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(영문) 대법원 2020.6.25.선고 2016다3386 판결
임금
Cases

2016Da3386 Wages

Plaintiff (Appointedd Party), Appellee

Plaintiff (Appointed Party)

Defendant, Appellant

Busan Traffic Co., Ltd. and one other

Law Firm International Law Firm

Attorney Choi Jin-hun

Judgment of the lower court

Changwon District Court Decision 2014Na1731 Decided December 8, 2015

Imposition of Judgment

June 25, 2020

Text

The judgment of the original court shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the Changwon District Court.

Reasons

The grounds for appeal are determined.

1. Under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 15513, Mar. 20, 2018; hereinafter “former Labor Standards Act”), holiday work allowances, which should be paid in addition to at least 50 percent of ordinary wages, include not only weekly holiday work prescribed in Article 55 of the same Act, but also daily work determined by an organization agreement, employment rules, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Da14089, May 14, 1991). Whether a holiday is determined shall be determined by comprehensively taking into account the language and text of the provisions related to holidays in a collective agreement, employment rules, etc., as well as the background leading up to the provision of those provisions, the regulatory system and practices regarding working hours in the same industry as the relevant workplace, the actual name and method of calculating the amount of wages paid when providing labor, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2016Da1964, Jul. 16, 20197).

The above legal doctrine is the same as in a case where a person worked for one day and worked on a day without work in the form of work on the other day, and it cannot be deemed that a group agreement, employment rules, etc. were determined as a holiday as a result of an evaluation in full taking into account all the circumstances as seen earlier, it is not necessary to pay holiday allowances under the former Labor Standards Act with respect to the provision of work on the day.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance and the record, the following facts are revealed.

A. The plaintiff and the designated parties (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff et al.") are workers who were or are currently serving as urban bus drivers. The defendants, as drivers, worked as one day for the plaintiff et al. who falls under the service on board and implement a day-day system.

B. The Defendant provided safety education, kind education, etc. (hereinafter “instant education”) to the Plaintiff, etc. in accordance with the rules of employment. The instant education was conducted for two hours a day and eight or ten hours a year, on the day (in the case of multiple employees, the day of neglect, the even number in the case of an employee on the day of neglect, the day of even number in the case of an employee on the day of neglect; hereinafter “the instant visa”). The collective agreement that is applied to the Plaintiff, etc. was set as a paid holiday in accordance with the Labor Standards Act, and each of the rules of employment of the Defendant set “the company provides that employees a holiday in accordance with the Labor Standards Act.”

D. Meanwhile, the wage agreement that applies to the plaintiff et al. provides that the payment shall be made by adding 50% to the Si wage standard according to the number of days of service for the work as of the day exceeding the monthly fixed number of working days (15 days).

E. Defendant paid an allowance by applying the amount of ordinary wages during the above training hours, and the Plaintiffs seek payment according to the calculation of the premium for holiday work allowances.

3. Examining the following circumstances revealed through this fact-finding, in light of the legal doctrine as seen earlier, the instant visa is the day on which no duty to provide labor exists, but the collective agreement or the rules of employment, etc. were not set as a holiday. As such, the instant visa, which took place on such day, does not constitute holiday work under Article 56 of the former Labor Standards Act, and does not need to be paid a holiday allowance.

A. The instant visa is too excessive on the day on which the allocation of working hours is not made due to the characteristics of the Japanese-day work.

B. The collective agreement, rules of employment, etc. that are applied to the plaintiff et al. does not stipulate the non-day B as the non-day in this case, and there is no explicit provision that the payment of premium for the work of the non-day in this case is made, and there is no evidence to prove labor practices different from these provisions. Meanwhile, even if the wage agreement that applies to the plaintiff et al. provides that the worker shall pay premium for the work of the non-day in excess of the number of days in excess of the number of days in addition to the number of days in excess of the number of days in excess of the number of days in addition to the number of days in excess of the number of days in addition to the number of days in excess of the number of days, the concept of the non-day in this case differs from each other, so it cannot be interpreted that the non-day in this case set the non-day in this case as a holiday

4. Nevertheless, the lower court, solely on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined that the instant education was conducted on holidays stipulated in a collective agreement, etc. and constitutes holiday work, and thus, the Defendants were obligated to pay holiday allowances to the Plaintiff, etc. in lieu of the instant education, as prescribed in Article 56 of the former Act.

In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on holidays subject to holiday allowances under the Labor Standards Act, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The allegation in the grounds of appeal assigning this error is with merit.

5. Therefore, the original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Jae-young

Justices Noh Tae-tae

Justices Kim Jae-hyung

Justices Min You-sook of the District Court

Justices Lee Dong-won

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