[1] Whether a ground for retrial under Article 422(1)1 of the Civil Procedure Act constitutes a ground for retrial in a case where a panel composed of less than two-thirds of all Justices was rendered, even though the opinion on interpretation and application of laws, etc., expressed in the Supreme Court decision subject to review changed the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court decision previously rendered (affirmative)

[2] Whether the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court Decision 94Da4332 delivered on April 7, 1995 changed the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 delivered on July 23, 1991 (affirmative)

[3] In a case where a teacher of a private school appointed for a specified period under Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act was released from his position or dismissed before the expiration of the term of appointment and his term of appointment expires, whether there is a benefit of lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity of the above removal from position or dismissal (negative

[1] According to Article 7 (1) of the Court Organization Act, the judgment authority of the Supreme Court shall be conducted by a panel of not less than 2/3 of all Justices: Provided, That unless it falls under any of the subparagraphs of the same paragraph, a case may be tried by a panel of not less than three Justices first, and a case may be tried by a panel of not less than three Justices. Paragraph 3 of the same Article provides that "where it is acknowledged that there is a need to modify the opinion on the interpretation and application of the Constitution, Acts, orders, or regulations expressed in the previous Supreme Court". Thus, even though the opinion on interpretation and application of laws, etc. expressed in the judgment subject to a retrial changes the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court decision previously rendered by a panel of less than 2/3 of all Justices, if the judgment was rendered by a panel of less than two-thirds of all Justices on the judgment subject to a retrial, it constitutes a ground for retrial of "where the court of a judgment is not constituted

[2] [Majority Opinion] Supreme Court Decision 94Da4332 delivered on April 7, 1995 held that a professor appointed with a contract term under Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 1990) shall lose the status of professor as a matter of course upon expiration of the contract term, and there is no benefit in legal action to seek confirmation of removal from position and dismissal conducted before the expiration of the contract term, unless there are any special grounds for granting the duty of reappointment to the teacher whose contract term expires under the articles of association of the school juristic person or the personnel regulations of the university university, and that there is no benefit in legal action to seek confirmation of nullification of the removal from position and dismissal conducted before the expiration of the contract term. In addition, Supreme Court Decision 9Da4332 delivered on July 23, 191 that held that the Plaintiff, an associate professor of a university, has not been reappointed after the expiration of the contract term, and that the Plaintiff’s status shall continue to exist, barring special circumstances.

[Dissenting Opinion] Supreme Court Decision 94Da4332 delivered on April 7, 1995 held that a teacher who was appointed for a fixed period of time naturally loses his status on the expiration of the term of appointment is presumed to be under the premise that " there is no provision that grants the duty of reappointment to a teacher whose term of appointment expires under the articles of association or the personnel regulations of university professors." However, Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 delivered on July 23, 191 held that "Unless there are special circumstances," the plaintiff who was an associate professor of a university is not reappointed after the expiration of the term of appointment of an associate professor under the Private School Act and the articles of association of a defendant corporation, the plaintiff's status shall continue to exist unless there are special circumstances, which are contrary to the circumstances based on the premise in the pertinent case, the above decision that the above provision of dismissal of a teacher shall expire on the expiration of the term of appointment shall not be deemed to be null and void, and therefore, there is no room to determine that the above decision would be 294Da2394320 delivered.

[3] [Majority Opinion] A private school teacher who has been appointed for a specified period under Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 1990) after being subject to unfavorable measures such as dismissal, dismissal, dismissal, dismissal, etc. before the expiration of the term of appointment shall lose his status as a teacher as a matter of course upon the expiration of the term of appointment unless there are grounds provisions that grant the duty of reappointment to a teacher whose term of appointment expires under the articles of association of the school juristic person or the personnel regulations for university professors, even if such unfavorable measures are invalid. Therefore, even if removal from position or dismissal made before the expiration of the term of appointment is null and void, the request for confirmation of invalidity is impossible to recover his status, and even in the past legal relations, it shall be deemed that there is no benefit of confirmation of such legal relations immediately if it is acknowledged that it is a valid means to eliminate risks or apprehensions to the present rights or legal status, and it shall be deemed that there is no benefit of dismissal or dismissal from the term of a teacher under the current Private School Act.

