather than to the extent that it is not desirable. Nevertheless, the majority opinion acknowledges that the continuing defect of the trial is a defect in the trial, and the separate opinion acknowledges that it is a defect in the correct trial. hereinafter the majority opinion confirms the problems arising from the current practice of discretionary mitigation, such as the majority opinion, and presents a solution therefor.

B. It is called a voluntary mitigation of punishment in practice. It is understood that the court has given judges the authority or discretion to reduce or not to reduce the above language and text at present. In the case of voluntary mitigation due to such authority or discretion, the applicable sentences exist in two forms. Under Articles 258-2(3) and (1) and 257(1) of the Criminal Act, the crime of attempted special injury under Article 25(2) and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (at least one year to ten years), if punishment is to be mitigated, the applicable sentences are to be determined within the same range of imprisonment with labor for not less than six months and not more than five years, and the applicable sentences are to be determined within the same range of imprisonment with labor for not less than six years and not more than ten years, which is to be determined within the range of two years by adding two or more years of imprisonment with labor for not more than six years to six years, which is to be determined within the same range of punishment.

Meanwhile, Article 10(2) of the former Criminal Act, which was amended by Act No. 15982 on December 18, 2018, stipulated that the punishment should be mitigated to a person with mental disability; however, the amendment of the aforementioned Act changed to voluntary mitigation of the punishment for a person with mental disability. The claim for mental disability and the determination thereof are frequently problematic in practice, and the importance of the interpretation of discretionary mitigation has increased due to the amendment of the above Criminal Act.

C. The current practice regarding voluntary mitigation has been understood as referring to that where there is a cause for voluntary mitigation at all times, but where there is a cause for voluntary mitigation, 'if necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentences', 'if necessary, or not to reduce the applicable sentences'. From the perspective of special injury attempted crimes, two forms of sentences such as 'if not less than six months but not more than five years and imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than 10 years, depending on judge's attempted mitigation, are possible. However, as the sentence is lower than the applicable sentences, 'if necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentences', 'if it is necessary to reduce the applicable sentences, 'if the sentence is lower than the applicable sentences', 'if it is necessary to reduce the applicable sentences, 'if it is necessary to reduce the lower limit of the applicable sentences', 'if necessary, it means that it means that it is desirable to reduce the applicable sentences at the present time, it means that the following changes should be considered to maintain the applicable sentences.

1) The current practice does not reflect the actual decision-making process of judges in charge of criminal trials as it is.

In the case of attempted special injury, according to the current practice, two sentences of imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years and sentences of imprisonment for not less than six months but not more than five years can be imposed. The present practice is: (a) the sentence of imprisonment with prison labor for not less than six months but not more than ten years is determined; and (b) the sentence of imprisonment is determined within the scope of not more than ten years; and (c) where the sentence of imprisonment with prison labor falls under any of the above two sentences, the judgment is written. According to the written judgment, it consists of two stages of voluntary decision-making and decision-making of sentence. However, this differs not only from the decision-making process of judges in charge of actual criminal trials, but also from our daily life.

If one of the 300,000 or 700,000 won is selected at the time of purchasing a certain product in our daily life, it would be the same that if a reasonable person is able to purchase a product within the scope of 300,000 or 1,000 won, within the scope of '30,000 or 1,000 won' which is the entire scope, '30,000 or 1,000 won' which is the actual scope of '30,000 or 60,000 won' which is the actual scope of '30,000 or 70,000 won', '30,000 or 60,000 won' which is the actual scope of '30,000 or 1,000 won' which is the actual scope of '30,000,000 won or more' which is the actual method and method of 31,00,000 won.

However, the new interpretation theory sets forth the range of mitigation of statutory penalty to one half only, by the applicable sentences, a sentence shall be determined within the total range of both the above two areas. This is consistent with the decision-making process of a judge in practice.

2) At present, practice is contrary to the judgment structure of a trial and is in violation of Article 56 of the Criminal Act. The judgment structure of a trial is different from that of a judge. In other words, the conclusion is derived from the judgment structure of a trial in accordance with the legal, logical, and systematic order of judgment by the parties that may affect the conclusion of a trial. In other words, the conclusion is automatically derived from the judgment structure of a trial. In other words, it is called a "legal effect" that may affect the conclusion, and the outcome of applying the law is called a "legal effect", and it is called a "legal, logical, and systematic order of judgment." The process of deriving the legal effect corresponding to the legal requirements in accordance with the judgment structure is a trial. It is not permissible to change or revise the judgment order of the legal requirements set forth in the judgment structure. It is not permissible to make a judgment on the ground of a claim and defense after completing the judgment on the ground of a claim and re-determination, and it is not possible to make a new decision on the ground of a claim or defense subsequent decision on the ground for objection.

In a criminal trial, if the facts constituting an offense are acknowledged as a result of the examination of evidence, a judge shall determine the sentence through a judgment of sentencing within the applicable sentences after determining the applicable sentences through the process of the examination of evidence. The application of statutes is to first determine the provisions applicable to the relevant facts constituting an offense, and to confirm the statutory penalty, and then in accordance with Article 56 of the Criminal Act, an aggravated punishment under Article 34.2 of the 2. Aggravation 3. Aggravation 5. Aggravation 5. Aggravation 5. Aggravation 5. Aggravation 6. Aggravation 5. Aggravation 6. Aggravation 3. Aggravation 3. Aggravation 3. Aggravation Sentencing 5. Aggravation 6. A judge shall determine the sentence within the applicable sentences in consideration of all the sentencing conditions against the accused. Such a process is a judgment structure to determine the sentence which can be considered as a final conclusion in a criminal trial, and it is not permissible to decide whether to observe or reverse such a process. However, it is inconsistent with the order of statutory mitigation and discretionary mitigation of punishment.

However, according to a new interpretation theory, if a reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized, the legal effect of the change of the applicable sentencing is always recognized at all the same time, so the sentence is imposed contrary to the judgment structure of the criminal trial.

There is no problem of deciding or revising the judgment on legal mitigation.

3) In practice, the current practice is against the principle of no punishment without law in that it is unclear that the applicable sentence becomes unclear if the ground for voluntary mitigation is recognized.

Article 12(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea provides that the principle of no crime without the law shall be the core content of the provision of a law in the form of a formal meaning established by the legislative body. Furthermore, even if a law provides for a formal meaning of a law, it is possible for anyone to anticipate what the legal provision intends to punish and what punishment is, and accordingly, to determine one’s own act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2003Do3600, Nov. 14, 2003). Not only the principle of no crime without the law but also the principle of no punishment without the law shall be clearly provided for in the law. Judges have to decide a sentence within the scope of a punishment derived from the aggravated and mitigated punishment that is derived from the statutory punishment prescribed by the penal provision, so matters concerning the aggravation and mitigation of punishment with regard to the addition of punishment with regard to the derived punishment should be clearly provided for in the law, and the interpretation of the punishment shall also be clear.

