(a) A case of having recognized physical acts accompanied by an inland water gauge as violence;

(b) The case reversing the judgment of the court below which acquitted a person who participated in the act of massping and assistance in the act of massping, such as Paragraph (A), on the grounds of misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for establishing a joint principal offender

A. The case holding that, although he was aground or a little degree of hands on the patient's recovery or head, he was able to improve the disease for the patient, he is a sort of religious act that is to be cured by her thickness, and the purpose of his physical act is also justifiable. However, if physical act accompanying the act is not merely aground or a little degree of hands, but it is the same as the result of his death repeatedly or repeatedly over his chest and ship, it is an act belonging to the concept of violence as an exercise of force to the human body, and even if it was done by the method of the safe-water system, it is the act that belongs to the concept of violence, and even if it was done, it is not legitimate to believe that the person's body was aware of his awareness and intent, i.e., the awareness and intent of the assault, and even if it was a legitimate act, it cannot be found that it was a mistake.

(b) The case reversing the judgment of the court below which acquitted the defendant on the part of participating in the act of violence and assistance in the act of violence on the part of the euthanasia, on the ground that the euthanasia could not be exempted from co-principal liability by recognizing the act of violence on the part of the euthanasia as well as by supporting the act of violence on the part of the euthanasia when the euasia participated in the act of violence by using the euasia and even though he did the act of violence on the part of the euasia, he knew the act of violence

A. Articles 262 and 260(1) of the Criminal Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 85Do1892 delivered on December 10, 1985 (Gong1986,280)

Defendant 1 and one other

Prosecutor and Defendant 1

Attorney Lee Yong-sik

Seoul High Court Decision 94No62 delivered on April 29, 1994

The part of the lower judgment against Defendant 2 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. Defendant 1’s appeal is dismissed.

The number of days under detention after the appeal by Defendant 1 shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

1. Defendant 1's and state appointed defense counsel's grounds of appeal are examined together.

On the first ground for appeal

The defendant of this case, as a member of the church conference held by the victim's family, only she took aground and did not commit violence to treat the victim's mental illness upon the request of the victim's family members. Since it is recognized that the victim was faced with the third floor window of the victim's second floor, it is consistent with the experience rules that the death of the victim should be viewed as the result of the death of the victim, although it is consistent with the experience rules, it is true that the court below's fact finding that the defendant committed violence against the victim and died as a result of the assaulting or repeatedly takes advantage of the defendant's testimony, such as the witness disturbance in the first instance trial without consistency before and after the death of the victim, and it is argued that the decision of the court below is in violation of the rules of evidence. Accordingly, the court below's finding of facts is justified by examining the selection of evidence used for the fact-finding by the record, and there is no reason to find that there is any violation of the rules of evidence such as the theory of facts.

On the second ground for appeal

The defendant's eugrance is a kind of religious act that treats diseases, etc. on the basis of a religious trial, and does not belong to the exercise of tangible force that injures people, and there is no intention, so it is an error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to violence, separate from the intention to commit the crime of death by negligence.

In addition, the purpose of the study is a kind of religious act that is to recover illness by making the patient aground or take a little degree of hand on the patient's recovery or head, making the patient improve the disease for the patient, but the purpose of the study is the same as that of the theory of lawsuit. However, if physical act accompanying the act is not aground or a little degree of hand, and if it is the same to the extent that the judgment of the court below is legitimate, it shall be deemed an act belonging to the concept of violence as an exercise of force on the person's body. Even if it was done by the method of force, even if it was done, there was an awareness and intent about the person's body, and even if it was done by the method of force, it is not justifiable to find the mistake as long as it was judged by the judgment of the court below. Thus, the appeal shall not be justified.

In addition, the purport of the act of treatment is that the victim's consent has been obtained for treatment or that it is permissible under the social norms. However, in this case, the act of taking the victim's chest and boat toward the victim's chest as in this case is a strong harmful act against his body and it is not possible to treat it as a treatment act in this case where there is no evidence to recognize it as a kind of treatment act unnecessary.

Therefore, the argument of the appeal is without merit even if it is any mother.

On the third ground for appeal

In this case where the sentencing of the court below is too harsh and unfair, or the sentence of imprisonment less than 10 years is imposed, since the unfair sentencing cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal, the argument is without merit.

2. The prosecutor's grounds of appeal on Defendant 2 are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below found, based on the evidence of the court of first instance, that the act of Defendant 1's participation in the safe season of this case and Defendant 1's participation in the safe season of this case, and that Defendant 2's participation in the safe season of this case was prevented from driving the victim's arms when the victim moved in the body, and that Defendant 2's act was light of the victim's chest was not a causal relation with the victim's death. Furthermore, there is no evidence supporting that the act of Defendant 2's minor injury caused the victim's death. Further, Defendant 2 acquitted Defendant 1 on the grounds that Defendant 1's participation in the safe season of Defendant 1's safe season of this case's act was attempted to help Defendant 1's normal safe safe season of the safe season of this case, and that Defendant 1 did not have any intention to commit violence against Defendant 1's normal act of assault, and it is difficult to find Defendant 1's explicit intent or any other explicit intent.

However, according to the facts acknowledged by the court below, when Defendant 1 took an all-time violence against the victim one time from June 4, 1993 to July 7 of the same month, from June 22:00 of the same month to around 03:00 of the following month, and from around 5 hours from July 22:00 of the same month to about 22:00 following the following day, he assaults the victim's chest and fingers repeatedly with the victim's chests during about 2 hours as stated in each judgment, and the victim died, and Defendant 2 took part in the safe handdo of Defendant 1, and Defendant 1 took part in the act of violence over two occasions from the beginning of the month to the beginning of the same month, he cannot be viewed as having known that Defendant 1 took part in the act of assaulting Defendant 1, who was the cause of death, and he cannot be viewed as having known the victim's intention to commit the above act of assault and declared it to Defendant 15 through the method of assault.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below which acquitted the co-principal on the grounds as stated in its holding is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for establishment of a co-principal or in mistake of facts in violation of the rules of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against Defendant 2 is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. Defendant 1's appeal is dismissed, and part of the detention days after the appeal is included in the original sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Lee-soo (Presiding Justice)