[Dissenting Opinion] Since Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 1990) provides unfavorable measures such as dismissal, dismissal, dismissal, dismissal, etc. before the expiration of the term of appointment and then the term of appointment expires, even if such unfavorable measures are invalid, if there is no provision that grants the duty of reappointment to the teacher whose term of appointment expires under the articles of association of the school juristic person or the personnel regulations for university faculty members, he/she naturally loses his/her status as a teacher upon expiration of the term of appointment, the request for nullification of removal from position and dismissal made before the expiration of the term of appointment is merely a request for confirmation of past legal relations and no benefit of confirmation exists even in terms of recovery of the status as a teacher. However, as the majority opinion also expresses, if a request for confirmation of such legal relations has an impact on the present rights or legal status even in the past legal relations, and if it is recognized that such removal has an effect on the present rights or legal status as a teacher's right to dismissal or dismissal, it can be seen as an unfavorable measure.

[1] Article 422 (1) 1 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 7 (1) of the Court Organization Act / [2] Article 422 (1) 1 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 7 (1) of the Court Organization Act / [3] Article 228 of the Civil Procedure Act, Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 1990), Article 53-2 (4) of the Private School Act, Article 7 subparagraph 3 of the former Education Act, Article 31 (1) of the Constitution, Article 2 of the Special Act for the Improvement of Teachers' Status, Article 764 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 81Da99 delivered on September 28, 1982 (Gong1982, 105) Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Da260 delivered on April 25, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 185) / [2/3] Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 delivered on July 23, 1991 (Gong1991, 2230), Supreme Court Decision 94Da4332 delivered on April 7, 1995 (Gong1995Sang, 1815Sang, 196.195) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 91Da1134 delivered on June 25, 1991 (Gong1991, 203Sang, 197Da197939 delivered on April 39, 195) 197Da198395 delivered on April 29, 1997.

Plaintiff 1 and nine others (Law Firm Spah, Attorneys Park Woo-dong, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant School Foundation (Attorney Kim Jong-sik, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Supreme Court Decision 94Da4332 delivered on April 7, 1995

All requests for retrial are dismissed. Litigation costs for retrial shall be borne by the plaintiff (Plaintiffs).

1. As to the existence of a ground for retrial

According to Article 7 (1) of the Court Organization Act, the judgment authority of the Supreme Court shall be conducted by a panel of not less than 2/3 of all the Justices: Provided, That unless it falls under any of the subparagraphs of the same paragraph, a case may be tried by a panel of not less than three Justices with the assent of all the Justices, and a case where it is acknowledged that there is a need to modify the previous opinion on the interpretation and application of the Constitution, Acts, orders or rules." Since Article 7 (1) 3 of the Court Organization Act provides that the opinion on the interpretation and application of laws, etc., expressed in the judgment subject to a retrial changed the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court decision previously rendered, but if the decision subject to a retrial was rendered by a panel of less than two thirds of all the Justices, it constitutes the ground for retrial of "when the court of the judgment was not constituted by the law under Article 422 (1) 1 of the Civil Procedure Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 81Da99, Sept. 28, 1982; 204Da64.).

The judgment subject to review of this case is to review the case in a panel composed of four Justices, and to review the case and appoint a public office or teacher under Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 4226 of Apr. 7, 1990), if there is no provision that grants a school foundation's articles of incorporation or a university faculty member's duty of reappointment to the teacher whose term of appointment expires under the personnel regulations of the university, the professor status shall be naturally lost due to the expiration of the term of appointment. The plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff") shall be deemed to lose his status as a professor upon expiration of the term of appointment. Thus, the plaintiff's claim seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal from office of this case is not only a request for confirmation of past legal relations, and there is no legal limitation in the appointment of a public office or teacher, unlike the removal or dismissal by disciplinary action, and even if there is such power, it does not affect the judgment of the court below which accepted the plaintiffs' claim for dismissal or dismissal of this case's interest.

However, in the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 Decided July 23, 1991, even if the plaintiff, who is an associate professor at a university, was not reappointed after the expiration of the term of appointment pursuant to the Private School Act and the articles of incorporation of the juristic person, it cannot be said that there is no interest in seeking nullification of the plaintiff, who was dismissed before the expiration of the term of appointment, and the plaintiff's status shall be deemed to continue to exist, except in special circumstances where the dismissal against the plaintiff is null and void.