However, if the application of the reason for mitigation of punishment is determined at the discretion of a judge, even though it has been clearly stated through a trial as to the existence of the reason for voluntary mitigation of punishment, it would go against the principle of clarity, which is in fact derived from the principle of no punishment without the law. If the grounds for mitigation of punishment are stipulated in the law and the reasons for mitigation are recognized, it is practically impossible for the defendant to know the range of the applicable punishment for his act and open a room for the judge to intervene in the determination of the applicable punishment, and it is contrary to the principle of no punishment without the law. In the case of the crime of attempted special injury, the defendant is not aware that he is subject to punishment for not less than 1 years but not more than 10 years, or for not more than 6 months and not more than 5 years, or for not more than 3 years to not more than 3 years to not more than 3 years to less than 4 years to less than 3 years to less than 3 years to less than 3 years to less than 3 years to be imposed. Furthermore, the case where the judge does not specifically choose the applicable punishment of Article 3433 of the punishment under the law.

On the other hand, in the case of the crime of attempted special injury, the scope of the punishment is from 1 year to 10 years. On the other hand, if the punishment is to be mitigated, the scope of the punishment would be from 6 months to 5 years, and it would be possible to make a sentence between 6 months and 1 year. Considering that the punishment means the final range within which the punishment can be determined as a result of aggravated or mitigated punishment, the punishment means the final range within which the sentence can be determined, as mentioned above, referring to 6 months and less than 1 years, which is the area within which the sentence can be sentenced. Nevertheless, according to the current practice, only the above example would be excluded from the sentence according to the judge's discretion, and if so, the part of the punishment would be excluded from 6 months to less than 1 year, and the practical issue of such voluntary mitigation is not the problem of application of the punishment without the punishment without the punishment without the law, but it is not the problem of application of the punishment without the punishment without the law.

However, according to the new theory of interpretation, since one applicable punishment is clearly established according to the reasons for voluntary mitigation, it is consistent with the principle of no punishment without law by guaranteeing predictability of punishment to the defendant.

4) The current practice arises with respect to the Defendants who committed the same crime at the discretion of the judge, which may constitute a discrimination with no reasonable grounds.

It is extremely difficult to accept such interpretation of the scope of punishment itself depending on the judge’s discretion even though the crime was committed, from the standpoint of the general public. Moreover, recognizing other legal effects at the discretion of a judge even though the same legal requirement is met is contrary to the general principles of law or the principle of no punishment without the law. For example, in cases where two defendants are convicted of attempted special injury in the same court on the same day, judges are recognized as having attempted, and thus the applicable punishment is between six and five months by discretionary mitigation, and as for the other defendants, “the applicable punishment is between one year and ten years by discretionary mitigation.” Furthermore, it is reasonable to accept the same interpretation of the same legal principle as above, apart from the cases where both the above two defendants are admitted as mental or physical disability and the fact that there is no possibility of application of punishment by a judge in accordance with the same legal principle as the punishment of imprisonment with labor for one year and ten years, and it is reasonable to accept the same legal principle as the punishment of a judge in accordance with the same legal principle as the above.

Furthermore, Article 56 of the Criminal Act requires the aggravation of concurrent crimes after statutory mitigation. In addition, even in cases where the crime subject to the aggravation is determined by comparison of punishment, not by the nature of the crime or the criminal intent, the crimes subject to the aggravation of concurrent crimes may vary. For example, in cases of larceny (a imprisonment for not more than six years or a fine not exceeding 10 million won) under Article 329 of the Criminal Act and the crime of attempted fraud under Articles 352 and 347(1) of the Criminal Act (a fine not exceeding 10 years or a fine not exceeding 20 million won or a fine not exceeding 20 million won) are committed, in practice, the crime subject to aggravated concurrent crimes may be larceny depending on whether to reduce attempted crimes, and may be the crime subject to attempted fraud. However, there is no reasonable explanation as to the grounds for such difference.

5) Based on the phrase “may be interpreted,” it cannot be interpreted as granting a judge discretion or authority to decide whether to reduce the amount of punishment.

The majority opinion argues that it is reasonable to interpret "may have the meaning as "the discretion or authority that may either be or not" in light of the language and text. However, the phrase "may be interpreted as "the discretion or authority of a judge", although the context requires a variety of meanings, such as drilling, ability, possibility, permission, etc., it can be interpreted as "locked or actual possibility". In addition, unlike the case where "may be interpreted as "the purpose" should be one of the objects, such as permission, confiscation, etc., unlike the case where the object should be selected. In the case of voluntary mitigation, it is reasonable to interpret it as meaning the discretion or authority of a judge as stated in the majority opinion. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret it as meaning the meaning of judge's discretion or authority as stated in the majority opinion. It is reasonable to interpret it in terms of possibility, and further, it is reasonable to interpret it in terms of the scope including all such possibility.

Article 38(1)2 of the Criminal Act concerning concurrent crimes provides that if the punishment prescribed for each crime is of the same kind, other than death penalty or imprisonment for life or imprisonment without prison labor for life, the maximum term or maximum amount for the most severe crime shall be increased by one half thereof, but shall not exceed the total of the maximum term or maximum amount of the punishments specified for each crime," provided that "it may be concurrently imposed with a minor fine or a minor fine, confiscation and confiscation," and that "it may be concurrently imposed with" under the above proviso, rather than with "an excessive penalty, minor fine, or confiscation and confiscation", it may be interpreted that "an excessive reduction of damages shall not be imposed concurrently," and that "an excessive reduction of damages shall not be imposed concurrently with that of confiscation and confiscation." In addition, Article 55(2) of the Criminal Act provides that "an excessive reduction of damages may be made if there are no grounds for reduction under law," and that "an excessive reduction of damages shall not be made for reasons for 9 times again without the necessity of reduction or exemption by a judge."

As above, the Majority Opinion’s assertion that the phrase “may be said to be a legal term as above does not always grant a judge the discretion or authority to him or her.” In this respect, the interpretation of the phrase “may be discretionary mitigation” has lost its main grounds for deeming that a judge is given discretion to reduce or not to reduce the judge. In general provisions of the Criminal Act, the interpretation of the phrase of “any such provisions as set forth in the proviso of the Criminal Act along with the said provisions on discretionary mitigation, and any such provisions as set forth in the Civil Act may be referred to as “may be” is not reasonable as of the present core grounds for the mitigation of discretionary mitigation.

6) Although the current practice is at the discretion of a judge to voluntarily reduce the working level, there is no discussion on the discretionary control to appropriately exercise the discretion.

There is no theory on the illegality of administrative disposition, even if it is a deviation or abuse, if it is illegal. In the event that administrative disposition is a discretionary matter of an administrative agency, discussions are actively conducted to properly control the discretion, and the discretionary rules setting the reasonable scope and standards of discretion have been enacted, and considerable precedents have been accumulated about the deviation or abuse of discretionary power.There have been many discussions about sentencing discretion in the past. Furthermore, after the establishment of the sentencing committee and the enforcement of the sentencing guidelines have been made, in-depth discussions on the sentencing discretion have been made through setting and revising the sentencing guidelines.

