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1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.
Reasons
1. The following facts do not conflict between the parties, or can be recognized by comprehensively taking into account the respective descriptions and arguments in Gap 1-3, 5-1-2, 6, and 1-4. A.
The instant land was partitioned on June 1, 1945, and its land category was changed to “road” on the same day (hereinafter “D land before division”); thereafter, the ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of the Plaintiff on October 19, 1970 on the instant land due to the sale and purchase on October 18, 1970, on the grounds of the inheritance by consultation division on August 13, 2014. The ownership transfer registration was completed in the name of the Plaintiff on November 19, 2014 on the grounds of the inheritance by consultation division.
B. Since the incorporation into a road, the land in this case was divided into D before the division on June 1, 1945, and the land category was used as a road from the time when the land category was changed into a “road”, and was decided as G on September 15, 1969. On October 28, 1986, the change was decided to the H of the Gyeongnam-do Public Notice on September 15, 196, and the Defendant occupied and used as a general road (a auxiliary road) until now.
(A) The plaintiff asserted that the land of this case was divided from D before the division to "road" on February 16, 1998, as indicated in the column for title of each closed register No. 5-5 and 6, and that the land of this case was changed to "road" on March 23, 200, as stated in the column for title of each closed register No. 5-5 and 6. However, the land of this case was divided from D before the division into D on June 1, 1945 and the same land category was changed to "road" on the old land register No. 5-1 and No. 2. According to the cadastral map No. 3, it can be confirmed that the land of this case was divided from D before the division into "road" before the division, and therefore the plaintiff's above assertion was without merit).