Therefore, the opinion expressed in the decision subject to a retrial is to modify the opinion expressed in the above Supreme Court decision as to whether a teacher, etc. appointed for a specified period has maintained his status despite the expiration of the term of appointment, and whether there is a benefit to seek nullification of such unfavorable disposition. However, it is clear that the decision subject to a retrial was rendered by a panel, not en banc, and therefore, there is a ground for retrial under Article 422 (1) 1 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. As to the legitimacy of the grounds of appeal

If a teacher appointed for a specified period under Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act was subject to a disadvantageous disposition such as dismissal, dismissal, or dismissal before the expiration of the term of appointment and then the term of appointment expires, even if such unfavorable disposition is null and void, he/she shall naturally lose his/her status as a teacher upon the expiration of the term of appointment unless there are grounds provisions that grant a school juristic person’s articles of incorporation or personnel regulations for university faculty members the duty of reappointment to a teacher whose term of appointment expires (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da1134, Jun. 25, 1991; 93Da5093, Apr. 23, 1993; 92Da40587, Jul. 27, 1993; 95Da11696, Feb. 27, 1996).

Therefore, if the facts are duly determined by the court below, the plaintiffs are professors of the defendant's university (the defendant) employed for a specified period and lost their status as professors due to the expiration of their employment period prior to the date of closing argument in the court below. Accordingly, even if the removal from position and dismissal are null and void, the professor's status cannot be restored. Thus, the claim for nullification of the removal from position and dismissal from position cannot be seen as a claim for confirmation of legal relations in the past.

Meanwhile, even in the past legal relations, if the current rights or legal status have been affected and it is deemed appropriate to obtain a judgment on confirmation of such legal relations in order to eliminate risks or apprehensions with respect to the current rights or legal status, the litigation for confirmation of such legal relations shall be deemed to have an immediate final and conclusive interest. Further, such viewing is consistent with the dispute resolution function and dispute prevention function of the confirmation litigation (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Da1134, Jun. 25, 1991; 92Da40587, Jul. 27, 1993; 92Da40587, Jul. 27, 1993; 2009Da19497, Apr. 15, 197).

Other precedents of the Republic of Korea, which are superior to this case, are different from those of this case, and are inappropriate to be invoked in this case.

In addition, as in this case, so long as the term of office has already expired and the legal position is not restored by the result of the lawsuit, the confirmation of dismissal from position and dismissal cannot be deemed to have the function of the remedy pursued in the lawsuit in question, and as long as there is a direct remedy as a means of claiming performance, such as the right to claim payment of wages or the right to claim compensation for damages premised on defamation, the infringed means of recovering the actual reputation cannot be said to have the function of the remedy pursued in the lawsuit in question, and as long as there is a direct remedy as a means of claiming performance such as the right to claim payment of wages or the right to claim compensation for damages on the premise of defamation, the lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity cannot be deemed an appropriate remedy, and the other requirements of another lawsuit in the lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity are not satisfied. As long as there is a direct remedy as above, it does not allow the lawsuit seeking confirmation of invalidity, and the importance of honor is

Therefore, the above Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 delivered on July 23, 1991 that held that, in case where a teacher appointed for a fixed period of time was subject to dismissal prior to the expiration of the term of appointment, his status is maintained despite the expiration of the term of appointment, or that there is a legal interest in seeking nullification of the term of appointment even after the expiration of the term of appointment, shall be discarded.

As such, as long as the plaintiffs' lawsuit seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal of this case has no interest in confirmation, the court below accepted the plaintiffs' appeal and accepted the claim or maintained the judgment of the court of first instance which accepted the claim, based on different opinions, and therefore, the court below erred by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the interest in confirmation, and as such, it is obvious that such illegality has influenced the judgment, the appeal is with merit.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and this case is sufficient for this court to render a direct judgment based on the facts established by the court below. Thus, all of the plaintiffs' lawsuits shall be dismissed on the grounds as seen above. However, since the conclusion of the judgment subject to a retrial is justifiable, all of the appeals in this case is dismissed pursuant to Article 430 of the Civil Procedure Act, and the costs of the retrial are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices except for the dissenting opinion by Justice Lee Yong-hun, Justice Cho

3. The dissenting opinion of Justice Lee Yong-hun, Justice Cho Jae-sik, Justice Cho Yong-dam, and Justice Lee Yong-woo is as follows.

A. Dissenting the Majority Opinion’s determination as to the existence of a ground for retrial.

The Majority Opinion deems that the opinion expressed in the instant judgment subject to a retrial changed the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 Decided July 23, 1991, and therefore, there exist grounds for retrial under Article 422(1)1 of the Civil Procedure Act in the judgment subject to a retrial.