However, there is no discussion about the discretion or authority of the judge with regard to the discretionary mitigation of judges. Inasmuch as the scope of punishment varies depending on the degree of voluntary mitigation or not, it is deemed that it falls under the discretion of the judge that has the most important meaning in the criminal procedure, in light of the seriousness of its effect, there is a need to discuss the reasonable exercise and control thereof in light of the seriousness of the effect. In the case of attempted murder under Articles 254 and 250(1) of the Criminal Act, in the same case, the attempted mitigation or not should be made according to the occurrence of injury or the degree of injury, or the case where the offender turns out to the police after being issued a detention warrant, and only when the offender turns out to the police after being issued, there is no need to reduce the number of judges, but there is no discussion about the criteria and scope for the proper control of discretionary mitigation, such as that the offender voluntarily surrenders to the police before being identified. However, there is no discussion about the judge’s discretionary power over discretionary mitigation of the criminal procedure.

Since discretionary mitigation, which is a kind of statutory mitigation, should be carried out prior to discretionary mitigation, it is not necessary to determine whether to apply it at the discretion of a judge in relation to a specific sentencing. Nevertheless, it is erroneous for the present practice to leave the discretion of a judge as to whether to reduce it according to discretionary mitigation, which is a legal ground for mitigation, at the discretion of a judge, and not to control the discretion.

However, according to a new interpretation theory, if a reason for discretionary mitigation is recognized, the legal effect is automatically determined, so it is unnecessary to discuss discretionary control over discretionary mitigation.Until now, there has been no discussion about discretionary mitigation so far, it is thought that there is no discussion about judge's decision in the same way as a new interpretation theory, including both the scope of voluntary mitigation and the scope of non-exclusive mitigation.

7) At present, practice provides theoretical grounds to justify the omission of judgment by the court on the defendant's assertion.

According to Article 52 of the Criminal Code, since it is apparent that a self-denunciation is not a reason for the necessary reduction or exemption of punishment, the argument about the fact of self-denunciation cannot be deemed a reason for specification in the judgment of conviction under Article 323 of the Criminal Procedure Act because it is nothing more than a reason for affecting the determination of punishment, and thus, the court below did not make any judgment on the above argument of the defendant and it cannot be said that there is no violation of law in the omission of judgment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Do945, Jul. 7, 1987; 98Do492, Apr. 28, 1998). In other words, the precedents are not erroneous even where the court did not decide on the remaining argument of the defendant concerning the reason for voluntary reduction, which is interpreted as having been left at the discretion of the judge. In fact, it can be viewed that there is no need to examine whether there is a relevant reason for voluntary mitigation.

This is compared with the above Supreme Court Decision 2007Da19051 Decided the estimated amount of compensation for damages under Article 398(2) of the Civil Act, which is similar to the above Supreme Court Decision 2007Da19051 Decided the estimated amount of compensation for damages. Legal provisions can be reduced by both parties, and they can be mitigated by mitigation. However, there is a Supreme Court decision that the failure to reduce the estimated amount of compensation for damages is illegal, while there is a judge's discretion on discretionary mitigation, which is not illegal even if there is no decision on the assertion. It is difficult to readily understand that the Supreme Court's decision on civil matters concerning similar language is more strict than the Supreme Court's decision on criminal cases.

A representative voluntary mitigation causes, such as self-denunciation, mental retardation, and attempted punishment, are factors causing a change in the sentencing, and there are important reasons that significantly affect the final sentence. In fact, the accused or defense counsel claiming the above reasons in the court is thought to have a considerable impact on the final sentence decision depending on the existence of the above reasons, and making efforts to prove that there are considerable evidence. However, even if the defendant is successful in proving, it may not take legal effect, even if it does not take place, and even if it is not possible to omit or examine any decision, it is difficult to accept it as the accused and defense counsel. Moreover, in a case where the defendant asserted voluntary mitigation but there is no decision on it in the first instance judgment, it is difficult to find out whether or not the grounds alleged by the defendant are recognized, and whether or not the defendant has not been reduced by consideration of the sentencing, and further, it is difficult to find out the fact that there is no voluntary mitigation in the second instance judgment without any specific explanation in the court of first instance.

As such, practice that is difficult to accept as a defendant and a defense counsel is being supported by judicial precedents. The present practice in this form does not constitute a serious obstacle to the defendant’s defense right.

Such erroneous form of practice is derived from the perception that it is the discretion of a judge as to whether to grant discretionary mitigation. However, according to a new interpretation theory, if a new ground for discretionary mitigation is recognized, the court shall render a judgment to reduce only the minimum statutory penalty by one half, and if it is not possible, it would be unlawful. Therefore, as a matter of course, the argument on the ground for discretionary mitigation falls under a statement of fact that is the reason for the increase or exemption of punishment under Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the judgment of conviction should be clearly stated. A new interpretation can be corrected naturally through a new interpretation.

Many scholars consider that it is reasonable to specify the judgment on the grounds of conviction in accordance with Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act, in order to ensure objectivity of the judgment in consideration of the parties' claims, while they are at the discretion of the court, such as the current practice, with regard to discretionary mitigation. There are many practical cases that share this view.

On the other hand, even though the amendment of the Criminal Code in 2018 has changed from a necessary mitigation to a voluntary mitigation, the majority of the practical practices seems to clearly state the decision in the case where the defendant's claim of mental disability is not recognized as a mental and physical disability. This attitude of the practical practice is not only very reasonable, but also shows that the current practical problems of the voluntary mitigation are recognized as potential.

8) According to the current practice, there arises a problem that it is logically difficult to explain with respect to an appeal by a defendant against a judgment rendered at the lower limit of the applicable sentences which did not grant voluntary mitigation. In the crime of attempted special injury, it is a case where the first instance court issues one year imprisonment with labor, which is the lower limit of not less than one year but not more than 10 years, within the scope of the applicable sentences which have led to the confession of a criminal defendant and to render a sentence of six months, which is the lower limit of the applicable sentences within the scope of which the punishment has been reduced. In this case, it is a matter of whether the defendant, who was sentenced in six months of imprisonment, could file an appeal for any reason. First, there is a view that the defendant may assert that no voluntary mitigation of punishment may be asserted as a reason for appeal. However, as seen earlier, it is difficult to understand that the decision of the first instance court did not contain the lower limit of the punishment of the defendant for lack of discretionary mitigation of punishment, and thus, it is difficult to accept the lower limit of the sentencing punishment of the defendant for reasons for lack of discretionary mitigation.

