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(영문) 대법원 2020. 6. 25. 선고 2016다3386 판결
[임금][공2020상,1462]
Main Issues

Whether holiday work allowances under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act include work on a holiday as prescribed by a collective agreement or rules of employment, etc. (affirmative), and the standard of determining whether a holiday work is determined on a holiday (affirmative); / Whether a holiday work allowance is to be paid under the former Labor Standards Act in cases where a collective agreement or rules of employment, etc. was provided on a day without work in the form of work, and it cannot be deemed that a holiday work is prescribed on a holiday (negative)

Summary of Judgment

Pursuant to Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 15513, Mar. 20, 2018; hereinafter “former Labor Standards Act”), holiday work paid in addition to 50/100 or more of ordinary wages as holiday work allowances shall include not only weekly holiday work prescribed in Article 55 of the same Act, but also the work on the day determined by a collective agreement or rules of employment, etc. as a holiday pursuant to the collective agreement or rules of employment. Furthermore, whether holiday work is determined shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account the language and text of the provisions related to holiday work prescribed in a collective agreement or rules of employment and the developments leading up to such provisions, the regulatory system and practices regarding working hours in the same industry as the relevant workplace, the name and amount of wages actually paid, and the method of calculating the amount of wages

The above legal principle is the same as in a case where a person worked on a day and worked on a day without work in the form of work on the day immediately following the day, and if it cannot be deemed that the collective agreement, the rules of employment, etc. were determined as a holiday as a result of the assessment of all the above circumstances, it does not have to pay holiday allowances under the former Labor Standards Act regarding the provision of work on the day

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 55 (see current Article 55(1)) and 56 of the former Labor Standards Act (Amended by Act No. 15513, Mar. 20, 2018)

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 90Da14089 Decided May 14, 1991 (Gong1991, 1617) Supreme Court Decision 2016Da9704, 9711 Decided August 14, 2019 (Gong2019Ha, 1713) Supreme Court Decision 2014Da41520 Decided January 16, 2020 (Gong2020Sang, 414)

Plaintiff (Appointedd Party), Appellee

Plaintiff (Appointed Party)

Defendant, Appellant

Busan Traffic Co., Ltd and one other (Law Firm International Law, Attorney Choi Jin-hun, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Changwon District Court Decision 2014Na1731 decided December 8, 2015

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Changwon District Court.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The determination of whether a holiday is fixed shall be made by comprehensively taking into account the language and text of the provisions related to holidays in a collective agreement or rules of employment and the background leading up to such provisions, the regulatory system and practices regarding working hours in the same industry as the relevant workplace, the name and amount of wages actually paid, the method of calculating the amount of payment, etc., as well as the weekly paid holiday work under Article 55 of the former Labor Standards Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Da14089, May 14, 1991). The determination of whether a holiday is fixed ought to be made by comprehensively taking into account the following: (a) the weekly paid holiday work under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 15513, Mar. 20, 2018; 2016Da97014, Aug. 14, 2019).

The above legal principle is the same as in a case where a person worked for a day and provided labor on a day without work in the form of work on the day following the day, and if it cannot be deemed that the collective agreement, employment rules, etc. were determined as a holiday as a result of the assessment of all the above circumstances, it does not have to pay holiday allowances under the former Labor Standards Act with respect to the provision of labor on the day.

2. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

A. The Plaintiff and the designated parties (hereinafter “Plaintiffs, etc.”) are those who were, or were currently serving as, drivers of urban buses. The Defendants, as drivers, have served as one day for the Plaintiff, etc. who falls under the service on board and are working on the next day.

B. The Defendants provided safety education, kind education, etc. (hereinafter “instant education”) to the Plaintiff, etc. in accordance with the rules of employment. The instant education was conducted for two hours a day and eight or ten hours a year on the day (in the case of an even number of employees, the day of neglect, even number in the case of a person who works alone; hereinafter “instant number”).

C. In a collective agreement that applies to the Plaintiff, etc., the New Year’s Day, tin, etc. is a paid holiday, and each of the Rules of Employment of the Defendants stipulates, “A company grants an employee a holiday pursuant to the Labor Standards Act” (Article 37).

D. Meanwhile, with respect to a work on the day exceeding the monthly fixed number of working days (15 days) under the wage agreement that applies to the plaintiff et al., the payment shall be made by adding 50% to the monthly standard according to the number of days.

E. The Defendant paid allowances by applying the amount of ordinary wages during the above training hours, and the Plaintiffs seek payment according to the calculation of the premium for holiday work allowances.

3. Examining these facts and the following circumstances revealed through such facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, given that the instant No. 1 did not have an obligation to provide labor, but did not have an obligation to provide labor on a holiday in a collective agreement or employment rules, the instant education provided on such day does not constitute holiday work under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act and does not need to be paid holiday allowances.

A. The instant visa is merely a day on which the allocation of working hours is not made due to the characteristics of the daily work.

B. The collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. applicable to the Plaintiff et al. did not set the instant visa as a holiday, and does not explicitly stipulate that additional allowances shall be paid for the work of the instant visa, and there is no data to recognize labor practices different from those of such regulations.

C. Meanwhile, even if the wage agreement applicable to the plaintiff et al. stipulates that the worker shall pay a holiday allowance for overtime hours in addition to a holiday allowance for each excess number of days, the concept of the worker’s overtime hours differs from that of the worker’s day of this case, so it cannot be interpreted that the worker’s additional allowance was set as a holiday for which the worker’s day of this case should be paid.

4. Nevertheless, the lower court determined otherwise on the grounds stated in its reasoning that the instant education was conducted on holidays stipulated in a collective agreement, etc., and thus constitutes holiday work, and thus, the Defendants are obligated to pay holiday allowances to the Plaintiff, etc. as prescribed in Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act.

In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on holidays subject to holiday allowances under the Labor Standards Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

5. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment] List of Appointeds: Omitted

Justices Noh Tae-tae (Presiding Justice)

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