However, as pointed out in the majority opinion, the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 Decided July 23, 191 and the Decision subject to a retrial in this case are different from each other as to whether a teacher of a university appointed for a specified period maintains his status despite the expiration of the term of appointment. However, the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 Decided July 23, 191 is based on the premise that "it does not provide for the duty of reappointment to a teacher whose term of appointment expires under the articles of association or the personnel management regulations of university teachers" that "if a teacher of a university is not reappointed by the Private School Act and the articles of association of a defendant foundation, his status remains as it is, unless there are special circumstances that make it impossible to determine that the above provision would be null and void in the decision subject to a retrial in this case where there are special circumstances different from those of the pertinent case."

Therefore, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that there is a ground for retrial under Article 422 (1) 1 of the Civil Procedure Act in the judgment subject to retrial on the premise that the opinion expressed in the judgment subject to retrial changes the opinion expressed in the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 Decided July 23, 191, and that the plaintiffs' request for retrial of this case should be dismissed only on the ground that there is no ground for retrial without further determination as to whether the plaintiffs' lawsuit seeking nullification of removal from position and dismissal of this case has a benefit of confirmation. In addition, if the request for retrial of this case is dismissed, the decision subject to retrial of this case is maintained as it is, and there is a defect in maintaining the dissenting opinion as to the determination as to the legitimacy of the grounds for appeal, which is inconsistent with the dissenting opinion on the determination as to the legitimacy of the

B. We oppose the Majority Opinion’s determination as to the propriety of the grounds for appeal.

As seen earlier, there is no ground for retrial under Article 422(1)1 of the Civil Procedure Act in the judgment subject to a retrial. However, even if the majority opinion acknowledges that there is a ground for retrial in the judgment subject to a retrial, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that the plaintiffs' lawsuit seeking nullification of removal from position and dismissal of the defendant's lawsuit seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal of the defendant's lawsuit is illegal without the benefit of confirmation, and we differ with the majority opinion on this point.

(1) If a teacher appointed for a specified period under Article 53-2 (2) of the former Private School Act receives unfavorable measures such as dismissal, dismissal, dismissal, etc. before the expiration of the term of appointment and the term of appointment expires, even if such unfavorable measures are null and void, if there is no ground provision that grants a teacher the duty of reappointment for a teacher whose term of appointment expires under the articles of association of a school juristic person or the personnel regulations of a university faculty member, he/she shall naturally lose

Therefore, in this case where there is no articles of association or personnel regulations that grant the duty of reappointment to a teacher whose term of appointment expires, if the term of appointment for the plaintiffs, who are teachers of the defendant (the re-appellant; hereinafter referred to as the "defendant") employed for a specified term, has expired all before the closing date of argument in the court below, the plaintiffs naturally lose their status as a teacher regardless of the validity of the removal from position and dismissal from position, so the plaintiffs' claim of this case seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal from position is merely a claim for confirmation of past legal relations in terms of restoration of teacher status, and thus there is no interest in confirmation.

However, as the majority opinion acknowledges, even in the past legal relations, if it has an impact on the present rights or legal status, and if it is recognized as a valid and appropriate means to eliminate the risk or apprehension of the present rights or legal status, the lawsuit seeking confirmation of such legal relations shall be deemed to have an interest in immediate confirmation. The existence of the removal from position and dismissal in this case shall not only infringe on the procedural rights of the plaintiffs with regard to the reappointment that can be held by the teachers whose term of appointment expires, but also have an actual impact on the plaintiffs' rights to personal interests or legal status that can be appointed as teachers by acting as disadvantageous causes to the plaintiffs' social reputation and further, the plaintiffs' new appointment as teachers. Such risk or apprehension of rights or legal status may be fundamentally removed only through the nullification of the removal from position and dismissal in this case. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' claim in this regard shall not be deemed to have an interest in immediate confirmation, and in this regard, it shall be viewed to have a different opinion from the majority opinion in this regard.

(2) The majority opinion holds that, unlike the case of removal from position or dismissal of a teacher by disciplinary action, there is no legal limitation in the appointment of a public office or teacher as well as the case of dismissal from position, and even if there is such a power, it actually serves as an unfavorable cause to a person who has no such power in the appointment as a public office or teacher, it cannot be deemed that legal interest has been infringed, and the plaintiffs' request for nullification of the removal from position or dismissal from position is illegal action for which there is no interest in confirmation.

