[1] The amount of fees that an attorney may request for the delegated affairs of a lawsuit

[2] The case affirming the court below's determination that the agreed attorney fees were reduced on the ground that they are contrary to the principle of trust and good faith or the principle of equity

[1] In principle, in a case where there is an agreement with the client on the remuneration for the handling of delegated affairs in a case where an attorney-at-law has agreed on with the client, an attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs may claim the agreed amount of remuneration, barring special circumstances, barring special circumstances. However, the attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs shall be deemed to have allowed to claim only the amount of remuneration within the reasonable scope exceptionally recognized, in exceptional cases where there are special circumstances to deem that the agreed amount of remuneration is unduly excessive and contrary to the principle of good faith or the principle of equity in light of the relationship with the client, the background leading up to the case, the amount of the case, the progress and difficulty of the case handling, the degree of effort

[2] The case affirming the court below's determination that the agreed attorney fees were reduced on the ground that the agreed attorney fees are contrary to the principle of good faith and equity

[1] Articles 2 and 686 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 2 and 686 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 71Da2722 delivered on February 29, 1972 (No. 20-1, 128) Supreme Court Decision 92Da30382 delivered on February 9, 1993 (Gong1993Sang, 940) Supreme Court Decision 94Da57626 delivered on April 25, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1945)

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and 3 others (Attorney Min Jong-soo, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Gwangju District Court Decision 2000Na2883 delivered on August 11, 2000

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against each party.

1. Summary of the judgment of the court below

A. The lower court acknowledged the following facts based on the evidence produced therefrom.

(1) On March 21, 1995, the non-party clan (hereinafter referred to as the "non-party clan") filed a lawsuit for the registration of ownership transfer against the defendants and the non-party as to the cancellation of title trust with respect to the forest land of 9,956 square meters in Gwangju Mine-gu ( Address 1 omitted), 11,753 square meters in 76-203 square meters in mountain, from February 13, 1995, the size of which is 8,203 square meters in square meters in 76-1 and 76-20 square meters in mountain; hereinafter referred to as the "forest of this case") and the forest land of 76-3,203 square meters in mountain 76-3,203 square meters in Busan-gu.

(2) On April 13, 1995, the Plaintiff, an attorney-at-law, accepted the case from the Defendants on April 13, 1995 (referred to as 'the date of the original judgment on April 10, 195'). As to the remuneration, the Defendants decided to transfer the plane amounting to 22% of the total sum of the above forest land in favor of the Defendants in the case of winning the lawsuit at the above lawsuit. 2. Where it is difficult to transfer the land area to be transferred under the above 1. 3. The payment refers to the amount calculated by converting the land area to be transferred under the above 1. 1. into 270,000 won per ordinary day when the lawsuit is withdrawn, or when the Defendants terminate the lawsuit at will, or when the Defendants and the non-party clans agree with the Defendant, the above agreement should be set up to the Defendants at the same time as a promissory note to implement the agreement.

(3) However, on May 25, 1995, the non-party clan withdrawn the lawsuit against the above non-party and the above (name 2 omitted) forest portion. The judgment of the court of first instance that dismissed all the claims of the non-party clan on April 17, 1996 at the end of the lawsuit pending.

(4) On the other hand, on April 15, 1996, two days before the above judgment was rendered, the Defendants agreed to immediately transfer the above judgment after the defendants' winning judgment became final and conclusive in favor of the defendants on April 15, 1996, and on April 13, 1995, the Defendants agreed to immediately transfer the above judgment as to the land ( Address 1 omitted) 545.82 (the part equivalent to 22% of the above ( Address 1 omitted) which was ordinarily converted by the defendants' shares in the land ( Address 1 omitted) to the plaintiff or its designated person instead of establishing the right to collateral security on forest land.

(5) Although Nonparty clan appeals (No. 96Na3011) and appeals (Supreme Court Decision 97Da8700) against the above judgment, all of them were dismissed, the above lawsuit became final and conclusive in favor of the Defendants (the above appellate court and the final appeal court also accepted by the Defendants).

B. Furthermore, the lower court rejected the Defendants’ assertion on the claim for the registration of transfer of ownership in accordance with the above agreement on April 15, 1996. (1) As to the Defendants’ assertion that the instant fee agreement is null and void as it is a juristic act which has considerably lost fairness due to the Plaintiff’s old-age, rashness, and experience, the Defendants’ assertion that there is no evidence to prove that the Defendants had entered into the said agreement as alleged at the time, or that the Plaintiff would have reached the said agreement by using the Defendants’ status. (2) As to the assertion that the contents of the instant fee agreement are to pay the winning fee to the Plaintiff or its designated person at the same time as a notarized promissory note to secure this, the lower court rejected the Defendants’ assertion that such agreement is null and void against social order, on the premise that the Defendants’ claim for the registration of transfer of ownership in violation of the principle of set-off against the good faith and good faith, and that there is no ground to view that the Defendants’ assertion that the agreement would be null and void due to the Plaintiff’s interest and the pertinent fee-off agreement.