Furthermore, a serious inconsistency occurs in the appellate court’s trial. Separate from the foregoing, the appellate court’s ruling that one-year sentence of imprisonment was too heavy and that it is assumed that the court reversed the sentence and sentenced six months. In this case, the appellate court may reverse the judgment of the first instance for any reason. According to the position of the judicial precedents, whether discretionary mitigation is permissible can not be reversed for the reason of violation of Acts and subordinate statutes, and as long as the sentence of the first instance judgment is reversed in accordance with the judgment that is too heavy, it would be unreasonable to reverse the judgment on the ground of unfair sentencing. It is no different from the fact that the court’s determination on the grounds of unfair sentencing is currently impossible for the current practice. Accordingly, it is difficult to reverse the judgment of the first instance on the grounds of unfair sentencing in the above case. However, even if the court’s judgment that did not have attempted to reduce the sentence, the appellate court’s new judgment on the grounds of unfair sentencing cannot be seen as being inconsistent with the present judgment that did not apply to the judgment of the first instance court, which is the lower court’s final judgment.

However, according to a new interpretation, there is no room for such confusion. If a ground for discretionary mitigation is recognized, the effect of changing the applicable sentences always arises, and thus, if such a ground for discretionary mitigation is not taken, it would be a violation of law, and if such measure was taken, it would be an issue of unfair sentencing. The grounds for appeal of unfair sentencing, including a suspended sentence, can be clearly known only by the written judgment on which the grounds for appeal of unfair sentencing, including a suspended sentence, are legally constituted, and it is necessary to view the

9) According to the current practice, there may be a problem in which the range of applicable sentences is divided, and there may be a gap in which a sentence cannot be selected between the highest and lowest applicable sentences.

According to the current Criminal Act, the scope of imprisonment for a limited term of not less than one month but not more than 30 years may be sentenced by 50 years. However, the former Criminal Act (amended by Act No. 10259, Apr. 15, 201) prior to the amendment of Act No. 10259 (hereinafter referred to as the "former Criminal Act") may be sentenced to imprisonment for a period of not less than one month but not more than 15 years. The statutory punishment for robbery under Article 338 of the former Criminal Act (amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995) may vary from the scope of imprisonment for a limited term of not less than 10 years if the number of defendants is recognized to have been sentenced to imprisonment for a limited term of not less than 10 years or not more than 15 years if the punishment is sentenced to imprisonment for a limited term of not more than 1 year but not more than 15 years. Thus, it is difficult to declare that the above sentence of imprisonment for a limited term of less than 1 year may be sentenced.

10) The current practice is infinite to the purport that legislators have formulated a phased mitigation system.

The Criminal Code provides the system of mitigation of punishment according to the degree of illegality, the degree of responsibility, etc., and the criminal liability is treated differently according to the order of minor mitigation, (1) discretionary mitigation, (2) discretionary mitigation, and (3) mitigation.

At present, the current practice handles the same as that of a judge’s necessary mitigation in relation to voluntary mitigation at his/her discretion, or that the same is applied to cases where there is no reason for mitigation because he/she does not reduce or reduce such mitigation. To the contrary, the crime of attempted special injury is identical to the case where the applicable punishment becomes more than six months but not more than five years in the case of the former, and the latter becomes the same as the case where the imprisonment is more than one year but not more than ten years in the case of the latter, and the latter becomes the same as the case where there is no reason for mitigation. Such interpretation is made influencesing the intent of the system for mitigation under the Criminal Act and the legislative choice thereof. This interpretation consists of two statutory provisions that are divided into three categories. The Majority Opinion is clearly distinguishable from the necessary mitigation and voluntary mitigation, but it is inconsistent with its own distinction.

However, according to a new interpretation theory, the difference in the applicable sentence is clearly revealed in accordance with the grounds for mitigation. In other words, in the case of (i) a crime of attempted special injury, (ii) imprisonment for not less than six months but not more than ten years, and (iii) imprisonment for not less than one year but not more than ten years in the case of (iii). (iv) Article 10(2) of the former Criminal Act prior to the amendment by Act No. 15982, Dec. 18, 2018 stipulated that "the act of a person who lacks the ability under the preceding paragraph shall be mitigated due to the extension of the trial," and that "the act of a person who lacks the capacity under the preceding paragraph shall be mitigated." Accordingly, if the defendant claims mental and physical disability, the judgment thereof is written in the written judgment, and if a mental and physical disability is acknowledged, the court has to find it necessary to voluntarily reduce the punishment of mental and physical disability as a reason for mitigation of the punishment of mental disability.

However, the current practice on mental and physical disability seems to be operated in a way that is not significantly different from the time when the necessary grounds for mitigation exist. Even if the defendant does not accept the defendant's claim of mental and physical disability, the judgment on it is written judgment, and it seems that it seems a substitute working-level position that legal mitigation is made even if it is not intended to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentencing, and even if it is recognized as a mental and physical disability. Such practice is a part that is linked to a new interpretation and interpretation. The working-level form on mental and physical disability is not based on the legal and logical basis for voluntary mitigation, but is a case that shows that the practice is not based on the legal and logical basis for voluntary mitigation, but rather on the wrong practice as a result of responding to it.

(d) Voluntary mitigations must be newly interpreted as follows:

1) As seen earlier, insofar as the meaning of “may be interpreted differently, it shall be interpreted to be consistent with the legislative intent as much as possible.” “may be determined” means that both “the scope of a case where mitigation is performed” and “the scope of a case where mitigation is not performed” can be determined across the range of punishment. In other words, considering that both cases are possible where mitigation is performed and where mitigation is not performed, the scope of two cases must be determined by adding up the applicable sentences. Thus, it can be understood that the range between the upper limit of the scope for which mitigation is not performed and the lower limit of the scope for which mitigation is performed is to be mitigated is limited to the lower limit of the statutory punishment. In short, it can be understood that it can be understood that the scope of a punishment may be mitigated by attempted mitigation is limited to the lower limit of the statutory punishment.” “The scope of imprisonment for not less than 6 months but not more than 5 years” means that the upper limit of the statutory punishment for which one-year imprisonment can be determined by both years and less than 10 years can be determined by one-year imprisonment.

In accordance with a new interpretation, the discretionary mitigation method is "reasonablely fixed" in the area of the sum of the reduced section and the unalleviated section without room for the involvement of the judge's discretion, and accordingly, the scope of the applicable sentences.

The range of applicable sentences is considered to be the upper limit and the lower limit of the mitigated section.

As a result, this conclusion leads to the same conclusion that reduces the statutory penalty to one half only.Although there is extremely exceptional cases, if the discretionary mitigation is considered to be a "elective discretion," the problem that the gap occurs due to the division of the applicable sentences cannot be resolved as seen earlier. On the other hand, as a result, the new interpretation theory takes the form that reduces the punishment to one half only the lower limit of the statutory penalty, there is no room for such problem, and it is clear and clear.

On the other hand, according to a new interpretation on discretionary mitigation, even if a crime for which the minimum statutory penalty is not set forth, even if it is mitigated, it is no longer lower than the minimum statutory penalty, and the applicable sentence is not changed, but it is a process leading to the sentence on the part of the law applied in the judgment, and the reason for mitigation is recognized.