However, Article 53-2(4) of the Private School Act (amended by Act No. 6004, Aug. 31, 1999) provides that when the term of appointment of a teacher appointed for a specified period expires, the person who has the authority to appoint and dismiss shall decide on the reappointment of the teacher concerned after deliberation by the teachers personnel committee, thereby imposing an obligation on the person who has the authority to appoint and dismiss, to decide on the reappointment of the teacher in question, subject to deliberation by the teachers personnel committee, as well as the right to request the person who has the authority to appoint and dismiss the teacher whose term of appointment expires to decide on the reappointment of the teacher after deliberation by the teachers personnel committee, and the right to request the person who has the authority to appoint and dismiss the teacher whose term of appointment has expired to decide on the reappointment of the teacher after deliberation by the teachers personnel committee. Therefore, the number of the teachers who have lost their status after the expiration of the term of appointment differs from the teacher who has lost their status due to unfavorable disposition such as dismissal. Therefore, the plaintiffs do not have legal interest in seeking

In addition, all of the plaintiffs in this case, other than plaintiffs 2 and 3, are associate professors or assistant professors of the defendant's universities under the jurisdiction of the defendant's university. In order to be promoted as professors or associate professors of the university, the majority opinion that uniformly concluded that there is no legal limitation on the appointment of the plaintiffs as teaching staff does not constitute criticism in this regard, it is improper in that the majority opinion that uniformly concluded that there is no legal limit on the appointment of the plaintiffs as teaching staff.

Meanwhile, Article 77 subparag. 3 of the former Education Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the Framework Act on Education, Act No. 5437, Dec. 13, 1997) which was enforced at the time of the closing of argument in the lower court comprehensively provides for the grounds for disqualification for the appointment of teachers by preventing any person deemed to have poor character and behavior from becoming a teacher. Article 54(3) of the former Private School Act provides that the competent agency may demand the person who has the above grounds for disqualification for the appointment of teachers to dismiss the relevant teacher. If a teacher who shall meet professional knowledge and ability and strict moral standards is removed from position or dismissed from office on the grounds that such qualification is immediately denied, such teacher is deemed disqualified for the appointment of a teacher under Article 7 subparag. 3 of the former Education Act, and thus, there is a high room for not being re-appointed as a teacher. Therefore, even if the removal from position and dismissal for reasons of lack of job performance or work performance are not likely to be re-appointed as a teacher, it cannot be determined as an indirect or unstable interest in the foregoing.

(3) Furthermore, the majority opinion argues that the reputation of a teacher damaged by removal from position or dismissal can be relieved by means of seeking compensation on the premise of defamation, and thus, seeking nullification of the removal from position or dismissal on the ground of the need for restoration of reputation cannot be deemed an appropriate means of remedy, and therefore, it does not meet the requirements of litigation for confirmation.

However, the Constitution of the Republic of Korea guarantees the right to receive education as one of the fundamental rights by providing that all citizens have the right to receive education equally according to their abilities (Article 31(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea). In order to ensure that the right to receive such education is effective, the authority of teachers should be respected in providing education and guidance to students, and the social environment of teachers should be created so that teachers may engage in educational activities with high pride and a sense of duty (Article 2 of the Special Act on the Improvement of Teachers' Status).

Therefore, the social reputation of a teacher needs to be specially protected, and such special protection needs not be met if the restoration of such reputation is promptly and completely performed, in the event of a situation that damages the reputation of a teacher. In the event of a unfavorable disposition, such as dismissal, dismissal, dismissal, removal, etc. that damages the reputation of a teacher, seeking compensation for damages after the fact cannot be a prompt and complete remedy for damages, and only the declaration of such unfavorable disposition itself becomes the most effective and appropriate means to promptly and completely restore the reputation of a teacher. This is the reason why, in the event of a unfavorable disposition against a teacher, the benefit of the need for restoration of reputation itself, separate from the benefit of recovery of a teacher’s status, should be regarded as an independent legal interest worthy of remedy through the invalidity of the disposition. With respect to seeking the invalidity of an unfavorable disposition against a teacher, denying the benefit of a lawsuit merely on the ground that the period of appointment expires and the status of a teacher cannot be recovered again, is entirely denied the need for prompt and complete recovery of a damaged teacher’s reputation.

