[1] The limit to which an euthanasia can be recognized as a justifiable act, and whether an injury was a justifiable act by exercising a tangible force that cannot be said as an ordinary euthanasia (negative)

[2] The case holding that in a case where an operator of a parastegic source caused bodily harm to a patient while performing an internal organs for the purpose of treating a patient with a mental fissione, it does not constitute a "political act which is acceptable under social norms" as it exercises excessive tangible power, such as coercion of a patient's body by force, etc.

[1] Where, as part of a religious instrument, salt sources or doctors by the instrument of a reporter are deemed to be helpful in transmitting the body part of the other party to the other party psychological or visually, or by taking a little part of the other party’s body to the extent that it can be recognized that the purpose and method of the act is justifiable. However, in the event that such religious instrument acts are brought up patients on the basis of both medical treatments having medical effects, which are the treatment act having medical effect, and then inflict bodily injury on the body of the patient by exercising the patient’s abnormal or excessive force and excessive physical freedom beyond the ordinary method and degree, it cannot be deemed as a justifiable act that is acceptable under social norms even if the exercise of such force was done in the name and method of the safe-water season, even if it was done in the manner and manner.

[2] The case holding that in a case where an operator of a parastegic source caused bodily harm to a patient while performing an internal organs for the purpose of treating a patient with a mental fissione, it does not constitute "a justifiable act which is acceptable under social norms" as it exercises excessive tangible power, such as coercion of a patient's body for long time, etc.

[1] Articles 20, 260(1), and 262 of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 20, 260(1), and 262 of the Criminal Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 94Do1484 delivered on August 23, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2569)

Defendant

Prosecutor

Attorney Kim Jong-soo

Incheon District Court Decision 2007No1743 Decided March 21, 2008

Of the judgment below, the part concerning violence as of August 18, 2006 and August 20, 2006 and injury as of August 21, 2006 shall be reversed, and this part of the case shall be remanded to the Panel Division of the Incheon District Court. The remainder of the prosecutor's appeal shall be dismissed.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The portion caused by the assault of August 19, 2006 and the assault of each item of August 21, 2006;

The purport of the grounds of appeal is that there is an error of violation of the rules of evidence in this part of the court below's fact-finding, but it is merely an error of the selection of evidence or fact-finding which belongs to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court, and it cannot be

2. The portion resulting from the violence on August 18, 2006 and August 20, 2006, respectively, and the part resulting from the assault related to the Anmalutism among the bodily injury of August 21, 2006;

On August 18, 2006 and August 21, 2006, the court below found the victim's body 25 years of age who suffered from mental marbling, and caused the victim to have knee and kneeb from her kneb, so as to prevent the victim from leaving knebly with her kneb, so that it is difficult to view the victim's knebry and kneb, so that the victim could not have knebly suffer from the victim's kneb, and that it would be difficult to view that the victim's kblbly suffered from the victim's kblick, by using the victim's kblbs, and that the victim's kblbage would not have any other kbling method than the victim's kblbry, and that it would be difficult for the victim to have any other method than the victim's guardian's kblor.

However, as part of a religious instrument, the act of taking aground or a little part of the body of the other party to the extent that it can be deemed as helpful for the psychological or permanent delivery of the other party to the other party as part of the religious instrument is justified in its purpose and method. However, if such religious instrument acts are taken out as a treatment act having medical effect, on the ground that it is a both of the treatment act having medical effect, and thereby inducing the patient, and as a result, exercising the patient's body abnormal or excessive force and excessive physical freedom excessively suppressing the patient's bodily injury, it cannot be deemed as a justifiable act acceptable under social norms even if the exercise of such tangible force was done in a manner and manner, and even if it was done in a manner and manner, it cannot be deemed that there was a victim's consent to the treatment act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 200Do4284, Aug. 23, 199; 200Do4205, Apr. 16, 2005).

However, according to the facts found by the court below, the euthancia of this case, which was executed by the defendant, received from the non-indicted 1, under the premise that it is a medical treatment act, the mother of the victim was responsible for the procedure of the procedure. In response to the execution of the procedure, many people were mobilized to force the victim's body for long time. The victim's physical injury in the actual process of euthanciacia (in the diagnosis report submitted by the victim, multiple emulsiumsciasciasciascia and divesciasciascia, etc.) was able to escape from the pain when the victim suffered bodily injury (in the diagnosis report submitted by the victim, e.g., e., e., e., e., e., e., eucia), unlike the victim's mental disease, it is difficult to view that the victim's euciaciacia was an unlawful act of self-harm as well as a series of physical harm by the victim.

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to legitimate acts under Article 20 of the Criminal Act, which found the Defendant not guilty on the ground of the facts stated in its holding, on the ground that the Defendant’s act of assault on the pretext of the above safe-water season was a legitimate act, and on the other hand, on the part of August 21, 2006, the judgment below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the act of assault on the part of the above safe-water season, which is the premise of the judgment of innocence, as long as there was an error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the act of assault on the part of the above safe-water season, which is the premise of the judgment of innocence, as to whether there was a proximate causal relation between the violence and the injury of the above safe-water season, and thereby affecting the conclusion of each judgment. Accordingly, the prosecutor’s allegation in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, among the judgment of the court below, the part concerning assault as of August 18, 2006 and assault as of August 20, 2006 and injury as of August 21, 2006 are reversed (the part concerning injury as of August 21, 2006 is reversed in its entirety due to the grounds for reversal in part of the charges with a single crime relation). The case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination, and the remaining appeal by the prosecutor is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cha Han-sung (Presiding Justice)