Although this discussion mainly focuses on the punishment for limited imprisonment for convenience, it is also applied to other types of punishment, such as fines.

2) According to the interpretation of the language and text, “a person may be mitigated if the legal requirements corresponding to the causes for voluntary mitigation, such as mental and physical disability, attempted crimes, and self-denunciation, are met,” the legal effect to be mitigated by 1/2 of the statutory minimum statutory penalty becomes effective as seen earlier. In other words, where a legal requirement is acknowledged, there is no room to intervene in the judge’s discretion as to whether to mitigate the punishment. Therefore, where the existence of legal requirements corresponding to the causes for voluntary mitigation is recognized, the legal effect is always recognized, and the legal effect differs from the scope of the applicable punishment. Therefore, where it is recognized that there is a cause for voluntary mitigation, the court shall always enter the relevant matter in the application of the law. The same applies even if the defendant does not assert any claim on the grounds for voluntary mitigation. Furthermore, since a voluntary mitigation brings about the effect of lowering the applicable punishment whenever a defendant claims voluntary mitigation, the judgment on the conviction should be entered in the judgment of conviction pursuant to Article 323(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

3) As above, it is necessary to newly understand the grounds for mitigation that were compared with the previous necessary mitigation and discretionary mitigation. As seen earlier, the effect of voluntary mitigation takes effect only by lowering the lower limit, whereas the necessary mitigation takes effect by lowering both the upper and lower limit. In the case of the necessary mitigation, the effect of allowing a lower sentence than the lower limit of the statutory penalty to be recognized, and at the same time allowing a lower sentence than the statutory penalty to be mitigated by half the upper limit of the statutory penalty to be mitigated by one half. On the other hand, in the case of the discretionary mitigation, the degree of the liability mitigation is lower than the case of the necessary mitigation, and thus, it is possible to sentence a lower sentence than the lower limit of the statutory penalty, but all punishment within the scope stipulated by the original statutory penalty can be sentenced.

위와 같이 이해하게 되면 감경사유에 대한 요건을 충족하는 이상 그에 따른 법률효과가 당연히 발생한다는 점에서 종래 필요적 감경과 임의적 감경의 구분이 용어상 적절하지 않게 된다. 이에 종래 필요적 감경은 '상·하한 감경'으로, 임의적 감경은 '하한 감경'으로 구분하여 부르는 것이 타당해 보인다. 앞서 본 바와 같은 여러 문제점을 가진 현재 실무가 굳어지게 된 것은 '임의적' 감경이라는 잘못된 용어 사용도 하나의 원인(遠因)이 되었다고 본다.

4) As above, this study examined the contents of new interpretation theory regarding discretionary mitigation. However, with the knowledge of the new interpretation theory, there is no difference between the present practice and the present practice.

First of all, there is no difference in practical or new interpretation or difference in terms of referring to the final scope in which a judge can choose a sentence of punishment. Currently, practice can decide whether to grant a sentence of punishment or not, and accordingly, a judge can decide both the scope and not to grant a sentence of punishment to the extent that is not limited to the scope of mitigation. Thus, there is no difference from a new interpretation theory that regards the sum of the above two scope as a sentence of punishment. Then, if a legal requirement is recognized, the legal effect is derived, and a new interpretation is to establish a logical system that is identical to this principle for a discretionary mitigation. In practice, we understand the legal effect of a sentence of punishment of punishment of a judge in terms of 'reasonable discretion', and the new interpretation theory is interpreted as 'the legal effect of a sentence of a sentence of a punishment of a punishment of a punishment of a judge.' From the standpoint of a trial practice, there is no new interpretation from the viewpoint of a trial practice.

E. 1) The Majority Opinion does not mean that if it is not necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentencing, it is not necessary to voluntarily reduce the applicable sentencing age, but rather, it does not err by the above practical practice, following the determination of the applicable sentencing age.

However, according to the current practice, the sentence is to be determined before the sentence is determined.

In practice, where it is no longer necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentences, it has been widely used for a long period of time and can be confirmed in the past and current court training materials, etc. According to such practice, the issue of whether to grant voluntary mitigation is necessary to determine whether to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentences in light of the sentencing sentence. However, in cases where it is necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentences, it is difficult to find it necessary to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentences unless a sentence is determined. Ultimately, in order to determine whether to grant voluntary mitigation according to practical practice, the Supreme Court has to decide whether to determine the applicable sentences before determining the applicable sentences. Furthermore, the Majority Opinion is in support of the practical decision-making process of determining whether to grant voluntary mitigation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Do492, supra). Furthermore, the Majority Opinion is that the sentencing guidelines that is the current method of a sentencing recommendation or a statutory mitigation is not reasonable, which reflects the relevant working-level recommendation to determine the applicable sentencing range.

Meanwhile, as seen earlier, the fact that there is no discussion about discretionary mitigation in practice at all is that judges in charge of practical affairs have determined sentence in the aggregate of the scope in which the scope of discretionary mitigation has been mitigated and the scope not exceeding the scope of discretionary mitigation, such as a new interpretation. As can be seen, even though the current practice has been wrong, the fact that judges could have been maintained without any particular awareness is due to the fact that judges avoid the judgment in accordance with the current practice and make decisions in the same manner as a new interpretation, thereby avoiding the problems that may bring about the current practice in cases where they are in accordance with the current practice by avoiding the judgment in accordance with the practical practice and making decisions in the same way as a new interpretation, and that the current practice may not be said to be prior to many opinions.

2) In granting statutory mitigation of imprisonment for a limited term as stipulated in Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act, the Majority Opinion states that: (a) the method of reducing both a maximum and short term to one half of a maximum or short term to one half of the minimum term is not permissible under the principle of no crime without law; (b) the Majority states that the foregoing separate opinion is erroneous if it is understood that Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act does not apply to the part concerning the maximum term among the above separate opinions; (c) as stated earlier, the separate opinion states that in a case of voluntary mitigation, a sentence may be imposed on both the maximum and minimum term to be reduced to one half of the total amount of the mitigation and the minimum term to be mitigated pursuant to Article 5(1)3 of the Criminal Act; and (d) this result is the same as the maximum statutory penalty to be mitigated to one half of the minimum limit, and thus, it does not constitute a short-term mitigation as defined in Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act and Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act.

3) The Majority Opinion states that a number of discretion is given to judges, such as selection of types of punishment, until a sentence is determined after conviction, and that the discretion of judges in relation to discretionary mitigation is only one of them.

For instance, in the case of larceny under Article 329 of the Criminal Act, since punishment and fine are prescribed selectively, it is inevitable to choose the type of punishment in order to determine the sentence, and the same punishment is expressed at the stage prior to the determination of the sentence. However, in the current practice regarding the crime of attempted special injury, if no punishment is to be mitigated, punishment for not less than six months but less than one year shall be excluded from the first punishment against the defendant. In the case of the former, where the same punishment is applied to all the defendants, the punishment of the defendant shall be differently applied.

In this respect, the problem of choice of the type of punishment and the problem of discretionary mitigation are completely different.