In infringement of a person’s moral interest, such as reputation, there are cases where monetary compensation alone cannot be sufficiently satisfied due to the diversity of attitudes. Accordingly, Article 764 of the Korean Civil Act provides that the court may order a person who defames another person’s reputation to take an appropriate measure in lieu of or in addition to compensation for damages upon request of the injured party. One of the appropriate measures for restoring reputation is that where there is a defamation disadvantage disposition against a teacher under our legal system where an advertisement for a crime of defamation is not allowed, it may be an appropriate measure to confirm the invalidity of the unfavorable measure itself, and such interpretation is also consistent with the purport of the provisions of our Civil Act.

(4) In addition, judicial action is a passive and passive state action in that it takes place only when filing a lawsuit from the parties in the event of a specific legal dispute. However, the resolution of legal dispute is the duty of the court and the reason for existence of the court, so long as there is a request for judgment on a dispute related to the legal life of the people, the court shall actively accept the request and make every effort necessary to solve the dispute as possible, and it is also the way to achieve judicial democracy. The request for democratization to expand the freedom and rights of the people cannot be an exception in the field of the judiciary, and the democratization of the judiciary shall begin from the process to ensure that the people can easily access the dispute resolution procedure by relaxing the limitation elements in the legal proceedings more easily. The concept of the benefit of the past lawsuit needs to be reviewed immediately from this point of view.

The concept of benefit in a lawsuit is originally designed from the national and public interest point of view, which is to reduce the burden of the court by controlling the use of the lawsuit system. However, in today, such as today, the guarantee of fundamental human rights of the people is emphasized as well as the status of the people against the State is particularly important, it is no longer acceptable to limit the scope of benefit in a lawsuit on the basis of the national interest, such as the reduction of the burden of the court on the part of the people who use the lawsuit system. Restrictions excessively on the scope of benefit in a lawsuit under the pretext of preventing a lawsuit on the grounds of preventing a dispute may result in fundamental infringement of the rights of the people to be tried by the court by refusing a trial by judging that it is not a legal dispute even though there is no substantial dispute. The concept of benefit in a lawsuit does not function as a restriction or a wall to make it difficult for the people to access the opportunity to resolve the dispute by the court, and discussions on the benefit in a lawsuit should be discussed to open the way to resolve the dispute by the people as far as possible.

From this point of view, the Majority Opinion’s view that, based on the previous concept as to the benefit of a lawsuit, the benefit of a lawsuit seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal is always denied if the term of appointment of a teacher is expired and the status of a teacher cannot be recovered again due to the expiration of the term of appointment of a teacher, on the ground that the disadvantages of restricting the opportunity for re-employment that a teacher subject to removal from position or dismissal from position are merely de facto disadvantage, or there is a separate remedy method for damage caused by removal from position or dismissal from position, cannot be said to be a failure to thoroughly protect the rights of the people by comparing the above points to be considered in discussing the scope of benefit of a lawsuit. The attempt to expand the scope of benefit of a lawsuit to expand the opportunity for the protection of rights of the people by expanding the scope of benefit of a lawsuit is an appropriate attitude suitable for the situation of the modern society where the demand for such restriction exists.

(5) In the instant case, even though it was impossible for the Plaintiffs to recover their status again due to the expiration of their employment period for the Plaintiffs, the procedural rights to be reappointed and personal rights to social reputation are infringed upon by the removal from position and dismissal of the instant case, and further, the Plaintiffs whose opportunity to be re-employed is restricted shall be deemed to have an interest in confirmation immediately after seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal from position. Accordingly, the lower court’s decision to proceed to the instant case on this premise is justifiable.

Therefore, if the majority opinion that there are grounds for retrial in the judgment subject to retrial of this case, the conclusion of the judgment subject to retrial of this case, which dismissed the plaintiffs' lawsuit seeking nullification of the removal from position and dismissal of this case, is not justifiable, and the plaintiffs' petition for retrial should be determined on the premise that the plaintiffs' lawsuit is legitimate. Furthermore, the Supreme Court Decision 91Da12820 Decided July 23, 1991, which is to be abolished by the majority opinion, is different from this case, and the above decision should not be discarded, and even if it is deemed that the case is the same as the majority opinion, the part which affirmed the benefit of lawsuit should be maintained, and the judgment subject to retrial of this case which the majority opinion maintained should be discarded.

The final judgment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Presiding Justice) is that the use of a new Kim-Jon Kim Jong-Jon's right to create a new Kim-Jon-Jon's right to create a new job is made by the Ordinance of the Prime Minister.