2. Judgment on the Defendants’ grounds of appeal

A. On the third ground for appeal

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records, the fact-finding by the court below on the background and contents of the instant fee agreement is just, and the judgment of the court below that the instant fee agreement cannot be deemed unfair legal acts or null and void against social order is also justified, and it cannot be deemed that there were errors in violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds of appeal. As alleged in the Defendants, there were many cases where the Plaintiff was a problem related to the instant fee agreement with the litigant, or the process and contents of the instant fee agreement concluded cannot depend on the aforementioned conclusion on the fact-finding in light of the practice of the attorney industry.

B. On the first, second, and fifth grounds

As long as the Plaintiff filed a claim for the registration of transfer of ownership in accordance with the instant remuneration agreement with the Defendants, the Defendants cannot arbitrarily convert this into money and perform it. Thus, even if the Defendants held a claim for return of unjust enrichment equivalent to the amount of contingent fees as asserted against the Plaintiff, the aforementioned claim for return of unjust enrichment cannot be offset against the amount equal to the amount calculated by converting the object subject to the Plaintiff’s registration of transfer of ownership into money based on the automatic claim for return of unjust enrichment.

In this regard, the decision of the court below that rejected the defendants' defense of offset is just, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the offset, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal, and as long as the defendants' defense of offset is rejected, it did not examine whether the time for payment of the contingent remuneration under the agreement of April 13, 1995 has arrived or the subject matter thereof has not been examined in order to determine the existence of a claim for return of unjust enrichment equivalent to the contingent remuneration, which is the premise of the defense of offset, as long as the defendants' defense of offset has been rejected. Accordingly, there is no error of law by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or exercising the right

In addition, the court below did not decide on the defendants' assertion that the provision of Paragraph 3, which stipulates that the payment of the agreed fee at the time of withdrawal of the lawsuit among the agreement of April 13, 1995, is null and void in violation of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act. However, even if the above provision is recognized as null and void and the defendants' claim for return of unjust enrichment equivalent to the contingent fee is recognized, the offset against the automatic claim cannot be accepted. Thus, the judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the judgment as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. On the fourth ground for appeal

In principle, in cases where there is an agreement with the client on the remuneration for the handling of delegated affairs by the attorney-at-law, barring any special circumstance, an attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs may claim the agreed amount in full, barring special circumstances, for the entire amount of remuneration. However, in cases where there are special circumstances to deem that the agreed amount of remuneration is unduly excessive and thus contravenes the principle of good faith or the principle of equity, the attorney-at-law who has completed the delegated affairs may claim only the amount of remuneration within the reasonable scope, exceptionally, in consideration of the relationship with the client, the background leading up to the case, the amount of the case in question, the progress and difficulty of the case in question, the degree of effort, the value of the subject matter of lawsuit, the specific interest gained by the client from winning the case, the rules on the remuneration of the affiliated attorney-at-law meeting, and

Examining the relevant evidence in light of the records on the premise of these legal principles, the court below's findings are just in finding the following facts: (a) the plaintiff's acceptance of the above case during the first instance to the third instance court; (b) the details of the litigation performance in relation to the above case; (c) the details of the fees paid by the defendants to the plaintiff during the above litigation process; (d) the economic benefits accrued in the lawsuit and the appraised value of the winning bonus pursuant to the above contract; and (e) the amount of the retainer and contingent fees in the event that the plaintiff complies with the rules on the standards for attorney's fees to the bar conference to which the plaintiff belongs; (b) the degree of litigation performance; (c) degree of difficulty of the case; (d) the amount of the attorney's winning; (d) the amount of the fees calculated by the rules on the standards for attorney's fees; (e) the amount of the fees already received; and (e) the amount of the fees already received; and (e) there are no errors in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the above fee agreement or the principle of good faith.

3. Judgment on the Plaintiff’s grounds of appeal

The freedom of contract and private autonomy can only be limited to the extent of special circumstances where the content is deemed contrary to the principle of trust and good faith and the principle of equity. Thus, the decision of the court below that only a part of the fee agreement in this case is valid in light of the principle of trust and good faith and the principle of equity and that the remaining part cannot be recognized as valid is as stated in the above 2-B., and there is no error of law in violation of the Supreme Court precedents, or in violation of the principle of freedom of contract or the principle of private autonomy, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

In addition, as long as the Plaintiff’s claim based on the instant fee agreement is bound to be restricted in light of the principle of good faith, the Defendants asserted such circumstances at the latest, even though they recognized the instant fee agreement for a long period, and cannot be deemed contrary to the principle of good faith.

4. Therefore, all of the Plaintiff’s appeals and the Defendants’ appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Ji-dam (Presiding Justice)