4) Article 323 of the Criminal Procedure Act concerning the assertion of reasons for voluntary mitigation while maintaining the current practice

As seen earlier, there is a view that the determination of the grounds for voluntary mitigation should be clearly stated by deeming that it constitutes “a statement of fact that is the reason for the reduction or exemption” as stated in paragraph (2). However, the Supreme Court has taken the position that the Defendant’s assertion on the reason for voluntary mitigation is not unlawful even if the court omitted its judgment regarding the Defendant’s assertion on the reason for voluntary mitigation, and that the current practice on voluntary mitigation provides a theoretical basis to justify the omission of judgment by the court on the Defendant’s assertion, as seen in paragraph (3) 7 above. Even if the reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized, it seems difficult to logically conclude that the legal effect of the change of the punishment, such as the occurrence of the legal effect of the change of the punishment, is uncertain, and to stipulate the judgment on the ground for voluntary mitigation without fail.

Even if there is a change in the current practice of discretionary mitigation and the determination of the grounds for discretionary mitigation is required to be clearly stated, various difficulties are expected. However, there is no problem if there is no reason for voluntary mitigation, such as voluntary mitigation, as a result of the examination of the Defendant’s argument, even if the grounds for voluntary mitigation are recognized, it is a matter whether or not a judge decides that a defendant would not be mitigated. In particular, it is difficult for a defendant to separately decide on the grounds that a certain defendant would not be mitigated and that a defendant would not be mitigated. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish the procedure of final judgment and the sentencing for specific sentencing decision, and the determination of whether to grant mitigation should be distinguished from the sentencing conditions. Therefore, it is very difficult to say that the determination of whether to grant mitigation is desirable to state the circumstances other than the sentencing conditions. Ultimately, if a reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized to avoid such difficulty, practical practice will be operated in the direction of mitigation pursuant to Article 55(1) of the Criminal Act at all times, and this would be prejudicial to the purport that the Criminal Act regulates voluntary mitigation and necessary mitigation.

These problems can be confirmed by examining the recent practical precedents on the argument of mental or physical disability mentioned in paragraph (c)(11) above. If a mental or physical disability has been changed from a necessary mitigation to a voluntary mitigation, it is recognized that the defendant's assertion is rejected on the ground that the fact of mental or physical disability is not recognized, and it is recognized that the case where the defendant's claim is reduced for the reason that the fact of mental or physical disability is not recognized, and the case where the mitigation of mental or physical disability is made even if the lower limit of the punishment is not to be lowered. However, even though the mental or physical disability is recognized, it is difficult to find the case where the reason is stated in the written judgment without the mitigation of mental or physical disability. This practice is not different from that where the mitigation is determined depending on the recognition of mental or physical disability, and it is practically the same as the necessary mitigation. As such, it is highly probable that the distinction between the two parties is difficult if the judgment on the voluntary mitigation claim is recorded in the written judgment while maintaining the current practice.

5) The issue of statutory interpretation that takes place in the course of a trial pertains to most of the legal requirements. In such a case, there is a difference between whether to grant a legal effect depending on which opinion is chosen. In other words, the acquisition and loss of the legal effect depends on how to define the boundaries of the legal requirements.”

However, the issue of discretionary mitigation dealt with in this decision, however, will not be discussed as to the scope of punishment that can be sentenced to the defendant, and how to express it in the judgment in the form of legal logic. It would be more appropriate to discuss the practical improvement of criminal judgment. It would be more appropriate to discuss the practical improvement of criminal judgment. Through a new interpretation, the current practical issues may be solved through the new interpretation, and it is difficult to find a practical problem in the legal doctrine that is newly raised, and it is difficult to find. It may be concerned with the erroneous interpretation of the language and text, and what is the current practical practice is to be observed. It is difficult for the majority opinion to accurately dissent from the Majority Opinion, and as it is difficult to understand whether there is any objection against it.

F. Examining the problems raised on the basis of a new interpretation on the discretionary mitigation as above, we can find out that all of the following problems are naturally resolved.

1) According to a new interpretation theory, in all cases where a reason for voluntary mitigation is recognized, the minimum statutory punishment is mitigated to 1/2. As such, the same crime is committed and the Defendants are punished by the same applicable sentences whenever there are the same reasons for the increase or decrease of punishment. If a ground for statutory mitigation is recognized, the legal effect therefrom is always the same, and the applicable sentences are equally determined.

2) According to a new interpretation theory, it is not determined whether to apply legal mitigation according to the discretion of a judge with regard to reasons for voluntary mitigation, such as practical affairs, but at all times, the effect of change of the applicable sentences arises. As such, it is not limited to cases where the applicable sentences are lower than the applicable sentences in practice, and there is no room to add discretionary mitigation to the application of the statutes, even if the sentence is determined and the sentence is not applicable to the applicable sentences.

3) According to the current practice, where there are several reasons for voluntary mitigation, for example, the crimes of attempted robbery may occur, such as imprisonment with labor for not less than three years but not more than 30 years, imprisonment for not less than one year and not more than 15 years, imprisonment for not less than 9 months and not more than 7 years, imprisonment for not less than 4.5 months and not more than 3 years and not more than 9 months. However, according to a new interpretation, where there are several reasons for voluntary mitigation as above, the punishment shall be reduced by 1/2 again, and therefore, the punishment shall be reduced by 4.5 months to not more than 30 years.

4) According to Article 56 of the Criminal Act, the statutory mitigation ought to be first implemented prior to the aggravation of concurrent crimes. However, according to the current practice, among several concurrent crimes, Article 38(1) of the Criminal Act is applicable.

Even in cases where the most severe crime subject to aggravated punishment is determined by comparison of punishment, not by the nature of the crime or the punishment, the most severe crime may vary depending on the discretion of the judge in regard to voluntary mitigation. However, according to a new interpretation theory, if a new reason for discretionary mitigation is recognized, the lower limit of statutory punishment is reduced to 1/2, and the same punishment becomes the same. As such, the most severe crime subject to aggravated punishment is determined consistently based on this.

5) According to the current practice, even if a sentence identical to the lower limit of the applicable sentences is imposed, the appeal on the ground of unfair sentencing may only be recognized. However, according to a new interpretation theory, if there exists a ground for discretionary mitigation, the applicable sentences include all of the maximum scope that a judge can determine a specific sentence, and the sentence is determined within the scope of the applicable sentences expanded to all the possible areas, so if the lower limit of the applicable sentences is sentenced, the Defendant is sentenced to the maximum favorable sentence. Therefore, in such a case, there is no room for accepting an appeal on the ground of unfair sentencing, and such interpretation is obvious to conform to the structure of our criminal procedure.” The phrase, “non-existence of a suspended sentence under the law,” as seen earlier, may be very inaccurate in the practical practice as to discretionary mitigation.”

6) According to the current practice, where the lower limit of the applicable range of the sentencing range, which did not grant a voluntary mitigation in the first instance trial, is sentenced to a sentence lower than that of the first instance court, the appellate court may render a sentence lower than that of the first instance court. To do so, the part of the first instance judgment’s application ought to be modified in order to lower the lower limit of the applicable sentencing range by granting a voluntary mitigation. However, as seen earlier in the new interpretation theory, since a voluntary mitigation has the same legal effect at all times as seen earlier, there does not occur any situation where the applicable parts of the first instance judgment’s statutes are modified to apply a new discretionary mitigation while accepting the grounds for appeal

G. We examine the judgment of the court below in light of a new interpretation on discretionary mitigation.

According to the present practice on voluntary mitigation, the first instance court reduced the punishment pursuant to Article 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act while reducing attempted special injury according to voluntary mitigation pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act. As a result, the applicable punishment of attempted special injury was committed for not less than six months but not more than five years, and the applicable punishment was determined based on the above term of punishment.

However, according to a new interpretation theory on voluntary mitigation, mitigation of attempted special injury crimes shall be applied to "Article 25 (2) and Article 55 (1) 3 (limited to reduction) of the Criminal Act", and the term of punishment to be mitigated to 1/2 only the lower limit of the term of the crime of attempted special injury (at least six months and not more than ten years of imprisonment) shall be limited to concurrent crimes as of the term of the punishment mitigated to 1/2 of the lower limit of the term of the crime of attempted special injury (at least 15 years of imprisonment), but since the term of the crime of attempted special injury and assault is lower than 1/2 of the term of the aggravated punishment (at least 15 years of the term of the punishment (at least 12 years of the term of the punishment), the punishment shall be determined within the combined range and the sentence shall be determined within the scope of the term of the punishment.

Although the court below did not correct the above error, it erred by misapprehending the legal principles on discretionary mitigation, the punishment imposed by the court of first instance, which the court of first instance maintained by the court below, is within the scope of punishment in accordance with a new interpretation, and is not disadvantageous to the defendant, and thus, it does not seem that the above error affected the conclusion of the judgment. The judgment on the defendant's ground of appeal is consistent with the majority opinion.

As above, I agree with the majority opinion with respect to the conclusion that there is no ground to reverse the judgment below, but with different reasons, I express my separate opinion. 6. The supplementary opinion with respect to the separate opinion by Justice Lee Ki-taik is as follows.

A. The key issue of the instant case is whether the practical practice is appropriate as to voluntary mitigation including attempted mitigation under Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act. Since the current practice treats attempted mitigation as the same as other voluntary mitigation, the separate opinion discussed about the new interpretation on the general provision for voluntary mitigation without distinguishing voluntary mitigation from other voluntary mitigations. However, as examined below, in relation to the "voluntary mitigation", there is a specific difference from other voluntary mitigations. In other words, other voluntary mitigation is an issue concerning the meaning of "reduction of punishment" provision on the premise of the statutory punishment stipulated in the penal provision, as discussed in the separate opinion, in determining "the scope of the punishment" under the premise of the statutory punishment stipulated in the penal provision, while attempted mitigation is a matter concerning the meaning of "reduction of punishment" provision in determining "the statutory punishment for attempted mitigation", which is a matter concerning the meaning of "the statutory punishment not stipulated in the individual penal provision."

At present, the common theory of practice and academia, in principle, has been interpreted to punish an attempted crime under Article 25 (1) of the Criminal Act (hereinafter referred to as "Attempted crime"), which is the same statutory penalty as that of an attempted crime under Article 25 (2) of the Criminal Act, and it has been interpreted to be merely a voluntary reason for mitigation of punishment that can be mitigated depending on the case under Article 25 (2). However, the understanding of the above attempted crime in practice is erroneous. An attempted crime is a separate crime distinct from the attempted crime, and has its own statutory penalty, and it is reasonable to view that the statutory penalty is set at the scope that is mitigated by 1/2 of the minimum statutory penalty of an attempted crime

First of all, the subject of punishment for attempted crimes under Article 29 of the Criminal Act is prescribed by the provision that "an attempted crime under Article 29 of the Criminal Act shall be punished" and the provision that "an attempted crime under Article 25 of the Criminal Act shall be punished." The following elements of attempted crimes are combined with the provision that "an attempted crime shall be punished as an attempted crime if an intended crime is not completed or if the intended result does not occur after commencing the commission of a crime under Article 25 (1) of the Criminal Act, and the provisions that constitute an attempted crime under Article 25 (2) of the Criminal Act shall be combined with the provision that "an attempted crime may be mitigated than an attempted crime", and Article 5 (1) of the Criminal Act concerning the meaning of mitigation means that "an attempted crime under Article 254 and Article 250 (1) of the Criminal Act may be mitigated than an attempted crime." For example, a person who attempted murder under Article 254 of the Criminal Act and Article 250 (1) combined with Article 25 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Act to commit an attempted crime.

As above, a new understanding of the punishment for attempted crimes is required as follows. It will be discussed mainly on the crime of consequence for convenience.

1) Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act provides that “When an attempted crime is not completed or if the intended result does not occur, it shall be punishable as an attempted crime.” In the case of an attempted crime, it shall not be punishable only on the basis of Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act, and only the penal provision of an attempted crime shall not be punished as an attempted crime. The elements of an attempted crime shall be combined with the penal provision of an attempted crime and Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act, and shall be justified as the basis for the punishment of an attempted crime. If an attempted crime under Articles 254 and 250(1) of the Criminal Act is committed as an example of the attempted crime under Articles 254 and 250(1) of the Criminal Act, the provisions of Article 254 of the Criminal Act are the grounds for punishing a attempted crime.” Article 250(1) of the Criminal Act provides that “When a person kills another,” and Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act is combined, the concept of an attempted crime under Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act is complete.

2) As for the elements of a crime, the statutory penalty for attempted crimes should be understood to be determined by combining the penal provision for attempted crimes and Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act. Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act provides that “The punishment for attempted crimes may be mitigated than that for attempted crimes.” However, according to a new interpretation theory for voluntary mitigation, the punishment for attempted crimes may be mitigated more than that for attempted crimes.

Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act concerning the punishment of attempted crimes is understood as a discretionary mitigation provision. In other words, in principle, an attempted crime is punished as the same statutory penalty as that of a term offender, but may be mitigated or not be mitigated pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act. However, there is no literal basis for the same statutory punishment as that of a term offender. In addition, even though there exists a difference between a term offender and an attempted crime, it is difficult to accept in the legal doctrine of the Criminal Act to regard the same statutory punishment as that of a term offender. Moreover, considering that a crime which does not punish attempted crimes is extremely large, it is unreasonable to regard the same as that of an attempted crime in principle as that of a term offender.

3) Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act provides that "If an attempted crime is not completed or if the result does not occur after commencing the commission of a crime, the punishment may be mitigated than that of the attempted crime", Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act provides that "an attempted crime may be mitigated than that of the attempted crime", and Article 29 of the Criminal Act provides that "an attempted crime under the preceding Article shall be punished" in the form of punishment. Article 29 of the Criminal Act provides that "an attempted crime under the preceding Article shall be punished," instead of a complicated form of individually stipulating the elements and statutory penalties for an attempted crime, the general principles on punishment for attempted crimes shall be provided for in the general provisions, and if an attempted crime is designated only as an attempted crime under the preceding Article, the relevant elements and statutory punishment shall be automatically completed if an attempted crime is designated under the preceding Article." Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act provides that "an attempted crime under the preceding Article shall not be punished separately from all criminal attempts under the preceding Article."

In other words, the Criminal Act, instead of stipulating the elements of an attempted crime and the statutory penalty individually in each crime individually, provides for the common elements (paragraph (1) and statutory penalty (paragraph (2)) for an attempted crime under Article 25 of the General Provisions, and combines them with individual penal provisions, so that the elements of an attempted crime and the statutory penalty can be derived. In addition, it is reasonable to deem that legislators explicitly expressed that the statutory penalty for an attempted crime is mitigated to a half that is less than that for an attempted crime through the aforementioned statutory form. If the statutory penalty for an attempted crime was separately provided, it was very difficult to express such legislative intent. Accordingly, even if the statutory penalty for an attempted crime is the same as that for an attempted crime in principle, it is difficult to view that it is difficult to arbitrarily reduce it pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act.

Based on a new understanding of these attempted crimes, the legislators do not have the provision for punishment for attempted crimes, and if there is a need for punishment on the risk of occurrence of the result of the commencement of the implementation even if (L) the crime does not result from a minor crime, the legislators are punished as a statutory punishment mitigated by 1/2 of the minimum statutory penalty for attempted crimes pursuant to Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act, and if (c) a strong punishment is required, it can be seen that (c) a crime is divided into cases where the application of Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act is excluded by separately specifying the statutory penalty for attempted crimes, as in the following cases.

4) The term “legal penalty” means a punishment prescribed in an individual constituent element as a scope of punishment, which generally evaluates the typical illegality of each constituent element by legislators. In other words, the scope of punishment established by legislators upon meeting the constituent elements is set. If so, it is reasonable to view that both setting or amending the scope of punishment resulting from the constituent elements of an attempted crime are the elements of a decision on statutory punishment. It is not reasonable to regard it as a constituent element of a decision on statutory punishment as current practice. Furthermore, it is a principle prohibiting double evaluation that the circumstances constituting the constituent elements of a crime should not be considered again in the course of the determination of punishment. Moreover, the circumstance that the constituent elements of a crime should not be considered again in the course of the determination of punishment. Since the fact that the commencement of the commission of a crime and the occurrence of a crime did not occur, understanding it as a constituent element of an attempted crime is possible to understand it as a legally mitigated ground,

5) In the past, the Supreme Court has decided to the effect that the statutory punishment is not allowed for attempted punishment under Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 87Do1635, Sept. 22, 1987; 200Do3947, Nov. 14, 200; 2010Do1620, Nov. 25, 2010) where the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes explicitly provides for an attempted crime in the same manner as that of an attempted crime (see, e.g., Articles 5-4(6) and 11(1), etc.) (see, 5-4(2)). However, according to the current practice, it is difficult to find the grounds for the interpretation of the special law as to an attempted crime under Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act, which is the same meaning as that of the current special law.

However, according to a new understanding that the statutory punishment for attempted crimes is recognized as seen earlier, the statutory punishment for attempted crimes is determined by combining the statutory punishment for attempted crimes with Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act. If a special law specifies individual statutory punishment for attempted crimes, it is unnecessary to interpret the law for the purpose of establishing the statutory punishment, so there is no room for operating Article 25(2) of the Criminal Act, which serves as the function of establishing the statutory punishment. As such, through a new understanding of attempted crimes, the above Supreme Court precedents can be explained harmoniously without contradiction.

6) In short, Article 25(1) of the Criminal Act provides the elements of an attempted crime, and Article 25(2) provides the statutory penalty. The interpretation that statutory penalty of an attempted crime is identical to that of an attempted crime without any express legal basis is contrary to the principle of no punishment without law. The elements of an attempted crime do not exist even before the operation of Article 25 of the Criminal Act.

B. I would like to point out one of the relevant issues with regard to the jurisdiction of an object.

Article 32 (1) 3 of the Court Organization Act refers to a case of imprisonment with or without prison labor for a short term of at least one year, which is the lowest among the multiple-choices listed in the statutory penalty, and it is reasonable to interpret that it does not constitute a case where a minor fine, etc. is prescribed by multiple-choices, such as imprisonment with or without prison labor, or imprisonment without prison labor, for a short term of at least one year. The reasons are as follows.

1) As a matter of principle, the Court Organization Act requires a collegiate panel of a district court and its branch to judge a case prescribed in each subparagraph of Article 32(1) exceptionally while exercising the authority to judge a district court and its branch court. Of note, a serious case requires caution in handling such case, the Court set the statutory penalty under the jurisdiction of a collegiate panel of a collegiate panel of a collegiate panel of a district court (Article 16(1) of the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Real Estate Ownership, Etc. (hereinafter “Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Real Estate Ownership”) as a type of imprisonment with or without prison labor for not less than one year but not more than ten years, or for not more than 10 million won, or for not more than 10 million won and less than 10 million won, and thus, it constitutes a violation of Article 16(1) of the Act on the Registration of Real Estate Ownership, which constitutes a short-term penalty under the jurisdiction of a collegiate panel of a collegiate panel of a district court of a district court of more than 15 years.

Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the lowest type of statutory punishment, i.e., the lowest type of punishment, which is the type of imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for more than one year, as the case where the lowest type of punishment is imprisonment with or without prison labor for more than one year. Therefore, if a more minor fine is prescribed in a selective format, it is reasonable to regard it as a single judge in the jurisdiction of a single judge. In the case of a violation of Article 16(1) of the Act on

3) In addition, according to a new understanding on an attempted crime, the statutory penalty for an attempted crime is equal to the minimum of the statutory penalty for an attempted crime, and the jurisdiction over an attempted crime shall be based on the statutory penalty for an attempted crime. If an attempted crime is committed under Articles 143 and 141(2) of the Criminal Act, the statutory penalty for the attempted crime of destruction of public property is “a term of not less than one year but not more than ten years” and the statutory penalty for the attempted crime of destruction of public property is “a term of not less than 6 months and not more than 10 years” and it is reasonable to view the attempted crime of destruction of public property as the jurisdiction of a collegiate panel, while the crime of attempted destruction of public property is a single judge.

As above, I express my concurrence with the Concurring Opinion.

The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court

Justices Park Sang-ok

Chief Justice Lee Dong-won

Justices Kim Jae-in

Justices Park Il-san

Justices Noh Jeong-chul

Justices Min Min-young

Justices Kim Gin-soo

Justices Lee Jae-hwan

Justices Noh Jeong-hee

Justices Kim In-bok

Justices Noh Tae-ok

Justices Heung-gu